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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the question of why the kinship factor has not been 
able to provide a viable basis upon which Indonesia-Malaysia relations can be 
organised, despite the fact that the language of kinship continues to frame 
diplomatic discourse between the two “kin states”.
As a study of the phenomenon of kinship in international relations, the 
thesis discusses the basis of kinship discourse in Indonesia-Malaysia relations, 
how kinship was politicised in terms of its conceptualisation and application, 
and why its dominant motif has been rivalry more than harmony, despite its 
regular evocation. In order to understand the kinship factor as a political 
phenomenon in Indonesia-Malaysia relations, four issues are considered: (1) the 
anthropological and sociological nature of kinship, (2) the politicisation of 
kinship in terms of the perception and interpretation of its attendant expectations 
and obligations, (3) the association of the kinship factor with the historical 
process of identity building and nation formation in Indonesia and Malaysia, and 
(4) the discrepancies between popular pressures to emphasise kinship, which 
imply extra-national loyalties, and the political calculations of leaders based on 
conceptions of sovereignty.
Consequently, the study makes the observation that despite the fact that 
there is a basis upon which to define Indonesia and Malaysia as kin states, their 
“special relationship” has been characterised predominantly by tension. It 
argues that this state of affairs has been a consequence of the perceived failure 
of these kin states to fulfil the expectations and obligations of kinship. This, in 
turn, has been bome of fundamental differences in their respective historical 
experiences and the forging of their national identities, which contravened the 
loyalties wrought by the kinship factor. Having said that, there remain avenues 
for co-identification on the basis of kinship, particularly in reference to the 
influence of the “Chinese factor” that has traditionally been a cause for concern 
for the national identities and security of Indonesia and Malaysia.
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“He who kills me, who will it be but my kinsman; 
He who succours me, who will it be but my kinsman
- Lozi Proverb
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INTRODUCTION
According to mainstream paradigms of International Relations, the arena 
of international politics is populated by sovereign states all pursuing their own 
“self-interest”1. While this may be to large extents true, one particular category 
of inter-state relations stand out, in which the pursuit of material interest may only 
be half the story told. This pertains to what is referred to in international politics 
as “special relationships”2.
The concept of “special relationships” describes relations between states 
whose populations share historical and sentimental bonds, and whose leaders 
impute meaning into their relations on the back of these bonds. Such 
relationships warrant an almost immutable belief (on the part of their leaders and 
populations) that they, at least in theory, are meant to share a relationship driven 
by more than purely material factors3. One can observe such dynamics, for 
example, in Australian involvement in the First World War and the Boer War, 
and American support of Irish nationalism; it has also featured in Pan-Africanism 
and Pan-Arabism, Anglo-American relations, and a host of other bilateral and 
multilateral relationships. Yet often too, one notices discrepancy between the 
persistent use of the discourse of “special relationships” and the regular collapse 
of such relationships into animosity. It is precisely this dichotomy that interests 
this study. While realists might not find the collapse of “special relationships” 
puzzling given their belief that international relations is fundamentally 
competitive, it is suggested here that since social anthropological logic lies at the 
heart of these relationships, such approaches might offer up equally persuasive 
modes of understanding as to the matter of cooperation and rivalry between states 
who share “special relationships”4.
1 By mainstream, this study refers primarily to realism and liberalism.
2 Detailed examples of “special relationships” in international relations will be discussed in 
Chapter One.
3 In a sense, this is not unlike Martin Wight’s conception of the cultural basis to international 
society in that common culture forms the base upon which to build common identity and shared 
norms. See Martin Wight, Systems of States. [London: Leicester University Press, 1977]. 
Nevertheless as will be suggested later, the “special relationship” between kin states is premised 
on much more than shared culture.
4 The case for a social anthropological approach to studying International Relations is presented in 
C.A.W. Manning, The Nature of International Society. [London: MacMillan, 1975]; see also
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The point of entry of this study is the suggestion that one distinctive 
character of the concept of “special relationships” is the factor of kinship; that is, 
states which share historical ties based on common ethnicity, language, culture, 
and ancestry between the vast majority of their populations, and who attempt to 
organise relations on these premises. One such case is the Indonesia-Malaysia 
bilateral relationship, where political leaders have incessantly chosen to articulate 
their ties in terms of “blood brotherhood”. Specifically, the study looks to 
understand the politicisation of kinship in Indonesia-Malaysia relations -  what is 
the basis to this kinship discourse, how both conceptualise kinship and apply it in 
their relations, and why, despite the regular reference to this idea in diplomatic 
discourse, it has been unable to form a consistent basis for harmony in relations.
I. Locating kinship in the IR research agenda
Few would disagree that the lexicon of Southeast Asia’s international 
relations remains predominantly realist5. Several reasons account for this. The 
path to independence for many states in Southeast Asia has been defined by 
domestic and international struggle and conflict6. This legacy remains to inform 
policy choices today, and politics continues to be viewed through realist eyes, 
where the state continues to dictate the policy process in the name of national 
interest and where power, security and threat remain key preoccupations insofar 
as international affairs are concerned. Added to that, the mainstay of classical 
realism, the vital role played by statesmen in orchestrating international affairs, 
remains relevant in the political context of Southeast Asia. Hence despite the
Hidemi Suganami, “C. A.W. Manning and the Study of International Relations”, Review of 
International Studies. Vol.27, (2001); Peter Mandaville, “Reading the state from elsewhere: 
towards an anthropology of the postnational”, Review of International Studies. Vol.28 (2002);
Jack Snyder, “Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War”, International 
Organization. Vol.56, No.l (Winter 2002).
5 See Tim Huxley, “Southeast Asia in the study of international relations: the rise and decline of a 
region”, The Pacific Review. Vol.9, No.2 (1996); Tan See Seng, “Rescuing Realism from 
Realists” in Sheldon Simon (ed) The Many Faces of Asian Security. [Landham, M.D.: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, 2001].
6 For an exposition of the strategic environment in which the states o f Southeast Asia came of age, 
see Gordon Brown, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia. [New Jersey: Englewood 
Cliffs, 1966]; Peter Lvon. War and Peace in Southeast Asia. [London: Oxford University Press, 
1969]; Michael Leifer, Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia. [London: International 
Institute o f Strategic Studies, 1980].
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paucity of work in the International Relations field that deals explicitly with 
Indonesia-Malaysia political relations, it can be conceivably argued that any study 
of Indonesia-Malaysia relations should begin in the realist camp7.
International relations, so the realist mantra goes, are premised on power, 
be it an end in itself or a means to survival8. The importance of power and 
perceptions of power in the international politics in Southeast Asia have come 
across starkly in the writings of many scholars9. Extrapolating from this, 
neorealism will suggest that Indonesia’s larger size and bountiful resources make 
it a preponderant power in Southeast Asia, and the Malaysian response should be 
a policy of “balancing”10. Realists are also likely to suggest that Indonesia- 
Malaysia relations are conducted on the basis of “states acting as states”, where 
both pursue their respective interests based on material calculations, what 
Morgenthau termed the “guiding star” of decisions. Bilateral differences then, 
reflect a “clash” of these interests, and enmity between Malaysia and Indonesia is 
to be expected owing to the size, power and capability differentials in this 
bilateral relationship. Indeed, given the track record of contentious relations 
between these two key players in the Indo-Malay World, realism appears 
vindicated.
7 The implicit application of this paradigm comes out in Firdaus Abdullah, “The Rumpun Concept 
in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations”, The Indonesian Quarterly. Vol.XXI, No.2 (1993); A1 Baroto, 
“Similarities and Differences in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations: Some Perspectives”, Indonesian 
Quarterly. Vol.XXI, No.2 (1993) 156-157; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign 
Policy and Regionalism. [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994] 228-229; Leo Suryadinata, 
Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto. [Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996] 69-74; N. 
Ganesan, Bilateral Tensions in Post-Cold War ASEAN. [Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1999] 30. While Lee Kam Hing’s broad survey o f “milestones” o f Indonesia-Malaysia 
relations from 1957 to 1990 provides what until now is the most detailed study o f contemporary 
Indonesia-Malaysia relations, the articles offers little by way of theoretical frameworks. See Lee 
Kam Hing, “From Confrontation to Cooperation: Malaysia-Iundonesia Relations, 1957-1990”, 
Sariana. Special Issue (1994). Furthermore, his study, as well as Firdaus Abdullah’s, makes no 
mention o f the importance of co-affinity in opposition to the increasing prominence of ethnic 
Chinese in both countries. This phenomenon, as this study will argue, is vital to an understanding 
of the underlying dynamics of Indonesia-Malaysia relations.
8 This distinction lies at the hear of the defensive-offensive realism debate. See Jeffrey Taliaferro, 
“Seeking Security Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited”, International Security. Vol.25, 
No.3 (Winter 2000/2001).
9 See for example, Michael Leifer, Conflict and Regional Order: Tim Huxley, “Singapore and 
Malaysia: A Precarious Balance?”, Pacific Review. Vol.4, No.3 (1990).
10 Supporters of Waltzian neorealism would, o f course, be the key proponents o f this argument.
See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics. [New York: Random House, 1979].
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While realist observations on the conflictual end-result of international 
politics may be true, its means of arriving at these conclusions demand scrutiny. 
It is suggested here that the foci and objectivity of realist international relations 
theory, and in particular its behaviouralist strains, essentially lend themselves to 
an over-simplification of international politics. The ambiguity of power, for 
example, has been well documented11. How does the positivist realist measure or 
“operationalise” it? Are material yardsticks its only measurements12? How does 
one reconcile, for example, Geertz’s argument, made specific to the Indo-Malay 
World, that power could in fact be culturally constructed13?
Vagaries arising from privileging the state as the primary unit of analysis 
lead further to the problem of defining the concept of “interest” so often evoked 
by policy-makers and realist scholars as an explanation for state policy. 
“Interest” is ultimately a normative concept, and without further conceptual 
clarification its applicability in academic study will be diluted14. One scholar has 
intimated the elusiveness and ambiguity of the concept of “interest” is such that 
“political objectives remain so frequently hidden behind the verbal flannel of 
political argument that some political scientists are tempted to dismiss the concept 
(of interest) altogether”15. Indeed what precisely is the “national interest” 
involved for Malaysia and Indonesia, and what is its source? As this study will 
show, the ambiguities surrounding these concepts are problematic when applied 
to cases such as those under scrutiny here - of sovereign states who experience, 
particularly in the immediate post-colonial years, tension between the pursuit of
11 For example, Joseph Nye, “The Changing Nature of World Power”, Political Science Quarterly. 
Vol. 105, No.2 (1990); Stefano Guzzini, “Structural Power: The Limits o f Neorealist Power 
Analysis”, International Organization. Vol.47, No.3 (1993).
12 Even realist scholars themselves have begun considering more cognitive aspects o f power. See, 
for example, Stephen Walt, Origins of Alliance. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987].
13 See Clifford Geertz, “Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics o f Power” in 
Geertz (ed), Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. [New York: Basic 
Books, 1983] 121-146; also Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture” 
in Claire Holt, Benedict R. O’G. Anderson and James T. Siegel (eds), Culture and Politics in 
Indonesia. [London: Verso, 1972] 1-69; Anthony C. Milner, Keraiaan: Malay Political Culture on 
the Eve of Colonial Rule. [Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1982].
14 For an illuminating theoretical study of the problems inherent in current understanding o f the 
concept o f national interests, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. 
[Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996] 1-33.
5 Benjamin Frankel, National Interest. [London: Pall Mall, 1970] 17.
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“national interests ” as the elite see it, and the enduring communal loyalties of 
their respective populations.
Realism’s conceptual shortcomings have led students of International 
Relations to search elsewhere for equally, if not more, persuasive explanations for 
international political phenomenon. The gradual shift from material to cognitive 
and sociological contents and perspectives that one witnesses in the field in recent 
times is indicative of this trend16. Consider, for example, the resurgence of 
interest in ethnic conflict, where scholars have found underlying explanations in 
non-material factors17. Consequently, this move to conceive the international 
political environment as a social rather than natural phenomenon has spawned a 
literature that has introduced concepts such as culture and identity into the 
International Relations lexicon18. Culture and ideology, for example, have been 
pinpointed as alternative lenses through which issues of conflict, war, and policy 
formulation can be viewed19. The material yardsticks for measuring power, the 
cornerstone of realism’s objectivity, have been challenged by scholars who have 
identified “soft power” as equally important to understanding influence in 
international politics20. Likewise security, another mainstay of realist theory, has
16 There is an increasing pool of scholars from the Southeast Asia IR community who are 
exploring non-material bases to the international politics o f the region. See Amitav Acharya, The 
Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia. [Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
2001]; Jurgen Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins. Development, and 
Prospects. [London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002].
17 For example, David Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds), The International Spread o f Ethnic 
Conflict. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998]; Vamik Volkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic 
Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. [Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1998]; Thomas Ambrosio,
Irredentism: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. [London: Praeger, 2001].
18 These issues lie at the heart of the so-called “structure-agency debate”. See Yosef Lapid and 
Friedrich Kratochwil (eds), The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. [London: Lynne 
Rienner, 1996]; Stephen Hobden and John Hobson (eds), Historical Sociology in International 
Relations. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002].
19 Some examples include Alistair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism. [Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995]; Peter Katzenstein, The Culture o f National Security. [Columbia:
Columbia University Press, 1996]; Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics. [New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998]; Dominique Jacquin-Berdal, Andrew Oros and Marco Verweij 
(eds), Culture in World Politics. [London: MacMillan, 1998]; Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral 
Purpose of the State: Culture. Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International 
Relations. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999]; Beate Jahn, The Cultural Construction of 
International Relations. [New York: Palgrave, 2000]; Chris Brown, “Cultural Diversity and 
International Political Theory”, Review of International Studies. Vol.26, No.2 (April 2000). For a 
general discussion on the role of culture in theory, see Margaret Archer, Culture and Agency: The 
Place of Culture in Social Theory. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999].
20 See Rodney Hall, “Moral Authority as a Power Resource”, International Organization. Vol.51, 
No.4 (Autumn 1997); Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of
15
been considered an issue of identity as much as “interest”. Wendt notes, for 
instance that: “The distribution of power may always affect states’ calculations, 
but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and 
expectations, on the ‘distribution of knowledge’, that constitute their conceptions 
of self and other”21. Accordingly, it has been suggested by proponents of identity 
that questions of how states relate to their environment necessarily begin with the 
perception of “self’22. These trends in IR scholarship indicate that while concerns 
of realist international relations theory are well taken, it is likely that international 
politics is dictated by factors in combination with tenets of realism, if not beyond 
it. Identity and culture certainly cannot be bracketed out of the discussion. 
Correspondingly, while accepting the premises of realist theory, this study argues 
that the contribution of social-communicative renditions of international politics 
needs also to be considered. Such an approach, this study believes, will do more 
to illuminate upon the multifaceted and difficult-to-unpack phenomena of 
international relations, particularly when one takes into account the fact that 
relations between kin states encompass both fraternity and rivalry, as the study 
will uncover.
Human Rights. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999]; Andreas Wenger, “The Internet 
and the Changing Face of International Security”, Information and Security. Vol.7 (2001); Joseph 
Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power. [New York: Oxford University Press, 2002].
21 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction o f power 
politics”, International Organization. Vol.88, No.2 (1994) 397.
22 In Wendt’s words, “interests are dependent on identities”. See Alexander Wendt, “Collective 
identity formation and the international state”, American Political Science Review. Vol.88, No.2 
(1994) 385. For a sample o f the IR literature of identity, see David Campbell, Writing Security: 
United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. [Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1992]; Ole Weaver, Insecurity and Identity Unlimited. [Copenhagen: Center for Peace and 
Conflict Research, 1994]; Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds), State Sovereignty as 
Social Construct. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996]; Wendt, Social Theory of 
International Politics. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999]; Bill McSweeney, 
Security. Identity and Interests: A Sociology o f International Relations. [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999]; Rodney Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and 
International Systems. [New York: Columbia University Press, 1999]; Jutta Weldes, Constructing 
National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis. [Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999]. Indeed, questions o f identity have become the basis o f the research
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II. Methodological and epistemological issues
The inability of popular realist concepts to deal with social- 
anthropological problems in international affairs flags another problem associated 
particularly with the neorealist Zeitgeist - its ahistorical rendition of international 
politics. While classical realism fairs better on this front, neorealism fails to take 
into account the fact that “the key actors on the international stage are themselves 
historically constituted subjects who understand their mutual relationships in 
historical terms”23. Many modem states for instance, and in particular those from 
the so-called “Third World”, often arise out of older communal bonds and 
identities, many of which pre-date the “modernity” of Westphalian statehood by 
centuries, but were nevertheless thrown together into a singular political entity, 
often via plotting of colonial political boundaries. Others consist of distinctly 
different, sometimes even antagonistic, sub-national identities that had modem 
statehood thrust upon them without recourse for historical antagonisms. How 
does a state’s policy arise out of these historical complexities? As will become 
evident by the end of this study, the timeless propositions of neorealism are ill- 
equipped to explain change in a case such as that being studied here, where 
historical context is central24.
The problems above highlight the fact that positivist realists too often 
assume important precepts in international politics to be empirical while 
neglecting passions, beliefs and perceptions of policy makers, and of historical 
context in which they function, despite the fact that very often power and interest, 
the cornerstones of realism, stem from the beliefs and perceptions of the actors 
themselves25. Stanley Hoffman has observed that focusing on abstract concepts
agenda o f both the so-called “Minnesota” and “Copenhagen” schools o f thought in sociological 
IR.
23 Hidemi Suganami, “Narrative and Beyond”, paper presented at ISA 2001 Convention, Chicago,
24 February 2001, 3. Even E.H. Carr, one of the pioneers o f American realism, stressed the 
historical conditioning of any thought on the international system. See E.H. Carr, The Twenty- 
Years Crisis. 1919-1939. [London: MacMillan, 1949] 65.
24 For a critique of neorealism, see Robert Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics. [Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1985].
25 This point was raised by Kratochwil and Ruggie, who wrote in their discussion on regime 
theory: “Precisely because state behaviour within regimes is interpreted by other states, the 
rationales and justifications for behaviour which are proffered, together with pleas for 
understanding or admissions of guilt, as well as the responsiveness to such reasoning on the part
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such as power “neglects all factors which influence or define purposes”. Marcel 
Merle intimates further:
Confronted with the accumulation of works devoted to the state or to 
power, one nevertheless cannot fail to be surprised by the virtually 
systematic removal of the international dimension from the phenomena 
studied, as if the construction and functioning of a political society could 
be perceived and understood in isolation from the context and 
surroundings in which they began and where they are developing26.
No doubt concepts such as national interests, power and the balance of 
power remain critical to attempts at understanding issues of world politics. 
Nevertheless should one choose scientific approaches to social-political inquiry, 
these concepts still demand clarification if they are to generate any analytical 
traction. Otherwise to contend that problems in international relations proceed 
from clashes of national interest or disparities in power without illuminating the 
transition from the concept to its operational definition is not to “explain”, but to 
abandon explanation altogether. In other words, these theoretical concepts have 
to be made more intelligible, if not more identifiable, if one is to avoid a 
theoretical cul-de-sac11.
Another means through which to circumvent this problem is actually to 
break out of the paradigmatic rigidity of behaviouralist realism. This however, 
raises another concern. This time, it is the epistemological problem associated 
with the empiricism of the American social scientific tradition, which focuses on 
explanation via the construction of covering-law models. Intra and inter- 
paradigmatic restructuring, even metatheorizing for that matter, remains markedly 
difficult within this tradition because of the need to maintain theoretical 
“parsimony” and “determinism” in maintaining the all-important core premises of 
“first-order theories”. Any attempt to engage in such an exercise within the
of other states, all are absolutely critical component parts of any explanation involving the 
efficacy o f norm s.. . .  To be sure, communicative dynamics may be influenced by such extra- 
contextual factors as state power, but that is no warrant for ignoring them”. Friedrich Kratochwil 
and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A state o f the art on an art o f the state”, 
International Organization, vol.40, No.4 (Autumn 1986), 768.
26 Marcel Merle, The Sociology of International Relations. Translated by Dorothy Parkin. 
[Leamington Spa, Hamburg, New York: Berg, 1987] 7-8.
27 See part III of Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little (eds), The Logic of Anarchy: 
Neorealism to Structural Realism. [New York: Columbia University Press, 1993].
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American tradition is quickly labelled as the “degenerative” compromising of 
intellectual beliefs28. Consequently, scholars are epistemologically
straightjacketed. As Gunther Heilman rightly observes:
The thrust of their (American social science positivists) argument is the 
equivalent of an unfriendly takeover in the business world: The 
liberal/epistemicist bid involves defining and delimiting the “proper” 
borders of the territory that realists can rightly claim, thereby expanding the 
jurisdiction of liberal and epistemic rule. Paradigmatic battles such as 
these, however, tend to occur in an anarchic realm of science, where the 
knowledge dilemma assumes the role of the security dilemma in 
international relations: If realists could rightly claim more knowledge 
territory, paradigmatic liberals, epistemicists, institutionalists, and idealists 
are likely to perceive that there is less knowledge for them to claim. As a 
result, each side charges its opponents with lacking “coherence”, 
“distinctiveness”, and other sorts of epistemological ammunition29.
From an academic perspective this is an unfortunate state of affairs, and as Barry 
Buzan has highlighted, there certainly is a need to “broaden the perceptions of 
those within realist orthodoxy, and build bridges to those who . . .  are 
unnecessarily outside it”30.
In view of Heilman’s critique and Buzan’s exhortations, it is argued here 
that the conundrums of Indonesia-Malaysia relations may be better comprehended 
via a more subtle approach to theory. This can be achieved by beginning or 
ending with, but not necessarily confining oneself to, readily-identifiable realist 
assumptions. Practically speaking, this would involve the marrying of 
sociocultural factors (such as culture and identity) with realist tenets within 
definitive historical contexts, emphasising what Wittgenstein termed “family 
resemblances” among theoretical strains. In point of fact, such an approach has a 
legacy reaching back to the pre-positivist era, when scholars emphasised the
28 See for example, John Vasquez, The Power in Power Politics. [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999], Andrew Moravcsik and Jeffrey Legro, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, 
International Security. Vol.24, No.2 (Fall 1999).
29 Gunther Heilman, “Correspondence: Brother can you spare a paradigm?”, International 
Security. Vol.25, No.l (Summer 2001) 170.
30 Barry Buzan, “The timeless wisdom of realism?” in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia 
Zalewski (eds), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. [Cambridge: Cambridge University
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explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement bom out of theorizing from the 
disciplines of philosophy, law, and history, and when scholarship was equated to 
careful study of narratives and historical processes31. This epistemological 
tradition, which continues to enjoy a vibrant following outside North American 
International Relations, is markedly more sympathetic to the need for intra and 
inter-paradigmatic exchange in order to understand the very complicated social 
and political world of international politics32. Collectively, this movement has 
come to be known as the classical approach, and is found, among others, in the 
English School33.
Such an approach can take advantage of epistemological space offered in 
classical and English School realism, which allow for the possibility that “such 
things as the national interest, power and the states system are not just pre-given 
in the sense that they are not “natural” categories but . . .  are historically 
contingent”34. Focus on historically-premised and cross-paradigmatic approaches 
to International Relations, while clearly falling outside the comfort zone of 
contemporary American social science tradition, will be a worthy endeavour if it 
provides a better understanding of; (1) how Indonesia and Malaysia came into
Press, 1996] 63. Jack Snyder has also suggested the marrying of “material” and “symbolic” 
factors in explaining war and international relations. See Snyder, “Anarchy and Culture”.
31 See Hedley Bull, “International Theory: The case for a classical approach”, World Politics.
Vol. 18, No.3 (1966).
32 In this sense, the “realism” of the classical tradition should not be mistakenly lumped with 
positivist neorealism. While some would argue that classical and English School realists remain 
essentially epistemological positivists, the distinction remains between the inclusive nature of 
classical theory as opposed to the exclusive and reductionist tendencies o f neorealism. See Barry 
Buzan, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime 
Theory Meet the English School”, International Organization. Vol.47, No.3 (1993); Yosef Lapid 
and Friedrich Kratochwil, “Revisiting the “National”: Toward an Identity Agenda in 
Neorealism?” in Lapid and Kratochwil (eds), The Return of Culture and Identity.
33 The case for a historical approach to understanding international relations has been made in 
Martin Wight, “Why Is There No International Relations Theory” in Herbert Butterfield and 
Martin Wight (eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory o f International Politics. 
[Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966]; Hedley Bull, “The Theory of International Politics” 
in Brian Porter (ed), The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics. 1919-1969. [London: Oxford 
University Press, 1972]; Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Evolution o f International 
Society. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984]; John Lewis Gaddis, “Explaining the Data Base: 
Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies”, International Security. 
Vol. 12, N o.l (Summer 1987); Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A 
Comparative Historical Analysis. [London: Routledge, 1992]; Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality 
versus Neo-realist Theory”, International Security. Vol. 19, N o.l (Summer 1994); Odd Arne 
Westad (ed), Reviewing the Cold War. [London: Frank Cass, 2000].
34 Marysia Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe, “Questions about Identity” in Smith et.al, International 
Theory. 295-296.
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being as kin states; (2) the role of the kinship factor in the permutations of 
Indonesia-Malaysia relations; and (3) how the concept of kinship can advance the 
understanding of notions of power and interest in the context of Indonesia- 
Malaysia relations.
III. An “English School” approach to understanding kinship relations
The English School of International Relations provides epistemological
o r
and methodological background to the present work in two ways .
First, unlike the behaviouralist tradition, the English School is more 
receptive to conceptual plurality. It is an inclusive rather than exclusive approach 
to grappling with material and “ideational” assumptions behind international 
order, both of which carry equally important explanatory weight. Such an 
approach, exemplified for instance in the concept of international society and its 
exploration of the balance between material power and norms in the organisation 
of international relations, is welcomed, for international politics is too complex 
for unchanging sets of paradigmatic core assumptions conveyed in sweeping 
terms36. As for Indonesia-Malaysia relations, this approach also permits the 
tapping of the rich tradition of area studies scholarship that have identified non­
material bases to concepts such as power and interest in Southeast Asian 
society37.
As the evolution of kinship as a political phenomenon is socially 
embedded in interpretative features such as race, culture, and ethnicity, this study 
can be conceptually located at the intersection of literature on identity and 
nationalism, both of which deal with the effect of social-cultural and even 
genealogical-biological factors on the shaping of politics. Having established this 
correlation however, the main analytical point of departure that distinguishes the 
kinship factor from studies on nationalism and identity in International Relations
35 For purposes of convenience, the Classical Realist approach and the English School approach 
are taken here to be synonymous. See Hedley Bull, “International Theory” .
36 See Gunther Heilman,’’Correspondence”.
37 See for example, A.C. Milner, K e ra ia a n Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics. [Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1985]; Benedict Anderson, Language and Power. [Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990].
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is the fact that it is concerned primarily with expectations, obligations, and the 
mobilization of the same bonds characteristic of ethnic politics and nationalism 
specifically for purposes of organising relations between sovereign states. This is 
a phenomenon yet to be addressed in International Relations, even though, as this 
study will illustrate, it has manifested itself with sufficient regularity to warrant 
scrutiny.
Second, the reflectivist tradition of the English School, focusing on 
evolutionary processes and historical sociology in international relations, also 
permits one to delve to a greater extent into the historical contexts that frame 
Indonesia-Malaysia relations. Just as the English School tradition deals with the 
evolution of contemporary international society across history, so too the 
emphasis here will be the context against, and process through, which historical 
kinship links between Indonesia and Malaysia have intersected with the emerging 
identities and politics of the Indo-Malay World. In the context of its attempt to 
understand the role and impact of the kinship factor in Indonesia-Malaysia 
relations, this project should involve “delving into history not as a bank of 
information which might falsify a theory, but as a narrative which permits a 
greater appreciation of the origins, evolution, and consequences of an event”, for 
political phenomenon never take place in a political or historical vacuum38.
Central to this approach is the objective of “understanding” international 
relations phenomena. Indeed, the importance of historical context to the study of 
social-political phenomena has been registered in Gerald Cupchik’s admonition 
that “phenomena are therefore events that unfold and recur in the flow of time and 
are only meaningful when understood in context; they are processes and not 
essences”39. This point has also been impressed upon by Partha Chattaijee, who 
noted that “there are no substantive affinities that define identity regardless of 
context”40. To that can be added Robert Jackson’s contention that “international 
relations . . .  is socially constructed and can thus have different shapes and
38 Ngaire Woods, “The Uses of Theory in Studying International Relations” in Woods (ed), 
Explaining International Relations Since 1945. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996] 11.
39 Gerald Cupchik, “Constructivist Realism: An Ontology That Encompasses Positivist and 
Constructivist Approaches to the Social Sciences”, Forum: Qualitative Social Research. Vol.2,
No.l (February 2001) 3.
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substances at different times and places”41. Finally, as Gary Goertz has 
discovered:
The social sciences in their more behavioralist and positivist modes have 
sought laws of behavior and generalizations independent of culture and 
historical accident. After years of effort one may come to the conclusion 
that simple context-free laws of behavior do not exist. Researchers have 
often found that relationships may be positive in one period then 
negative in the next or changing from one country to another. From the 
empirical literature in world politics the conclusion imposes itself: 
simple bivariate hypotheses have no simple answer42.
That context is important to the study of social-political phenomenon is certainly 
supported by the fact that these scholars from such varied intellectual 
backgrounds share a common belief in its import.
A historical approach further permits the study to consider the evolving 
character of the sovereign nation-state rather than ipso facto take it for granted43. 
Although the English School has traditionally concentrated on identifying broad 
patterns in the evolution of the international system, it also allows for the 
consideration of idiographical characteristics44. Studying the kinship factor 
entails taking into account how states, nations and sovereignty come together, as 
well as the residues of this process. To that end, central to this study is the need 
to reconcile the distinct dynamics of the Indo-Malay World’s pre-colonial,
40 Partha Chattarjee, The Nation and its Fragments. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993] 
222 .
41 Robert Jackson, “Is there a classical international theory?” in Smith et.al, International Theory. 
209.
42 Gary Goertz, Contexts of International Politics. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994] 1.
43 This characteristic is most often associated with, though not necessarily confined to, the 
neorealist and neoliberal tradition of International Relations as well as the rational choice school. 
See for example Robert Keohane (ed), Neorealism.: David Baldwin (ed), Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. [New York: Columbia University Press, 1993]; 
Michael Brown, Owen Cote, Jr., Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller (eds), Rational Choice and 
Security Studies: Stephen Walt and his Critics. [Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000]. It 
should also be noted here that while the English School is also “state centric” in the sense that it 
accepts nation-states as the only members of international society, it is the “spirit” o f the English 
School, i.e. its concern for the historical evolution of contemporary international society into its 
present form through the transformation of the nation-state from earlier entities such as sovereigns 
and the sovereign state, that distinguishes it from positivist “state-centric” approaches.
44 See Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Evolution o f International Society. 217-322.
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colonial, and post-colonial political character. The importance of particularistic 
methodology has been emphasised by Adda Bozeman:
As one reviews the present national and international systems, which 
certain particularly talented European nations have brought into 
constitutional forms through generations of revolutionary thinking and 
planning, one cannot avoid the realization that these nations in their 
overemphasis on the political and constitutional aspects of their social 
development have disregarded many sources of cultural strength, not 
only in their own civilization, but also in the realms that they came to 
dominate, and that, as a consequence, the world has been to this extent 
not only impoverished of its human heritage but also prevented from 
attaining the full measure of its possible cultural records45.
A historical and idiographic perspective would be especially pertinent to the 
present study, which essentially involves two new “Third World” nation-states 
consisting of much older societies with their own sense of identity and history 
reaching back into the pre-colonial era46. This intersection between old and new 
dispensations creates conceptual and practical problems, for it leads to 
contradictions surrounding non-Westem nation-states’ desires to associate 
themselves with what is clearly a predominantly Western international society 
through the declaration of independence and the establishment of political and 
territorial boundaries, while still maintaining what their nationalists have 
identified as pre-colonial identities47. To various extents, the factor of kinship 
reflects these abiding tensions between nation and state within international 
society. Recent “encroachment” of International Relations scholarship into the 
area of Southeast Asia has elicited criticisms from area studies scholars 
(particularly, though not exclusively, historians) who view these attempts
45 Adda Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History. [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1960] 8.
46 For a study o f the history-identity nexus, see Gerrit Gong (ed), Memory and History in East and 
Southeast Asia: Issues of Identity in International Relations. [Washington: The CSIS Press, 2001]. 
For a broader discussion, see Consuelo Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember 
their Past and Make their Futures”, World Politics. Vol.52, No.3 (April 2000).
47 It should be evident here that this study prefers Anthony Smith’s model of nationalism as 
opposed to Ernest Gellner’s in regard to its interpretation of Indonesian and Malaysian 
nationalism. Chapter One deals with these theoretical issues in greater detail.
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precisely as lacking historical understanding and empirical depth48. Their call for 
more extensive empirical research on case studies is certainly warranted, and it is 
in this regard that the study looks to place greater emphasis on historical research 
and factual interpretation by looking beyond secondary literature and undertaking 
extensive archival research and interviews, as well as a careful reading of local 
histories.
Another facet of the classical approach that is useful here is the emphasis on 
statecraft, which introduces the normative role of perceptions and interpretations 
of the kinship factor among policy practitioners49. Perception and interpretation 
are vital considerations for scholars of international politics because they: 
Interleave(s) the logic of more materially driven theories of the international 
system . . . with the view that sentience makes a difference, and that social 
systems cannot be understood in the same way as physical ones. When 
units are sentient, how they perceive each other is a major determinant of 
how they interact50.
Consequently it is not power and interest per se that are the diktat of international 
politics, but the employment of instruments of power in pursuit of the values of 
security and survival as perceived and interpreted by statesmen.
Two reasons lie behind the need to consider the role of practitioners of 
statecraft here. First, it is a fact that as agents of the state, personalities such as 
Abdul Rahman Putra, Sukarno, Suharto, Abdul Razak, Ghazali Shafie, Adam 
Malik, Mahathir Mohamad and Subandrio dictated the course of Indonesia- 
Malaysia relations through their domination of policy formulation. It is through 
the perceptions of these statesmen, as well as their interpretations of the terms of 
kinship relations, that the politicisation of kinship has been conceptualised. 
Second is the fact that many of these practitioners identify their counterparts as
48 See for example, Ralph Smith’s review of Khong Yuen Foong, Analogies at War: Korea.
Munich. Dien Bien Phu. and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. [Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992] in Pacific Review. Vol.6, No.4 (1993) and John Sidel’s review o f Acharya, The 
Quest for Identity in Survival. Vol.43, No.4 (Winter 2001-2002). Even Michael Leifer, the pre­
eminent scholar of the international politics o f Southeast Asia, criticised Acharya’s “reliance on 
secondary material” leading to “factual errors”.
49 See Robert Jackson, “The Political Theory o f International Society” in Ken Booth and Steve 
Smith (eds), International Relations Theory Today. [Oxford: Polity Press, 1995] 124-126.
50 Barry Buzan, “The English School as a Research Program”, paper presented at the BISA 
Conference, Manchester, December 1999. See 
www.ukc.ac.uk/politics/englishschool/buzan99.htm.
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kin. Ghazali Shafie and Adam Malik for instance, were distant cousins, and not 
surprisingly their domination of foreign policy in their respective states coincided 
with the “golden years” of bilateral relations. Likewise, Abdul Rahman’s close 
relations with the Sultanate of Langkat in Sumatra certainly played a role in his 
interpretation of Malaysia’s ties with Indonesia in relation to Sumatra, and Abdul 
Razak’s Buginese descent may well have influenced his archipelagic outlook 
during his office.
IV. Kinship and Indonesia-Malaysia political relations
Interest in the politics of kinship begins with an observation that 
discourses of “brotherhood” have been employed regularly and liberally in 
Indonesia-Malaysia relations. The idea of politicised kinship first took on 
prominence with the evolution of anti-colonial discourse. Early nationalist 
movements in both Indonesia and Malaysia were not averse to the contemplation 
of a unified ethno-religious and historically based identity defined as Indonesia 
Raya (Greater Indonesia) or Melayu Raya (the greater Malay kingdom). This was 
certainly the case at least until the end of the Pacific War in August 1945, 
although pockets of activists continued to agitate for unification in the 1950s. 
Through the ideas of prominent Indonesian and Malay thinkers such as 
Muhammad Yamin, Ibrahim Yaacob, Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, Ahmad 
Boestamam, Ishak Mohamad, Mokhtaruddin Lasso, and Sukarno, attempts were 
made at conceptualising an independent political entity predicated on the premise 
that a Malay World existed and thrived in the pre-colonial era, and which could 
be revived in the context of post-colonial territorial boundaries with this historical 
legacy and bonds built across time as a chain of reference51.
Though the political discourse of pan-unity eventually subsided as a result 
of the consolidation of Indonesia and Malaysia into sovereign political entities in 
their own right, its remains a residual phenomenon linking pockets of political 
groups within Indonesian and Malaysian society. The recent resurgence in 
collaborative civil society activities across the Melaka Straits draws attention to
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this, as do revelations of the depths of collaboration between Islamic groups in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, where evidence has emerged that not only have links 
between moderate Islamic movements like Muhammadiyah (Indonesia) and 
ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia) 
strengthened over recent years, but more fundamentalist movements such as the 
Jemaah Islamiyah as well52. While such relations are not taken as representative 
of Indonesia-Malaysia state or societal relations as a whole, the persistence of 
such ties against the historical background of bilateral relations commands 
attention.
The discourse of kinship among political elite too, survived the demise of 
the Pan-Malay project. Leaders of Indonesia and Malaysia, as this study will go 
on to show, have persistently looked to kinship for meaning and intelligibility as 
they grappled with issues in relations. This has been most pronounced in the 
regular assertion of Pribumi (indigenous) identity against Chinese minorities, 
which harken attention to kinship defined as an identity based on exclusivity. 
These concerns seemed to be implicitly written into former Indonesian President 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s recent diatribe against Chinese-dominated Singapore for 
the latter’s apparently insolent attitude toward the “Malay” community53. While 
Wahid’s evocation of ethnic solidarity between Indonesia and Malaysia may be 
tenuous from an anthropological point of view (as chapter two will show), what 
remains valid is the sub-text of his statement, which clearly implicates Chinese 
communities (in this case Singapore) as a viable “other” against which Indonesia- 
Malaysia brotherhood can be reinforced. Some time later, the rhetorical device of 
kinship was evoked again when an Indonesian minister called on Malaysian 
authorities to take in greater numbers of Indonesian labourers by impressing upon 
them that “after all, Indonesia and Malaysia are part of the Malay Archipelago 
and are one big family”54. As will become evident by the end of this study, such 
statements were modelled along a tradition of political discourse rendered on the 
basis of “blood brotherhood” and repetitively employed by leaders to romanticise
51 For a biographical account of the thinking of several of these personalities, see Massa. 29 
August 1998, 29-33.
52 Interview with Syafi M a’arif, Singapore, 20 November 2001.
53 “Why Gus Dur is not happy with Singapore”, Straits Times. 27 November 2000.
54 “K.L. sends back shiploads of overstayers”, Straits Times. 20 November 2001.
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the foundation of the “special relationship” between these two states. The sense 
that Indonesia-Malaysia relations have an immutable base in the form of blood 
brotherhood can be summarised in the following comment by former Malaysian 
deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie made at the Third 
Indonesia-Malaysia Colloquium held in Bali in December 1992:
What I am driving at is that the relationship between the peoples of 
Indonesia and Malaysia goes back to the age of Rumpun Melayu 
(Malay stock). It was colonialism of the West which divided the 
Malay world and now perforce we are discussing in Bali about the 
relationship between two peoples, the people of which belong to the 
same cluster like bamboos with each tree growing on its own or 
“hidup berkampung” that is in togetherness55.
Such is the apparent resilience of common identity in the diplomatic language 
between Indonesia and Malaysia, it regularly informs academic study as well, 
specifically those of the area studies tradition56. Particularly evocative, if 
historically flawed, intellectual thinking on the kinship factor has derived from 
the ideologies and writings of prominent Indonesian and Malay nationalists who 
championed the pan conceptions of Indonesia Raya-Melayu Raya57,
These academic and ideological traditions illustrate how many have tried to 
understand aspects of Indonesia-Malaysia relations from the perspective of 
kinship. The popularity of indigenous scholarship on shared Indo-Malay 
historical, ethnic, and cultural consciousness indicates that although the political 
unity of the region in the post-colonial era has so far been elusive, the sense of co-
55 Ghazali Shafie, Malaysia. ASEAN and the World Order. [Bangi: Penerbit University 
Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2000] 382.
56 Some o f these include Thoming Svensson and Per Sorensen (eds), Indonesia and Malaysia: 
Scandinavian Studies in Contemporary Society. [London & Malmo: Curzon Press, 1983]; 
Muhhammad Yusoff Hashim, Penseiarahan Melavu: Kaiian Tentanz Tradisi Seiarah Melavu 
Nusantara. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992]; Michael Hitchcock and Victor T. 
King (eds), Images of Malav-Indonesian Identity. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 
1997]; Alijah Gordon (ed), The Propagation of Islam in the Indonesian-Malav World. [Kuala 
Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2001], and for more dated studies, John 
Bastin and R.Roolvink (eds), Malayan and Indonesian Studies. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964]; 
Syed Naquib al-Attas, Preliminary Statement on a General Theory of the Islamization of the 
Malav-Indonesian Archipelago. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1963]; R.M. 
Koentjaraningrat, Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures o f Indonesia and Malaysia. [Menlo 
Park, C.A.: Cummings Publishing Company, 1975].
57 For a critique, see Kwa Chong Guan, “The Historical Roots o f Indonesian Irredentism”, Asian 
Studies. Vol. VIII, No.l (April 1970).
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identity remains sufficiently significant an issue to be pondered58. Many of these 
themes have also been discussed in numerous Indonesia-Malaysia public forums, 
including the Meeting of the Malay World Conference, the Malindo (Malaysia- 
Indonesia) Youth Forum, and the Indonesia-Malaysia Conference.
It is clear then, that at the level both of rhetoric and abstract thought, 
scholars and policy practitioners have continued to look to the kinship factor for 
added meaning to Indonesia-Malaysia relations. The regularity of these 
invocations among both Indonesian and Malaysian political leaders in itself is 
telling of how they perceive of each other and their ties. Hence, rather than being 
brushed aside as pure rhetoric this propensity should be subjected to greater study 
in order to comprehend these impulses. The extent to which personal and cultural 
identity can be grafted onto the political sphere is a matter of interest for this 
study. Two questions can be asked here to that effect. One should first raise the 
issue of the distinction between the “foreign policy of words” and “foreign policy 
of deeds”. In other words, has rhetoric been translated into action, and if not, 
why. An equally important, if perplexing, question to raise would be why, if the 
kinship factor indeed has by and large failed as a viable basis upon which to 
organise relations, has the discourse (of kinship) persisted.
Historical records provide evidence both of concerted attempts to present 
the factor of kinship as a viable basis upon which to foster policy coherence, and 
incidences when relations have gone awry. Several examples stand out: (1) 
Jakarta’s opinions of Kuala Lumpur’s position taken in times of domestic crises 
in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s. Malaya was chided for its lackadaisical 
support in the wake of Indonesia’s Sumatran/Sulawesi crisis in 1958, yet was 
later taken to task when Kuala Lumpur sought to play an active role in mediating 
Indonesia’s West Irian crisis of 1960; (2) Malaysia’s policy of “self-induced 
subordination” toward Indonesia that began in the late 1960s, and that heralded a 
“golden age” of bilateral relations, in fact took place barely a few years after the 
termination of the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation of 1963-1966, during a time 
when from a truly realist perspective, Kuala Lumpur would have been expected to 
remain wary of Indonesian intentions and cautious of rapprochement; (3)
58 This is argued, for example, in Ismail Hussein, Antara Dunia Melavu dan Dunia Kebanssaan.
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Indonesian President Suharto’s personal frustration at what his administration 
construed were attempts by Kuala Lumpur during the late 1980s and 1990s to 
usurp Indonesia’s “rightful” position of political primacy in the region; (4) across 
the time line of Indonesia-Malaysia relations, but especially so in the early years, 
popular opinion has always been noticeably strong on issues regarding bilateral 
ties, and has been a critical factor to why political leaders have continued to 
search in kinship for greater meaning to bilateral relations. All these issues will 
be dealt with at greater length in the following chapters. Suffice to mention here 
that the form, context, and regularity of such events are telling of the 
particularistic and ultimately contradictory terms of this “special relationship” as 
perceived by Indonesia and Malaysia.
It is by way of these opening observations that this study moves to consider 
the kinship factor as one dimension of Indonesia-Malaysia relations. It is not 
contended here that kinship is the only dimension, nor even the most significant, 
in relations between kin states. Nevertheless it does contend that that when one 
adopts a historical perspective on International Relations, it will be evident that 
the kinship factor has been of some consequence from time to time, when states 
try to use the notion of kin affinity and blood brotherhood to generate harmony 
and policy coherence. In other words, kinship claims do provide meaning and 
intelligibility to Indonesia-Malaysia relations at certain times, and is not merely 
an ideological/utilitarian device for rationalising self-interested actions, although 
it could certainly be used in such a fashion.
A historical perspective will also enable one to observe how the kinship 
factor transforms over time, depending on how relatedness is understood and 
constructed by its proponents in relation to evolving national identities, and on 
whether the expectations and obligations that underpin the kinship factor are met. 
Kinship discourse, as engaged in regularly by policy-makers and scholars, is 
ultimately a historical concept, as talk of common culture, language, ethnicity, 
religion, and historical experience ultimately reflect a historically-based 
perception of affinity through time.
[Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1990].
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Finally, from an epistemological vantage, the kinship factor also provides 
the all important context through which one can better understand the terms and 
conditions of the conceptualisation and pursuit of power and national interest 
among the policy-makers of Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur when they formulate 
policy towards each other.
V. Thesis structure
Given the general observations made above, the following chapter 
presents in greater detail the theoretical framework by laying down the definitions 
of kinship and the process through which it is politicised, borrowing primarily 
from Carsten’s work on kinship identities and Anthony Smith’s on nationalism, as 
well as identifying general patterns of its manifestation in the arena of 
international relations. The chapter introduces three characteristics that are 
emblematic of kinship and the kinship factor: (1) genealogical and biological 
relations, (2) socially and culturally constructed relatedness, including the 
“functional aspects of relatedness”, defined by the perception, interpretation and 
fulfilment of expectations and obligations associated with identification as kin, 
that provide the terms under which kinship becomes applicable to international 
relations, and (3) its inclusive-exclusivist nature. From here the chapter 
introduces the concept of kin states, ponders how the factor of kinship manifests 
itself in the course of international relations, and explores the phenomenon of 
“kin rivalry”.
Because the discourse of kinship in Indonesia-Malaysia relations is always 
initiated with a reference to the past, it is necessary to revisit this past in all its 
complexities in order to verify the basis on which Indonesia and Malaysia can 
indeed be considered kin states. This entails an examination of the origins of 
explicit notions of kinship in political discourse in the Indo-Malay World. This 
exploration of pre-independence ideas and processes spans two chapters and 
provides the context to the politics of kinship in the post-colonial era. As a “start 
point” for causal narratives, these considerations are vital, for, as Suganami noted, 
“all social events may be thought of as the outcome of a concatenation of some
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mechanistic, volitional and contingent factors, starting from a set of initial 
conditions”59.
Chapter Two discusses the search for precedents in the construction of kin 
identity among the respective political elite and ideologues in the Indo-Malay 
World, looking at how the phenomenon of trade and migration led to the spinning 
of a genealogical web across the Indo-Malay World and the building of kin 
identity, and exploring social-cultural avenues of kinship construction such as 
language, religion, and concepts of statehood and community. More importantly, 
the issue of colonial intervention and its introduction not only of terrestrial 
borders (which were non-existent in the pre-colonial Indo-Malay World), but also 
ideas such as race, ethnicity, and nationalism which eventually inspired the 
mobilisation of kinship for political purposes in the form of pan-Malay identity 
that echoed the romanticism of Western nationalism of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries is explored in detail. Consequently, die chapter looks at 
how this search for precedents yielded different understandings of the past, 
resulting in contested versions of the basis of Indo-Malay kinship.
The construction of kin identity and mobilisation of kinship by pan-Malay 
nationalists in the anti-colonial movement is the focus of Chapter Three. This 
chapter investigates the rise and demise of the pan-national concepts of Indonesia 
Raya-Melayu Raya within the framework of contested prescriptions for 
nationhood not only within, but also between, the Dutch East Indies and British 
Malaya. Here it plots the different paths chosen to nationhood - civic and 
republican nationalism on the part of Indonesia and ethno-nationalism on the part 
of Malaysia, and how these choices laid the basis for subsequent perceptions and 
interpretations of kinship in the post-colonial era.
Chapter Four marks the first of three chapters that look specifically at the 
functional aspect of relatedness insofar as political relations between kin states of 
Indonesia and Malaysia were concerned. It covers the period from Indonesian 
independence up to its confrontation with Malaysia, focusing on key events 
during this first phase of post-colonial relations between Indonesia and Malaya, 
and ending with the termination of Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation.
59 Suganami, “Narrative and Beyond”, 8.
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Chapter Five covers the period from 1967 to 1980, when a significant 
upturn in relations brought about by both the euphoria of the termination of 
Konfrontasi as well as the advent of the Tun Abdul Razak administration in 
Malaysia was evident. Once again, key events are explored, as well as the 
apparent change in mindsets and outlook in Kuala Lumpur towards Jakarta.
Chapter Six carries the study into the 1990s. This chapter looks at what is 
essentially bilateral relations during the “Mahathir era” of Malaysian foreign 
policy, seeing that Mahathir Mohamad had succeeded Tun Hussein Onn in 1981. 
Again, it is not just the policies that are of interest, but also the perceptions and 
outlooks of political leaders as both Indonesia and Malaysia pursued activist 
foreign policies in what appeared to be a contest for primacy in the Indo-Malay 
Archipelago, resulting in a prestige dilemma that bore some semblance to earlier 
epochs in bilateral relations.
Finally, the conclusion assesses the transformations of the kinship factor 
over the course of this historical study by addressing the questions raised at the 
beginning of this chapter: (1) what was the basis to kinship discourse, (2) how 
kinship was conceptualised and applied, and (3) why the success of kinship to 
organise relations was extremely limited. In the process, the conclusion pays 
particular attention to: (a) the anthropological strengths and weaknesses of 
kinship conceptions, (b) the sociological mobilisation of kinship in terms of 
perceptions and interpretations of expectations and obligations, (c) the factor of 
kinship in bilateral relations as a function of the historical process of state 
formation and identity building, (d) the paradox between popular and elite 
conceptions of kinship, and (e) possible scenarios for the future of the kinship 
factor in Indonesia-Malaysia relations.
A note of sources
This thesis is the first major study in Southeast Asian International 
Relations that is built around not only key secondary texts, but primary resources 
such as archival material, which have hitherto been unpublished, and local (in the 
case, Indonesian and Malay) historical writings as well. Two caveats have to be
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made here regarding archival fieldwork. First, the archival material utilised has 
been limited to British and Australian sources. While attempts were made to 
obtain access to indigenous sources in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, the 
“sensitivity” of the topic and absence of a the 30-year rule governing the release 
of classified government material meant that access to Malaysian and Indonesian 
archives effectively denied the author. Indeed, this unfortunate circumstance 
continues to hamper good historical research on the region. Be that as it may, 
there are benefits in relying on British and Australian material, not least for the 
fact that they are likely to be more impartial and objective in their reporting of 
events and negotiations that transpired between Indonesia and Malaysia. Second, 
the study becomes empirically thin in the last chapter, owing to its more recent 
nature and the unavailability of primary material. Nevertheless, the extension of 
the study into the contemporary era remains a worthy exercise, and effort was 
made to overcome empirical limitations with alternative sources of primary 
information, such as interviews with policy-makers concerned60. The use of local 
historical texts too, is an important contribution to this study in the sense that it 
provides insight into how Indo-Malay kinship was conceptualised and perceived 
in indigenous historical and anti-colonial discourse.
In adopting a methodology premised on extensive primary research and 
close perusal of indigenous historical texts, this study responds to criticisms 
regularly levelled by historians and area studies specialists that scholars of the 
international relations of Southeast Asia are empirically weak and often overly 
reliant on secondary sources. Historians will see that much of the primary 
material used here, with the possible exception of the material on Confrontation, 
is new61. Similarly, Area Studies specialists too will see that chapters Two and
60 For interviews, the author focused mostly on high-raking, retired officials, as they were the most 
likely to have significantly less at stake in sharing their insights on policy-making.
61 Recent release of classified material on the 1963-65 Indo-Malay Confrontation by the Public 
Records Office has spawned a cottage industry comprising colonial historians who have 
conducted sound research on this episode of bilateral relations on the basis o f these documents.
See for example, Greg Poulgrain, The Genesis o f Konfrontasi: Malaysia. Brunei. Indonesia. 1945- 
1965. [Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998]; John Subritsky, Confronting Sukarno:
British. American. Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malavsian-Indonesian 
Confrontation. [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999]; Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation 
in Southeast Asia. 1961-1965: Britain, the United States, and the Creation of Malaysia. 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001]. It must be said, however, that these narratives
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Three introduce a new dimension to indigenous historiography of the Indo-Malay 
World by comparing local renditions of Indonesian and Malay histories in order 
to explore their intersections and points of departure. Finally, there is also a 
substantial amount of anecdotal evidence, accrued through interviews with retired 
policy-makers, which reveal not only the intricate details of statecraft and 
diplomacy between the leaders of the two states, but also the perception and 
interpretation of the kinship factor and the role it has played in decision-making.
There is a fundamental reason why primary evidence is important to this 
study of the kinship factor in Indonesia-Malaysia relations. As this study will 
endeavour to show, it is precisely in the primary material, both archival and 
anecdotal, that the kinship factor becomes even more pronounced. Unlike 
secondary sources, primary source material permit scholars an insight into what 
were “real-time” considerations that motivated and impacted upon decision­
makers, and which were seldom, if ever, publicly expressed. It is contended here 
that a close perusal of such records will reveal the influence and pressure that the 
kinship factor played in the minds of Indo-Malay political elites as they pondered 
policy decisions vis-a-vis each other, particularly in the immediate post-colonial 
era. Likewise, one can also see how perceptions and interpretations of kinship 
transform over time in relation to the process of national identity building. Given 
that a key feature of the English School tradition is an epistemology focused on 
the normative nature and character of political decision-making (which in the case 
of Indonesia and Malaysia has always been dictated by a select few individuals) 
that emphasises what Hedley Bull termed the “exercise of judgement” in an 
international arena which Martin Wight characterised as “a realm of human 
experience”, such a methodological approach corresponds with the objectives of 
this study. Put differently, while the English School does not deal explicitly with 
kinship, as a mode of inquiry it opens channels to which, as this study suggests, 
the kinship factor can be seen to have assumed some measure of prominence in 
the consideration of policy-makers as Indonesia-Malaysia relations took shape.
locate Confrontation in the broader perspective o f the Cold War, and focus mainly on the policies 
o f the external players towards the region rather than the indigenous dynamics of Confrontation.
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Kinship Factor and International Relations
Introduction
Three dimensions of kinship are useful for the analysis of international 
relations. First, the concept of kinship can refer to the existence of genealogical- 
biological ties encapsulated in shared notions of race, ethnicity, and ancestry. 
Second, kinship can also take the form of social-cultural construction as opposed 
to “ontological truth”, where it is the functional aspect of relatedness that takes on 
prominence. Here it will be necessary to recognize that kinship has a dynamic 
component, and consideration should be given to the “act” as much as to the 
“state” of being kin. This distinction is important when one considers that the 
utility of kinship can be determined by the fulfillment of expectations and 
obligations; it is also this distinction that defines the phenomenon this study 
identifies as “politicized” kinship. Finally, kinship can also be premised on a 
logic of exclusion, where an “external” entity is used as a yardstick to reinforce 
kin identity (this refers also to what identity literature terms the “inside/outside 
boundary”)1.
In the main these attributes affect how the concept of kin is interpreted 
and expressed between the leaders and societies of so-called kin states, and hence 
determine how the kinship factor might influence the conduct of foreign policy 
and the flow of international relations. While one could argue that a potential 
ontological tension might exist across these definitions, this study takes the 
position that insofar as Indonesia-Malaysia relations are concerned, they reinforce 
each other and contribute to characterising affinity in the Indo-Malay World. 
There is a strain of historical continuity that defines relations between the 
populations of Indonesia and Malaysia in genealogical terms, traceable to the pre- 
colonial era, and it is this historical linkage that feeds the later construction of
1 See Roxanne Doty, “Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National 
Identity” in Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct. 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996] 122.
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affinity along social-cultural lines2. After all, it is through migration and marriage 
that cultures and traditions interact and extend the web of kinship across societies. 
Kin affinity between Indonesia and Malaysia then, has been “imagined” and 
constructed along social-cultural lineages bome of and extended from a narrower 
conception of literal blood relations. Moreover, these ties can, and often are, 
strengthened in the face of threats to common identity.
I. Defining kinship -  A matter of blood or obligation?
Within the social sciences, kinship describes a principle of association 
originating from the field of anthropology3. Understood from a biological 
perspective, kinship refers to the characteristic of blood ties that define relations 
within a family structure. This manner of relation is determined both by 
patrilineal or matrilineal ties and essentially narrows the scope of kinship studies 
to smaller structures of human interaction. Within the anthropological literature, 
the superlative statement in support of genealogical-biological interpretations of 
kinship has been that of Meyer Fortes, who in studying kinship made reference to 
“the irreducible genealogical connections, the given relations of actual 
connectedness, which are universally utilized in building up kinship relations and 
categories”4. Fortes then proceeds to contend that kinship “arises from the 
generally recognized fact that the relations they designate have their origin in a 
distinct sphere of social life, the sphere which, for both observers and actors, is 
demarcated by reference to the base line of genealogical connection”5. While 
bloodlines and descent are clearly important dimensions to the understanding of 
kinship, anthropologists since Fortes have begun questioning if kinship is indeed 
an ontological given. By this regard, quite apart from direct blood ties, descent or 
biological characteristics, it has been claimed that the concept of kinship can 
carry other meanings as well.
2 Here, the works of Anthony Smith on the ethnic origins of nations provide insight into the 
relationship between kinship and politics. Smith’s contribution will be discussed in greater depth 
later in this chapter.
3 David Sills (ed), International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 8. [New York:
Mamillian Co and the Free Press, 1968] 309-413.
4 Meyer Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order. [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969] 52.
5 Ibid, 53.
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In a critique of Fortes’ narrow interpretations, David Schneider argued 
that the idea of kinship carries a plurality of meanings, and does not merely 
adhere to the so-called “natural” facts of procreation or genealogy6. Central to 
Schneider’s concern is the fact that kinship is not so much a biological but social 
phenomenon, whose meanings and interpretation is subject to social and cultural 
influences. Schneider’s conclusions have since been corroborated by others who 
observe that “kinship comes in a variety of packages and with a multitude of 
meanings attached. . . . Instead of insisting on universal characteristics as a 
precondition for the analytical validity of kinship, variation is viewed as a 
practical necessity resulting from detailed fieldwork and observation of social 
reality that does not a priori privilege certain aspects of social relatedness over 
others”7. Further emphasizing that kinship is not only biologically prescribed, 
others have concluded that:
The boundaries of kindred and descent-based groups are shifting 
constantly, as are the interpersonal relationships that are defined in 
terms of kinship. . . . Kinship may appear to have distinct biological 
roots, but in practice it is flexible and integrates non-biological social 
relationships that are considered to be as ‘real’ as any biological
relationship Kinship relationships are not always permanent states
(as a strict biological interpretation would suggest) . . .  it is a system 
that is inherently flexible and allows extensive improvisation in that 
people can choose their kin8.
Indeed, convictions of kinship and myths of common ancestry need not, 
and often do not, accord with biological descent. Cultural symbols are often used 
as markers of biological affinity, and the basis for an existential sense of 
community9. Implicit in these observations is the argument that kinship can also 
be said to exist when social interactions within cultural frames of reference allow 
genealogical logic to be transcribed onto non-biological relationships. In the
6 This was Schneider’s seminal treatise published as David Schneider, A Critique of the Study o f 
Kinship. [Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1984].
7 See Peter Schweitzer, “Concluding Remarks” in Schweitzer (ed), Dividends of Kinship.
[London: Routledge, 2000] 207.
Mark Nuttall, “Choosing Kin: Sharing and subsistence in a Greenlandic hunting community” in 
Schweitzer (ed), Dividends of Kinship. 34.
9 Walker Connor, Ethno-Nationalism: The Quest for Understanding. [Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994] 197-212.
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main, such approaches extend the meaning of kinship beyond the immediate 
family structure and suggest that kin relations can be based on the assumption of 
ethnic similarity and shared cultural identity as well -  untraceable, but yet 
sociologically “real” kinship10. Social anthropologists refer to this as “quasi”, 
“pseudo” or “fictive” kinship, implicating an imagined or constructed idea, where 
“kinship . . .  is not necessarily a correlate of biogenetic or agnatic ties, but rather a 
culturally defined domain”11. Even political scientists have adopted such notions 
in their explication of the “mythical kinship community”12.
The fact that meanings of kinship may be extended outside the 
genealogical grid is illustrated, for example, in the work of Clifford Geertz, who 
applies kinship in this manner when he relates the metaphorical concept “blood 
brother” to the interaction of what he calls “primordial attachments”, a common 
historical and cultural relation that underpins the relationship between two 
groups13. Here the idea of “blood”, commonly used in the study of genealogy, is 
applied in a broader sense to denote a close relationship grounded on familial-like 
affiliation, suggesting “a relation of alliance or consociation by which individuals 
not related by kinship acquire ties of pseudo-kinship, the rights and duties that 
compose the relationship being modeled on those of brotherhood”14. Kinship 
used in this sense hence implies more than just familial relations. It has not 
merely ethno-genealogical dimensions, but social and cultural ones as well. Mark 
Nuttall notes: “kinship is a cultural reservoir from which individuals draw items 
they can use to define and construct everyday social interaction”15. In other 
words when ascribed to a particular relationship, the kinship factor may be 
equally understood as a social-cultural construction as well as a natural “reality” 
of blood ties.
10 For a recent exploration o f this debate in anthropology, see Janet Carsten (ed), Cultures o f 
Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of Kinship. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000).
11 Jenny B. White, "Kinship, reciprocity and the world market ” in Schweitzer (ed), Dividends of 
Kinship. 124.
12 See David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic. Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics. 
[London: Routledge, 2000] 42.
13 See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. [New York: Basic Books, 1973] 255-310.
14 Julius Gould and William L Kolb (eds), A Dictionary of the Social Sciences. [New York: The 
Free Press, 1964] 58.
15 Mark Nuttall, “Choosing kin”, 34.
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Recent anthropological literature has taken this re-conceptualisation of 
kinship further. Carsten proposes in a recent volume to adopt “a broad and 
imaginative view of what might be included under the rubric ‘kinship’” and to 
describe “the ethnographic particularities of being related in a specific cultural 
context” (of kinship)16. This is accomplished by introducing the concept of 
“relatedness”, which she maintains allows her to “suspend the assumptions 
behind the biological and social faces of kinship” and to circumvent the analytical 
dichotomy between the biological and the social17. In using the concept of 
relatedness one could conceivably explore a particular relationship via the 
implicit paradigm of kinship without having to rely on an arbitrary distinction 
between biological-genealogical and social-cultural, and without presupposing 
what constitutes kinship. In turn, this permits one to see the unity as opposed to 
the separation of the biological and the social18. Other scholars however, have 
not shied away from explicit attempts at merging the two interpretations. 
Strathem for example, contends elsewhere that quite apart from conceptual
IQ *distance, kinship is a “meeting place between nature and culture .
The implications of these findings are critical to the understanding of kin 
affinities. No longer is kinship confined to biological affinity; it also refers to 
identities constructed along social and cultural lines where congruities of 
language, religion, custom, and history all have an ineffable cohesiveness in and 
of themselves, working to bind one to one’s kinsman or fellow-believer not 
merely out of necessity or interest, but also by virtue of some absolute import 
attributed to the very tie itself. In sum, social and cultural ingredients impute into 
relationships a corporate sentiment of oneness that make those who are charged 
with it feel as if they are kith and kin.
16 Janet Carsten, Cultures of Relatedness. 4.
17 Ibid, 4-5.
18 This idea is expanded in the chapters by Hutchinson, Edwards, and Strathem in Carsten, 
Cultures o f Relatedness.
19 Marilyn Strathem, After Nature: English Kinship in the Late Twentieth Century. [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992] 87.
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II. Kinship as a functional aspect of relatedness
An important corollary to the social-cultural construction of kinship is the 
fact that it is action that gives intelligibility and meaning to relationships 
characterized as that between kin. Again, this has been reflected in recent trends 
in the field, where anthropologists have argued for a shift in attention from what 
“kinship is” to what “kinship does”, or as Janet Carsten puts it, to “the hard work 
of making and maintaining relations”20. Focusing on the functional and dynamic 
dimension of kinship performs three important tasks; first, it gives further clarity 
to the argument that kinship can be a social-cultural construction by providing the 
terms upon which such kin identities take shape; second, it opens analytical 
avenues for the detailed study of the impact of relatedness on social-political 
action, either between people, communities or even between modem nation­
states; finally, it provides a framework for the conceptual separation of kinship 
from interrelated notions of identity such as ethnicity.
Presenting what remains a widely accepted definition, Max Weber 
contended that the basis of ethnicity essentially revolves around characteristics 
such as customs, the belief in and partaking of common history and ancestry,
A 1
shared language, and religion . Common ethnicity then, implies two 
communities or groups that share some or all of these traits. At first glance, the 
difference between ethnicity and social-cultural interpretations of kinship appears 
merely a matter of semantics. It has been argued for example, that even ethnicity
99is not a given, but chosen and contextual . Yet there is a subtle but cmcial 
difference between ethnicity and kinship insofar as analytical consequence is 
concerned. While kinship shares the same core assumptions or bases of ethnicity, 
its major conceptual point of departure lies in the more self-conscious and 
assertive nature inherent in its meaning. That is, one could say that the concept of 
“relatedness” carried in the meaning of kinship takes on a more dynamic and
20 Carsten, Cultures of Relatedness. 26.
21 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology. Vol.l. [New York: 
Bedminster Press, 1968] 385-398.
22 Orlando Patterson, "Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance," in Nathan Glazer and Daniel 
Moynihan (eds), Ethnicity: Theory and Practice. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975].
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functional form than in ethnicity. This is because although ethnicity denotes 
likeness, kinship connotes action in the name o f or resulting from it.
In point of illustration, people may share common histories or historical 
myths (as with common ethnicity), but it is how they perceive and interpret these 
commonalities that determines if they form the basis or impetus for social- 
political mobilisation. This distinction carries important implications, for the 
factor of kinship involves not only sharing common ethnicity, but also the 
translation o f such relatedness into socio-political action. Put differently, this 
entails its utility as a “value” through which policy-makers view their world . In 
that manner, kinship provides the reference point for relations between states who 
are perceived to share historical commonalities. Drawing attention to this 
distinction between kinship and ethnicity, it has been noted that “ethnicity is an 
aspect of social relationship between agents who consider themselves as being 
culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom they have a 
minimum of regular interaction. It can thus also be defined as a social identity 
(based on a contrast vis-a-vis others) characterised by metaphoric or “fictive 
kinship”24. However, formulated and presented thence, the symbols of ethnic 
identity must be appropriated and internalised before they can serve as a basis for 
orienting people to social-political action. It is suggested here that it is the sense 
of kinship that invests these bonds with a potential for action and mobilization.
The kinship factor can therefore be understood as ethnicity appropriated, 
internalised, and politicized, where common ethnicity, history, and social-cultural 
relatedness such as similar religion and cultural practices are constructed to create 
a strong psychological sentiment between two groups of people not necessarily 
directly linked by bloodline, which in turn encourages political action on behalf 
of they who are considered kin. In the study of a social or political relationship, 
the kinship factor refers to how this socially and culturally constructed relatedness 
between two groups or populations results in co-identification, which is often 
expressed in terms of bonds of kinship despite the paucity of direct consanguineal 
or affinal relations. Such a functional notion of kinship then, as David Schneider
23 For the role o f “values” in foreign policy-making, see Joseph Frankel, The Making of Foreign 
Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making. [London: Oxford University Press, 1963] 111-122.
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has described, “is more one of doing than of being. It is based largely on the 
interaction, the doing, of exchange and less on the state of being, of having some 
substance, quality, or attribute”25. This distinction is particularly important to the 
objective of understanding how kinship can or cannot be a factor in relations 
between nation-states who perceive their relationship along the terms of such 
constructed relatedness.
It should be evident that because it often exists as a social and cultural 
construction, the presence and operation of the kinship factor is also based largely 
on perception and interpretation, particularly of those who evoke and appropriate 
it for political causes. The matter of the perception, interpretation and 
appropriation of kinship metaphors for political purposes hence, is fundamental to 
any attempt to understand the discourse and function of the kinship factor 
between people, communities or states. Put differently, the kinship factor entails 
obligations and expectations.
Expectation and obligation is largely accepted as a given in the context of 
biological kinship, but takes on equal importance for kinship defined as socially 
and culturally constructed relatedness. Put simply, expectations and obligations 
are the norms of kinship that distinguish it from other less intimate forms of 
relationships. Likewise as a functional and dynamic concept the kinship factor 
also dictates that concern be given to how these norms work out in the behaviour 
and action of peoples and groups identified as “kin”. Again, the importance of 
interaction among, and expectations of, kin can be found in the anthropology 
literature. Roy Wagner, for example, surmised “exchange defines; consanguinity 
relates” . Elsewhere, Rita Astuti has concluded that notions of identity and 
relatedness are established through performance rather than substance27. 
Similarly in Charles Stafford’s work, he emphasizes the importance of obligation
9Rand reciprocity in the construction of relatedness . Likewise, Barbara Bodenhom
24 Kevin Yelvington, Producing Power: Ethnicity. Gender, and Class in a Caribbean Workplace. 
[Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995] 168.
25 David Schneider, A Critique. 75, emphasis in the original.
26 Roy Wagner, The Curse of Souw: Principles of Daribi clan definition and alliance in New 
Guinea. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press ] 66.
27 See Rita Astuti, People of the Sea. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995].
28 See Charles Stafford, “Chinese patriliny and the cycles o f yang and laiwang” in Carsten,
Cultures.
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contends that it is the work process more than birth or blood that creates 
“immutable rights” associated with kinship29. Indeed, extending Schneider’s 
critique of Fortes’, it can be suggested as an extreme that without consideration 
for the functional aspects of relatedness, the “state” of being kin may well be 
rendered meaningless.
III. Kinship exclusivity
It is also the functionality of kinship that allows it to be conceptualized 
along the inclusion-exclusion frontier. As Walker Connor has argued, kinship is 
the psychological bond that joins people and differentiates (them) from everyone 
else30. Viewed from the perspective of identity, it can be argued that kinship 
functions to translate relatedness into the “we” effect of inclusion. Alternatively 
in emphasizing relatedness and affiliation, it is inexorable that an “other” (or 
“they”) is implicated31. The difference between kin and non-kin is perceived as 
being manifested through one set of people whom one can trust and rely on, 
whose identity is perceived to be dynamically linked with one’s own and, on the 
other hand, the set of all others who are non-kin, whose responses are less 
“predictable”. Kin then, are those of whom one has expectations, and who have 
obligations toward their fellow kin. Likewise from a functional perspective, it is 
the fulfillment of these expectations and obligations that define one as kin. It is 
this phenomenon that has been manifested in the sphere of international politics. 
Consider for example, relations between Israel and the Arab League, or of 
Maphilindo, a still-borne organization that nevertheless had as its implicit logic 
kin-based unification of the Malay peoples of Southeast Asia (namely Indonesia, 
Malaya and the Philippines) against the increasing presence and political 
assertiveness of the Chinese diaspora in the region. Perhaps the most vivid 
example of such exclusion took the form of German expansionism in the 1930s, 
where Nazi Germany’s pursuit of Volkstumspolitik in resolving the Sudeten
29 See Barbara Bodenhom, “’He used to be my relative’: exploring the bases of relatedness among 
Inupiat of northern Alaska” in Carsten, Cultures.
30 Walker Connor, Ethno-Nationalism. 92.
31 See for example, the chapters by Seiser, Pedroso de Lima and Brumann in Schweitzer (ed), 
Dividends of Kinship.
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problem led to the exploitation of the ethnic German population in 
Czechoslovakia as a fifth column that eventually resulted in the subjugation of the 
Czech state32.
IV. The politics of kinship: Nationalism and beyond
In his investigations into the origins of nationalism, Anthony Smith argues 
that the basis of the modem nation can be found in the Ethnie, which he defines 
as “clusters of population with similar perceptions and sentiments generated by, 
and encoded in, specific beliefs, values and practices”33. Smith later refines it to 
“named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical 
memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some 
measure of solidarity, at least among their elites”34. One should note that the idea 
of Ethnie defers from that of the nation, which Smith presents as “a named human 
population which shares myths and memories, a mass public culture, a designated 
homeland, economic unity and equal rights and duties for all members”35. Hence, 
while Smith would concede that nationalism is a modem doctrine, to him it is 
based on pre-modem premises36. By suggesting that this dimension of identity 
comprises “historical clusters of myth, memory, values and symbols”, Smith in 
fact evokes Geertz’s notion of the “primordial attachments” of kinship37. More 
importantly, his definition of Ethnie reflects the kinship factor at work at forging 
a national identity, for he identifies the manner by which ethnic bonds are 
mobilized toward the formation of a nation-state. To Smith’s mind, the sense of 
shared destiny that underscores the birth of nationalist ethos is based primarily on
32 Radomir Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study of Czech-German Relations. 
1933-1962. [New York: New York University Press, 1964]; Ronald M. Smelser, The Sudeten 
Problem. 1935-38. [Kent: Dawson, 1975].
33 Anthony D. Smith, Ethnic Origins of Nations. [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986] 97 and Smith, 
National Identity. [London: Penguin, 1991] 21.
34 Anthony D. Smith. Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. [Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995] 
56.
35 Ibid, 57.
36 It is notable that Anthony Smith is more sympathetic to such primordial forces than other 
theorists o f nationalism. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. [Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983] and Encounters with Nationalism. [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994].
37 That said, it must also be emphasized that Smith’s reading of primordialists such as Geertz is 
more nuanced and as such, Smith would not consider himself a “primordialist”, even if  he does 
share in some of their assumptions.
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the construction of relatedness on the back of perceived commonalities, not least 
of which is a particular interpretation of its own history. It is interesting too, that 
Smith emphasises the importance of “historical clusters, or heritages, of myths, 
memories, values and symbols for cultural community formation” over the state 
of ethnic ties, emphasizing that the Ethnie is in fact more than common 
ethnicity38.
The relevance of Smith’s version of nationhood for this study will come to 
the fore in the following two chapters when an analysis of how kinship discourse 
was framed by nationalists either side of the Melaka Straits precisely in terms of a 
shared interpretation of a common history (what Smith terms the “myth-symbol 
complex”) is undertaken, for it is through the lens of history that the kinship 
factor is mobilised in nationalist discourse . The matter of the need for careful 
distinction between kinship and the modem, Western nationalist enterprise is also 
critical to this study for as Chapter Three will show, tensions arose when these 
Western conceptions of nationalism and nation-statehood were applied to the pre­
war and immediate post-war anti-colonial struggles in British Malaya and the 
Dutch East Indies, where conceptions of nation were blurred by kinship loyalties. 
This was illustrated most poignantly in the agitation for pan-Malay unity.
Returning to the theoretical association between kinship and nationalism, 
in Smith’s view there is a very distinct political dimension to the co-affiliation 
dynamics generated within the Ethnie. This lies in the process through which the 
Ethnie becomes a modem nation. This process takes place through essentially 
five stages: the inclusion of whole people (masses), the constitution of a ‘legal- 
political community’, legitimation through nationalist ideology, integration in the 
international system, and the delimitation of a national territory40. The pertinence 
of Smith’s conclusions for this study can be distilled at two levels. First, he has 
clearly illuminated how the kinship factor can function through the politicisation
38 Anthony Smith, “Theories of Nationalism” in Michael Leifer (ed), Asian Nationalism. [London: 
Routledge, 2000] 12.
39 See Natividad Gutierrez, “Ethnic Revivals Within Nation-States?” in Hans Rudolf Wicker (ed), 
Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity: The Struggle for Meaning and Order in Europe. [New 
York and Oxford: Berg, 1997] 166-169. See also Anthony Smith, “Ethnic Myths and Ethnic 
Revivals”, European Journal of Sociology. XXV (1984) and “Ethnic Election and Cultural 
Identity”, Ethnic Studies. No. 10 (1993).
40 See Smith, Nations and Nationalism.
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of relatedness in the context of Ethnies for the objectives of national self- 
determination. In other words, it can be argued that it is the kinship factor that 
drives people to sacrifice and die for “their people” in the name of national 
liberation. This point was further emphasised by David Brown when he 
described the “invention” of the ideology of nationalism as “individuals (who) 
sought imagined communities which could mimic the kinship group in offering a 
sense of identity, security, and authority”41. Similarly, while Anderson would 
suggest that the co-affiliation of Smith’s Ethnies in and of themselves are 
insufficient in scope to shape a population into a nation-state with territorial 
boundaries, he does agree that “primordial forces” such as kinship are important 
in the “imagination” of the nation-state42: just as the nation-state is imagined on 
this basis, so too kinship can be constructed. Yet one need also consider that the 
transition from Ethnie to the modem nation is not necessarily unilineal. One 
critical point to keep in mind is the fact that even assuming that the “nation” 
would ultimately find territorial expression, many of its “members” could also 
conceivably be left outside its borders. It is here that one finds distinction 
between kinship and nationalism.
Forces such as colonialism, migration and war for example, can 
conceivably separate an Ethnie, leading eventually to the creation of separate 
nation-states from the same Ethnie. The question to be posed here in this event, 
and one that has eluded studies of nationalism in international relations, is to what 
extent the kin ties that bind the people within an Ethnie continue to define, 
organise and influence relations between nations and nation-states constituted into 
different territorial entities, but originating from the same Ethnie. Put differently, 
what happens to kinship when Ethnies, or nations (which for Smith are the 
successors to the Ethnie) for that matter, evolve into separate states, and how does 
one reconcile the similarities that kinship has with nationalism, stopping short of 
a claim of one state for one Ethnie? This would certainly pose a conceptual 
problem if the modernist principles of nationalism include the acceptance of
41 David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism. 40.
42 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism -  Second Edition. [London: Verso, 1991]. Anderson suggests that the advent of print 
capitalism is the crucial catalyst in the imagination of the nation as it assisted in the spread of the 
national “myth”.
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Mayall’s “national idea” that the nation is the proper basis for the sovereign 
state43.
V. The concept of kin states
While there is no “theory” of kinship in International Relations, there is 
evidence of it in terms of the dynamics of relations between “kin states”. In his 
study of secessionist movements in South Asia, Raj at Ganguly contends “ethnic 
kin states are typically those states which border or are close to the secessionist 
region and which contains co-nationals of the secessionists with whom the 
secessionists share and maintain strong ethno-cultural and ethno-religious 
bonds”44. A kin state for Ganguly then, is a sort of “motherland state”, and 
kinship operates in terms of movements seeking to enlist political or military 
assistance from the “motherland state” either to create their own state, or even to 
foster political union with the motherland. Often, such a kin state relationship is 
driven by the close ethnic and people-to-people ties between some or all of the 
nationals in the “motherland state” and the ethnic communities that are agitating 
for autonomy in or independence from a host state45. The issue of geographic 
proximity is also a feature of Ganguly’s definition, for secessionist groups often 
are located physically in close proximity to their motherland states.
Beyond assisting ethno-nationalism and secession however, kin affinity 
can also operate at other levels; namely, that between independent territorial 
nation-states. When one speaks of the kinship factor among independent 
territorial nation-states, one refers to the strong sense of affiliation that might 
bring the majority of a nation-states’ population to identify with those of other 
nation-states with which they share commonalities such as those described by 
Smith. It follows that nation-states that enjoy a relationship based on these shared
43 See James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society. [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993] Introduction.
44 Rajat Ganguly, Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts: Lessons from South Asia. [New 
Delhi and London: Sage Publishers, 1998] 9.
45 See James Rosenau (ed), International Aspects o f Civil Strife. [Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1964]; Evan Luard, The International Regulation of Civil Wars. [London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1972]; Alexis Heraclides, “Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement”, 
International Organization. Vol.44, No.3 (Summer 1990).
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characteristics can also be termed kin states. It is clear that the idea of kin states 
employed here shares Ganguly’s general assumptions of primordial, ethno­
cultural and ethno-religious bonds, yet these bonds can exist not only between 
diasporas or secessionist movements and irredentist states, but between two 
separate sovereign, independent territorial nation-states where a significant 
portion of their respective populations share historical-symbolic, linguistic and 
religious ties as well. Beyond that however, the populations of these states must 
also have shared a high degree of historical interaction not only for these bonds of 
kith and kin to be established, but also for them to subsequently be politicised. 
This influence of historical interaction is crucial to an understanding of the 
kinship factor as political action, for there can be states whose populations share 
some measure of kin affiliation, but whose relations have not been politicised46.
For the purposes of this study then, kin states can be defined as sovereign 
states where a significant percentage of their populations (but not necessarily the 
entire population) share common ancestry as well as ethnic and cultural 
(particularly religious and linguistic) affiliations with each other that have been 
established through a historical process of close interaction (not unlike Smith’s 
concept of Ethniesf1.
Returning to an earlier point, the kinship factor also has that functional 
element, the “act” of kinship, which is defined by the existence of expectations 
and obligations. In considering the notions of expectation and obligation it is not 
surprising that kinship is often equated with amity. Fortes for instance suggests 
that amity is a universal content of kinship, and he offers the operative feature of 
the kinship factor as “the axiom of prescriptive altruism”48. This approach 
presents connection and inclusion not merely as desirable but inevitable, while 
exclusion is likewise caste in negative terms. Further elaborating on kinship as 
amity, Julian Pitt-Rivers has noted:
The reciprocity (of kinship) is undifferentiated in that it requires that a 
member of the group shall sacrifice himself for another, that kinsmen
46 One thinks of the Scandinavian countries, which the rest of Europe sees as conspicuous kin 
states.
47 The majority is taken as the definition of a kin state because there are very few homogenous 
states in the world today.
48 Fortes, Kinship and the Social Order. 110.
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shall respect preferential rules of conduct towards one another 
regardless of their individual interests. Such reciprocity as there is 
comes from the fact that other kinsmen do likewise49.
Hence relations between kin states can be defined not only by the ethno­
cultural and historical links their inhabitants share, but also by the expectations 
and obligations these sovereign states have of each other as a result of their co­
identification. Expectations and obligations take on greater precedence when one 
considers relations between kin states, where pressure almost always exists for 
them to organise their relations on logic beyond material calculations of 
“interest”.
VI. Kinship as a factor in International Relations
By way of the above as a theoretical springboard, it follows that kinship 
can be considered one of a range of factors that conceivably account for the state 
of relations between kin states, particularly if one favours an inter-paradigmatic 
and historical approach to understanding international relations. Of particular 
import for purposes here is how the anthropological concept of kinship 
illuminates what Mandaville describes as “political dimensions of various 
transnational social forms, some of which seem to challenge the limits of the 
political as defined by the modem state . . . .  because transnationalism creates 
forms of political identity which do not fit the taxonomies of political 
modernity”50.
Reflecting the conceptual premises established earlier, when evoked, the 
kinship factor immediately brings to mind solidarity based on biological or social- 
cultural relatedness between populations. Such solidarity is often manifested in 
resolute support expressed toward the party considered “kin” in times of crisis. It 
is in this sense that kinship relatedness among kin states can be articulated as a 
functional concept. It is not surprising then that such deep-seated relations can 
conjure up images of blood relations reflected in such ideas as “blood
49 Julian Pitt-Rivers, “The Kith and Kin” in Jack Gooding (ed), The Character o f Kinship. 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973] 101.
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brotherhood” and “blood ties”. These metaphorical images reflect attempts to 
give greater meaning and intelligibility to relations, and from there create 
conditions of possibility out of which policies may arise.
A common exercise of politicised kinship takes the shape of activities 
such as diplomatic, political and cultural support for the cause of national self- 
determination51. In Mao’s China for instance, the policy of “dual citizenship” for 
overseas Chinese harkened attention to the power of the kinship factor. The 
example of Irish-American relations illustrates further the relevance of kinship. 
Irish involvement in American affairs dates back to the early 19th Century, when 
British subjugation and oppression, along with famine, drove millions of Irish 
migrants to the greener pastures of America. Physical dislocation however, did 
not bring about the severance of emotional ties with the homeland. Irish 
immigrants would bring along with them culture, language and religion. More 
importantly, political values and nationalist ethos were transported across the 
Atlantic as well. The Irish stood as America’s ally during their war of 
independence against Britain, a war in which Irish-Americans fought proudly52. 
So too, as a result of perceptions of kinship that existed, “the question of Irish 
self-government became an American question as surely as it was a British 
one”53. The Secretary of State in Theodore Roosevelt’s government noted how 
the Irish in America were a powerful interest group which he could not discount 
in US-British-Irish relations54. Similarly, Woodrow Wilson admitted in 1917 that 
“the only circumstance which seems now to stand in the way of absolutely cordial 
co-operation with Great Britain is the failure so far to find a satisfactory method 
of self-government for Ireland”55.
Oftentimes, this kinship factor also translates into support in times of 
crisis for a fellow kin state. British leaders regularly espoused kinship between
50 Peter Mandaville, “Reading the state from elsewhere: towards an anthropology of the 
postnational”, Review of International Studies. Vol.28 (2002) 204.
51 See for example, Gabriel Sheffer (ed), Modem Diasporas in International Politics. [London: 
Croom Helm, 1986].
52 See Carl Wittke, The Irish in America. [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956]; 
J.L. Kieman, Ireland and America versus England. [Detroit: George W. Pattison, 1964].
53 Alan J. Ward, Ireland and Anglo-American Relations. 1899-1921. [London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1969] 2.
54 Ibid, 256-257.
55 Ibid, 258.
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the “English-speaking peoples” in the early years of the Cold War to underscore 
Anglo-American cooperation against the Soviet threat56. Kin sentiments also 
motivated ideologies of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Slavism in the 19th and early 20th 
Centuries. It is notable that such ideologies remain enduring forces in 
international politics, even as they have taken on more muted forms since the late 
1980s57. Ethnic affiliation and co-identification have also driven governments to 
go to war in the name of brotherhood. Militant Pan-Arabism during the Arab- 
Israeli wars, particularly the Yom Kippur War of 1973, attest to this; so too the 
support given by Australia and New Zealand to the British war effort during both 
the First and Second World Wars (particularly during the First World War when 
tens of thousands of Australian and New Zealand troops were shipped halfway 
across the world to fight a war which had no immediate impact on national 
security)58. It was also the case during the Balkans war, where Serb and Croat 
minorities were supplied arms by their kindred states.
Another striking example is Russia’s relations with Serbia59. Ties 
between Serbs and Russians extend back to the early medieval period, built on the 
premises of shared language (Slavic) and religion (Orthodox Christianity). This 
close affinity led David MacKenzie to contend that “with no one else can Serbia 
achieve its goal more easily than in agreement with Russia”60. The pre-modem 
basis of Russo-Serb ties has seen Russia fight several wars alongside Serbia, wars 
that did not have any direct impact on Russian strategic interests. Alexander II 
sent nearly 1,000 volunteers to fight in the Serbian Army against the Ottoman
56 See Ritchie Ovendale, The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the 
Dominions and the Cold War. 1945-1951. [London: Allen & Unwin, 1985]; John Baylis, Anglo- 
American Relations Since 1939. [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997].
57 See Jacob Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation -  2nd Edition. [London: 
Hurst and Company, 1995] esp. 194-234.
58 See for example, Dennis Austin and W.H. Morris-Jones (eds), Australia and Britain. [London: 
Frank Cass, 1980]; Michael Davie, Anglo-Australian Attitudes. [London: Seeker & Warburg, 
2000].
59 For a general survey o f Russo-Serb relations, see David MacKenzie, Imperial Dreams. Harsh 
Realities: Tsarist Foreign Policy. 1815-1917. [Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College 
Publishers, 1994]; see also P/ Kolsto, “The New Russian Diaspora”, Ethnic and Racial Studies. 
Vol.19, No.3 (July 1996) and V. Vujacic, “Historical Legacies, Nationalist Mobilization and 
Political Outcomes in Russia and Serbia: A Weberian View”, Theory and Society. Vol.25, No.6 
(December 1996).
60 Ibid, 7.
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domination of the Balkans in the mid-1870s61. Russia also reluctantly declared 
war on Turkey in 1877, despite both international opposition to Russian 
interference in the Balkans and economic instability at home62. It was also noted 
that despite Russia’s failure at the Congress of Berlin to uphold the territorial 
integrity of Slavic populations in the Balkans, “the Serbian people still looked to 
Russia as a kindred nation whose people were of the same race and religion”63. 
Certainly this comment echoed the sentiments of Serbs at the time, just as the 
Serbian newspaper Zastava noted, “as to our national relations with Russia and 
our Russian brethren, they can never cool, nor can the Serbs ever be wrenched 
away from our brother Russians”64. Russia would again come to the aid of Serbia 
in 1914, where “it was the clamour of the Slavophiles that caused Alexander II to 
interpose to save Belgrade from occupation and the Serbs from virtual 
annihilation”65. Once again, Russian involvement would be undertaken against 
perceived Russian interests. Rather then allow a massive Slavic defeat in the 
Balkans, Russia entered the conflict on the side of the Serbs, even though the 
Serbs instigated the conflict. The fact that Russia subsequently paid a high price 
for involvement demonstrates just how strong ties were between Russia and 
Serbia66.
As was elucidated earlier, the kinship factor is also as much about 
exclusion or identifying an “other”, as it is about inclusion. Exclusionary 
dynamics were discernible in Pan-Arabism and Ba’athism, particularly during the 
1950s to 1970s. These movements found official expression after World War 
Two in the Arab League, and in several other attempts at unification67. While 
presented outwardly as an attempt to unify the various states of the Arab world on 
the basis first of Islam and subsequently nationalism, the sub-text of these
61 See David MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism. 1875-1878. [Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1967] 194-247.
62 See Ibid.
63 Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal 
Affairs o f Bulgaria and Serbia. 1879-1886. [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1958] 163.
64 Quoted in MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism. 288-289.
65 Stephen Graham, Tsar of Freedom: The Life and Reign of Alexander II. [New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1935] 218.
66 Russian involvement in the Second World War contributed substantively to the outbreak o f the 
Russian Revolution and the subsequent downfall o f the Romanov Empire.
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political movements was clearly the common cause of anti-Zionism, manifested 
most strikingly in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. Pan-Arabism later took 
on a less conspicuous but no less political form of cohesion in their use of oil as a 
major economic and political weapon in international politics. Likewise, pan- 
Afficanism, which was a vibrant political ideology during the anti-colonial period 
of the 1950s and 1960s on the African continent (mostly due to the political and 
diplomatic exertions of Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and the “Casablanca Group”),
• • • AOfocused a common energy against colonialism and racial discrimination . 
Likewise it can be argued that the cause of blood brotherhood between China and 
North Vietnam espoused in the 1950s was built more on their mutual revulsion 
against Western imperialism than cultural or ideological convergence.
VII. The phenomenon of “kin rivalry”
Considering the favourable impulses toward cooperation generated by the 
kinship factor between kin states, the question arises as to whether relations 
between kin states are presupposed to be harmonious. It is argued here however, 
that while amity is certainly an identifiable trait, this by no means makes it a 
deterministic or conclusive outcome of kin relatedness. Indeed, relationships 
defined as kin are also prone to rivalry. Though regularly read into its meaning, 
kinship in no way implies predetermined and unconditional support at all costs; 
and if amity is accepted as a code of behaviour in kinship relations, this does not 
entail that it cannot be contravened, nor should one assume a priori that amity 
everywhere and under all circumstances elicits the same generosity in response. 
In a study on Malay kinship for example, David Banks noted that “consanguinity 
is a morally approved framework for the expression of kin sentiments, but blood 
kinsmen are not thought always to share kin sentiments even if they are close 
consanguines”69. Furthermore in a groundbreaking study on sibling rivalry, 
socio-biologists have discovered that:
67 For example, the Arab Federation, The United Arab Republic, the Arab Union, and the Arab 
Maghreb Union.
68 See for example, W.Ofuatey-Kodjoe (ed), Pan-Africanism: New Directions in Strategy. [New 
York: University Press o f America, 1986].
69 David Banks, Malay Kinship. [Philadelphia: Institute for the Study o f Human Issues, 1983] 164.
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Because many or most social interactions are not between close kin, 
such an expectation (of rivalry) is of no particular interest; selfishness 
is unchecked. However, selfish behaviour often exacts a heavy toll 
on the very closest of genetic relatives, including offspring and 
siblings70 {emphasis added).
Quite clearly, kin state relations have the capacity to deteriorate, 
prompting one to consider not merely “blood brotherhood” but “sibling rivalry” 
as well. Paradoxically, then the potential of kinship for fostering a sense of unity 
and mutual understanding is rivalled only by its potential for divisiveness. One 
striking example revolves around the phenomenon of “divided nations”. States 
such as Korea, China, and pre-unification Germany have consistently articulated 
re-unification in terms of kinship, yet, particularly in the case of the former two,
71conflict as a tool for re-unification has never been discounted .
At other times, kin state tensions take the form of diplomatic 
disagreements over policy positions. Consider again US-Ireland relations. Even 
though the US played an active role in supporting the formation of an 
independent Irish Republic, relations turned contentious not long after Dublin 
declared independence. One of the most controversial periods of Irish-American 
relations was the Second World War. Troy Davis notes that:
Most American leaders, and a large number of Americans in general, 
thought that Ireland’s history and its political values, as well as the ties 
of kinship and affection that bound so many Irish to the United States, 
made the smaller country’s adherence to the Allied cause a logical 
response to the war against German Nazism, Italian fascism and 
Japanese militarism72.
Nevertheless despite heavy American pressure, and much to Washington’s 
displeasure and frustration, Dublin chose to maintain a policy of “friendly 
neutrality” throughout the war73.
70 Douglas Mack and Geoffrey Parker, The Evolution o f Sibling Rivalry. [London: Oxford 
University Press, 1997] 2.
71 See John Metzler, Divided Dynamism: The Diplomacy of Separated Nations. [Lanham: 
University Press of America, 2001].
72 Troy Davis, Dublin’s American Policy: Irish-American Diplomatic Relations. 1945-1952. 
[Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1998] 2.
73 Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland. Ulster and the Price of Neutrality. 1939-1945. 
[Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1983] 280-281. In effect, Ireland’s foreign
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Notwithstanding Washington’s own declaration of neutrality in the early 
years of the conflict, Roosevelt’s pro-British policy meant that beneath the 
official proclamation, Washington had begun exerting pressure on Dublin to 
rescind neutrality and join Britain in the fight against Germany and Italy. At this, 
Irish Prime Minister de Valera was unimpressed, and he doggedly maintained 
Ireland’s commitment to neutrality74. As the war drew nearer however, 
Washington rejected de Valera’s request for arms to defend Ireland should the 
war reach Irish shores. At the same time, relations with Britain reached a new 
level of tension with Churchill’s decision in June 1940 to destroy the French 
naval fleet at Oran to prevent it falling into German hands. In response, de Valera 
expressed concern for a possible British invasion of Ireland for the similar 
purpose of pre-empting Germany from establishing a foothold on Britain’s 
Western flank. De Valera had suspected that the US would likely remain silent if 
London took such a move. Subsequently upon entering the war, American troop 
landings in Northern Ireland were interpreted as disrespecting of Irish sovereignty 
and were greeted with protests in Dublin75. Nor was Ireland ready to give up its 
ports for the Allies’ Atlantic war efforts76. Dublin too, would reject American 
pressures to sever diplomatic relations with Berlin77. Ties between Washington 
and Dublin remained strained after the war as a result of Ireland’s reluctance to 
participate in NATO78.
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Anvil Books, 1987] 162-249.
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The permutations in Ireland-US relations illustrate the complexities 
surrounding the kinship factor that plague relations between kin states. The US 
and Britain too, English speaking and Judaeo-Christian “brothers-in-arms” over 
two world wars, have experienced their share of disputes, the most controversial 
perhaps being the Suez Crisis. At times kin rivalry even results in military 
conflict. For instance in the case of Laos and Thailand, it has been suggested 
that:
If natural affinity alone had determined the political orientation of 
modem Laos, it probably would have led to an association with 
Thailand, at least for the ethnic Lao population of the Mekong Valley.
The two peoples are believers in Theravada Buddhism, speak a similar 
language, written in a script of Indian derivation, and belong to the 
Hinduized sphere of civilization79.
It is clear from this description that Laos and Thailand share much in common 
insofar as kin affiliation is concerned80. Yet as recent as 1987-1988, these kin 
states fought a bloody border war against each other81. The extent to which the 
kinship factor deteriorated into animosity and rivalry was tersely summarized by 
a Thai politician:
It is now 200 years since (the last war with Laos). We should cross 
over and bum Vientiane once more. There is no need to declare war 
-just go across and bum it; when it’s done come back. I don’t think 
friendly relations can happen between the Thai and Lao. The Thai 
side must remain strong. If we want to be countries like elder and 
younger brother, the elder brother must be strong, to make the 
younger brother fear. There is no use being too compliant like this.
If you go to war, do it properly, break them completely82.
In many cases, kin rivalry occurs when expectations and obligations 
associated with the mobilisation of kinship go unfulfilled. What remains striking
79 Paul Langer and Joseph Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for 
Laos. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970] 16.
80 See Mayoury and Pheuiphanh Ngaosyvathn, Kith and Kin Politics: The Relationship between 
Laos and Thailand. [Manila: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1994].
81 See Gehan Wijeyewardene, “Thailand and the Thai: Three Versions o f Ethnic Identity” in 
Wijeyewardene (ed), Ethnic Groups Across National Boundaries in Mainland Southeast Asia. 
[Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990] 76-77.
82 Siam Rath (Bangkok), 23 February 1988, quoted in Ngaosyvathn and Ngaosyvathn (eds), Kith 
and Kin Politics. 2.
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about most, if not all, of these conflicts is how the language of kinship is also 
employed to rationalise conflict between these states, giving credence to the 
argument that kinship-speak seems to be a way for these states to provide 
meaning and intelligibility to their relations, even in times of conflict.
What interests this study hence, is why kinship has not formed a viable 
basis for harmony in Indonesia-Malaysia relations, and yet continues to be evoked 
despite this. In order to address these concerns, the findings of this chapter need 
first be summarised.
VIII. Theoretical implications
It appears that the kinship factor has exercised varied influence on politics 
at several levels. It is most rudimentarily manifested in the phenomenon of 
nationalism. Numerous theorists have argued that the modem nation-state is built 
upon the genealogical, cultural and social attachments of its inhabitants, which 
Smith terms Ethnies. The key to nationalist mobilisation is the politicisation of 
ties of blood, history, ethnicity and culture. Here there is an international 
dimension as well, for the identification of each other as “kin” based on common 
expectations of and opposition to colonialism binds anti-colonial projects across 
borders. This was pronounced in pan-Arab and pan-African nationalism, and to 
some extent in the Afro-Asian movement as well. In this manner the kinship 
factor can be said to contribute to the defining of an identity in opposition to alien 
influences (i.e. the extortionist colonial enterprise).
Beyond nationalism however, the kinship factor also exerts influence in 
relations between sovereign states and the remnant of their Ethnies left outside 
their territorial boundaries. In this form perceptions and interpretations of kinship 
inspire challenges to conceptual and territorial boundaries of the nation-state, 
when new members into international society are not always supportive of the
principles of the collectivity into which they strive to enter through nationalist
0-1
agitation . In such instances, the kinship factor morphs into irredentism, 
separatism, and “fifth column” politics.
83 See Mayall, Nationalism and International Society. 35-69; 111-144.
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Finally, kinship can also feature as a factor in relations between sovereign 
states. Two points have emerged in this regard. First, the influence of the kinship 
factor can take the form of expectations and obligations arising from the 
understanding that inhabitants of kin states share common bonds (constructed or 
otherwise) that should be utilised to organise their “special relationship” in the era 
of modem statehood. This refers to the logic that while the inhabitants of a 
certain geographical area who have experienced a long history of socio-cultural 
interaction and exchange (hence sharing elements of co-identity as kin) can be 
divided (usually by imperialist intent) into separate terrestrial entities, their 
identification of each other as kin persists and informs the conduct of relations at 
an inter-state level. This is particularly so when cultural exchange and interaction 
endure, and respective populations maintain linkages across borders even after the 
formation of autonomous territorial states.
The bonds behind such “special relationships” can be further augmented 
in the face of common threats and challenges. The cooperation between the 
English-speaking Christian nations during the Second World War remains one of 
the most cogent examples. Likewise Pan-Arabism continues to be a potent 
phenomenon when directed against Israel, just as pan-Africanism was built 
around a continent-wide anti-colonial movement. Much in the same vein, as the 
study will illustrate, it seems that Indo-Malay kinship has been most potent when 
emphasised in relation to anti-Chinese sentiment. Similarly Islam, a religion 
shared by the majority of the populations of Indonesia and Malaysia and which is 
premised precisely on the language of extra-national brotherhood, offers another 
potential avenue through which to codify kinship. In recent times, the Islamic 
dimension to kinship has re-surfaced in the reluctance among Arab states (and 
Indonesia and Malaysia as well) to support U.S. military action against Iraq.
As terms of reference for relations between kin states, expectations and 
obligations can take on various forms depending on context and circumstances. 
Its most extreme case would be military support, sometimes undertaken in 
situations where a state would accrue no clear mileage from such an act other than 
fulfilling “kin” obligations. Australian involvement in the First World War 
clearly illustrated this, as did Russian support of Serbia. Expectations and
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obligations can also assume the form of political and diplomatic support such as 
the case of affirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a kin state, as the 
pan movements of Arab and African nationalism indicate.
Of interest for current purposes is the relationship between expectations 
and obligations and the potential for conflict between kin states. Here several 
observations can be made. In the case of asymmetrical relations (that is, between 
kin states of different levels of political development or maturity), expectations 
and obligations usually entails a measure of deference on the part of smaller, less 
mature states to the primacy of the more established kin. To some extent, one 
could say that the Chinese expected this of their North Vietnamese “ideological 
brothers” after Dien Bien Phu84; so too the Thais of Laos, the Americans of 
Ireland, and the Russians of Serbia. Indeed, if power is a determinant in 
international politics, one could suggest that it can be manifested in conceptions 
of primacy and deference, insofar as relations between kin states are concerned. 
Correspondingly given that kin states cross swords in the diplomatic and political 
arenas as well, it can be argued that rivalry arises out of differences in the 
perception and interpretation of kinship that result in the frustration of these 
expectations and obligations. In other words, expectations and obligations go 
unfulfilled as the anticipated mobilisation and alignment of policy, or deference in 
the case of asymmetrical relations, fails to materialise. At times, differences are 
so substantial as to result in armed conflict. Other times, they result in diplomatic 
sabre-rattling, or to the more muted but no less significant “interference in 
domestic affairs”, as if being kin somehow “legitimises” intervention in others’ 
domestic politics.
Expectations and obligations, as terms of reference for kinship, are 
pronounced in Indonesia-Malaysia relations, and have been tied intimately to 
notions of sovereignty, primacy, and deference. Seeing that a strong kinship bond 
was fostered around the shared anti-colonial struggle of two peoples whose 
respective nationalist histories attempted to paint the Indo-Malay World as a 
contiguous social-cultural unit, one of the key obligations that defined this
84 For this dimension of Sino-Vietnamese relations, see King C. Chen, Vietnam and China. 1938- 
1954. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969]; William Duiker, China and Vietnam: The
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relationship, especially in the immediate post-colonial era, was unyielding 
support from each for the other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Likewise, 
given that Indonesia and Malaysia fell into the category of Third World states 
whose independence was often contested from both within as well as outside of 
the territorial state in the early years of independence, expectations that both 
would reaffirm the sovereignty of the other in times of crisis was a definitive term 
to their relations. Dovetailing into this framework lay the matter of deference and 
primacy.
Scholars of Indonesian politics have identified Jakarta’s “proprietary 
attitude” of “regional entitlement” that have always dictated Indonesian views of
or
its position in the region . While the fact that Indonesia is primus inter pares in 
Southeast Asia in generally accepted in the field, there is a case to be made that 
this sense of primacy was particularly pronounced in relation to Malaysia. 
Indeed, the especial attention paid by Jakarta to Malaysian acknowledgement of, 
and response to, its political primacy in the Indo-Malay World has become a 
definitive feature of bilateral relations. For example, as chapters three and four 
will illustrate, Indonesia took an active interest in Malay nationalism, and this 
interest in Malayan affairs continued into the post-colonial period as it sought to 
influence the direction of Malayan foreign policy. Likewise, Malaya was 
constantly singled out in Indonesian quarters as a state that required 
“revolutionizing”, while Malayan independence, gained in cooperation with the
o r
British, was seen in Jakarta circles as “counterfeit” . Even in more recent times, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that former Indonesian President Suharto was 
particularly incensed that it was Malaysia that was attempting the usurp 
Indonesia’s rightful role as the manager of regional order and leader of the Third 
World. These observations will be elaborated upon later. Suffice to say that such 
an attitude betrayed the sense of primacy that Indonesian, and particularly 
Javanese, leaders felt towards their Malaysian counterparts. Given the historical 
ties between the two countries, this primacy clearly translated into expectations of
Roots of Conflict. [Berkeley: University of California, Institute o f East Asian Studies, 1986] 20- 
34.
85 See Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. [London: Allen and Unwin, 1983].
86 Frederick Bunnell, “Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965”, Indonesia. Vol. 11 
(October 1966) 47.
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deference on the part of Jakarta. Bilateral harmony hence, depended on whether 
Malaysia acknowledged Indonesian primacy. Equally important however, was 
how Indonesia responded to Malaysian expectations of respect for its sovereignty, 
or the extent to which Jakarta desired to influence decision-making in Kuala 
Lumpur. To that effect, events such as Confrontation would have had a severe 
impact on Malaysian perceptions of the terms of kin affiliation with Indonesia.
Second, historical process and transition are vital when considering the 
issue of consolidation and fragmentation of kin-state bonds. This is because, as 
with all social-political concepts, the kinship factor itself is subject to perceptions 
and interpretations, which in turn are influenced by the passage of time and the 
evolution of identities. Consider for example, Bull and Watson’s contention that 
Third World states had to meet what they termed “the standard of civilization” 
before being accepted as members of international society. While this may be 
true, one should also note that structures of pre-colonial international order were 
not abandoned wholesale and overnight in order to embrace the concept of
o*7
“sovereignty of the nation-state” ; nor did the European model of international
OQ
society go unchallenged . In the course of historical transition the domestic life 
and political cultures of states rooted in different civilisations, in this case 
Indonesia and Malaysia, had to reconcile their pre-modem norms, mles and 
institutions with those of modem international society. It is here that one notes 
how even upon independence, sovereign states whose populations and leaders 
share affinity are liable to develop expectations and obligations of each other. It 
is this legacy that underpins the notion that kin state relations should be premised 
on values other than pure material interests. This co-identification is further 
enhanced in the face of threats to common identity. When kin states are 
confronted with challenges to their shared identities, kinship can be constructed 
and/or emphasised to rationalise politically expedient action of defining a “we” 
against a “them”.
87 Nor did they disregard the possibilities that the prevailing Western-centred international society 
might subsequently be supplanted by other forms of international order. See Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society. [New York: Columbia University Press, 1977] 233-317.
88 An example o f this Third World “reaction” to the Western-oriented international society they 
were entering in was the Afro-Asian Conference. Some others include the Non-Aligned 
Movement, G-77, and the 1974 call for a New International Economic Order.
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Yet it is also the case that as these political entities evolve into nation­
states, internal and external contexts can have a negative effect on the kinship 
factor as national discourse and loyalties shift away from co-identification to self- 
identification on the basis of national identity construction. Such transitions work 
to affect the perception and interpretations of the terms of kinship among policy­
makers of kindred states. As states mature and consolidate their independence, 
their identities and interests, not to mention the loyalties of their populations, tend 
also to change accordingly as the character of sovereign statehood takes root. 
Correspondingly allegiances shift over time, giving primacy to the nation-state 
while commitment to other forms of identity and loyalties, including the 
expectations and obligations towards a kin state, wane. In other words the 
process of identity transformation through state formation and domestic political 
consolidation can inspire change in a state’s international outlook as nationalist 
projects influence foreign policy propensities. This transformation has a bearing 
on kin state relations, particularly in the case of asymmetrical relations where the 
“elder cousin” views the “younger relative” with mixed feelings of suspicion and 
envy when the latter assumes policy choices independent of kinship 
considerations, while the younger cousin may look at his older relative with some 
contempt as it seeks to establish relations on an even keel. This too, can 
consequently influence how kindred states conceive of the obligations and 
expectations of each other. For example, it can conceivably result in a re­
assessment of cooperation, policy alignment, or deference when one of the 
kindred states perceives such policies as unnecessary or burdensome. In like 
manner such transformation can also give rise to contradictory perceptions and 
interpretations of the terms of kinship, causing misunderstandings. When 
identities and nationalist prerogatives of kin states clash, this invariably results in 
competition. How imperatives of kinship are reconciled with nation and state 
building then, appear fundamental to whether the kinship factor can or cannot 
form a viable basis upon which relations between kin states can be organised.
The cross-currents to the influence of kinship in international relations 
discussed above explains why kinship is not necessarily synonymous to amity, 
and in fact is prone to disharmony as perceptions and interpretations of its
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attendant expectations and obligations change over time. A germane scenario to 
that effect, and one that will be the focus of this study, can be found in the process 
of national identity transformation, common in the case of post-colonial states, 
and how this process affects relations with kindred states89. As national identities 
take shape, pressure is inevitably exerted on other loyalties such as kinship. This 
observation has further theoretical consequence in the sense that evidence of 
animosity between kin states need not necessarily disprove the existence of the 
kinship factor, but rather reveals another side of the same coin.
Conclusion
To sum up thus far:
There are members of international society that can be classified 
as kin states, and this measure of kinship stems not only from 
genealogical factors, but from broader social-cultural affiliations 
a§ well, and it is these affiliations, not mere material calculations 
of “interests”, that impute meaning to their relations;
In diplomatic parlance these states define their ties as “special 
relationships”, and they organise their relations based on the 
fulfilment of expectations and obligations that kinship entails;
These expectations and obligations however, are neither static nor 
timeless, for perceptions and interpretations of the kinship factor 
among kin states evolve alongside national identities;
Consequently, the historical context set in place by processes of 
state building and national identity construction has a definite 
impact on how states perceive and interpret their relations with kin 
states, particularly when identities of these states begin with 
emphasis of similar historical start-points, as with all kin states, 
but subsequently diverge along antagonistic paths as nationalisms 
take root.
89 For a study o f how structural change impacts upon the constitution o f identity, see P.W.
Preston, Political/Cultural Identity: Citizens and Nations in a Global Era. [London: Sage 
Publications, 1997].
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Given these observations, three points should be kept in mind. First, one 
should be careful not to accept willy-nilly that in relations between kin states 
policies are made purely on calculated material “interests”. As this chapter has 
shown, perceptions of kinship have been a factor in relations between states 
whose populations share affinities, and often it is in these affinities that political 
leaders search for greater meaning and intelligibility to their relations. Second, 
neither should one construe that kinship and harmony are correlated. When the 
expectations and obligations that characterise the perception of kinship are not 
fulfilled, relations are likely to sour. Finally, to understand the full spectrum of 
the kinship factor and its influence on bilateral relations one has to realise that the 
phenomenon is dependent on the historical and political context in which it exists 
or is invoked. The fact of the matter is that from a historical perspective the 
kinship factor, despite its obvious shortcomings, does have attraction and import 
for many (including policy practitioners), and it is this that accounts for its 
continued (if diminishing) relevance for those seeking to find deeper meaning in 
the relationship between kin states.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Search for Kinship Precedents in Indo-Malay Historiography
Introduction
Kinship in Indonesia-Malaysia relations tends to be located, accurately or 
otherwise, in the notion of Malay-Muslim blood brotherhood often espoused by 
political leaders and emphasised to certain extents in scholarship on the Indo- 
Malay Archipelago. Conceptualising affinity between Indonesia and Malaysia 
however is a rather more delicate task than at first appears, and academic 
discussions arguably give rise to more controversies than unanimity of opinion. 
While there is little doubt that ethno-cultural considerations have an impact on the 
conduct of politics, the interface between the two will nevertheless have to be 
carefully drawn out from a complex conceptual maze. This is especially so with 
regard to the subject matter at hand, for the cultural and ethnic correspondence 
that some would suggest defines Indo-Malay identity obtain alongside very 
diverse and complex social-political phenomenon that temper not only the 
contiguous identity of the Indo-Malay World, but the very existence of Indonesia 
and Malaysia as unitary nation-states in their own right. Certainly, scholars 
would be well aware that the “national” identities upon which these modem states 
are built are in fact agglomerations of diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic 
groupings, each with its own particularistic character and history1. It is bearing 
these considerations in mind that this chapter sets forth to explore the 
historiography of kinship in the Indo-Malay World. This chapter lays the 
premises not only for the grounds upon which the kinship factor between 
Indonesia and Malaysia can and has been built by its proponents, but also the
1 Historians of Southeast Asia have been alert to this very early on. As a result, they have 
observed that “the greatest research need . . .  is the filling o f innumerable and vexing gaps in our 
detailed knowledge . . .  o f the histories of the area’s constituent parts and sub-parts”. See, Harry 
Benda, “The Structure of Southeast Asian History: Some Preliminary Observations” in Benda, 
Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Journal Articles of Harry J. Benda. [New 
Haven, C.T.: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1972] 121. With very few exceptions,
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conceptual and practical problems one encounters in the process of defining the 
kinship factor in Indo-Malay history.
I. Kinship in the pre-colonial international system
Much of the thinking about kinship systems in Indo-Malay historiography 
arise from the historical record of interaction and inter-marriage that has defined 
the identity of this region, and that have been transcribed in historical texts such 
as Tuhfat al-Nafis or Sejarah Melayu dan Bugis (History of the Malays and 
Bugis)2. In Tuhfat al-Nafis, the main theme is the relationship between the Malay 
rulers of Riau, Johor and Trengganu with the Siak (in Sumatra) and Bugis. The 
writers of the text also focused on the matter of ethnic origin and relations sewn 
through a vast network of intermarriages linking Riau-Johor, Kedah, Perak, 
Selangor, Pahang and Trengganu on the peninsula, and the east and west coasts of 
Sumatra and Kalimantan respectively. Similar tales of co-identification resulting 
from inter-marriages, such as that between Sultan Mansur Shah of Srivijaya and 
the Princess Radin Galah Chandra Kirana of Majapahit, can be found in the 
Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals)3. Intermarriages paved the way for genealogical 
tracing of the most elementary sources of kinship -  common ancestry. Indeed 
right up until the eve of the Pacific War intermarriages between Malay and 
Sumatran royal families remained a principal feature of the socio-political 
landscape in the Indo-Malay World, leading to close alliance between the ruling 
elites of British Malaya and Sumatra.
Inter-marriage and migration also brought into being large trading states 
and kingdoms that at their peak of power encompassed within their spheres of 
influence territories of present day Malaysia and Indonesia, and where power and 
influence over the Indo-Malay World ebbed and flowed through pre-colonial 
history. Among the more prominent of these kingdoms was the Srivijaya Empire,
contemporary works on the international relations of Southeast Asia have not made attempts to 
study their topic from a historical perspective.
2 See Virginia Matheson, “Tuhfat al-Nafis: A 19th Century Malay History Critically Examined”, 
PhD dissertation, Monash University, 1973.
3 See Kwa Chong Guan, “The Historical Roots o f Indonesian Irredentism”, Asian Studies.
Vol.VIII, No.l (April 1970) 44-45.
67
which lasted approximately from the 7th to 13th Centuries. With its capital settled 
in Palembang in Sumatra, the influence of the Srivijayan Empire is suspected to 
have spread throughout Sumatra and the west coast of the Malay Peninsula up 
towards the Isthmus of Kra4. At times, its influence appeared to extend to the 
island of Java as well5.
The existence of Srivijaya in the history of archipelagic Southeast Asia 
intersected with the land-based Javanese kingdom of Majapahit, which existed 
from approximately 1293 to 15206. At the height of its power, the physical 
boundaries of the Majapahit kingdom may have been roughly co-extensive with 
much, though not all, of modem Indonesia. Certain historical records suggest that 
at some time or other, Majapahit also exerted a measure of influence over 
principalities on the Malay Peninsula, though in truth the extent of its influence 
remains an issue of scholarly debate .
The decline of Majapahit coincided with the emergence of another centre 
of power in the Indo-Malay World, located in Melaka8. The Melaka Sultanate 
was centred along the Southwestern coast of the Malay Peninsula. While there 
remains disagreement among historians as to the extent to which Melaka can be 
considered a direct successor to the Srivijayan Empire, what is certain is its strong 
Sumatran roots9. The similarities in political and economic organisation, as well 
as security outlook, of both kingdoms has been illuminated upon by Rosemary 
Brissenden:
4 The capital o f the Srivijayan Empire was subsequently moved from Palembang to Jambi on the 
Southeastern Coast of Sumatra in the latter part o f the 11th Century.
5 See O.W. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study o f the Origins of Srivijaya. [Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1967] and The Fall of Sriviiava in Malay History. [London: Lund 
Humphries, 1970].
6 See T.G. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century: A Study in Cultural History. [The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, I960].
7 Ailsa Zainu’ddin and Elaine McKay, “Tradition and Leadership in the Other Islands” in McKay 
(ed), Studies in Indonesian History. [Victoria: Pitman, 1976] 255. This view, o f course, is not 
unchallenged. See for example, W.F. Wertheim, “The Sociological Approach” in Soedjatmoko 
(ed), An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965] 348- 
350.
8 For a study o f the impact of the Melakan Sultanate in defining the identity o f the Malay World, 
see Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate o f Malacca. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa 
dan Pustaka, 1992].
9 This point is emphasized in Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Andaya, A History of 
Malaysia. [London: MacMillan Press, 1982].
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We know that the political and defence tasks, as well as the need to 
cope with a large international and itinerant sector of the population 
which formed the basis of its economy had been much the same in 
Srivijaya as they were in Malacca. Thus it does not seem entirely 
outrageous to take the organisation of political and economic life in 
Malacca as a reflection in some senses at least of the structure of 
trading kingdoms in Indonesia10.
With the advent of Portuguese colonialism, the Melaka Sultanate declined 
in the early 16th Century and the indigenous centre of power shifted to the 
kingdoms of Aceh, Johor and Riau. Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest 
that the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra enjoyed a degree of interaction and 
integration within the spheres of these early kingdoms to the extent that 
Srivijaya’s traditions continued in an almost unbroken line to Malacca, Johor and 
Riau11.
These kingdoms and empires formed the pivot to a pre-colonial
international system that was premised on trade, war, migration, and marriage. It
was such interaction that provided a historical basis to the perception that many of
inhabitants of the contemporary Indo-Malay World in fact come from the same
ancestry, thus justifying the term “rumpun” (stock or race) that is sometimes used
1 ^
to refer to the majority of the peoples of Indonesia and Malaysia .
II. Concepts of community and statehood
While differences obviously existed across the social-political structures
of these kingdoms, one thread of similarity can be found in shared understandings
11of statecraft and concepts of community . As but one example, conceptions of
10 Rosemary Brissenden, “Patterns of Trade and Maritime Society Before the Coming o f the 
Europeans” in Elaine McKay (ed), Studies in Indonesian History. 87.
11 See the discussion in Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Andaya, A History o f Malaysia. 14- 
114.
12 In Indonesia’s case, this characterisation applies mostly to the West Indonesian populations on 
Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Riau, and Sulawesi.
13 See Ariffin Omar, Banssa Melavu: Malay Concepts of Democracy and Community. [Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993]; Abdul Hadi Hasan, Sejarah A lam Melavu. [Singapore: 
MPH Publications, 1968]; David J. Banks, Malay Kinship. [Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of 
Human Issues, 1983]; Akifumi Iwabuchi, The People o f the Alas Valiev: A Study of an Ethnic 
Group of Northern Sumatra. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994]. For example, references to Mount
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the role and status of the aristocracy in both traditional Malay and Indonesian 
societies up to the end of the Second World War were by and large similar14. The 
concept of Kerajaan stood as the main political institution throughout much of the 
history of Sumatra and the Peninsula, while in the Javanese inland agrarian 
kingdoms (Kraton), the Negara (State) took on similar precedence15. Within this 
structure, “the pre-eminent figure . . . was the Sultan, whose right to the throne 
was primarily based on his unbroken descent from a glorious ancestor”16. So too, 
one finds in traditional forms of authority and dogma, village structures and 
decision-making procedures many similarities that resulted from centuries of 
interchange and integration17. An indication of this can be found in the shared 
ascription to the concepts of Musyawarah and Muafakat (Consultation and 
Consensus) that underpinned decision-making in the traditional social-political 
structure of the village18. Even the Adat (customary laws) inherited from pre- 
Islamic Hindu cultural reference was to great degrees shared between Malay and 
certain Indonesian communities, to the extent that some have suggested that what
Meru can be found in both the Sejarah Melayu as well as the Negarakertagama, dating from the 
Majapahit era. For a discussion on this conception o f statecraft, see Robert Heine-Geldem, 
Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956]; 
Lorraine Gesick, (ed), Centers. Symbols, and Hierarchies: Essays on the Classical States of 
Southeast Asia. [New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1983].
14 For Indonesia, see Rex Mortimer, “Class, Social Change and Indonesian Communism”, 
Indonesia. Vol. 15 (1973); Anthony J.S. Reid, Blood of the People. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1979]; Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: The Colonial 
Transformation of the Javanese Privavi. [Singapore: Heinemann Books, 1979]; Betram J.O. 
Schrieke, “Ruler and Realm in Early Java” in Schrieke (ed), Indonesian Sociological Studies. 
Vol.2. [The Hague: W. von Hoeve, 1957]; M.C. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta Under Sultan Mangkubumi. 
1749-1792: A History of the Division of Java. [London: Oxford University Press, 1974]. For 
Malaya, see Leonard Andaya, Kingdom of Johor. 1641-1728. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1975]; A.C. Milner, Keraiaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule. 
[Tucson, A.Z.: University o f Arizona Press, 1982]; Khoo Kay Kim, Malay Society: 
Transformation and Democratisation. [Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1991]. See also the 
chapters by Rex Mortimer (Indonesia) and Michael Stenson (Malaya) in J.W. Lewis (ed), Peasant 
Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia. [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974].
15 Distinctions can however be made between the Malay Kerajaan and the Javanese Kraton, 
particularly in reference to the role of Islam in statecraft. See Sumarsaid Murtono, State and 
Statecraft in Old Java. Revised Edition. [Ithaca: Cornell University Modem Indonesia Project, 
1981].
16 Barbara Watson Andaya, “The Nature of the State in Eighteenth Century Perak” in Anthony 
Reid and Lance Castles (eds), Pre-Colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia. [Kuala Lumpur: 
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1975] 24.
17 See for example, P.E. de Josselin De Jong, Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan. [The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1952]; M.B. Hooker, Adat Laws in Modem Malava. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1972].
18 It is a matter of fact that these traditional concepts were to be the cornerstone of rapprochement 
after Indonesia’s confrontation of Malaysia.
70
is called Malay Adat is essentially Indonesian in origin19. In the same way shared 
village culture carried with it a sense of obligation, where “in Malay villages, it is 
often difficult in practice to separate the principles of kinship and neighbourhood 
for the two may coincide. . . . Neighbours should be the first to render assistance 
in times of need”20.
It is important to register here that concepts of statehood that defined the 
character of these pre-colonial kingdoms differed substantially from the terrestrial 
state in Western scholarship. Traditional states in the Indo-Malay World did not 
have clearly defined boundaries. They were amorphous in character and based on 
loyalty to the person of the ruler (known in indigenous terms as Raja or Sultan)21; 
while the size and influence of kingdoms was determined by the number of 
people owing allegiance to a ruler at any given time as well as the amount of trade 
that passed through the kingdom22. Jan Christie notes in her study of the Melaka 
Sultanate for example, that Malay rulers “conceived of their states more in terms 
of populace and patron-cliente relationships than in terms of bounded territory”23. 
To this can be added O.W. Wolter’s observation that “the territorial scale of a 
political system is certainly not the correct measurement for describing and 
defining it. Instead, we should think of sets of socially-definable loyalties that 
could be mobilized for common enterprises”24. It was primarily trade, not land, 
which provided the resources by which the elites in the Indo-Malay World 
increased their following and expanded the realm. Accordingly, trade-centred 
rivalry was an important feature of pre-modem politics in the region. Marriage
19 Judith Nagata, “What is a Malay? Situational selection of ethnic identity in a plural society”, 
American Ethnologist. Vol.l, No.2 (1974), 344.
20 Judith Nagata, The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam: Modem Religious Radicals and their 
Roots. [Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984] 134.
21 Both Malay and Javanese pre-colonial societies were feudal, and the leaders were said to both 
derive legitimacy from mystical sources of authority (known as daulat in the Malay kingdoms, 
and wahyu in the Javanese Kraton). See David J. Steinberg (ed), In Search of Southeast Asia. 
[London: Pall Mall Press, 1971] 73-86.
2 This description may not have been as relevant for Majapahit, which was essentially a land- 
based kingdom and hence naturally reliant on territorial borders to demarcate its sphere of 
influence. But even then, it was difficult to determine exactly where the border stopped as the 
kingdom’s influence was a gradual extension in concentric fashion outward from the power 
centre, waning as it widened.
23 Jan Wisseman Christie, “State Formation in Early Maritime Southeast Asia: A Consideration of 
the Theories and Data”, Biidraeen tot de Taal-. Land -  en Volkenkunde. Vol. 151, No.2 (1995)
267.
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also played an important role in determining the power and influence of these 
trading kingdoms. Typically, the elites of a particular port would, upon subduing 
its rival, marry into the ruling families there. In this manner the kingdoms in the 
Indo-Malay World came to be linked to each other through genealogical kinship 
and marriage ties as well, bringing into existence kingdoms in Kedah, Malacca, 
Palembang, Brunei, Sulu, Aceh and Sulawasi from the 10th to the 15th century25.
The role of these kingdoms in political myth-making in contemporary 
Indonesia and Malaysia is worthy of note, as is the sense of affiliation among the 
Indonesian and Malay peoples deriving from popular histories. This was 
registered by J.A.C. Mackie, who observed that “pride in the greatness of ancient 
Malay-Indonesian kingdoms is taught in the classrooms of both nations without 
much concern about the boundaries created by the colonial powers”26. Yet while 
their legacy has been a welcome tool for political mobilization, it is precisely the 
amorphous character of these kingdoms that renders their memory impractical for 
modem state-building. In no way are modem Indonesia and Malaysia 
coterminous to the kingdoms of the pre-colonial era. This, as the study will 
endeavour to show, was a problem pan-Malay nationalists paid little attention to 
in their enthusiasm to conjure a glorious history to justify their anti-colonial 
project, and that consequently resulted in greater problems in their attempt to 
frame their relations in terms of kinship.
Common identity was also reinforced in the course of interaction with 
external forces. The pre-colonial Indo-Malay World was not a hermetically- 
sealed one, pried open only with the advent of colonialism. It has already been 
noted that relations had long been established between the various islands within 
the Indo-Malay Archipelago, laying the grounds for interaction and exchange. 
Beyond that, external influences also came in the form of Indian, Chinese, Arabic 
and Japanese trading activity. Historical records indicate the existence of early
24 O.W. Wolters, History. Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives. Second Edition. 
[Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999] 25.
25 For example, the Sejarah Melayu chronicles the marriage between Sultan Mansur Shah of 
Melaka and the Princess from Majapahit Radin Galah Chandra Kirana, as well as a genealogy of 
their family. See C.C. Brown, Sejarah Melavu. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1970] 
169-171.
26 J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malavsia Dispute. 1963-1966. [Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1974] 15.
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trading networks that not only linked the peninsula and archipelagic worlds 
together, but to more complex international networks stretching to Africa, India 
and China as well. Such international trading links and interaction with other 
cultures and peoples also played an important role in reinforcing the sense of 
kinship and shared identity among the people of the Indo-Malay Archipelago by 
augmenting the sense of similarity in relation to foreign cultures, identities and 
language.
III. Constructing Relatedness: Language
Two common threads established during this pre-colonial era that had the 
potential to act as agents for the construction of kin affinity and identity were
97language and religion .
Malay was originally spoken as a mother tongue only in parts of Sumatra, 
Riau, the Malay Peninsula, and perhaps parts of the Philippines. However, it 
received a stimulus when Melaka became the centre for trade in archipelagic 
Southeast Asia in the late 15th Century. Subsequently many of the various ethnic 
groups in the Indo-Malay Archipelago adopted one essential lingua franca, the 
Malayo-Polynesian language and its cognate derivatives from the Austronesian 
language family that had spread throughout the peninsula and archipelago with 
trade28. Language then, became the first channel that gave the Indo-Malay World 
a semblance of superficial unity29.
Be that as it may, there is a need also to recognise that this semblance of 
unity derived from linguistic congruence was itself a product of the creation of a 
linguistically consistent form of Malay from Malayo-Polynesian and its cognate 
derivatives by the Dutch and British on the basis of their reading of indigenous 
texts such as Sejarah Melayu, and their understanding of the spoken language in
27 See Anthony Reid, “Understanding Melayu as a Source of Diverse Modem Identities”, Journal 
o f Southeast Asian Studies. Vol.32, No.3 (October 2001), 309-310.
28 Nothofer argues that the three main languages of Java (Javanese, Sundanese and Madurese) in 
fact belonged to Malay and several other languages in a relatively close-knit subgroup. See B. 
Nothofer, The Reconstruction of Proto-Malavo-Javanic. [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975].
29 For a study on the importance of language in identity building, see J.A. Fishman, Language and 
Nationalism. [Rowley, Massachusetts: 1972].
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Riau and Johor, which they viewed as the centre of the “Malay World”. In the 
words of Henk Maier:
This newly created form of Malay, primarily laid down in the written 
form of grammars and textbooks, was then provided with the notion of 
‘good’ Malay and then with the notion of ‘real Malay’. Thus, a novel 
form was turned into a norm. It was a Malay that was meant to serve 
as an effective communication as well as a careful description of the 
world30.
Contestable though the historiography of the unity of the Malay language 
may be, it was not without political import. It is significant that Malay emerged 
as the national language of both Malaysia, as Bahasa Melayu, and Indonesia, in 
the form of Bahasa Indonesia. The importance of the Malay language as a 
bonding agent for Indonesia and Malaysia was given greater impetus when it was 
adopted as the language of the nationalist movement at the 1928 Second 
Indonesian Youth Congress in Indonesia (better known as the Bandung 
Declaration). No doubt the decision to choose Malay over Javanese as the 
national language of Indonesia was a tactical one, where the underlying objective 
was to quell suspicions of Javanese dominance31. After all, compared to the 
feudalistic roots of Javanese, the Malay language was viewed as a “democratic 
language”32. Consequently, the Malay language provided a channel through 
which the sense of kinship affinity could be better communicated throughout the 
Malay-speaking Indo-Malay World33.
After independence, the issue of orchestrating a shared spelling system 
between Malay and Indonesian gained prominence in cultural relations, when 
efforts were made to bridge differences resulting from different transliterations of
30 Henk Maier, “We Are Playing Relatives” in See Cynthia Chou and Will Derks (eds), Riau in 
Transition. [The Hague: Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land-En Volkenkunde, 1997] 679-680.
31 See George McTuman Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. [Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1952]. Takeshi Shiraishi noted that before the First World War, Javanese and 
Dutch had been used by the educated elite as the principle languages of communication.
According to Shiraishi, it was with the formation of the Islamic-based nationalist movement o f 
Sarekat Islam in 1912 that Malay was introduced as a mass language and subsequently 
appropriated by the nationalist elite. See Takeshi Shiraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular 
Radicalism in Java. 1912-1926. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990].
32 David Steinberg (ed), In Search of Southeast Asia. 298-299.
33 For an exposition of why Malay and not Javanese emerged as the dominant language in the 
region, see Asmah Haji Omar, Language and Society in Malaysia. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa 
danPustaka, 1993] 1-18.
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the Malay script under colonialism. The persistence of language as an avenue of 
kinship today is exemplified in the work of MABBIM {Majlis Bahasa Brunei, 
Indonesia dan Malaysia or the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia Language Council). 
Established in 1972 as part of the resurgence of cultural exchange resulting from 
the termination of Konfrontasi, MABBIM has continued to pursue the 
enhancement of unity between the two languages in order to foster a closer 
understanding of the historical and cultural similarities that binds their societies34.
At another level, the influential role that the Malay language played in the 
building of identity in the Indo-Malay World was further attested to in its position 
as a literary and philosophical language of Islam35.
IV. Religion
As with language, religion, in this case Islam, forms a pillar for the social- 
cultural construction of relatedness36. One justification for this logic lies in the 
fact that those who claimed to adhere to the Mohammadiyan faith are considered 
part of the Ummah or brotherhood. More specific to the Indo-Malay Archipelago 
however, was the fact that Islam provided a cultural avenue in which affiliation 
could be built, where the Indo-Malay Archipelago can be understood as a single 
religious entity37.
Islam is generally acknowledged to have been introduced into die region 
by Muslim traders from India around the thirteenth century, though Muslim 
traders from the Middle East had by then already begun converting pockets of 
local communities. It was with the aid of the Malay language that Islam spread 
throughout this region, and in so doing consolidated the Muslim worldview 
through the medium of Islamic philosophical literature expressed in Malay
34 MABBIM originally encompassed only Indonesia and Malaysia and was known as MBIM. It 
subsequently expanded to include the Sultanate of Brunei when the latter gained independence 
from Britain in 1984.
35 Syed M. Naguib Al-Attas. Islam dalam Seiarah dan Kebudavaan Melavu. [Kuala Lumpur: 
Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1972] 21.
36 One could, o f course, postulate that Islam in the Indo-Malay World in fact built on the pre- 
Islamic Hindu-Buddhist traditions which had already offered a modicum of cohesion, albeit not as 
extensive as Islamic influence.
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language. In that sense, the fact that an archipelago-wide lingua franca already 
existed facilitated the spread of Islam throughout the Indo-Malay World.
There have been some distinctive characteristics about the Islamization of 
the Indo-Malay Archipelago that distinguished it from other regions such as the 
Middle East and South Asia. One such distinction was the nature of Islam’s 
arrival in the region - Islam came not by force, but through trade. Historical 
records suggest that trading communities along the coastal areas of the Indo- 
Malay Archipelago were the sites of the first conversions, with Aceh in North 
Sumatra and Melaka along the Southwestern coast of the Malay Peninsula seen as 
the closest geographical point of Southeast Asia to the original locale of Islamic 
penetration. Because it was not a conquering force, Islamic theology was brought 
mainly by religious teachers and advisors; and because it was a movement spread 
through trade and not war, the introduction of Islam in effect created an 
indigenous Muslim network across the archipelago.
Whilst the introduction of Islam into the region has been attributed to 
Indian-Muslim traders, Malay scholars have traced the spread of the religion to 
the Melaka Sultanate38. The expansion of Melaka’s sphere of influence, they 
suggest, occurred simultaneously with the court’s conversion to Islam39. This led 
simultaneously to the Islamization of vassal states of the Sultanate. While the 
specific role of Melaka in transmitting this new religion throughout the 
archipelago remains debatable, there is a consensus that trade was a key channel 
through which Islam was spread40. In time, Islamic schools were established 
throughout the Indo-Malay World, and the instruction of Islamic theology became 
an activity that invited cross-strait interaction and exchanges between Muslim 
scholars and teachers, particularly between Sumatra, Java and the peninsula.
37 See Mahayudin Haji Yahaya, Islam di Alam Melavu. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan 
Pustaka, 1998]; Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malav-Indonesian World. [Singapore: Horizon 
Books, 2001].
38 See Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia. 51-55. Melaka was also considered “the 
centre o f Moslem learning in the Indonesian area”. See C.K. Nicholson, “The Introduction of 
Islam into Sumatra and Java -  A Study in Cultural Change”, Ph.D dissertation, Syracuse 
University, 1965, 51.
39 See Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate. 167-179.
40 Noticeably, the latest and arguably most comprehensive study o f the Islamization o f the Indo- 
Malay World by Peter Riddell does not mention Melaka at all. See Peter Riddell, Islam.
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Needless to say, these channels remain active today41. The period between the 
1920s and 1950s, notable for the emergence of modernist and political Islam in 
the region, witnessed the bulk of Malay religious students being sent to 
Indonesian (mostly Sumatran but Javanese as well) pesantren and madrasah42.
Notwithstanding the general impact that Islam has had on the social and 
political environment in the Indo-Malay Archipelago, one should note that its 
influence was neither uniform in its acceptance nor adaptation. To be certain, 
there was great variety in the way Islam was integrated into everyday political 
and social life everywhere in the Indo-Malay World43. Much of this variation has 
its roots in the porous and shifting local cultures of the region that adapted Islamic 
philosophy to traditional practices44. Differences emerged as to the precise status 
and practice of Islam in these societies. In Java, Western anthropologists have 
noted two distinct streams of Islam based on the adherence to Islamic strictures 
and practice of Muslim lifestyles -  the more nominal Abangan, which 
incorporated elements of Buddhism, Hinduism and animism, and the orthodox 
Santri45. No such dichotomy has been identified in Malaysia, though some would 
suggest that Islam is generally more strictly adhered to in the northern Malay 
states. The difference in interpretation and acceptance of Islam in Indonesia was 
explained by Geertz to be a result of Islam’s movement into what he called “one 
of Asia’s greatest political, aesthetic, religious and social creations, the Hindu-
41 For an academic exploration of the social and political roles and functions of these Islamic 
schools in both Indonesia and Malaysia, see Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: 
Occupation and Resistance. 1944-46. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972] and Safie bin 
Ibrahim, The Islamic Party of Malaysia: Its Formative Stages and Ideology. [Kelantan: Nawawi 
bin Ismail, 1981].
42 Such links are traced in Howard Federspiel, “Muslim Intellectuals in Southeast Asia”, Studia 
Islamika. Vol.6, No.l (1999).
43 This is discussed in detail in A.H. Johns, “Islam in Southeast Asia: Reflections and New 
Directions”. Indonesia. 19, April 1975. See also Anthony J.S. Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan- 
Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia”, Journal of Asian Studies. Vol.26, No.2, (1967) and Southeast 
Asia in the Age of Commerce. 1450-1680. Volume Two: Expansion and Crisis. [New Haven, 
C.T.: Yale University Press, 1993] 132-201.
44 See Alijah Gordon (ed), The Propagation of Islam in the Indonesian-Malav Archipelago. [Kuala 
Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 2001].
45 This classic division of Indonesian Muslims was posited by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz. 
See Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java. [Glencoe, 1964]. Geertz’s work has since been refined 
by Mark Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate o f 
Yogjakarta. [Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989]; this can be compared to the Islam o f the 
Malays as discussed in Mumi Djamal, “The Origin of the Islamic Reform Movement in 
Minangkabau: Life and Thought of Abdul Karim Amrullah”, Studia Islamika. Vol.5, No.3 (1998).
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Buddhist Javanese state”46. Koentjaraningrat makes the further distinction 
between Agami Jawi and Agama Islam Santri, as if Java possessed a religious 
identity of its own47. There are other scholars however, who argue that the 
Abangan-Santri divide has become a rather tenuous characterisation of Islam on 
Java. These scholars in fact have noticed a shift towards greater Islamic 
consciousness among the Indonesian population in general48. Further to that, 
differences in how Islam was administered by the British in Malaya, where they 
refrained from direct involvement in religious matters, and the Dutch in the East 
Indies, who deliberately sought to influence the development of Islam, 
contributed to the convolutions beneath the fa?ade of religious unity49.
Historically, strong precedence for the conception of kinship along 
religious lines can be found in indigenous historical texts such as the Hikayat 
Merong Mahawangsa, where the relationship between Kedah in the peninsula and 
Aceh in Northern Sumatra is discussed from the perspective of Islam (and in 
opposition to Siam). More recently too, as later chapters will illuminate, the 
Islamic factor provided a pivotal link for the nationalisms of Malaysia and 
Indonesia, even as both subsequently emerged as secular nation-states50. Yet 
while it can certainly be said that at an abstract level, Islam can prove a viable 
channel of kinship for the Indo-Malay Archipelago by virtue of its broad appeal 
and acceptance in the region, taking the above observations into consideration, 
one must also be sensitive to the nuanced differences in the practice of Islam 
throughout the Indo-Malay Archipelago before making conclusions as to its 
effectiveness as a bonding agent toward common identity.
46 Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia. [Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1968] 11.
47 Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture. [Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985] 317. 
In drawing these comparisons, Koentjaraningrat and Geertz draw attention to Javanese 
distinctiveness.
48 This case is argued in Kuntowijoyo, Paradisma Islam: Interpretasi untukAksi. [Bandung: 
Mizan, 1991] and Howard Federspiel, Muslim Intellectuals and National Development in 
Indonesia. [Commack: Nova Science Press, 1992],
49 Unlike the British, who essentially refrained from direct involvement in religious issues in 
Malaya, the Dutch actively interfered in Islamic affairs in the East Indies in an attempt to turn 
Indonesia away from what Hurgronje called the “narrow confines of the Islamic system”. See 
Harry Benda, “Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in 
Indonesia”, The Journal o f Modem History. Vol.30 (1958).
50 See “Nasionalisme Melayu dan Islam", Melavu Islam & Reformasi. 
http://www.geocities.com/melayuislam/165.htm.
78
V. Rivalry and discord in the Indo-Malay World
Avenues of affinity did not eliminate schisms in the pre-colonial Indo- 
Malay Archipelago. Indeed, the theme of rivalry left as indelible a mark on the 
politics of the region as did perceptions of affinity.
That rivalry was a distinct feature of the pre-colonial kinship-based 
regional system stems from the fact that the history of the region was not a 
unilineal progress from kingdom to kingdom, empire to empire. Kingdoms and 
empires co-existed at various points, and as such possessed different impressions 
of the contiguity of the Indo-Malay Archipelago that they sought to control51. 
From this one could certainly argue that a source of this historical tension seemed 
to stem from the impetus of geopolitics. The crossing of paths of the Srivijaya 
and Majapahit kingdoms, two historical centres of power in maritime Southeast 
Asia, appears to have resulted in the sort of power struggle that has defined 
international relations through the centuries. A scholar has described the struggle 
as such:
Their (Malay coastal states) activities in guarding the sea in pursuit of 
their economic interests and their military activities to safeguard these 
interests led to conflicts between the Javanese, based in Java, and 
Malays based in Srivijaya. Struggles for rights of passage at sea 
frequently occurred, which in turn led to political and cultural rivalry52.
After the demise of the Melaka entrepot, fragmented rivalries emerged as 
Aceh, Johor, Riau, and the Bugis tussled with each other for prominence in the 
Indo-Malay World. Thus considerations of kinship in the Indo-Malay World 
need also take into account centuries of rivalry and wars between the various 
kingdoms and principalities within it.
A recurring theme that has imposed itself on the historiography of the 
Indo-Malay Archipelago has been conflict borne of the apprehension of peoples
51 See J.C. Van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic 
History. [The Hague: W van. Hoeve, 1955]; C.D. Cowan, “Continuity and Change in the 
International History of Maritime South East Asia”, Journal of Southeast Asian History. Vol.IX, 
N o.l (March 1968).
52 Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, The Malay Sultanate. 263-264.
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in the region for Javanese domination53. This was best exemplified by the 
struggles between the Srivijaya and Melaka kingdoms against their Java-based 
nemeses54. These struggles were of such severity that the downfall of Srivijaya 
has been traced to the invasion of Majapahit under the Javanese king Kertanegara 
in 127555. Indeed the sub-topic of Java-Sumatra wars has been one of interest to a 
handful of historians of the region56. This apprehension outside Java for Javanese 
domination has been documented in Malay records such as Hikayat Hang Tuah, 
Hikayat Raja Pasai, and Sejarah Melayu, where the central theme has been the 
relationship between the Minangkabau and Malays, often portrayed as underdogs 
against the hegemonic tendencies of the Javanese57. For example in the Hikayat 
Hang Tuah, a great part of the text revolved around fierce rivalry between the 
courts of Melaka and Majapahit, expressed through the exploits of the Malay
co
hero, Hang Tuah, against the Javanese . It has also been recorded how Javanese 
were often portrayed as a self-aggrandizing people proud of their “refined” 
culture, whereas the Malay language was depicted as the crude and crass 
language of Java (compared to the more “refined” and “cultured” Javanese
53 See for example, Leslie Palmer, Indonesia and the Dutch. [London: Oxford University Press, 
1962]. This theme has also been taken up and applied by Herbert Feith who, in his discussion of 
post-independence politics in Indonesia, noted that the differences between the cultures o f Java 
and the rest of Indonesia were “sharp enough to presage serious difficulties for the process of 
maintaining consensus of the ends and proper procedures of government and politics”. See 
Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. [Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1962].
54 See Bernard H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of Indonesia. [The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd, 
1959] 41-45.
55 For a discussion on the wars between Srivijaya and Majapahit, see Andaya and Andaya, A 
History o f Malaysia. 26-31. See also O.W. Wolters, The Fall o f Srivijaya. 64-76.
56 This has been particularly so of Western scholars, who have been less averse to focusing on the 
disharmony in the Malay World. The works of Vlekke, Wolters, Van Leur, Cowan, and Palmer, 
amongst others, exemplify this vein of scholarship.
57 Many Malaysians relate that in relations with larger neighbours (presumably Indonesia), the wit 
of the mousedeer is necessary to overcome the odds imposed against Malaysia because of its size. 
See Philip Frick McKean, “The Mouse-Deer in Malayo-Indonesian Folklore: Alternative Analyses 
and the Significance of a Trickster Figure in South-East Asia”, Asian Folklore Studies. No.30 
(1971).
58 Kassim Ahmad, Hikavat Hans Tuah. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1975].
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language)59. The presence of Javanese passages and reference to Javanese that 
can be found in the Sejarah Melayu further suggests Javanese cultural influence60.
Many other instances can be found to illustrate how the Majapahit court in 
Java sought to exercise hegemony over the Malay principalities. As but one 
example, it has been written how in 1378, the ruler of Majapahit, in response to a 
move by the Jambi local rulers (in Sumatra) to establish independent relations 
with the Ming Court, waylaid and murdered the Chinese envoys sent to the 
archipelago61. There is also the famous story of the Javanese-Minangkabau 
bullfight found in the Hikayat Raja Pasai, where through their characteristic wit 
the Minangkabau managed to successfully repel a Javanese attempt to conquer 
their land. While the case can be made that many of the stories and events are 
Malay folklore, what stands out is the acute concern for excessive Javanese 
influence within the Indo-Malay World. Describing in later years this recurrent 
sentiment in the context of pan-Malay nationalism and the revival of past 
kingdoms, Kwa observed:
To the Javanese with his strong ethnocentric perspective of history. . .  
Majapahit is the first historic “Indonesian unitary state”, a symbol of 
Indonesian political grandeur and cultural renaissance. But to other 
Indonesians all this stinks of a political and cultural imperialism, of a 
Javanese domination of the nusantara . . . (which) in old Javanese 
proper, refers to the outer islands, foreign countries, as viewed from 
Java62.
Extrapolating from this, it will be demonstrated in the following chapter how 
these historical misgivings haunted the pan-nationalist movements that agitated 
for Indonesia Raya and Melayu Raya.
59 See Mohd. Taib bin Osman, “Trends in Modem Malay Literature” in Wang Gungwu (ed), 
Malaysia: A Survey. [Singapore: Donald Moore Books, 1964] 212-213; see also Russel Jones 
(ed), Hikayat Raia Pasai. [Petaling Jaya: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1987].
60 See S.O. Robson, “Java in Malay Literature” in V.J.H. Houben, H.M.J. Maier and W. von der 
Molen (eds), Looking in Odd Mirrors: The Java Sea. [Leiden: Vakgroep Talen en Culturen van 
Zuidoost-Azie en Oceanie, Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1992] 37.
61 O.W. Wolters, The Fall of Srivijaya. 62.
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VI. Colonialism
The above discussion has contextualised the basis of the kinship factor as 
a function of historical intersection and the emergence of language and religion as 
bonding agents. These factors took on greater significance with the imposition of 
imperialist intent, and it was under the shadow of colonialism, and its large-scale 
introduction of alien (most notably Chinese) communities as a consequence of the 
expansion of the colonial economic enterprise, that the search for common 
identity began in earnest in the Indo-Malay World. Ironically, this search for 
common identity would be framed by the logic of a distinctly colonial ideology -  
nationalism.
Colonialism was to have a paradoxical impact on the search for common 
identity. At one level the imposition of colonial administration divided the Indo- 
Malay Archipelago and brought into being the terrestrial entities of Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Yet it was also colonialism that generated abstract notions of Indo- 
Malay identity. Indeed the most striking, if accidental, contribution of 
colonialism was the introduction of the erstwhile alien concept of nationalism, 
and with it notions of race and ethnicity.
To certain degrees, Indonesia and Malaysia exist today as independent 
states whose territorial configurations resulted from the imperialist exercise of 
cartography and diplomacy63. However convincing the sense of pre-colonial 
relatedness was as a result of the influences and interactions discussed earlier, the 
advent of colonialism cemented the erstwhile fluid terrestrial boundaries of the 
Indo-Malay Archipelago. While the process of colonialism is too complicated to 
be dealt with at any length here, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty cannot be passed
62 Kwa, “The Historical Roots”, 50.
63 The question of whether the making of Third World states was more a result o f external 
processes (de-colonization from the metropole) or internal agency (anti-colonial nationalism) 
remains contested. Central to this debate between the metropolitan narrative and narratives of 
national liberation, as T.N. Harper notes, is “not merely a question of perspective, but one of 
power”. He further adds that “colonial histories share the underlying tension of constructing a 
history that acknowledges the realities of European domination, without constricting the 
possibilities of giving real agency to indigenous societies”. See T.N. Harper, “Power and the 
People: The End of Empire in History” in K.S. Jomo (ed), Rethinking Malaysia. [Kuala Lumpur: 
Malaysian Social Science Association, 1999] 206.
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unmentioned. Signed in London in 1824, the treaty was both a reflection of 
European politics and a culmination of colonial politics and competition over 
spheres of influence in the Indo-Malay Archipelago between Britain and 
Holland64. By the beginning of the 19th Century, the Dutch had more or less 
established control over Java, and were expanding their influence throughout the 
vast Indonesian Archipelago. Britain, on the other hand, had only just arrived in 
the region65. This meant that the Netherlands was the preponderant power insofar 
as Western influence and control of archipelagic Southeast Asia was concerned. 
That notwithstanding, Britain’s increasing trade and economic activity in 
Southeast Asia, coupled with a concern for the possibility of French expansion 
into the archipelago, compelled London to re-assess their interests in the region66. 
This eventually led to the founding of a ffee-port in Singapore, which lay at the 
foot of the Malay Peninsula, in 1819. The founding of Singapore upset the 
delicate commercial balance that existed between the British and the Dutch. The 
presence of this British-controlled free port meant that trade flow from the Indian 
Ocean and South China Sea was gradually being diverted away from the Dutch 
port of Battavia in Java to Singapore, and this caused the Dutch much anxiety.
The result of this was the signing of the Anglo-Dutch treaty in 1824 that 
arbitrarily demarcated British and Dutch spheres of influence. Yet the treaty did 
not merely lay the basis for the contemporary boundaries of Indonesia and 
Malaysia. By artificially fracturing the Indo-Malay Archipelago it transformed 
the course of history67. The terms of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty saw Melaka and 
other bases ceded by the Dutch to the British, thus consolidating British control 
over the Peninsula and the Melaka Straits. In return, Britain surrendered control
64 For an account of Anglo-Dutch rivalry, see Nicholas Tarling, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay 
World. 1780-1824. [Brisbane: University of Sydney Press, 1962].
65 Briefly, the origins o f Dutch colonialism can be traced back to the appearance of the first Dutch 
ships at Banten in west Java towards the end of the 16th Century. In contrast, active British 
interest in archipelagic Southeast Asia did not materialize until the 1770s, when Britain began 
taking an active interest in political affairs in Borneo, and subsequently in 1786, when they took 
possession of Penang.
66 For a study o f British considerations towards the position of Malay amidst the developments in 
Southeast Asia in the early part o f the 19th Century, see L.A. Mills, “British Malaya, 1824-1867”, 
Journal o f the Malayan Branch o f the Roval Asiatic Society. Vol.33, No.3 (1960), C.D. Cowans, 
Nineteenth Century Malava: The Origins of British Political Control. [Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1961] and C.M. Turnbull, The Straits Settlements. 1826-1867. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1972].
67 See O.W. Wolters, History. Culture, and Region. 33.
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of her East Indies possession at Bencoolen to the Dutch, and in so doing 
cemented Dutch influence over the entire East Indies Archipelago. Remarkably 
then, through this act of colonial diplomacy the territorial forms of modem 
Malaysia and Indonesia came into being. The legacy of this “accidental 
intervention” has been summarised as such:
At the most obvious level, the division of the Malay world down the 
Melaka Straits laid the basis for the contemporary boundary between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. But there were other even more far-reaching 
ramifications, as centuries of history were set aside without a qualm...
. Ties between individuals and communities remained close but the 
division into “Dutch” and “British” spheres meant that the easy 
movement of Melayu leadership back and forth between the Peninsula 
and the east coast of Sumatra was now a thing of the past. What were 
effectively political divisions also affected academic scholarship as a 
new generation of British ‘orientalists’ concentrated on collecting and 
compiling Malay texts associated with the Peninsula, leaving the study 
of Malay culture in Sumatra and southwest and southeast Borneo to 
their Dutch counterparts. But the latter, with some notable exceptions, 
were not drawn to the study of coastal Malays. In Sumatra their 
descriptions of ‘Minangkabau’ or ‘Aceh’ tended to accentuate 
differences rather than similarities with Melayu traditions68.
VII. Semenanjung Melayu: The Bridging of Identities
From an anthropological perspective, the strongest case for this perception 
that colonialism fragmented a contiguous entity and identity stems from the link 
between the island of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, which in effect sets the 
context for this idea of kinship in Indonesia-Malaysia relations69. Indeed,
68 Andaya and Andaya, A Hi story of Mai avsia -  2nd Edition, 125-126.
69 The close interaction between Sumatran and Peninsula cultures and histories is studied in 
greater detail in Jane Drakard, A Malay Frontier: Unity and Duality in a Sumatran Kingdom. 
[Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1990] 1-62.
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Sumatra had long been considered an integral part of Semenanjung Melayu
• • • 70(Malay Peninsula), conceived as a cultural, not political, entity .
Genealogical factors have long influenced Peninsula-Sumatra ties, and the 
great majority of the Malays in the peninsula are ethnographically almost 
indistinguishable from those of North-eastern Sumatra for the fact that most 
Malays are descendents of Minangkabau and Acehnese migrants. These ties have 
roots traceable to the early coastal kingdoms that ruled the archipelagic waters of 
the region71. Consequently, ties of blood obtained alongside strong ethnic and 
cultural links to define the belt that ran across the Melaka Straits and which 
emphasised kinship as an organizing principle for relations between the polities 
along the West coast of the Malay Peninsula and the Eastern principalities of 
Sumatra. These ties were strengthened by the vast religious and trading links that 
were sewn across the archipelago, and augmented by the centripetal forces of 
large kingdoms such as Srivijaya and Melaka. This far-flung Malay political 
culture was reinforced by the profession of Islam, a widely circulating Malay- 
language literature, subscription to a similar Adat, loyalty to the Kerajaan, and 
frequent inter-marriage across the seas72. In parts of the peninsula (particularly in 
Negri Sembilan), Malays are still proud of their origins in the Sumatran district of 
Minangkabau, which is regarded locally as “the cradle of the Malay race”73. In 
key Malay historical classics the word Malay is clearly linked to Sumatra as 
well74. And of course, a fundamental feature of Peninsula-Sumatra kinship was 
built around a shared aversion for Javanese dominance. This was particularly so 
during the pre-Islamic era, but, as the study will show, has also carried on into 
more contemporary times.
Until the advent of the Indonesian revolution of 1945-1949, relations 
between the sultanates of the peninsula and of Sumatra were extremely close.
70 Indeed, it was “differences of culture, origin, development, religion etc” with Sumatra and also 
Java that inspired East Indonesia to coalesce into an Indonesian commonwealth in December 
1946. See “The South Moluccan Case in the United Nations Machinery”, FO 371/123547, PRO.
71 For example, Malay and Sanskrit inscriptions found in the Palembang region in Sumatra 
suggest that present-day Malaysia was part of the vast trading state o f Srivijaya, which existed 
between the 8th and 13 Centuries and whose heart was situated in Sumatra.
72 O.W. Wolters, History. Culture, and Region. 32-33; See also Edwin Loeb, Sumatra: Its History 
and People. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972] 7-12
73 This too, is a matter o f contention, and some scholars have in fact identified Riau as the source 
o f Malay identity. See Chou and Derks (eds), Riau in Transition.
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The early Indonesian central government was well aware of this proximity 
between the Malays in the peninsula and their cousins in Sumatra, and former 
Vice-President Mohammad Hatta had noted to Tunku Abdul Rahman that 
Indonesians “were becoming very afraid of the gravitational attraction of the 
Federation of Malaya upon Sumatran Malays. The Sumatrans even now were 
beginning to dislike being called Indonesians”75. Such concerns were justified in 
light of comments such as these made by the Sultan of Deli after the regional 
rebellion of 1957-58: “We Sumatrans would do better to leave the Republic 
altogether and join Malaya. Most of the Sultans are relatives of mine, and one 
really has so much more in common (compared to the Javanese)”76. It was not 
surprising thence, that during the early stages of relations Jakarta was careful not 
to have Sumatrans in their Kuala Lumpur mission77.
Yet it is also the case that relations between Sumatra and peninsular 
Malaya in part set the context for the consideration of kinship affiliation between 
the broader entities of Indonesia and Malaysia. No doubt enthusiasm for the 
portrayal of kinship between Indonesia and Malaysia should not lose trace of the 
fact that from an ethnic perspective, the links are really between Malays and 
Sumatrans. But as one shall see shortly, it was precisely around this link that the 
inhabitants of the Indo-Malay World constructed a sense of common identity. 
Even the Javanese, who loathe being classified as ethnic Malay, stop short of 
denying kinship links with Malays owing to other factors such as myths of 
descent, historical memories and elements of common culture. On that note, one 
finds even in the Hikayat Hang Tuah, the Malay text known for its anti-Java 
undertone, evidence that Malays of the proud kingdom Melaka were considered 
“bastardised Malays, mixed with Javanese from Majapahit”78. Furthermore, the 
fact that Sumatrans had of their free choice been an integral part of the Republic 
of Indonesia since 1945, and Sumatran nationalists were crucial to the 
independence struggle, lends further justification to the link between the Malay
74 Andaya and Andaya, A History o f Malaysia -  2nd Edition, 47.
75 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur and Commonwealth 
Relations Office, London, No. 103, 12 April 1962, CO 1030/1013, PRO.
76 Quoted in James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise -  Indonesia’s Civil W ar. [London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1961] 75.
77 Interview with Zainal Sulong, Kuala Lumpur, 14 August 2001.
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Peninsula and Indonesia. Beyond that lies the fact that quite obviously, 
immigrants who originated from Indonesia did not come only from Sumatra. 
Broadly speaking, a substantial percentage of the Malay population, particularly 
in the Western states of Perak, Selangor, Johore, and Negri Sembilan, are 
descended from Indonesians who had migrated from other parts of the 
archipelago. For example, beyond the link between some West coast states like 
Negri Sembilan to central Sumatra, there have been similarly close kin relations 
based on ethnicity and descent between the Malays in Pahang and Johore and the 
Bugis and Boyanese from the Celebes and the Riau islands of Indonesia. 
Javanese as well have migrated in large numbers to the various states of the 
Malay Peninsula as a result of British colonial policy, and in so doing took on 
“Malay” identities insofar as colonial census was concerned. Indeed, it was 
estimated by British colonial sources in 1960 that a third of the Malay population 
in Malaya was of Indonesian descent79. Again, it was this complex web of 
migration that spun the kin-based network linking the population of the peninsula 
with their places and cultures of origin across the Indonesian Archipelago and 
facilitated the perception and interpretation of kinship based not merely on 
bloodlines and descent, but on the social and cultural constructions of relatedness 
set in motion by this historical process of trade and migration, as well as the 
adhesive influence of language and religion.
Does that mean however, that “Indonesians” are racial and ethnic kin of 
Malays? Indeed, this question has occupied much of early Indonesian and Malay 
nationalist discourse; and it takes on greater significance when one considers the 
emergence and impact of pan-Malay nationalism on Indo-Malay political history. 
The key to understanding this important question of identity and its relation to 
politicised kinship can be found, once again, in colonial legacy.
78 Kassim Ahmad (ed), Hikayat H ans Tuah. 175.
79 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur and Commonwealth 
Relations Office, London, 164/104/5, 28 November 1961, DO 169/74, PRO.
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VIII. Kinship as colonial sociological enterprise
While colonialism brought into being the terrestrial entities of Indonesia
O A
and Malaya, its influence at the intellectual level was equally profound . One 
feature of European scholarship during the colonial era was that it effected a 
fundamental change in the discursive domain of politics by insisting upon the 
identification of community in an enumerable sense81. Whereas colonial 
administration identified this Indo-Malay World by drawing borders, colonial
OA
historiography did the same by categorising its inhabitants . It was western 
scholars who laid down in their writings a template for the history o f the Indo- 
Malay World. The assumptions underlying this template postulated a region that 
possessed a fixed territorial and ethnographic character, rather than the 
amorphous intermix of kingdoms and principalities that greeted it upon its arrival. 
Summarizing this phenomenon, Farish Noor observed:
As the process of colonisation progressed, the Malay world was 
opened up, studied, categorised and finally quarantined within the 
coloniser’s order of knowledge. Raffles, Brooke, Hugronje, 
Swettenham, Clifford and other colonial administrators took to the task 
of regulating and compartmentalising the Malay world within their 
own ethnocentric worldview which necessarily placed the native as 
well as his culture, beliefs and symbols on an inferior, subjugated 
register83.
Hence, it was colonial scholar-administrators who identified the expansive 
archipelago as the “Malay Archipelago” or “Malay World”. Pre-war Western 
historians suggested that the Dutch East Indies comprised “the major part of the
80 See for example, Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and its Form o f Knowledge. [New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1996].
81 For a theoretical discussion, see Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: 
Anthropological Perspectives. [London: Pluto Press, 1993].
82 A study o f British classification and categorisation o f pre-colonial concepts and institutions, for 
instance, can be found in Cheah Boon Kheng, “Feudalism in Pre-Colonial Malaya: the Past as a 
Colonial Discourse”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. Vol.25, No.2 (September 1994).
83 Farish Noor, “The One-Dimensional Malay: The Homogenisation of Malay Identity in the 
Revisionist Writing o f History in Malaysia”, paper presented at the Third Annual Malaysian 
Studies Conference, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Selangor, 7-8 August 2001. See 
also Anthony Reid, “Understanding Melayu”, 302-304.
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Malay Archipelago”, which to them included the peninsula84; others wrote of the 
Dutch East Indies being part of the “Malay World”85.
In so doing, colonial anthropologists and ethnographers fashioned 
conceptual instruments that exaggerated affinity and subsequently created 
dilemmas for nationalist leaders who later appropriated their ideas in the name of 
pan-nationalism86. Colonialism was a black and white affair and colonial 
scholars, imbued with a belief in the enlightenment tradition of scientific 
classification and romanticised visions of racial and language-based nations, 
presented the case that the inhabitants of the “Malay World”, insofar as they 
shared the same basic “proto” and “deutero” Malay traits and features, were all
on
essentially Malay-speaking families of the Malay-Polynesian race . One such 
scholar argued: “both race and Archipelago are singular in their kind”88. A 
prominent historian of Indonesia further advocated that “in racial terms 
Indonesia’s population is basically of Malay stock”89. British historians wrote of 
how the Dutch East Indies and the Malay Peninsula were, for all intents and 
purposes, both part of the “Malay Archipelago” as well90. This was exemplified 
in the work of the prominent British colonial scholar, R.O. Winstedt, who wrote 
of the Malay identity: “of recent years the Malay is sometimes called an 
Indonesian. . . . Less confusing is the connotation of the term Malay, which 
denotes more particularly the civilized Malays of Sumatra and the Malay 
peninsula and in a broader sense almost all the inhabitants of the Malay 
archipelago”91. Raffles himself intimated that “I cannot but consider the Malayu 
nation as one people, speaking one language, though spread over a wide space,
84 Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies. [Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1941] 1. 
See also Schrieke B. (ed), The Effect of Western Influence on Native Civilisation in the Malay 
Archipelago. [Batavia: G. Kolff & Co, 1929],
85 See Bernard Vlekke, Nusantara: A History o f the East Indian Archipelago. [Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1944].
86 This contrasted with the case in India, where colonial thought constructed the sociological view 
that India was a mere collection of discrete communities. See Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and 
Its Fragments. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993] 220-239.
87 See Reid, “Understanding Melayu”, 302.
88 E.S. De Klerck, History of the Netherlands East Indies. Vol. 1. [Rotterdam: W.L. & J. Brusse, 
1938] 99.
89 John Legge, Indonesia. [Englewoods Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964] 4.
90 See Alfred Wallace, The Malay Archipelago. [London: MacMillan & Co, 1894] 1-3.
91 R.O. Winstedt, The Malays -  A Cultural History. [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1947] 3- 
4.
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and preserving their character and customs, in all the maritime states lying 
between the Sulu Seas and Southern Oceans”92. Not surprisingly, indigenous 
works soon echoed these categorisations. Milner has observed for instance how 
in indigenous Malay writings Java was described as a “branch of the Malay 
race”93. Illustrating this strong imprint of colonial scholarship on indigenous 
perceptions of self in Malaya, Milner further noted that Malay writing of history 
necessarily placed “the entire investigation in the context of the expansion of 
Europe. The truth of its empirical context seems ultimately to be endorsed by the 
power of a confident imperialism”94. This interest given to race reflected 
intellectual trends in Europe where racial interpretations of all aspects of human 
behaviour were multiplying and racial myths became standard explanation for the 
establishment of nations, where “the nation was or should be . . . really a family 
held together by ties of blood”95. Hence alongside language and religion, race 
emerged as a category in colonial intellectual discourse to classify the inhabitants 
of the Indo-Malay World.
In certain respects, this use of racial yardsticks did gain credence with an 
indigenous audience already familiar with the fact that many among them came 
from the same “stock” for reasons explicated earlier96. Yet one should also 
consider that prior to the advent of colonialism Malays did not see a need to 
explicitly identify themselves as a single people or a distinctive “race”. Such 
categorisation was clearly of European inspiration, and it was with these 
impressions of the contiguity of the “Malay Archipelago” that orientalist 
apologists portrayed colonialism as essentially an alien influence that 
dismembered two identities whose fates were indelibly intertwined:
Drifted, perhaps, is not quite the word -  were forced apart, rather, for 
the Peninsular and Indonesian areas, each caught up in an earlier 
extensive Far Eastern version of the Drang nach Osten of the Western
92 Thomas Raffles, “On the Malayu Nation, with a Translation of its Maritime Institutions”,
Asiatic Researches. Vol.12, (1818), 103, quoted in Reid, “Understanding Melayu", 303.
93Anthony Milner, The Invention of Colonial Politics in Malava. [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995] 68.
94 Ibid, 60.
95 Boyd Shafer, Faces o f Nationalism. [New York: Routledge, 1972] 154. For a summary on 
European scholarship on race during that period, see Thomas Gossett, Race: The History of an 
Idea in America. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997] 32-175.
96 The term “Melayu” appears in the Sejarah Melayu and Hikayat Hang Tuah.
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powers, inevitably followed the lead and consequently the divergence 
of their colonial patrons, the British and the Dutch.
Thus, two areas which formed an ethnic and cultural whole were 
artificially separated more or less by historical accident, for if the 
British or Dutch had never come to the East they might never have 
been divided; or if either of the two Western powers had held influence 
over both areas, these might well have grown together in strength and 
unity in the process of forming the inevitable opposition to colonial 
rule and in the pursuit of ultimate independence97.
Others have noted further that:
The countries that go to make up Malaysia are, in fact, only part of a 
larger Malayo-Indonesian world, which was partitioned in very recent 
times . . .  by the forces of colonialism. The only claims that Malaysia 
has to being any kind of distinctive historical entity is that her 
territories were subject, to varying degrees, to British and not to Dutch 
or Spanish colonial control. It is British colonial rule during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries that constitutes the one unique 
element that divides the existing Malaysian territories from the 
remainder of the Malayo-Indonesia world98.
For the first time in its history then, the territories of modem Indonesia 
and Malaysia were given a specific geopolitical and anthropolpgical identity. The 
terrestrial area was called the “Malay Archipelago”; and it was largely inhabited 
by people who were known as “Malay”. The anthropological and 
historiographical basis to these Western claims remains a hotly debated topic in 
Southeast Asian studies that stands beyond the scope of this study. What matters 
more for purposes here is the manner in which these Western perceptions in effect 
provided frames of reference for the construction of pan-Malay identity by local 
thinkers schooled in Western thought". It is eventually the ideas of these
97 J.C. Bottoms, “Some Malay Historical Sources: A Bibliographical Note” in Soedjatmoko, 
Mohammad Ali, G.J. Resink and George McTuman Kahin (eds), An Introduction to Indonesian 
Historiography. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965] 157.
98 John Bastin and Robin Winks, Malaysia: Selected Historic Readings. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1966] xiii.
99 See Firdaus Abdullah, Indonesia Rava di Alam Melavu: Setiakawan Serumpun di Zaman 
Periuanzan. [Jakarta: KITLV, 1995].
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indigenous architects of pan-Malay identity and those of their detractors, 
encapsulated in the notion of “Malayness”, that set the stage for the politicisation 
of kinship between Indonesia and Malaysia.
IX. Constructing pan-Malay identity
The manner in which colonial ideas were internalised by indigenous 
historians, scholars, and nationalists was manifested in their renditions of 
history100. Robert Young has described this influence of colonial thought in the 
following manner: “anti-colonialism was a diasporic production, a revolutionary 
mixture of the indigenous and the cosmopolitan, a complex constellation of 
situated local knowledges combined with racial, universal political principles”101. 
This dynamic characterised much of early indigenous political thought.
In Indonesian political parlance for example, the sense of a unbroken 
territorial entity that existed to encompass all the various other factors of 
affiliation such as race, religion and language, and that encompassed modem day 
Indonesia and Malaysia, emerged in the form of the concept Nusantara, and has 
been expressed most poignantly in early Indonesian nationalist writings of 
Muhammad Yamin, Ruslan Abdulgani, and A.H. Nasution102. Correspondingly 
Yamin and Nasution interpreted anti-colonialism as a movement towards the 
realisation of Indonesia Raya, which to them was a modem territorial expression 
of the Nusantara103. Yamin drew precedence for Indonesia Raya from the
100 It is not the purpose here to “debunk” indigenous conceptions of history. Instead, regardless of 
historical accuracy, these indigenous conceptions provide critical insight to the mindsets and 
perceptions of the political elite in Indonesia and Malaysia. For a cogent criticism of indigenous 
interpretations o f history, see Kwa, “The Historical Roots”.
101 Robert Young, Postcolonialism. [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001] 2.
102 Indonesian conceptions are covered in detail in Osman Haliby, Documenta Historica: Sediarah 
Documenter dari Pertumbuhan dan Perdiuansan Neeara Republic Indonesia. [Djakarta: Bulan 
Bintang, 1953]; Seminar Sediarah: Laporan lenskap A tiara I  dan I I  tentans Konsepsi Filsafat 
Sediarah Nasional dan Periodisasi Sediarah Indonesia. [Jogjakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada, 
1958]; Bambang Oetomo, “Some remarks on Modem Indonesian Historiography” in D.G.E. Hall 
(ed), Historians o f Southeast Asia. [London: Oxford University Press, 1961]; Roeslan Abdulgani, 
Heroes Day and the Indonesian Revolution. [Jakarta: Prapantja Publishing House, 1964]; Nugroho 
Notosusanto, “A Current Concent of Indonesian History: The relationship between nationalism 
and historiography, address delivered at the Goethe Institut, Jakarta, 23 March 1970; A.K. 
Pringgodigdo, Sediarah Perserakan Rakvat Indonesia. [Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 1970] 164-167.
103 See Muhammad Yamin, 6000 Tahun Sang Merah-Putih. [Jakarta: Penerbit Siguntang, 1954]; 
A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perans Kemerdekaan Indonesia. [Bandung: Disrajah-AD dan Penerbit
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Javanese kingdom of Majapahit, and it was the Negarakertagama, court 
transcripts of Majapahit, that played an important role in influencing his sense of 
geopolitics104. According to the document, discovered by Dutch archaeologists in 
1919, the influence of the Majapahit Empire had encompassed a land so vast that 
it included not only the entire East Indies Archipelago, but also the Malay 
Peninsula and Borneo as well105. The utility of such historical visions, however 
mythological, was not lost to Sukarno, who applied them liberally in his political 
orations aimed at transforming the ancient Nusantara into the modem state of 
Indonesia106. While the exact expanse of Majapahit continues to be debated 
today, for Yamin the notion of a timeless territorial entity covering the peninsula 
and archipelago would certainly appear corroborated by trends in colonial 
scholarship on the terrestrial boundaries of the “Malay Archipelago” at the turn of 
the century discussed earlier.
The centrifugal tendencies of Nusantara also had a secondary racial logic, 
however flawed, behind it. Within its boundaries Nusantara was populated by 
peoples with similar “Malay” and “proto-Malay” racial traits107. The racial 
characteristic defined within this territory was emphasised by Nasution, who 
referred to the idea of "Naluri Rumpun Melayu ” (Malay family or stock instinct) 
in explaining this affiliation between the peoples of Nusantaram . Clearly for 
Yamin and Nasution, Indonesians and Malays were of the same “racial stock”109.
While pan-Malayism originated from Indonesia, it had its proponents 
among peninsular Malays as well. Chief among them was Ibrahim Yaacob. 
Yaacob drew analogies between Nusantara and his own conception of Dunia
Angkasa, 1977]. See also Mohd Dahlan Mansoer, Pensatar Seiarah Nusantara Awal. [Kuala 
Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1979].
104 It is likely that Yamin’s conceptions were influenced by works such as N.J. Krom, Hindoe- 
Javaansche seschiedenis. 2de druk. [‘s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1931] that corroborated his 
ideology, as suggested in Kwa, “The Historical Roots”, 45-48.
105 See Supomo, “The Image of Majapahit in late Javanese and Indonesian Writing” in A.J.S. Reid 
and David Marr, Perceptions of the Past. [Singapore: Heinemann Books, 1979] 180.
106 For example, Sukarno, Indonesia Menssusat: Pidato pembelaan Buns Kam o dimuka hakim 
kolonial. [Jakarta, 1956] 21-22.
107 See Cynthia Chou, “Orang Suku Laut Identity” in Hitchcock and King (eds), Images of Malav- 
Indonesian Identity. 148.
108 A.H. Nasution, Sekitar Perans Kemerdekaan Indonesia. 52.
109 The case for this is presented in R.M. Koentjaraningrat, Introduction to the Peoples and 
Cultures o f Indonesia and Malaysia. [Menlo Park: Cummings Publishing Co, 1975]. In point of
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Melayu (Malay World). Historically, Dunia Melayu has been associated with a 
wide range of expressions and meaning. This concept, found in traditional 
indigenous literary works dating to the 19th Century, has been popularised by 
historians of Malaysia studying the pre-modem era of the history of the Indo- 
Malay Archipelago110. In essence, proponents of the Dunia Melayu concept 
desired to articulate a Malay World based on language and religion, populated by 
“Malays” defined as an ethnic group that loosely incorporated the vast majority of 
Indonesians as well. What is of interest from this train of thought is how these 
Malay ideologues sought to include Indonesians in the ethnic category of 
“Malay”.
In response to colonial attempts to create indigenous identity, Peninsular 
Malay writers conceptualised “Malayness” and Malay community in a manner 
that has various meanings; racial, linguistic, religious, and political111. Without 
getting into the nuances of definitions of the terms race and ethnicity, it can be 
established that from a racial perspective, “Malayness” contains the same 
essential meanings as that which Indonesian writers have envisaged, namely that 
most of the indigenous people of the peninsula share similar physical traits with 
their counterparts throughout the archipelago112. As an ethnic concept however, 
“Malayness” in Malay socio-political discourse carries much deeper connotations 
that did not necessarily correspond with those of their Indonesian counterparts. 
As Ibrahim Yaacob, a champion of pan-Malayism from the peninsula, expressed: 
There is no other Bangsa in this world which has extended culture on a 
vast scale for the whole race at the same time and pace as the Bangsa 
Melayu. The Bangsa Melayu has absorbed three cultures one after
fact, from a purely racial perspective, the Maori o f New Zealand and certain quarters o f the 
Madagascan population would also be considered “Malay”.
110 See Shaharil Talib, “The Asiatic Archipelago: History Beyond Boundaries” in Proceedings of 
the International Symposium South-east Asia: Global Area Studies for the 21st Century. [Kyoto: 
Kyoto International Community House, 1996]. Leonard and Barbara Andaya’s study of 
Malaysian history also provides two maps indicating that to their understanding, the “Malay 
World” included the areas covering the Indonesian Archipelago. It certainly included Java, 
according to the maps. See Leonard Andaya and Barbara Watson Andaya, A History o f Malaysia. 
xviii-xix.
111 See Lee Kam Hing, “Indonesian and Malaysian History from Dutch Sources: Reconstructing 
the Straits of Malacca’s Past”, Seiarah. No.4 (1996) 26,
112 For a discussion of the difference between race and ethnicity, see Stephen Cornell and Douglas 
Hartmann, Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World. [Thousand Oaks, C.A.:
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another, which has fulfilled the character and soul in the descent of the 
Bangsa Melayu, that is, Hindu culture for thousands of years and for a 
thousand years the soul and blood of the Bangsa Melayu flowed with 
Buddhist culture. From the eleventh century A.D, Islamic culture has 
replaced these two cultures Mid flourished in splendour and glory with 
the light of God that is pure in the soul of the Bangsa Melayu as a 
whole113.
Bangsa Melayu then, refers to the notion of “Malay” as a culturally 
constructed concept114. This led Milner to contend, “the problematic character of 
Bangsa (Malay identity) is its impermanence”115. This impermanence is 
embodied in the discourse on Malay identity, and exemplified in the concept 
Masuk Melayu (to become a Malay). The prominent Malay cultural activist 
Zainal Abidin Ahmad has argued that to be considered a Malay, a person had 
essentially to originate from the Indo-Malay Archipelago, adhere to Malay adat, 
speak the Malay language, and profess Islam as their religion116. Among these 
traits it has often been emphasised Malay identity is most closely associated to 
Islam; to be Malay is, for all intents and purposes, to be Muslim117.
Given this variety in definitions it is clear that ethno-cultural boundaries 
of “Malayness” are elastic118, For example, some scholars have noted that 
“despite the persistence of enmity among the Bugis, Malays and Minangkabaus, 
the distinction between their ruling classes became increasingly blurred. Migrant 
groups gradually adopted Malay, and Malay titles were used rather than Bugis
Pine Forge Press, 1998] 25-34. Suffice to say that here, race is taken to imply physical traits, 
while ethnicity includes elements of culture and shared history.
113 Quoted in Kamaruddin Jaafar, Dr. Burhanuddin AlHelmv: Politik Melayu dan Islam. [Kuala 
Lumpur: Yayasan Anda, 1980] 32. Also cited in Ariffin Omar, Banssa Melavu. 40-41.
114 This theme comes across very strongly in the indigenous literature. The radical Malay 
nationalist ideologue Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy tried to present a well-thought argument for the 
primordial existence of the Malay race throughout archipelagic Southeast Asia, including the 
Malay Peninsula and Southern Thailand. See Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, Asas Falsafah 
Kebanssaaan Melavu. [Djakarta, 1963]. See also Amat Johari Moain, Seiarah Nasionalisma 
Maphilindo. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1960] and Abdul Hadi Hasan, Seiarah 
A lam Melavu.
115 Milner, Invention of Colonial Politics. 99.
116 See Adnan Nawang, “Zainal Abidin Ahmad”, Massa. 29 August 1998.
117 For a study on how Malays perceive of the close association between their identity, language 
and religion, see Asmah Omar, Language and Society. 1-18; See also William Roff. The Origins 
of Malay Nationalism. [Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1994] 67-68.
118 See Charles Hirschman, “The Meaning and Measurement o f Ethnicity in Malaysia”, Journal of 
Asian Studies. Vol.46, No.3 (1985).
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and Minangkabau honorifics”119. Defined in this manner, the Malay Bangsa can 
conceivably consist of Javanese or Boyanese, Minangkabau, Bugis or Rawa. 
More than anything, it is this that allows the conceptualisation of affinity among 
the people within an abstract “Malay World”, permitting the conceptual extension 
of the Malay identity to encompass other ethnic groups that share elements of 
similar histories and cultures which correspond to the Malays, including the 
inhabitants of present-day Indonesia120. Correspondingly, it was on the basis of 
such a definition of Bangsa Melayu that Ibrahim Yaacob proceeded to include 
two and a half million people in Malaya and 65 million in Indonesia as Malay and 
residents of the Dunia Melayu121. Another scholar has articulated the nuance in 
the following manner:
On close examination, it will be found that the modem Malays are 
made up of peoples of diverse racial origins among which cultural, 
social and economic distinctions are becoming more evident, to such 
an extent, indeed, as to invalidate the statement that they belong to a 
community that is culturally homogeneous. This is even more 
apparent if by the term Malay one has to include not only the Malays 
in Malaysia, but also those of Malaysia and Indonesia122.
The fluidity and ephemerality of Malay identity, which continues to this 
day to be a subject of great debate, is itself represented in historical folklore such 
as the Hikayat Hang Tuah, where in response to suggestions by his hosts at 
Indrapura that he was “Melayu Sungguh” (authentic Malay), Hang Tuah noted: “I 
may not be as pure as you think I am; I am the servant of a hybrid community and 
am living in a mixed context”123. Reflecting on this, Maier has observed:
Reading Hikayat Hang Tuah is like being constantly given the 
suggestion that this is what Malayness is all about: it is the desire to 
create a feeling of communality and kinship between concrete 
human beings instead of the blind obedience to a set of abstract
119 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia -  2nd Edition, 99.
120 This point is emphasized in Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, Penseiarahan Melavu: Kaiian 
Tentans Tradisi Seiarah Melavu Nusantara. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992] 
1-48; see also the essays compiled in Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia (Ministry of Education, 
Malaysia), Pertemuan Dunia Melavu ’82. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1987].
121 Ibrahim Yaacob, Melihat Tanah Air. [Kuantan: Percetakan Timur, 1975] 12.
122 Wan A. Hamid, “Religion and Culture” in Wang Gungwu (ed), Malaysia. 181.
123 Ahmad, Hikavat H ans Tuah. 189.
96
conventions, considerations of geography, or the belief in a stable 
personal identity. Flexibility and the willingness to play, in other 
words, is what counts in being a Malay, in acting out Malayness124.
It appears that in Malay sociological parlance then, the definition of 
“Malayness” is fluid, and if anything relies primarily on ethno-cultural 
construction125. “Malayness” has various overlapping spheres: it defines a 
linguistic group, is an ethnographic term, a cultural concept, and returning to what 
was established earlier, a loose territorial entity in the form of the “Malay 
Archipelago”. It is this train of thought that permits the proponents of the Dunia 
Melayu to believe that by virtue of their language and religion, most (if not all) of 
the people of the Indo-Malay Archipelago are, in essence, “Malay”126. In this 
sense, it is not difficult to see how the cultural definition of “Malayness” allows 
many Indonesians to slip through the definitional net. Indeed, while the post­
colonial leaders of Malaya may have opposed the ideology of Ibrahim Yaacob 
and harboured their own reservations towards Indonesians, it is nevertheless a fact 
that ethno-cultural links behind pan-Malay identity were elusive enough for them 
to have encouraged Indonesians to migrate to Malaysia in the 1960s and 1970s to 
maintain “Malay” political primacy over the Chinese and Indian populations127.
An important, if unwritten, dimension to this broad definition of 
“Malayness” in Indonesian and Malay nationalist discourse is its functional and 
exclusive nature. In this domain where kin identity is created, activated, and 
sustained one finds functionality in two forms. First, it is already evident that the 
drive to establish a pan-Malay political entity, Indonesia Raya or Melayu Raya, 
was viewed by the pan-nationalists as the logical extension of pan-Malay identity. 
Second however, was the fact that identities were by then also coalescing among 
the inhabitants of the Indo-Malay World against alien Europeans and Chinese 
who were flooding into the archipelago to sustain various commercial ventures, 
giving greater impetus to Indo-Malay kinship. “Malayness” hence, was also
124 Maier, “We Are Playing Relatives”, 675.
125 This point was emphasised in an interview with Taufik Abdullah, Jakarta, 22 January 2002.
126 There is also the issue of the populations of East Indonesia, which would not be considered as 
Malay, but who nonetheless remain outside the scope o f early thinkers o f Malay identity.
127 Interview with an Indonesian source, Jakarta, 21 January 2002.
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defined against particularly the alien Chinese communities in both the Dutch East 
Indies and British Malaya.
X. Kinship and the perceptual gap
While it no doubt had proponents on either side of the Melaka Straits, 
conceptions of pan-identity suffered from fundamental definitional problems. 
Several points need to be appreciated to that effect. First, it is important to note 
that the proponents of pan-Malayism among Indonesian thinkers, notably 
Muhammad Yamin and Abdul Haris Nasution, were not Javanese; they were 
Sumatran, and of Minangkabau descent. Hence the fact that they had no 
difficulty reconciling Malay and Indonesian identities should not be taken as 
representative of the political proclivities of their non-Sumatran colleagues.
Moreover, while Robert Curtis’ observation that “most of the important 
ethnic groups in the area, the Malays, Atjehnese (Acehnese), Javanese, 
Sundanese, Minangkabao, Buginese and Makassarese belong to the so-called 
Deutero-Malay racial group and have obvious physiological and cultural traits in 
common” is generally correct, what needs also to be emphasised is the differences 
and sense of distinction that existed across the vast ethno-cultural web of 
Indonesia128. Here, it should be established that notwithstanding the exertions of 
Yamin and Nasution, there was a clear distinction in Indonesian anthropological 
thought between “Rumpun Melayu” (the same Malay racial stock) and “Suku 
Melayu” (Malays as part of a larger community). Put differently, the distinction 
is one between race and ethnicity. To Indonesian minds, kinship identity 
measured in terms of ethnicity is an issue of locality - Malays as an ethnic group 
resided around the Melaka Straits and Riau, and made up only a small percentage 
of the overall Indonesian population. Hence in suggesting that a modem state 
could be bome out of pan-Malay identity the way Yamin and Nasution did 
implied a distinctly ethnic basis to Indo-Malay solidarity, though they themselves 
did not explicitly champion that interpretation. Given the ethno-cultural
128 Robert Curtis, “Malaysia and Indonesia”, 6-7.
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differences in colonial Indonesia this betrayed a lack of sophistication borne of a 
fundamental misinterpretation of history.
This tension between race and ethnicity in Indonesian nationalism was 
reflected in the intellectual contest between ethno “pan-Malayism”, as Yamin’s 
“Nusantara nationalism” implied, and a civic nationalism that circumvented the 
complexities surrounding explicit compartmentalisation of the inhabitants of the 
Dutch East Indies into racial and ethnic groups. To that regard, the 1928 
Bandung Declaration requires mention. It was at Bandung that the decision was 
made to build nationalism on a civic and republican logic premised not on racial 
and ethnic identity, but on the staunch anti-Dutch sentiment shared by the people 
throughout the archipelago. This in turn was registered in the Bandung mantra of 
“One Language, One Flag, One Nation”. Cognisant of these tensions, the 
respected nationalist Mohammad Hatta, himself of Minangkabau (Sumatran) 
origin, staunchly opposed attempts by some among his colleagues to 
conceptualise national identity along ethnic lines. Hatta challenged Yamin’s 
conception of Indonesia Raya on the basis of Tumpah-dara Indonesia or “the 
Indonesian fatherland”, which he feared was disturbingly similar to the German 
nationalist idea of Kultur und Boden propounded by the Nazi party729. To his 
mind, his fellow Sumatran’s attempt at inventing Indonesian authenticity was 
perilously close to being interpreted as betrayed Javanese hegemony based on the 
revival of the Majapahit kingdom, and hence was nothing short of a veiled 
attempt at Javanese imperialism.
In retrospect, it seemed that some architects of identity in Indonesia were 
in fact aware of this problem of defining national identity along racial and ethnic 
lines, and it was with the Bandung Declaration that they registered a refusal to use 
the Javanese language and ethnicity as the core of Indonesian language and 
identity130. Hence it is evident from the Bandung Declaration that Yamin and 
Nasution’s attempt to place race and ethnicity at the forefront of nationalism was
129 An exposition of the Yamin-Hatta debate is provided by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds), 
Indonesian Political Thinking. 1945-1965. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970], chapters by 
Yamin, “Unity o f  our country and our people” and Hatta, “Z,e/ us not encourage the spirit o f  
expansionism”. see also Angus McIntyre, “The ‘Greater Indonesia’ Idea”, 81.
130 A move that was striking considering the general trend of nationalist movements in the Third 
World at the time.
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rejected, as racial or ethnic terms of reference were viewed in Indonesian 
nationalist circles as anathema to the nationalist cause.
Clearly from ethnographic perspectives, distinctions existed between 
Indonesian and Malaysian conceptions of “Malayness”. As argued earlier, in 
early 20th Century Indonesian thinking Malay was accepted as a racial definition 
for the large majority of the population of Indonesia. Yet as an ethnic marker 
“Malayness” was limited to the inhabitants of the Riau islands, peninsular 
Malaysia, and portions of the North-eastern Sumatra131. Even the notion of 
Malay primacy implicit within the concept of the Dunia Melayu is debatable 
owing to the fact that most Malays are purportedly not in the strictest sense Orang 
Asli (natives) in the peninsula . One scholar for example has highlighted that 
according to Chinese chronicles (which he presumably perused), Malay emigrants 
from Sumatra began to settle on the coast of the peninsula only in the 7th and 8th 
Centuries133.
The cultural characterisation of all Indonesians as ethnic Malays is 
particularly objectionable to many Javanese who by and large do not conceive of 
themselves as ethnically or culturally “Malay”134. As discussed earlier, to them 
their culture, a key component of ethnicity, is very distinct from, if not altogether 
superior to, that of the Malay135. Further to that, from an Indonesian perspective, 
a racial definition to Malayness also permits the possibility of “Malays” 
professing another religion other than Islam (this, indeed, is the case with Batak 
Protestants, Balinese Hindu, and Javanese Buddhists for example). Yet the 
thought of this is anathema in peninsular Malay discourse, where Malayness is
131 Some peninsula Malay scholars have also attempted to highlight this fact. See for example, 
Ariffin Omar, Revolusi Indonesia dan Bangsa Melavu. [Pulau Pinang: Penerbit Universiti Sains 
Malaysia, 1999]. See also Michael van Langenberg, “Class and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia's 
Decolonization Process: A Study o f  East Sumatra”, Indonesia. Vol.23, April 1982.
132 Because the Malays could not be considered Orang Asli in the strictest sense, the Malay 
political elite would subsequently construct the term “Bumiputra” (Sons of the Soil) in order to 
impute to the community an indigenous identity that would eventually translate to political and 
economic privileges.
133 Charles Robequain, Malaysia. Indonesia Borneo, and the Philippines. [London: Longmans, 
Queen and Co, 1954] 118.
134 Unless of course, they are second or third generation Malays descended from Javanese 
immigrants.
135 For more on Javanese culture, see Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture: Benedict Anderson, 
Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
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synonymous to Islam136. In essence then, a curious difference exists between 
Indonesia’s pride in ethno-cultural diversity, expressed in their national motto 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity), and peninsular Malays’ tendency to 
focus on similarities framed in ethno-cultural terms137. Likewise, because many 
Indonesian political traditions are in fact drawn from the legacy of Majapahit 
(owing to Javanese political dominance), it should not be surprising that the 
Javanese outlook and worldview might differ from that of the ethnic Malay, 
whose claim is to the legacy of Srivijaya. Such distinction, as was suggested 
earlier, has resulted in the traditional tension between Java and the ethnic Malay 
World, echoing the historical contestations between Srivijaya and Majapahit. Not 
surprisingly, such differences would also have an impact on what kinship meant 
for each state vis-a-vis the other.
Another reason accounted for Indonesia’s reluctance to frame national 
identity in ethnic terms the way the Malays in the peninsula did. As was 
suggested earlier, and as Chapter Three will show in greater detail, the very 
existence of Indonesia as a unitary and sovereign nation-state was grounded not 
on ethnographic logic, but on a nationalist tradition that deliberately avoided 
emphasising ethnic affiliation. Indonesian identity had no ethnic rationality. 
Much unlike other justifications of nationhood, Indonesia has never had, or rather 
has never chosen, an ethnic core. Instead, the Indonesian identity was built upon 
revolutionary struggle against a common oppressor. It is on these terms that one 
finds some Indonesians, particularly those who originate from Eastern Indonesia, 
resentful of kinship discourse in bilateral relations framed in ethnic terms the way 
peninsular Malays do138.
Peninsular Malays, on the other hand, appear more comfortable with the 
ethnic logic to nationhood. Contrary to the Indonesian experience, race and
1990]; Mudjahirin Thahir, Wacana Masvarakat dan Kebudavaan Jawa Pesisiran. [Semarang: 
Bendera, 1999].
136 Syed Husin Ali, Rakvat Melavu: Nasib dan Masa Depannva. [Jakarta: Penerbit Inti Sarana 
Aksana, 1985] 8.
137 That said, peninsular Malays on the other hand also expend much effort in emphasising Malay 
exclusivity in relation to other racial and ethnic groups such as the Chinese or Indians.
138 The author was informed that at a particular Indonesia-Malaysia Youth Dialogue session, a 
group of Indonesians from the Moluccas openly and vehemently expressed their objection as to 
the use of ethnic measures o f affinity during the session. Interview with Rizal Sukma, Jakarta, 15 
January 2002.
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ethnicity in Malaysia formed the cornerstone of its nation-building project. 
“Malayness” in Malaysia is and has always been a political/constitutional identity 
where being Malay permits one to lay claim to rights and privileges given to 
bumiputra (lit: Sons of the Soil)139. It was on this basis that peninsula proponents 
of pan-Malayism such as Ibrahim Yaacob and Burhanuddin al-Helmy mistakenly 
rationalised the incorporation of Indonesian identity into that of the Malay.
In later years, these fundamental differences between Indonesian and 
Malay understandings of race and ethnicity would surface in bilateral meetings 
such as the UNESCO-funded project on Malay culture in 1971 and the Indonesia- 
Malaysia youth meetings of the early 1990s. Both these projects were undertaken 
to locate commonalities upon which to build harmonious relations between the 
two kin states. In both instances, it was precisely the issue of the definition of 
“Malayness” that caused them to flounder. As Taufik Abdullah shared, in both 
instances the point of departure was over “Malay insistence on the ethno-cultural 
definition of Malay identity” and “Indonesian opposition to this definition”140. 
Underlying this was a fundamental difference of opinion between Indonesian 
discourse on the social anthropology of the Indo-Malay World, which avoided 
ethno-racial expressions of identity as political reference points, and peninsula 
Malay thinking, which sought to construct and politicise a brittle veneer of ethno­
cultural commonality 141.
It appears from this exploration of the search for kinship precedents in 
Indo-Malay historiography that attempts to trace avenues of affinity would lead 
one through a conceptual and historical minefield, where pressures for intellectual 
coherence and clarity are confronted with the need to reveal the full extent of the 
depth of complexities, not to mention scholarly divisions and disagreements, that 
underlie this notion of Indo-Malay kinship. At the heart of this tension lies the 
concept of Malayness, and the vexing question of how to conceptualise Indo- 
Malay identity. In peninsular Malay discourse, the “Malay” identity was a
139 Syed Husin Ali, Rakvat Melavu. 7-8.
140 Interview with Taufik Abdullah, Jakarta, 22 January 2002.
141 Compare and contrast for instance, the Malay definition o f “Malayness” discussed here with 
the essays in Claire Holt (ed), Culture and Politics in Indonesia. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1972] and J.J. Fox (ed), Indonesia: The Making o f a Culture. [Canberra: Australian National
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complex maze incorporating issues of race, religion, culture, and ethnicity. To 
Indonesian minds however, Malay identity was a much simpler concept -  though 
Indonesians may be racially “Malay” (insofar as racial markers remain relevant), 
as an ethnic group Malays are a mere minority residing in parts of Sumatra.
Anthropological debate over the contested nature of Indo-Malay identity, 
as this study has shown, throws up complexities and discrepancies that have to be 
appreciated. The construction and counter-construction of identity discussed here 
however, are not merely matters of polemics. They provide crucial cultural and 
historical backdrop, and would have a definite impact on the conceptual space 
available for the subsequent construction of affinity among political leaders.
Concluding remarks
The objectives set forth in this chapter have been to survey the basis to 
popular conceptions of kinship, and perceptions held among political elite as to 
how affinity can be constructed for political goals. With these objectives in mind, 
it is suggested here that given the fact that kinship can be a socially and culturally 
constructed phenomenon, there appears to be broad grounds upon which 
Indonesia and Malaysia can be classified as kin states. Language and religion 
were critical to this establishment of affinity. Trade and migration also figured 
prominently in the construction of the kinship system that defined the borderless 
character of the pre-colonial Indo-Malay Archipelago. Indeed, anthropological 
debate aside, it became increasingly fashionable by the early Twentieth Century 
to construct kinship between the inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies and British 
Malaya precisely along the problematic lines of race and ethnicity. Reflecting the 
earlier discussion on Smith’s theories of nationalism, in order for pan-nationalists 
to construct a nation that included the inhabitants of the peninsula and 
archipelago, the language of “Malay” kinship was used. This notion of kinship 
and common identity constructed by indigenous thinkers and ideologues stemmed 
from the appropriation of ideas and categories of race and ethnicity articulated in 
Western social-political thought. European models and concepts of nation,
University, Research School of Pacific Studies, 1980], both of which emphasise the theme of
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citizenship and nationalism, and the captivating romantic ideologies of 
movements such as Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanic nationalism that stemmed 
from them, inspired advocates of pan-Malayism to use these ideas to define how 
people in the Indo-Malay Archipelago related to their neighbours who spoke 
Malay, or shared the Islamic religion142. The struggle of the peoples of the Dutch 
East Indies and British Malaya to throw off the yoke of colonialism then, became 
the struggle of the “Malay people”. Implicating such sentiment was the following 
comment made by Tun Dr. Ismail, former Malaysian Home Minister:
One of the greatest events in the life of our young nation had been the 
conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship with Indonesia -  the first of its kind 
entered into by the Federation of Malaya -  reflecting our desire to 
restore those ties of race and culture with Indonesia; ties which were 
interrupted by the accidents of history143.
Framed in anti-colonial terms, the politics of affinity did have resonance with the 
vast majority of the respective populations. Hence while colonialism drew 
Indonesia and Malaysia apart territorially, it seemed to have inadvertently brought 
them together in terms of the anti-colonial ideology that emerged from the 
Western ideas and ideologies, and that challenged conceptually the 1824 partition.
One can argue that the utility of such loose conceptions of Malay identity 
persist today where, for reasons of political expediency, Javanese or Indonesian 
leadership disregard anthropological basis to accrue mileage from identifying 
themselves as Malay. To some extent this has been relatively easily facilitated by 
the fact that Javanese share linguistic and religious affinity with their Malay 
neighbours and are racially similar. Moreover, Indonesians migrating to the 
peninsula regularly accept, and are readily given, status as ethnic Malay144. This 
state of affairs facilitates the willy-nilly extension of the Malay identity to 
Indonesians, resulting in the perception held in certain quarters that there is a
variation and diversity within the ethno-cultural entity o f Indonesia.
142 See J.A. Fishman, Language and Nationalism. [Rowley, Massachusetts: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovish Inc, 1972]. For a study of the European origins of nationalism and its impact on the 
Third World, see Elie Kedourie (ed), Nationalism in Asia and Africa. [London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1971].
143 See speech by Tun Dr. Ismail Abdul Rahman at the 81st Plenary Meeting o f the 14th Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly, 5 October 1959.
144 In recent times, as Chapter Six will show, this has accounted for the easy integration of illegal 
Indonesian immigrants into Malay society, posing problems for bilateral relations.
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common racial and ethnic bond between the inhabitants of the peninsula and the 
archipelago, Javanese included. It can also be argued, as this study will show, 
that another important dimension to the consideration of the kinship factor is the 
emerging consciousness among Indonesians and Malays of the need to reinforce 
their identities against the encroachment of foreign, in particular Chinese, 
influence. Kinship certainly provided an avenue around which to build anti- 
Chinese solidarity.
Ultimately, despite all the vicissitudes associated with the notion of 
kinship discussed in this chapter, the fact that the pan-nationalists at the forefront 
of Indo-Malay nationalism, and the general populations of Indonesia and 
Malaysia, persistently looked to the kinship factor for meaning and intelligibility 
when formulating policies or reflecting on their relations, on the back of their own 
construction of affinity, is indicative of its significance in the early years of the 
anti-colonial struggle in the Indo-Malay World. With this in mind, the study now 
ventures to consider the ideological and institutional shape of contending 
discourses that defined the place of pan-Malay ideology in the kinship politics of 
the Indo-Malay World.
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CHAPTER THREE
A Tale of Two Nationalisms
Introduction
A striking paradox in the emergence of nationalism in the Indo-Malay 
World was the fact that it did not begin with the objective of forming sovereign 
states out of coterminous colonial territories. Rather, anti-colonial consciousness 
inspired the imagination and construction of a pan-Malay nation centred on the 
contested concept of “Malayness” and manifested in the “imagined” communities 
of Indonesia Raya and Melayu Raya. Pan-Malayism emerged as the predominant 
political ideology in the pre-war anti-colonial movement, where “the dream of 
Melaya-Raya or Indonesia-Raya was not merely a nostalgic return to the past: it 
recognised the traumatic manner in which the Indo-Malay world had been tom 
apart by treaties and pacts agreed upon by foreign powers that had descended 
upon the Malay people and their homeland”1. Indeed, the ideologies and events 
behind the formulation of this pan-identity would become as significant to an 
understanding of the politicisation of kinship in Indonesia-Malaysia relations as 
the reasons and ramifications behind its demise.
I. Converging nationalist motivations: The emergence of modernist
Islam
The genesis of politicised kinship can be traced back to the Malay and 
Indonesian student movements at Al-Azhar University in Cairo in the early 
twentieth century2. These movements were influenced profoundly by ideas of 
reformist Islam as a tool for regenerating what they perceived to be a Malay- 
Muslim identity that had deteriorated in the face of Western colonialism. Writing 
his classic study of Indonesian nationalism, George Kahin noted that in the
1 FarishNoor, “Fine Young Calibans: Broken Dreams of Melaya-Raya”, Malaysiakini.com, 13 
January 2002.
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politics of the Indo-Malay World, “the Mohammedan religion was not just a 
common bond; it was indeed, a sort of in-group symbol as against an alien 
intruder and oppressor of a different religion”3. Through journals such as Seruan 
Azhar, Al-Imam and Al-Manar, students regularly published the works of Arab 
scholars glorifying the Islamic reformation and disseminated them not only to the 
student community in Cairo, but in Indonesia and Malaya as well4.
Beyond serving as mouthpieces for Islamic awakening, these journals also 
harboured a nationalist agenda. One such publication described its motivation in 
the following manner: “(it) is for our homeland, because we recognize Indonesia 
and the Peninsula as one community, one people, with one Adat, one way of life, 
and what is more, virtually one religion”5. To underscore camaraderie, students 
from the Indo-Malayan archipelago formed an organisation called Djama ’ah al- 
Chairiah al-Talabijja al-Azhariah al-Djawiah or Welfare Association of Jaw a 
Students, with “Jawa” representing all Muslims indigenous to Southeast Asia6. 
Roff further observed that the cover of one such journal, Seruan Azhar, was 
embellished with a drawing of a globe with Southeast Asia in the centre and the 
territories of Dutch Indonesia and British Malaya shaded in black. Alongside 
them was printed: “The united world of our beloved people”, and in the 
introduction: “All our people . . . whether in Java, or in Sumatra, or in Borneo, or 
the Malay Peninsula, must unite and share a common purpose and agreement to 
strive for advancement, seek the best ways of doing this, and on no account allow 
ourselves to split into separate parties”7.
The awakening wrought by reformist Islam in both Indonesian and 
Malayan circles framed social-political discourse in terms of the Kaum Tua 
(Conservatives)-£fl«/n Muda (Progressives) dispute. What is relevant for 
purposes here about this philosophical dispute is the fact that the Kaum Muda 
Young Turks, whose worldview echoed the modernist interpretation of Islam
2 See William Roff, “Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920s”, Indonesia. No.9 
(April 1970).
3 George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1952] 38.
4 See Azyumardi Azra, “The Transmission of al-Manar’s Reformism to the Malay-Indonesian 
World: The Cases of al-Imam and al-Munir”, Studia Islamika. Vol.6, No.3 (1999).
5 Roff, “Indonesian and Malay Students”, 73.
6Ibid, 73.
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emanating from the Middle East, posed a fundamental challenge to what can be 
viewed as the status quo of that era by presenting Islamic ideology as a basis upon 
which to formulate a full-fledged nationalist agenda. The experience in Cairo at 
the height of Islamic reformation and Middle-Eastern nationalism would 
politicise these Indo-Malay students to the degree that many of them would return
Q
to the peninsula and the archipelago to lead nationalist movements . Upon 
returning to their respective countries, these nascent Indo-Malay nationalists, 
imbued with modernist Islam, continued to maintain ties with each other through 
regular correspondence9. In the Malay Peninsula, the political platform and 
rhetoric of Kaum Muda elements quickly focused upon the pursuit of 
independence within the context of a greater Indonesia10. In Indonesia as well, 
returning students from Cairo, Mecca, as well as Lahore, Qadian and Aligarh, 
brought with them the reformist agenda which inspired the transformation of 
traditional Islam throughout much of the archipelago. As for the response of the 
general population, it was noted that “the Muslim community, threatened 
commercially by Chinese competition and religiously by heightened activities of 
Christian missionaries in Central Java in the first decade of the twentieth century, 
eagerly embraced the new message”11. In 1912, reformist Islam was given 
organizational expression with the formation of Muhammadiyah; and it soon 
became “the dominant force in Indonesian Islam; in fact, it became the largest 
and most viable Indonesian association, overshadowing other religious as well as 
political organizations”12. Not surprisingly, Dutch alarm at the influence of 
reformist Islam led the colonial government to ban reformist publications in Java 
and Sumatra13. In Malaya too, the British administration and Malay sultans 
expressed concern about the impact of the Cairo experience on Malay students14.
7Ibid, 77.
8 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution. 46.
9 William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press,
1967] 64-67.
10 Emphasizing the close links they had with anti-colonial and anti-establishment Indonesians 
elements, the Kaum Muda movement in Malaya provided refuge for prominent Indonesian 
communists such as Alimin, Musso, and Tan Melaka, all o f whom had escaped across the Melaka 
Straits after abortive communist uprisings in Java and Sumatra in 1926-27.
11 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun. [The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd, 1958] 47.
12 Ibid, 47-48.
13 Taufik Abdullah, Schools and Politics: Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra. 1927-1933. 
[Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project Monograph Series, 1971] 147; See also Anthony Reid,
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II. Socialist and nationalist interpretations of Melayu Raya-Indonesia 
Raya
It was not only in reformist Islamic philosophy that anti-colonial 
movements in the Indo-Malay World found solidarity, for the emergence of 
socialist ideology also generated ideological propinquity15. This socialist- 
nationalist movement shared a reciprocal relationship with Islamic forces on the 
basis of anti-colonial agitation. Many of the Malay students returning from the 
Middle East linked up with Malay-educated and politically conscious students in 
the peninsula from peasant backgrounds, themselves already being influenced by 
the teachings of Indonesian reformists, nationalists and socialists16. The socialists 
tapped into secular and libertarian ideals of Western concepts of nations and 
nationalism, and unlike the modernist Muslim-nationalists, perceived the 
construction of pan-unity on the basis of a civic and egalitarian anti-colonial 
nationalism. This was certainly so in the case of the Malay socialists from the 
peninsula, with most of them originating from the SITC (Sultan Idris Training 
College), a hotbed of socialist and nationalist ideas in the pre-war years17. Not 
surprisingly, the college was particularly susceptible to Indonesian nationalist 
influence18. Many of the students from SITC had maintained contacts with 
Indonesian nationalists (including the communists), while several even joined 
Sukarno’s PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) upon its formation in 192719. 
Ibrahim Yaacob, one of the prominent socialist leaders of the Kaum Muda 
movement, articulated the movement’s ideology in the following manner:
“Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia”, The Journal o f Asian Studies. 
Vol.XXVI, No.2 (February 1967), 267-283.
14 Crosby to Curzon, 14 October 1920, CO 537/900, PRO. See also Mohammad Redzuan 
Othman, “Call o f the Azhar: The Malay Students Sojourn in Cairo before World War II”, Seiarah. 
No.3, 1994-1995.
15 For a detailed study into the various faces of this socialist movement in Malaya, see Khoo Kay 
Kim, “The Malay Left, 1945-1948: A Preliminary Discourse”, Sariana. V ol.l, N o.l (December 
1981).
16 See Khoo Kay Kim, “Malay Society, 1874- 1920s”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. Vol.V, 
No.2 (September 1974).
17 Roff, Origins of Malay Nationalism. 142-157.
18 Awang Had Salleh, Malay Secular Education and Teacher Training in British Malava. [Kuala 
Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1979] 43.
19 John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and PAS. [Singapore:
Heinemann International Books (Asia) Ltd, 1980] 32.
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The aspiration of the Bangsa Orang Melayu (the nation of the Malay 
people) is to struggle for the independence of the land and the Bangsa 
Melayu (Malay nation) who will unite again in one great country 
according to the interest and desire of the people as a whole. The aim 
of Melayu Raya is the same as Indonesia Raya which is the aspiration 
of the Malay nationalist movement, that is to revive again the heritage 
of Srivijaya, which is a common unity of the Bangsa20.
The subtext to this ideology of pan-unity however, stemmed from a concern for 
the burgeoning alien Chinese population on the peninsula. To the Malay 
socialists, it was better to be assimilated into a society broadly allied in race, 
ethnicity, and religion than to be overwhelmed on their own soil by the Chinese. 
The objectives of co-identification with Indonesia put forth by Ibrahim Yaacob 
would later take on greater organisational coherence in the form of the KMM or 
Kesatuan Melayu Muda (The Young Malays Union).
Formed in 1938, the KMM was the first explicitly political organisation in 
Peninsular Malaya, and it set forth as its political objective the fostering of a 
polity based on one race, one language, and one nation with Indonesia. The 
KMM was a meeting ground for reformist Islamic elements and the socialists 
from the SITC, who were becoming increasingly exposed to Indonesian literary 
and political works written in the Malay language21. Membership also consisted 
of a fair number of Indonesians as well22. Later, with the outbreak of the 
Indonesian revolution in 1945, many from the KMM would participate actively in 
the Indonesian revolution, which to them was also a Malay nationalist struggle. 
Scholars have emphasized how Malay radicals from the peninsula provided arms 
to freedom fighters in Sumatra and Java, though the extent of support provided 
remains difficult to determine23. Beyond that, it has also been highlighted that 
prominent Malay nationalists from the KMM such as Ibrahim Yaacob, Manaf 
(leader of the Giyu Gun, a volunteer army formed by the Japanese), Abdullah 
Hussain, Othman Abdullah, Baharom Basar, Abdullah Sanggora, Zulkifli Ownie,
20 Ibrahim Yaacob, Nusa dan Banesa Melavu. [Jakarta: N.V. Alma’ariff, 1951] 65.
21 Roff, Origins of Malay Nationalism. 172-173.
22 See John Funston, Malay Politics. 31-32.
23 Firdaus Abdullah, The Origins and Early Development o f the Radical Malay Opposition 
Movement in Malaysian Politics. [Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1985] 90.
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Karim Rashid and Dahari Ali and “hundreds of others” directly participated in the 
Indonesian revolution either on a military or political level24. Agitation for 
postwar unification with the Indonesian nation would subsequently take on more 
institutionalised forms such as KRIS (Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung), 
formed in July 1945, and PKMM (Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya) in 
October 1945, both successors to the KMM. Many among the Malay leaders also 
proceeded subsequently to take up membership in the PNI. The formation of 
these political organisations allowed the radical movement to propagandise their 
political objectives throughout the peninsula in tandem with elements in 
Indonesia who were sympathetic to the Malay cause of pan-unification.
Although a detailed comparative study of congruence between Indonesian 
and Malayan anti-colonial nationalisms remains to be undertaken, it is widely 
accepted that the anti-colonialism Indonesia developed and matured much faster 
than in Malaya. Nevertheless, pre-war Indonesian anti-colonial rhetoric also 
found in the discourse of kinship a frame of reference to contextualise relations 
with their enthusiastic but less accomplished Malay cousins. As previously 
discussed, some framed the Indo-Malay discourse of political kinship in terms of 
the peninsula’s geographical inclusion in the Indonesian nationalist vision to 
translate the historical polity of Majapahit into a modem nation-state25. Sukamo, 
for example, asserted such a historical basis to Indonesia’s ongoing nationalist 
struggle, and his vision was shared by Malayan counterparts such as Ibrahim 
Yaacob and Burhanuddin Al-Helmy. Other Indonesian leaders such as A.H. 
Nasution and Muhammad Yamin, a nationalist ideologue close to Sukamo and of 
Sumatran origin, were equally enthusiastic in proclaiming a historical basis to the 
incorporation of the peninsula into the territorial bounds of Indonesia26. During 
the Japanese occupation of 1942-1945, the incorporation of both Sumatra and 
Malaya into the 25th Army military administration of the Japanese occupation
24 See Ibid, 90-100. The participation of Malay nationalists in the Indonesian revolution is also 
mentioned in the autobiographies and writings of some o f these nationalists. See for example,
Keris Mas, Memoir. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980] 18; Ishak Haji 
Mohammad, “Kata Pendahuluan" in Ibrahim Yaacob, Melihat Tanah Air. [Kuantan: Percetakan 
Timur, 1975] 8; Ibrahim Yaacob, Nusa dan Banssa Melavu. 63.
25 See Muhammad Yamin, 6000 Tahun Sans Merah-Putih. [Jakarta: Penerbit Siguntang, 1954].
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force between 1942 and 1944 lent further credence to thinking about the
■ * • 27incorporation of the peninsula into a greater Indonesian territorial state .
III. Japanese occupation
The dismantling of colonial administration during the Japanese 
interregnum and Japanese sympathy towards anti-colonial movements opened a 
window of opportunity for Malay pan-nationalists to ensure the issue of political 
union and absorption of the peninsula into an independent Indonesia remained 
foremost on the minds of their Indonesian counterparts as the latter plotted the 
political future of the Dutch East Indies. On 28 May 1945 in Jogjakarta, the 
BPKI (Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or Committee 
for the Investigation of Preparatory Efforts for Indonesian Independence) met in 
Jakarta to deliberate the terms and conditions to be presented to the Japanese 
Military Administration for Indonesian independence28. Among the items tabled 
was the absorption of the Malay peninsula and Borneo into an independent 
Indonesia. At that historic meeting, representatives voted 39 to 25 in favour of 
the incorporation of the Malay Peninsula into an independent Indonesia29.
Another landmark event worthy of attention was a meeting between 
Malay and Indonesian nationalist leaders which took place at Taiping, Perak 
(Malaya) on 12 August 1945 to lay the grounds for the potential incorporation of 
the peninsula into independent Indonesia 30. That meeting, and the events that
26 See Muhammad Yamin, A Legal and Historical Review o f Indonesia’s Sovereignty over the 
Ages. [Manila: Indonesian Embassy, 1959]. Yamin was one o f the staunchest supporters o f 
Malaysia’s incorporation into Indonesia Raya.
27 Willard Elsbree, “Japan’s Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940-1945”. PhD 
dissertation, Harvard University, 1953, 112.
28 Minutes from this groundbreaking meeting have been circulated as Badan Penjelidek Usaha 
Persiapan Indonesia, Territory of the Indonesian State. [Jakarta: Badan Penjelidek Usaha 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 31 May 1945].
29 It should be noted that the results were consequently rejected by the Japanese military 
administration on account that Malaya was considered by the Japanese as “not ready” for 
independence. See Yogi Akashi, “Japanese Military Administration in Malaya -  Its Formation 
and Evolution in Reference to Sultans, the Islamic Religion and the Moslem-Malays, 1941-1945”, 
Journal o f Asian Studies. Vol. VII, No.l (April 1969).
30 An Indonesian delegation consisting of Sukamo, Hatta and Dr. Rajiman Wediodiningrat had 
flown to Dalat in Southern Vietnam to meet with General Terauchi, Commander-In-Chief o f 
Japanese Armed Forces in Southeast Asia, to discuss the future o f Indonesia. On their way back 
to Java they were met by Ibrahim Yaacob and Burhanuddin Al-Helmy in Taiping.
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transpired immediately after, was a telling prelude to Malayan and Indonesian 
independence. Quoting from Ibrahim Yaacob’s memoirs, Radin Soenamo wrote: 
After lunch the delegation left for the Taiping Airport and it was there, 
in one of the reception rooms, that Sukamo and Hatta held a brief 
discussion with Ibrahim and Dr. Burhanuddin who gave them the 
assurance that Malaya’s aim was independence united with Indonesia.
Sukamo told them that the Declaration of Independence was to be 
made the following week. To this Ibrahim answered that he was 
preparing an Eight-Man Delegation to Jakarta to represent Malaya in 
the Declaration Ceremony and also to take part in the forming of the 
Republic of Indonesia with Malaya as a part. It was in this short 
conference that Sukamo, flanked by Hatta, shook hands with Ibrahim 
Yaacob and said, “Let us form one single Motherland for all the sons 
of Indonesia”. . . . This event in Taiping marked the peak of the 
political success of the left-wing movements of the Malays31.
The significance of the Taiping meeting however (and for that matter the 
BPKI vote as well), has to be viewed in the broader context of political 
developments in the region. It was three days after Taiping that Japan 
surrendered. Two days later, on 17 August, Sukamo and Mohammad Hatta 
proclaimed the independence of Indonesia. Conspicuously absent from the 
proclamation was any mention of Malaya. This sudden detour was certainly 
portentous. At one level, it perhaps indicated that any successful political merger 
of Malaya and Indonesia could only be realised under the umbrella of Japanese 
occupation, for it was only during the latter that Malaya and Indonesia were ever 
united under one central authority, colonial or indigenous. On their part, while 
the Japanese military administration stopped short of actively encouraging 
political unification, the fact that they supported both the radical Malay 
nationalists and the Indonesian national movement while at the same time
31 Radin Soenamo, “Malay Nationalism, 1869-1941”, Journal o f Southeast Asian History. Vol. 10, 
No.2 (1969), 20-21. According to Cheah Boon Kheng however, there were several contradictory 
opinions of the events at Taiping depending on whether one took the Malayan, Indonesian or 
Japanese perspectives. See Cheah Boon Kheng, “The Japanese Occupation o f Malaya, 1941- 
1945: Ibrahim Yaacob and the struggle for Indonesia Raya” Indonesia. Vo.28 (1979), 112-114. 
Robert Curtis also presents another opinion of this episode where he argues that the request for 
incorporation into Indonesia was “no doubt regretfully, turned down”. See Robert Curtis, 
'Malaysia and Indonesia”, New Left Review. No.28, Nov-Dee 1964, 12.
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crippling the influence of the Malay traditional elite in the peninsula (whom they 
viewed as British sympathisers) did indicate a possible tacit backing of the idea . 
In any case, the end of the Pacific War and the Japanese surrender severely 
curtailed chances for unification. Yet the fact that it was highly likely Malaya 
would have eventually been integrated into Indonesia Raya had Japanese 
occupation lasted a while longer, or if Japan had not capitulated so soon after 
Taiping, should not be lost when one considers, for example, how in his memoirs 
Ibrahim Yaacob alluded to the real possibility that Sukamo was preparing to 
include Malaya in his scheduled independence proclamation33.
Notwithstanding the undoubted significance of the Taiping meeting from 
the Malayan perspective as revealed in Ibrahim Yaacob’s memoirs, the 
importance accorded it by mainstream Indonesian nationalism, characterized by 
Sukarno’s PNI-led republican movement, was conspicuously less apparent. 
Evidently, all existing published accounts of this groundbreaking Taiping meeting 
cite Malayan sources. There has been no mention of the Taiping meeting in any 
of Sukamo or Mohammad Hatta’s memoirs or autobiographies34. Hatta’s 
memoirs instead focused on a meeting with representatives from the Sumatran 
Independence Preparatory Committee on 13 August consisting of Teuku 
Mohammad Hassan, Dr. Amir Syarifuddin and a Mr. Abas35. While the fact that 
the Taiping meeting did indeed transpire is not being challenged here, this 
omission of any reference to it in Indonesian sources is nevertheless telling both 
of the accuracy of Ibrahim Yaacob’s account of Sukarno’s commitment to
32 There are contending accounts as to the degree to which the Japanese military government 
rejected the concept of Melayu Raya and Indonesia Raya. Bernhard Daim argues that the 
Japanese were laconic in their rejection of the concept. See Bernhard Daim, Sukamo and the 
Struggle for Indonesian Independence. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969] 109; Others, 
however, register Japanese sympathy toward it. See Mitsuo Nakamura, “General Imamura and 
the Early Period of the Japanese Occupation ”, Indonesia. Vol. 10 (October 1970), 5. Needless to 
say, this was a Japanese account.
33 See Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka. [Djakarta: Kesatuan Malaya Merdeka, 1957] 28- 
34.
34 The Taiping meeting was mentioned fleetingly in a footnote in J.D. Legge’s biography of 
Sukamo. Nevertheless, Legge was of the opinion that “ it is a significant commentary on the depth 
o f Sukarno’s ‘Greater Indonesia’ ideas that despite that expression of interest he gave no more 
thought to such an association (with Malaya). After his return to Jakarta his preoccupation was 
solely with a proclamation relating to an Indonesia narrowly conceived in terms of the former 
Dutch colony” . See J.D. Legge, Sukamo: A Political Biography. [London: Allen Lane the 
Penguin Press, 1972] 193-194, ff  4.
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unification as well as the importance his Indonesian counterparts attributed to this 
meeting and what it represented in the larger context of Indonesian nationalism. 
What was certain by 15 August 1945 was that by then it was the pace of events 
over those few days, and not the ideologies of either the Malay radicals or 
Indonesian nationalists, that dictated the historical trajectory in the Indo-Malay 
Archipelago. Sukarno’s snatch at independence upon Japanese surrender was 
necessary in order first and foremost to prevent the re-imposition of colonial rule 
in the Dutch East Indies, and his volte face on Malaya was necessary in order to 
dispel suspicions of collaboration and expansionism36. Together with opposition 
from several prominent revolutionaries such as Vice-President Hatta, hopes for 
Melayu Raya or Indonesia Raya were truncated with the turning tide of the war.
One should note here that the pan-Malay cause had also found support 
from the Indonesian communist movement, who considered unification an 
inseparable objective of Indonesian anti-colonialism. Among them was the 
Minangkabau (Sumatra) communist nationalist Tan Melaka and his followers. 
Insofar as Malaya was concerned, Tan Melaka was of the view that Indonesia had 
an obligation to dictate Malayan affairs. This attitude was reflected clearly in his 
writings:
Just as village people do not allow snakes to run wild in their gardens, 
so the Indonesian people are not content merely to sit on their hands in 
the face of the conspiracies and destruction wrought by British 
imperialism in Malaya. Solidarity between the Indonesian peoples of 
Malaya and Indonesia is a crucial matter . . . .  Its importance will 
surpass even what is implied in the statement by Malay-Indonesian 
political organizations that they join together and stake their life in 
fighting for independent Indonesia37.
These convictions were echoed during the Fourth Congress of PP 
(Persatuan Perjuangan or Struggle Union), an organization established to
35 See Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs, edited by C.L.M. Penders. [Singapore: 
Gunung Agung, 1981] 222-223.
36 This is discussed thoroughly in Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation 
and Resistance. 1944-46. [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971] 1-66. See also William 
Frederick, Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution. [Athens, O.H.: Ohio 
University Press, 1989] 182-267.
37 Tan Melaka, From Jail to Jail -  Vol.3. Translated and introduced by Helen Jarvis. [Athens,
O.H.: Ohio University Southeast Asia Series, 1991] 106.
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consolidate the efforts of radical youth movements (popularly known as Pemuda), 
at Madiun on 16-17 March 1946. Mirroring the BPKI decision, it was at Madiun 
that the PP called for independence to be declared not only over the Dutch East 
Indies, but including Malaya, North Borneo, Timor and Papua as well38. Unlike 
the mainstream nationalists though, whose interest in pan-unification was 
comparatively passive to begin with, and was subsequently superseded by the 
Indonesian revolution, Indonesian radicals continued to espouse Indonesia- 
Malaya kinship against colonialism as part of their revolution, providing 
ideological support for their Malayan cousins in their struggle against the British 
colonial government and the traditional Malay elite. Indonesian influence would 
only ebb as the revolution wore on and contingencies mounted, and as the 
nationalist politics of Malaya started itself to shift away from pan-unification.
IV. Consolidating the Indonesian nation
The drama of anti-colonial agitation is often defined and perpetuated by a 
multiplicity of actors. Correspondingly, forces of change come into conflict not 
only with foreign rule, but also traditional elites who, as beneficiaries of colonial 
administration, resisted socio-political and economic change threatened by anti­
colonialism.
The traditional elite in Indonesia and Malaya largely originated from two 
camps. Most were members of the aristocracy and/or the Western educated elite, 
whose loyalties were to the colonial government. In Malaya, conservative forces 
were uncomfortable with and highly suspicious of the anti-colonial sentiments of 
modernist Islam as well as socialist and nationalist ideologies, and shared the 
British colonial administration’s concern for the potential challenge of pan­
nationalism to the status quo39. In Indonesia’s case, anti-colonialism was 
countered by aristocrats and officials who favoured the progress that Dutch 
education and lifestyles represented. Among these colonial sympathisers,
38 Kedaulatan Rakvat. 18 March 1946; Soeara Rakvat. 19 March 1946; Merdeka. 19-20 March 
1946, quoted in ibid, 279, footnote 1.
39 See document no.l 1, 25 May 1946, CO 537/1529, PRO.
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agitation for change never went beyond minor reforms40. While the contest 
between the conservatives and nationalists hung in the balance during the pre-war 
period (largely because of the colonial government’s harsh policies towards the 
latter), nationalist politics took a swift and severe turn to the detriment of the 
former by the onset of the Indonesian revolution in September 1945.
Any study of the Indonesian revolution will necessarily have to 
distinguish between its political and social dimensions. As a political movement, 
the revolution was marked by competing political ideologies vying for political 
and ideological space within the nascent Indonesian republic. Apart from the 
mainstream nationalists such as Sukamo and Hatta, other ideologies such as 
political Islam, communism and federalism sought to exert their influence on the 
evolution of Indonesian politics41. Taking place within the broader context of this 
political struggle however, was a bloody social revolution that destroyed 
Indonesia’s traditional feudal society42. The revolution was without doubt a 
watershed event in the context of Indonesian history, and while its origins were 
clearly domestic, it would have an undoubted impact on the shaping of the 
Indonesian worldview. In particular, the experience of revolution would have 
substantive repercussions for the evolution of Indonesia-Malaysia relations in the 
post-colonial era in the way it transformed the perception of kinship at a national 
level in the eyes of the respective political leaderships and set both national 
identities on a collision course.
Considering the spontaneity and opportunism that characterised the 
Indonesian revolution, it was clear its impetus came not from the political elite. 
Instead, this agitation toward popular sovereignty, characterised by the sweeping 
aside of the anachronistic old order, was distinctly a massed based, mostly 
Pemuda phenomenon:
In reality a political, social and economic revolution is in progress.
The government supports the revolution which is arising from the
40 See George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution. 68-69; M.C. Ricklefs, A History o f Modem 
Indonesia Since c.1300. [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993] 170-176.
41 As a sample of the vast literature on the revolution, see Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution: 
Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution. [London: Oxford University Press, 1979]; 
Audrey Kahin (Ed), Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution. [Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1985].
42 Curtis, “Indonesia and Malaysia”, 12.
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people, and this is only proper in terms of democratic beliefs. The 
government is simply a body which carries out the will of the people, 
and the government can only exist with the people’s support43.
The hardship and depravity during the war, coupled with the inadvertent support 
of the Japanese for nationalist forces, gave impetus to mass mobilization on a 
scale never before experienced in Indonesian history44. The role of the Pemuda 
was especially crucial as a driving force behind the social revolution45; it was they 
who led a movement for the destruction of long-established social structures: 
“Every old fashioned attitude with a feudal smell must be done away with. Every 
structure and action which is not in accordance with the people’s demands at this 
time must be changed”46. In particular, traditional centres of authority that had 
been co-opted into both the Dutch and Japanese colonial administrations and that 
entertained “hopes of succour from the returning Dutch” stood out as prime 
targets of these ideologically diverse reactionaries47. This tension between the old 
order and the emerging spirit of egalitarianism has been succinctly summarized in 
the following observation on East Sumatra:
The respect and consideration which the Malay rulers formerly 
enjoyed has gradually declined, and people have come to regard most 
rulers here as having power in consequence of the political contracts 
(indeed it is these that give authority, not the love and affection of their 
people), and as nouveaux-riches, but not as good leaders . . . .
There is criticism now and it is malicious. It is directed not only at the 
behaviour and values of the Kerajaan (royal government), but it goes 
further and dwells upon history, making comparisons with rajas under
43 Soeloeh Merdaka. 4 February 1946, quoted in Anthony Reid, Blood o f the People. [Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979] 223. According to Reid, an English translation appears 
in Appendix C to WIS 17, 9 February 1946, WO 172/9893, PRO.
44 The specifics of Japanese policy in Indonesia are discussed in Mohammad Abdul Aziz, Japan’s 
Colonialism and Indonesia. [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955]; George Kanahele, “The 
Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence”. PhD dissertation, Cornell 
University, 1967; Anthony Reid and Akira Oki (eds), The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: 
Selected Memoirs o f 1942-1945. [Athens O.H.: Ohio University Monographs in International 
Studies, Southeast Asia Series No.72, 1986]; Shigeru Sato, War, Nationalism and Peasants: Java 
under the Japanese Occupation. 1942-1945. [New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 1994].
45 See Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, chaps 4 and 5. While Anderson’s study 
concentrated on the Pemuda o f Java, the phenomenon which he uncovered was also present 
elsewhere in the Archipelago.
46 Reid, Blood of the People. 223.
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the Korte Verklaring and with the rulers in Java. Formerly this 
criticism did not exist, people were satisfied with the aura which used 
to hang around the sultans48.
Economic and political malaise under Dutch colonialism and the grave 
depredation and suffering of Japanese occupation meant that a reactionary mood 
was already percolating among a large proportion of Indonesians. The sudden 
departure of the Japanese provided the catalyst that precipitated the inevitable 
backlash against established centres of power. In the quest to build an egalitarian 
society and national identity, traditional forms of authority such as sultans and the 
aristocratic and administrative elite (Priyayi and Pangreh Praja) were labelled 
agents of the repressive old colonial orders, and removed forcibly from their 
positions; in some instances traditional structures were demolished arbitrarily. 
From the perspective of the reactionaries, the social revolution was also necessary 
in order to disprove Dutch accusations that the new Republic was an illegitimate 
Japanese creation “promised” as it were to the traditional ruling elite in return for 
their allegiance during the occupation years.
On the revolution itself, it is notable that it was in Sumatra, the island 
which as was earlier determined was closest in ethnic, geographical and cultural 
proximity to the Malays of the peninsula, that the structural foundations of the old 
order were most dramatically ruptured. The Sumatra sultans and traditional elite 
had long been cautious of the nationalists and were at best measured in their 
support of the objective of independence, most being content with the colonial 
status quo. Anthony Reid noted for example, how the Malay sultans of Eastern 
Sumatra “gained much from their association with Dutch colonialism, and most 
of their Malay subjects appeared content to bask in their reflected glory”49; some 
within the old Kerajaan-based order even viewed Indonesian nationalism as a 
threat50. Not surprisingly, their scepticism was interpreted by some among the 
more radical nationalist elements as treason against the republic, and their loyalty
47 Ideologically diverse in the sense that elements of the Pemuda movement could be found in all 
ideological camps, including both the Leninist and Trotskyite camps of Indonesian communism.
48 Geheime MvO, Ezerman, 1993, 18-19 quoted in Reid, Blood of the People. 52-53. The Korte 
Verklaring referred to the Declaration of Allegiance to the Netherlands Indies Government signed 
by indigenous Indonesian rulers.
49 Reid, Blood of the People. 5.
50Ibid, 59-73.
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to the old order would prove costly. For instance in Banten, the police and local 
residency were targets of a reactionary nationalist backlash. In Eastern Sumatra, 
it was the social structure of the Malays, long viewed as the privileged indigenous 
ethnic group, that fell victim to revolutionary zeal. There, the sultans and rajas, 
symbols of Malay identity and tradition not only in Sumatra but in Malaya as 
well, crumbled in the wake of bloody revolutionary violence that began in March
194651. Likewise in North Sumatra there was much ill feeling among the 
population toward elements that had been incorporated into the old colonial 
administrative apparatus, resulting in the upheaval of December 1945 and January
194652. As a result of this backlash, the Sultans of Langkat, Serdang, Asahan and 
Indragiri were either killed or incarcerated. Several scholars have provided vivid 
descriptions of this wholesale destruction of the traditional social-political 
configuration. One noted for example that “early in 1946 a social revolution 
broke out around Medan among the brutalized Javanese coolie population and 
radical youth. A number of Medan intellectuals tried to moderate, guide or 
exploit this jacquerie, but it rapidly moved beyond their control. The sultanate 
families were decimated. Many were butchered, others tortured”53.
The social revolution in Indonesia was in fact a manifestation of the long- 
brewing struggle between the old and new orders (Kaum Tua-Kaum Muda) that 
by the end of the war had come to characterize politics within the Indo-Malay 
world. To that effect, it is interesting to register how militant Pemuda movements 
in Sumatra “never saw itself as an ‘anti-government’ movement except in relation 
to the kerajaan, because the republican government had no capacity to oppose it 
as in Java”54. Even among the Sumatran sultans, rajas and aristocrats who were 
more receptive to anti-colonial ideology, they favoured federalists who were more 
sympathetic towards the kerajaan55. The moderates in the central government 
themselves were predisposed to Sumatra’s integration into the republic without
51 In Eastern Sumatra in particular, the ruling elite came from six Malay sultanates -  Langkat, 
Serdang, Deli, Asahan, Kotapinang and Siak. See Michael Van Langenberg, “East Sumatra: 
Accommodating an Indonesian Nation Within a Sumatran Residency” in Kahin (ed), Regional 
Dynamics. 123-135.
52 See Anthony Reid, Blood of the People. 218-251.
53 Curtis, “Indonesia and Malaysia”, 12-13.
54 Reid, Blood o f the People. 226.
55 Ibid, 222-225.
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violence and bloodshed. To achieve this, they established KNI Daerah (Regional 
Indonesian National Committees) in Sumatra to discuss Sumatra’s absorption into 
the Indonesian republic. The Pemuda however, did not share the republican 
government’s conciliatory spirit, and its leaders “did not think much beyond 
abolishing the rajas”56. So strong was popular support for the Pemuda movement 
against the old order that the republican movement was unable to curb the slide 
into violence57. The inability of the central government to react was further 
exacerbated by the fact that unlike in Java, it lacked a substantial leadership and 
institutional presence in Sumatra that could harness the full potential of its social- 
political forces constructively for the nationalist cause. This leadership vacuum 
led Sumatrans to seek out their own models of revolution, and inspiration was 
eventually found in the regicidal legacy of the French revolution58. It was only 
when traditional authority was made to yield to the imperatives of popular 
sovereignty (either by surrender or bloodshed) that the tide of social revolution in 
Sumatra receded, making way for the nation-building project brought forth 
through republican nationalism59.
Even though the Indonesian social revolution effectively ended by the late 
1940s, its legacy would continue to resonate beyond Indonesia’s territorial 
borders. As Robert Curtis observed, “a jacquerie of this sort was something new 
and ominous in South East Asian history. It revealed to the feudal aristocracy the 
real weakness of their position, without effective outside backing, in the face of a 
mass-based social upheaval”60. The implications of this jacquerie would have 
greatest resonance for Malaya, where the traditional elite and aristocracy were 
just beginning to position themselves at the forefront of a Malay nationalist 
movement. Indeed, the point of departure for what was emerging in Malaya from 
what had emerged in Indonesia was that for the former, the conservative political 
structure was to be a rallying point, not victim, of nationalism. While many in 
Malaya sympathised with the Indonesian national struggle, the widespread 
violence in general, and hostility targeted at the Malay old order in particular,
56 Ibid, 234.
57 “Netherlands East Indies: General Situation, 1947”, A4355 7/1/7/9, NAA.
58 See Mohammad Said, “What was the ‘Social Revolution’ of 1946”, Indonesia. Vol. 15 (1973).
59 Reid, Blood of the People. 253-263.
60 Robert Curtis, “Indonesia and Malaysia”, 13.
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generated much unease among the traditional leadership classes in Malaya61. 
Sensitivity toward the disruptive nature of the Indonesian example would be 
further sharpened when radical Malay political forces re-emerged to challenge the 
old order in Malaya, driven by the same social and ideological imperatives behind 
the destruction of the Indonesian old order.
V. Malay reactions to the revolution
Despite the exertions of proponents of unification with Indonesia, 
Malayan nationalism by and large lagged behind that of their Indonesian kin62. 
Though Indonesian nationalism was very much centred in Java in the pre-war 
years, by the end of the war it had spread throughout the entire archipelago. 
Further, while there still remained a lingering concern within the Indonesian 
nationalist movement for Javanese domination, there nevertheless evolved a 
sufficiently strong, broad-based commitment to a staunch anti-colonial, national 
and egalitarian political ideology that emphasised national unity and territorial 
integrity to sustain the movement. In stark contrast, nationalism in the Malay 
Peninsula remained a relatively quiescent force even after the war, and never 
experienced the consensus toward anti-colonialism resembling that of Indonesia’s 
civic nationalism. Aside from the radical nationalist elements led by 
Burhanuddin (Ibrahim Yaccob had escaped to Indonesia before the British 
return), who remained in the minority, the vast majority of social and political 
leadership in Malaya (with the possible exception of the predominantly ethnic 
Chinese communist movement) were restrained in their response to the re­
imposition of British rule. Part of the reason for this seemed to lie in the nature of 
the colonial experience itself.
61 Curtis noted that “if  there was one area where the feudal rulers suffered a total annihilation 
rather than eclipse and obscurity, it was in the specifically Malay Sultanates of East Sumatra -  
precisely the group most closely attached by family ties to the Malayan ruling class”. Ibid, 12-13.
62 Radin Soenamo describes this disparity at the eve of the Pacific War as such: “It (Malay 
nationalism) had not entered into the political arena, but was still in the process o f preparing to do 
so. By then the Indonesian nationalist movement had become already a formidable challenger to 
the Dutch colonial government”. See Radin Soemamo, “Malay Nationalism”, 27. That is not so 
say, however, that Malayan history did not witness the kind of anti-colonial rebellions that 
featured so prominently and regularly in the histories o f Third World nationalism. The Perak and
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While colonialism under the Dutch was a particularly harsh experience for 
Indonesia, British rule was comparatively benign as the latter took efforts to 
ensure that the greater part of the Malay social-political structure, namely the 
sultans, kerajaan, and aristocratic feudal class, remained intact63. In retrospect, 
while Dutch colonialism effectively alienated the Indonesian masses through such 
harsh and exploitative policies as the Cultural System, British colonial initiatives, 
which included the introduction of popular economic policies, pre-empted the 
emergence of strong anti-British sentiments. In adopting prudent policies that 
kept various ethnic groups at a distance, and courting the traditional Malay 
leadership by preserving their ceremonial status and position in Malay society, the 
British managed to create a political environment of relative equanimity and also 
to foment a general nonchalance toward, if not acceptance of, colonialism among 
the vast majority of the Malayan population64. The full effect of Malay 
feudalism’s embrace of colonialism on their perceptions of nationalism became 
clear in the manner in which the traditional Malay elite were wary of and guarded 
in their response to the Indonesia-inspired socialist Malay politics of the KMM65. 
If not unabashed anglophiles, many among the aristocratic class were at least 
admirers of things British, and their outlook certainly resembled the West more 
than Indonesia. The fact that the traditional elite’s version of nationalism was 
articulated as “Hidup Melayu ’ (Survival of the Malays) and “Malaya for the 
Malays” within (as opposed to against) the context of loyalty to the British 
inspired an opinion that “another common feature of all the (political)
Negri Sembilan Wars of the 1870s, the Pahang Rebellion of the 1890s, the Kelantan Uprising of 
1915 and the Trengganu Uprising of 1928 are but some examples of such resistance.
63 For example in Malaya, British interests were represented by the Resident who acted in an 
“advisory capacity” to the kerajaan. See Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and 
Indirect Rule. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1964]; Radin Soenamo, “Malay 
Nationalism”.
64 Feudalism was in fact enhanced by the regalia that the British introduced to traditional Malay 
court practices.
65 This came across quite clearly in the early perceptions of traditional Malay leaders such as Onn 
bin Jaafar and Tunku Abdul Rahman. For example, Dato Onn, who became the first President of 
Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu (United Malays National Organization or UMNO), 
formed in 1946 to give organizational coherence to the traditional Malay political movement, was 
concerned for the radical Islamic bent in the activities o f these reformists. See Anwar Abdullah, 
Dato Onn. [Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Nusantara, 1971] 171-173.
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associations was the definite note of loyalty to the British Government and 
Rulers”66.
Unlike the Malay radical movement, whose nationalist ethos was being 
built around Islamic reformist journals as well as the Kaum Muda movement and 
echoed the egalitarian, nationalist character of their Indonesian counterparts, the 
brand of Malay politics espoused by traditional elements continued to revolve 
around parochial state identities; and it was also becoming increasingly ethnic in 
its disposition. The political pre-occupations of the traditional elite were geared 
more toward the protection of the Malay Bangsa or race from the increasing 
number of the minority populations such as the Chinese, Indian and Peranakan 
(indigenous Chinese) than from the excesses of British colonialism . As a result, 
the kerajaan never challenged the status quo in the manner that the radical 
nationalists were doing68. As for the Malay masses themselves, the slight degree 
of social dislocation brought about by British colonialism ensured that they 
remained less politicised than their Indonesian kin, and less susceptible to the 
social revolution that engulfed every strata of Indonesian society in the wake of 
the national revolution.
VI. Contested identities
Despite the peripheral impact of radical anti-colonialism in the unfolding 
of Malayan history, it did contribute to the discourse and development of Malay 
nationalism. Hence careful consideration of the ideology behind this movement 
is critical in order to appreciate the various facets of Malay leadership perceptions 
of Indonesia, for it is in the ideological cleavage of pre-independence Malay
66 Radin Soenamo, “Malay Nationalism”, 16. The associations that Soemamo was referring to 
were political associations established and run throughout the Peninsular by the traditional state 
structure
67 William Roff, Origins of Malay Nationalism. 197-211; Ariffin Omar, Banes a Melavu: Malay 
Concepts of Democracy and Community. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1993] 20-26.
68 That said, there were concerns expressed by members o f the traditional elite at the inability of 
the aristocracy to empathise with the common people. For discussion on relations between the 
traditional elite and the aristocracy, See James de V. Allen, The Malayan Union. [New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1967]; Anthony Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics during the 
Malayan Union Experiment. 1942-1948. [Kuala Lumpur: MBRAS, 1979]; Tim Harper, The End 
of Empire and the Making of Malava. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1999].
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politics between the radical nationalists and traditional elite that one finds the 
discourse on kinship with Indonesia most fascinating69.
As suggested earlier, a motivation for the divergent perspectives and 
outcomes of anti-colonialism must surely lie in the colonial experience itself. By 
portraying theirs as a common struggle against foreign imperialism, the pan­
nationalists in effect papered over substantial differences that existed as a result of 
fundamental differences between the Dutch and British colonial projects. Simply 
put, the excesses of Dutch colonialism created a local mindset that differed 
substantially from that of the peninsular Malays, who in many ways had their pre­
colonial way of life preserved, and who did not undergo nearly the kind of 
dislocation their Indonesian counterparts did. This fact certainly contributed to 
the kinds of responses colonialism elicited from the colonized populations, and 
for the fact that there was no “Malay revolution” in the peninsula. Reflecting 
upon these different colonial experiences, Soenamo noted that on the eve of the 
Pacific War, the idea of political unity with Indonesia “was still strange to most 
Malays in Malaya”, and this continued to hold true after the occupation70. It was 
not so much that such views were unacceptable, but that the abstraction of such 
notions to a Malay society still wedged between traditional world of the sultans, 
aristocracy, and the kerajaan prevented its translation into a mass movement71. 
As Soenamo went on to suggest, mass politics “went too far against the 
established Malay tradition of respect and loyalty towards the instituted 
government”72.
For the Malay elites, the civic and egalitarian ideology behind the 
Indonesian revolution was antithetical to their political objectives, while the very
69 This point has been suggested in Rustam Sani, “ Tradisi Intelektual Melayu dan Pembentukan 
Bangsa Malaysia: Berberapa Persoalan SosiaF in Ahmat Adam, Kassim Ahmad and Rustam 
Sani, Intelektualisme Melavu: Satu Polemik. Kertas Kadangkala Bil.5. [Bangi: Faculty o f Social 
Sciences and Humanities, 1989] 73-105; C.W. Watson, “The Construction of the Post-Colonial 
Subject in Malaysia” in Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlov (eds), Asian Forms of the Nation. 
[Richmond: Curzon, 1996] 306-322. Alternative interpretations are found in Kassim Ahmad, 
Characterization in Hikayat H ans Tuah. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1955] and 
Donald Nonini, British Colonial Rule and the Resistance of the Malay Peasantry. 1900-1957. 
Monograph Series 38. [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992].
70Soenamo, “Malay Nationalism”, 9.
71 There is hence some resonance between the traditional elite’s view o f radical nationalism in 
Malaya and the views of their counterparts in Sumatra to Indonesian nationalism. As far as the 
Javanese were concerned, this “traditional world” had long been destroyed by Dutch colonialism.
72 Soenamo, “Malay Nationalism”, 22.
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social-political institutions that the Indonesian masses were so bent on 
dismantling were elevated to the status of unifying symbols of Malay 
nationalism73. While the issue of post-colonial boundaries served as the point of 
reference for Indonesian nationalism, in Malaya it revolved around consociation, 
competition and consensus between the dominant Malay community and ethnic 
minorities over the manner to which the former could impose its presence upon, 
while at the same time accommodate, the interests of the latter74. Insofar as the 
traditionalists were concerned, nationalism was a Malay, as opposed to a “Malay­
an”, phenomenon, and the challenge was the creation of an identity as a nation 
rather than an entity as a state. The cornerstone to the post-colonial political 
structure was likewise envisaged to be Malay ethnic dominance. This was 
represented by the centrality of Malay symbols such as the sultanate and 
kerajaan, Islam, Malay language and Malay primacy in Malayan society75. The 
critical importance of the sultanate and kerajaan in Malay culture has been 
described as such:
The Malay states had long been in existence . . . they had developed 
their own socio-cultural, economic and political norms. Loyalty and 
patriotism within these states had become ingrained characteristics of 
the public life of their people. Many of the Rulers by 1946 were 
descended from long lines of ancestry which imposed upon them a 
duty to be true to the traditions set by their forebears; above all they 
had always to uphold the safety, integrity and sovereignty of their 
states. Granted that they were largely feudal aristocrats; but there is 
not a shadow of doubt that the Malay rulers of 1946 understood deeply 
that in their persons rested the ultimate responsibility for the survival 
and well-being of their states. . . .  the existence of well-established 
nationalist concepts of loyalty and patriotism within the nine states was 
thrown into bold relief when the Malays in general and from different
73 See Mohd Aris Othman, “The Sultanate as the Basis for Malay Political and Cultural Identity 
from a Historical Perspective”, Sari. Vol.l, No.2 (July 1983).
74 Karl von Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in 
Malaysia. [Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976] 15.
75 For an incisive discussion on the Malay political identity, see Clive Kessler, “Archaism and 
Modernity: Contemporary Malay Political Culture” in Joel Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds), 
Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia. [Honolulu: University o f 
Hawaii Press, 1992].
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strata of their society rallied and united to oppose the British proposals 
and defend the sovereignty of their rulers and states76.
Anthony Milner further articulated: “loyalty and service to the race were 
described in precisely the same terms as had been used for centuries to convey 
devotion to a sultan”77; while Cheah Boon Kheng noted that “royal power is 
crucial to an understanding of the Malay political mind”78. Invented or otherwise, 
the centrality of Malay identity remains synonymous to the modem Malaysian 
state, and its ebb and flow continues to dictate the course of Malaysian politics. 
Within this cultural framework the immediate post-war period witnessed the 
increasing dominance of traditional and mainstream elements and the 
simultaneous diminution in influence of the radical Malay movement in the 
evolving nationalist discourse.
While the issue of Malay supremacy was central to the Malay political 
psyche, it was the Malayan Union scheme, proposed by the British in October 
1946 as a potential political framework for the subsequent transfer of sovereignty, 
that provided the catalyst for the consolidation and institutionalisation of Malay 
defence of their political rights and privileges as “sons of the soil”79. Two 
implications of the Malayan Union stood out insofar as the status of the Malays 
were concerned. First, under the scheme the status and sovereignty of the sultan 
was to be circumscribed, and authority on all matters, including religion, were to 
be subjected to British control80. Second, the Malayan Union scheme also sought 
to enact flexible citizenship laws to allow easier access to citizenship for
76 James Ongkili, Nation-Building in Malaysia. 1946-1974. [Singapore: Oxford University Press, 
1985] 46-47.
77 A.C. Milner, “Inventing Politics: The Case of Malaysia”, Past and Present. Vol. 132 (1991), 109.
78 Cheah Boon Kheng, “The Erosion of Ideological Hegemony and Royal Power and the Rise of 
Postwar Malay Nationalism, 1945-46”, Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies. Vol.XIX, N o.l March 
1988, 3.
79 Detailed analysis o f the Malayan Union scheme have been provided by Anthony J. Stockwell, 
British Policy and Malay Politics: Albert Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy. 1942-1948. 
[Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990]; Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore 
Separation: Political Unification in the Malaysia Region. 1945-1965. [Kuala Lumpur: Universiti 
Malaya, 1974]. Stockwell provides a study of the British policy and its shortcomings, Lau 
discusses the theme of balance between the rights and demands of the various ethnic groups, while 
Sopiee presents the Malay side of the argument.
80 Great Britain, Malayan Union and Singapore: Summary of Proposed Constitutional 
Arrangements. London, 1946, para 7.
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minonties . Because the terms of the Malayan Union undermined the position of 
the sultans, the traditional foci of Malay loyalty and identity, and at the same time 
threatened Malay primacy, it was perceived as an immediate threat to Malay 
identity and became the impetus for the formation of UMNO (United Malay 
National Organisation)82. What was most significant about the impact of the 
Malayan Union scheme on the overall constellation of Malayan politics was the 
fact that it galvanised the traditional elite. Once comfortable with their position 
of privilege and protection under British colonialism, the Malayan Union 
proposal quickened among this traditional elite the realization that the era of 
colonialism was coming to its conclusion83.
Many from traditional centres of power where also wary of the pan­
nationalists and their socialist ideals. The former had made no secret of their 
support for die Indonesian model of civic and egalitarian nationalism, and had 
identified with and latched onto it as a premise to politicise kinship with their 
revolutionary Indonesian counterparts84. Yet insofar as pan-national objectives of 
the Malay radicals were concerned, to the traditional Malay elite the concepts of 
Melayu Raya-Indonesia Raya were not based on equality of status for Malaya and 
Indonesia. Rather, it was viewed as the subservience of Malay interests to that of 
a proclaimed egalitarian Indonesia-inspired nationalism, which they felt was a
81 This consideration was made specifically in response to ethnic Chinese pressure for recognition 
of their war-time resistance against the Japanese, an effort Britain felt obliged to recognize and 
reward.
82 For a detailed study on the response of the Malay community to the Malayan Union proposals, 
see Anthony Stockwell, British Policy and Malay Politics.
83 Two caveats are in order here. First, the support o f the mainstream nationalists for the sultans 
and the concept o f Kerajaan in the wake of the Malayan Union scheme did not necessarily imply 
predetermined loyalty. Indeed, it must be kept in mind that UMNO’s objectives were primarily 
the protection of the Malay race and identity, and their status and interests within it, and the 
survival o f the sultanate mattered only insofar as it was an integral aspect of Malay society. This 
was emphasised in “Suatu Mengenai asas Kenegaraan Melayu”, Utusan Melavu. 16 November 
1983. Second, one needs also to take stock of the fissures within UMNO itself. Here, one 
recognises that UMNO was itself divided between the conservative and aristocratic “old school” 
elements that assumed leadership of the party in the course o f negotiations for independence, and 
the so-called “ultras” who, having thrown their weight behind UMNO, still sympathised with the 
philosophy of the radical Malay movement in the manner to which they were critical o f the 
conservative leadership who in their view were not articulating the political and economic 
interests of the majority o f the Malay population. One particular trait they shared with members 
o f the radical Malay movement was their sentiments toward Indonesia. For example, it was 
known that some such as Jaafar Albar, Syed Nasir, Ghafar Baba and Abdul Aziz Ishak were less 
critical o f Indonesia than the old-school aristocrats o f UMNO.
84 See Leo Suryadinata, “Indonesian Nationalism and the Pre-war Youth Movement”, A Re­
examination”, Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies. Vol.IX, N o.l (March 1978).
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cover for Javanese hegemony85. On this matter Prime Minister Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, once noted “if they (Indonesia) stuck to the present system of 
centralised rule by the Javanese, there could be no future peace or stability and 
this presented considerable dangers for Malaysia”86. In view of the repercussions 
of the Indonesian revolution on traditional structures of authority, this section of 
the Malay elite understood unification with Indonesia to mean the inevitable 
marginalization of the Malay community in the peninsula and a loss of the 
privileged status accorded them by the British. The situation was aggravated by 
the fact that in championing the Indonesian conception of egalitarian nationalism, 
their radical opponents had directly challenged Malay tradition and protocol.
The underlying difference between radical and traditional politics within 
the domestic arena in Malaya lay in how they envisaged the emancipation of 
Malay society was to be achieved. It has already been discussed how the radical 
group conceptualised emancipation through absorption into Indonesia Raya. The 
nationalist ideology (insofar as they had one) of the English-educated middle and 
upper class that constituted the traditional elite however, was grounded on 
different premises. Of this, Anthony Milner wrote:
Concepts of ‘the nation’ . . .  were in fact enunciated only in the most 
limited and hesitant way . . . .  What preoccupied the ideologues was 
the contest between several social ideals, particularly that between the 
monarchical vision and two other concepts of community, the first 
based upon the community of Allah and the other upon Malay 
ethnicity87.
For them, the preservation (albeit with some adjustments) and not eradication of 
the traditional Malay state structure remained the priority. This put them 
diametrically opposed not only to the Malay radicals, but the spirit of Indonesian 
nationalism as well. This point was not lost to the Indonesian nationalists, who 
would have greater sympathy for the cause of the Malay radicals now grouped 
into the MNP (Malayan Nationalist Party, consisting mainly of members from the
85 A prominent Malaysian historian highlighted to the author that conservative Malay leaders such 
as Onn Jaafar saw the Indonesian struggle and a Javanese, not Indonesian, struggle. Interview 
with Cheah Boon Kheng, Penang, 17 September 2002.
86 Document H 2/1-264, FCO 24/243, PRO.
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defunct KMM movement, formed on 17 October 1945) and to whom the baton of 
agitation for Malayan independence under the auspices of Indonesia Raya was 
passed88. These different conceptions over the character of post-colonial Malaya 
would later play an important role in inspiring Indonesian accusations against the 
mainstream Malay political elite of complicity with British neo-colonialism.
In the thinking of the conservative quarters in Malaya then, the Indonesian 
experience had no place in Malay nationalism, and after the war the traditional 
Malay elite would distance themselves from the violence of the Indonesian 
national revolution even as the radical Malay nationalists embraced and sought 
inspiration from it. In truth, the suspicion among the Malay traditional elite that 
Dutch colonialism was merely supplanted through revolution by Javanese cultural 
and political imperialism appeared to be corroborated by the post-revolution 
politics that was taking shape in Indonesia in the 1950s, where a disconcerting 
increase in Javanese dominance of the Indonesian political process was taking 
place. Consequent professions of impartiality by the central government cut no 
ground with regional discontentment, and separatist elements sprouted throughout 
the archipelago. The grievances of the many anti-republic regional movements 
have been summarized as follows:
The Central Government is Javanese-dominated. It 
appoints Javanese even to the key positions in the 
provinces;
It is divided, impotent, and corrupt;
It milks the provinces of revenues and makes altogether 
incommensurate returns by way of grants;
It has not itself provided the provinces with any coherent 
development plan, nor has it permitted the provinces to 
formulate and execute their own;
87 Anthony Milner, The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malava. [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995] 282.
88 It should be noteworthy that the first president o f the MNP, Moktar U ’d-din was Javanese, and 
the MNP had some 60 000 members who were reportedly Indonesian.
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It obscures the lines of authority between Djakarta and the 
provinces and procrastinates on fulfilling promises of local 
“autonomy”, meaning increased local self-government;
It has failed to reorganize the hastily contrived provincial 
system to make adjustment for the real facts of geography, 
culture, and politics89.
It was also becoming evident to the Malayan political elite that not all the 
ills of the new Republic of Indonesia were attributable to the cumulative effects 
of three centuries of colonialism, but that some were directly attributable to the 
disruptive forces unleashed in the name of revolution90. Chief among their 
concerns was the possibility of a spill-over of Indonesia’s revolutionary fervour 
into their comparatively tranquil political domain. This was a particularly 
disturbing prospect given the fates of their kith and kin from the Sumatran 
aristocracy and kerajaan caught against the tide of Indonesian nationalist fervour. 
Insofar as the traditional elite in Malaya were concerned, their opponents from 
the MNP were tainted with the brush of Indonesian radicalism.
Two incidents in the early 1950s sharpened Malayan sensitivities. The 
first pertained to the Indonesian government’s pursuit of the perpetrator of the 
Westerling Rebellion into Malaya. In January 1950, Captain “Turk” Westerling, 
an officer in the Dutch Armed Forces, attempted a violent takeover of Bandung in 
the hope of triggering an Indonesia-wide uprising against the new Indonesian 
republican government. Though the rebellion was swiftly quashed by the 
Indonesian military, Westerling escaped. Because Westerling was thought to 
have operated out of Singapore and Penang, the Indonesian government subjected 
British and local authorities in Singapore and Malaya to a barrage of accusations 
of connivance in the rebellion91. A second incident surrounded what has come to 
be known as the Hertogh affair. This incident revolved around the fight for 
custody over Maria Hertogh, a Dutch Catholic girl who was placed by her mother 
under the care of a Malay nursemaid during the Japanese occupation. When the
89 See WAH-2-57, “Challenges to Central Government in Indonesia”, American Universities Field 
Staff Report. Southeast Asia Series, Vol.V, No.2, 28 February 1957.
90 WAH-5-56, “Indonesia and the New Malayan States”, American Universities Field Staff 
Report. Southeast Asia Series, Vol.IV, No.2, 20 February 1956.
91 “AngkatanPerangRatuAd.il, 1950”, A4357/265, NAA.
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battle for custody between the foster and biological mothers was resolved in 
favour of the latter after prolonged litigation, Singapore and Malayan Malays of 
Indonesian background were suspected to have been actively involved in 
instigating the racial riots in Singapore and Malaya that followed the unpopular 
court decision92. Indeed, British intelligence reported the detention of some 700 
pro-MNP Indonesians and people “of Indonesian race” in Malaya under 
emergency regulations93. Both these incidents alerted the conservative elements 
within the Malayan leadership to the spectre of unwelcome violence threatened 
by the interest of over-enthusiastic politicised Indonesians in Malayan affairs.
The concern among Malaya’s conservative elite and the sultans for the 
influence that Indonesia could have on elements of the radical Malay political 
movement was also shared by the British94. Poulgrain summarized British 
sentiments in the following manner:
The imposed colonial boundary along the Malacca Straits did not 
alter the traverse of local culture or the exchange of people and 
ideas, nor was it an impediment to the flow of revolutionary 
idealism from Indonesia to Malaya. In ethnic terms, many of the 
people who live on either side of the Malacca Straits are Malay.
The proximity of Malaya and Sumatra created a historical conduit, 
not only longitudinal -  up and down the famous Malacca Straits -  
but also transverse. Had Indonesian colonialism, harboured for 
centuries, crossed the narrow watery division between archipelago 
and peninsula and taken hold, then Britain’s tenuous postwar 
position in Malay would have been jeopardized95.
In response to the establishment of the API (Angkatan Pemuda Insaf) youth 
movement under the auspices of the MNP to encourage the Malay community to 
support the MNP’s call for immediate independence within an Indonesian 
federation, British intelligence reports warned: “One need only remember the 
close kinship between Malays of Malaya and the Malayan peoples of the rest of
92 WAH-5-56, “Indonesia and the New Malay States”.
93 Telegram 159 from Commissioner General (Southeast Asia), Singapore to British Embassy, 
Jakarta, 13 August 1951, FO 371/92486, PRO.
94 See CO 537/1529, No. 11, 25 May 1946, quoted in Anthony Stockwell, Malava: Part I o f the 
Malayan Union Experiment. 1942-1948. [London: HMSO, 1995] 236-239.
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Indonesia. What the latter can do, can be done equally well by the Malays of this 
Peninsula”96. Ultimately, it was their close alliance with the British colonial 
administration that saw the conservatives prevail in this contest of identities with 
the radical Malay nationalists. In the search for “ideological consensus”, left- 
wing parties and ideologies that espoused pan-nationalism were quickly labelled 
subversive and deviant, and eliminated by colonial repression and, after 
independence in 1957, by coercive instruments of control deployed to justify the 
preservation of internal security and stability.
The situation was exacerbated by the persistence of the issue of political 
unification with Indonesia, which continued to be a key political objective of 
radical Malay movements into the early 1950s. While UMNO and the British 
colonial administration were focused on ironing out the terms of independence, 
elements from the MNP were expressing through their party manifesto their 
unremitting desire to draw Malaya closer to Indonesia. Three points in the 
manifesto stood out to that effect:
To unite the Malay nation {bangsa Melayu) and to inculcate 
national feelings in the hearts of the Malay people (orang-orang 
Melayu) with the ultimate aim of making Malaya unite with the 
big family, namely, the Republic of Greater Indonesia (Republik 
Indonesia Raya);
To foster friendly relations with other domiciled races in this 
country to create a united and prosperous Malaya as a component 
member of Republik Indonesia Raya;
To support the Indonesian nationalist movement for the
• • Q7achievement of independence .
As with its predecessors, the MNP’s brand of Malayan nationalism that sought to 
win independence via unity with Indonesia stemmed from the need of the Malays 
to compensate for the fact that they were fast becoming a minority in their own 
homeland in the wake of the encroachment into their politics and economics by
95 Greg Poulgrain, The Genesis of Konfrontasi: Malaysia. Brunei. Indonesia. 1945-1965. 
[Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998] 31-32.
96 CO 537/1581, Nos. 14, 15 & 16, 31 May to 22 June 1946, quoted in ibid, 245-246.
97 UMNO file SG. 96/146, Akrib Negara Malaysia.
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Chinese and Indian minorities. In return, Indonesian youths sympathetic to the 
cause of the MNP subsequently moved to form the Perikatan Pemuda Malaya -  
diluar Tanah Air (Overseas Malayan National Youth Movement) in Jakarta to 
propagate the MNP cause of Malayan independence. When the MNP was later 
banned in 1953, it resurfaced in Indonesia as the Kesatuan Malaya Merdeka 
(Independence of Malaya Movement).
VII. Popular pressures
Notwithstanding the obvious concern among the vast majority of the 
political leadership in Malaya for the impact the Indonesian revolution and its 
legacy for the future of Malaya, the question of how to relate to Indonesia in light 
of their historical links as well as more recent experiences remained an 
understandably complex issue. The primary reason for this lay in the observation 
that the concern Malay leaders had about identifying themselves closely with 
Indonesia at the political level was still clouded by the fact that even these 
aristocrats and conservative elites in the peninsula (let alone the Malay population 
in general, who continued to have family ties across the Melaka Straits) were to 
some extent constrained by the historical legacy of kinship the Malay population 
shared with their Indonesian cousins. Nowhere was this dichotomy starker than 
in the impact of the Indonesian revolution on Malay popular opinion. For 
example, it has been noted that at grassroots level, many peninsular Malays had in 
the wake of Indonesia’s struggle against colonialism erected photographs and 
portraits of Indonesian heroes such as Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, and named
Q O
streets after Indonesian heroes of the past and present .
The intensity of popular support for Indonesia was not lost to the Malay 
elite. During his battle against the Malayan Union project Onn bin Jaafar 
explicitly appealed to Indonesian migrants to “safeguard the positions of the 
Malays”99. After independence, Tunku himself was aware that “a large
98 Indeed, the renowned Malay poet Usman Awang once noted that “Sukarno was our leader as 
much as Indonesia’s. I never missed listening to his speeches”.
99 Critchley to Tange, 29 November 1957, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 1, NAA.
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proportion of the Malays had other loyalties -  to Indonesia”100. It has also been 
noted earlier that many Malays from the peninsula actively participated in the 
Indonesian revolution. Throughout the 1950s, 17 August independence 
celebrations at the Indonesian Embassy in Malaya were a matter of festivity for 
Malays, and the event was celebrated in a “village atmosphere” akin to traditional 
festivals in Malay-Indonesian culture101. Even Malayan authorities have 
conceded the fact that to most Malays, Sukarno and Hatta were not merely 
champions of Indonesia, but of the Malays in the peninsula as well102. Such 
popular sentiments forced the Malay elite to temper public expressions of their 
reservations toward Indonesia, and this was reflected in the public statements of 
even the most wary of Malay leaders. UMNO founder-president Onn bin Jaafar 
once mentioned the possibility of Malaya integrating itself into the United States 
of Indonesia along with British Borneo103. Onn had apparently expressed the 
opinion that a pan-Malay union consisting of Malaya, Indonesia and Borneo 
should be a political objective of the leaders of the Malay World104. Later, even 
the incredulous Tunku Abdul Rahman expressed similar sentiments when he 
opined that Malaya “want(s) to unite with Indonesia, but as an independent 
country”105.
Concluding remarks
The ease to which kinship appeared to be socially and culturally 
constructed in anti-colonial discourse in the Indo-Malay World creates a difficult 
puzzle which this and the previous chapter has attempted to illuminate. If, in fact, 
similar language and religion are pre-requisites for nationalism, why indeed did 
two separate states emerge out of what appears to be one Ethniel hi attempting to
100 Critchley to Tange, 22 November 1957, ibid.
101 Malay Dream Remains as Elusive as Ever”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 18 April 
1985.
102 Department o f Information, Malaysia, Let the World Judge: Speeches of the Malaysian Chief 
Delegate to the Security Council. Dato Dr. Ismail bin Abdul Rahman, on 9th and 10th September 
1964. [Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, Malaysia, 1964] 4.
103 Malava Tribune. 11 August 1948.
104 This was related in Said Zahari, Dark Clouds at Dawn: A Political Memoir. [Kuala Lumpur: 
Insan, 2001] 161.
105 Utusan Melavu. 2 June 1955.
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disentangle the convolutions of kinship politics in nationalist discourse during this 
complex period of the region’s history, it emerges that the unfolding of the 
kinship factor was indelibly linked to both the highly contested discursive terrain 
of identity, and in particular “Malay” identity, as well as with the emergence of 
distinct brands of nationalism in response not only to these contested notions of 
identity, but also political expediency as a result of the sudden termination of the 
Pacific War.
By the end of the war, two nationalist assemblages had evolved in colonial 
Malaya, with distinct ideologies and positions on affiliation with Indonesia. 
Where nationalist discourse in Malaya was once the sole prerogative of the 
socialist radicals of the KMM before the war, the post-war Malayan Union saw to 
it that a galvanised traditional elite would emerge to stake their political claims, 
rejecting the notion of political union with Indonesia in the process. Uppermost 
on the minds of this elite, particularly those in the upper echelon of UMNO, the 
inheritors of the colonial state, was the impact of the Indonesian revolution itself. 
Whatever empathy the Malay political elite of UMNO felt toward the Indonesian 
nationalist struggle was blighted by the debacle of the social revolution in 
Sumatra, which witnessed the decimation of traditional Malay structures that 
were still widely respected in the Peninsula. Consequently, the perceptions and 
interpretations of kinship on the part of these mainstream Malay political leaders 
were informed by the victimization of their cousins in Sumatra in the wake of 
Indonesian nationalism. The matter of the nascent Indonesian central 
government’s inability or reluctance to stem the tide of the social revolution left a 
mark on the minds of the mainstream Malayan nationalists, who ironically had by 
then embarked on their own nationalism defined by the preservation of traditional 
political structures and symbols. In time, the negative perception of Indonesia as 
a Javanese-dominated state which made little attempt to accommodate the 
Sumatran kerajaan in the newly-formed republic would be further exacerbated by 
the left-leaning posture of the Sukarno administration and its proscription of the 
influential Sumatran-based Islamic party Masyumi, which enjoyed close ties with 
Malayan leaders.
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The matter of social origins and political socialization of the respective 
nationalist leaders would serve to further aggravate already-pronounced 
differences. On the peninsula, anti-colonial activity was by and large instigated 
and led by Indonesia-inspired radical nationalists, most of whom were from 
humble backgrounds. In contrast, it was a cohort of pro-British, Western- 
educated traditional elite who stood at the forefront of mainstream Malay 
nationalism106. In many ways, the English educated Malay bureaucratic elite 
were socially and culturally alienated from the masses. Aristocratic elites, by 
virtue of their feudal nature, were even more so. This contrasted with the 
Indonesian experience, where lower and middle class Dutch-educated elite from 
Java and Sumatra such as Sukamo, Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, Agus Salim, 
Muhammad Yamin and others formed the backbone of the anti-colonial 
movement and identified with the social, political and economic alienation of the 
masses, and subsequently rose to prominence through the trials and tribulations of 
detention and subsequently revolution107. Because of their alienation, the Malay 
conservative elite still had to come to terms with a society that, though respectful 
of traditional structures of authority, regarded the Indonesian nationalists as 
“Malay heroes”.
From the Indonesian perspective, the aristocratic and conservative 
advocates of mainstream Malayan nationalism were trapped in their world of 
feudalism and moderation, and hence were illegitimate representatives of the 
national struggle108. Clearly, the egalitarian Indonesian nationalism that was 
emanating from Java and driving the re-stratification of society, destruction of 
tradition, and eradication of the feudal and aristocratic class, was the very 
antithesis of the Malay-based nationalism many on the peninsula hoped to pursue. 
It was evident from the consequences suffered by the traditional Sumatran elite, 
who agitated for the protection of their privileged status, that the new Indonesian
106 For a detailed study of the political acquiesce o f the traditional elite in Malaya, see Tim Harper, 
End of Empire: Ariffin Omar, Banesa Melavu.
107 See Firdaus Abdullah, The Origins and Early Development. 12-13.
108 For Indonesian perspectives of this, see Roeslan Abdulgani. Indonesia dan Percaturan Politik 
Internasional. [Surabaya: Yayasan Keluarga Bhakti, 1993] 198-199.
137
state would not entertain such political demands109. Not surprisingly, the alacrity 
with which political conservatism was dispensed with as a result of their clash of 
conceptions with the revolutionaries over the social-political basis of the new 
state (or rather, the position of Sumatra and other outer island territories within 
the Javanese-dominated Indonesian state and societal structures) was viewed as a 
disturbing development and tempered traditional Malay elite support for 
Indonesian de-colonisation110. Representing the apprehensions of the ruling elite, 
the following thoughts of Tunku Abdul Rahman reveal the sober sense of 
vulnerability they felt in the wake of the appeal of Indonesian nationalism for the 
Malay population:
The Ruler who had enjoyed sovereignty and prestige under the British 
rule were equally concerned. After independence they had seen how 
many thrones in India, Pakistan and Indonesia had toppled. What
would be their fate if the British left? Would the people accept them?
They felt that they would be at the mercy of the Malay extremists. The 
general pre-Merdeka feeling was that this country would go the way of 
our neighbours, from prosperity to poverty, from happiness to sadness 
and from peace to violence. Even Datuk Onn, the founder of UMNO 
and a great Malay leader, had shared the views of the Rulers and others 
against complete independence111.
Tunku’s musings spoke much of the contradictions confronting the 
traditional Malay elite as they viewed developments in Indonesia. First, it was 
clear that unlike the Indonesian nationalists’ opinion of Dutch colonialism, the
Malay elite were of the view that colonialism under the British was a time of
109 See Reid, Blood of the People, chap 3; Michael van Langenberg, “Class and Ethnic Conflict in 
Indonesia’s Decolonization Process: A Study of East Sumatra”, Indonesia. Vol.33 (April 1982). 
O f course, in the eyes o f these traditional elite outside o f Java, the new Indonesian state was in 
fact a Javanese-conceived entity, and constructed to sustain Javanese dominance.
110 See Robert Curtis, “Malaysia and Indonesia”, 12-14; Ariffin Omar, Revolusi Indonesia dan 
Banssa Melavu: Runtuhnva Keraiaan-Keraiaan Melavu Sumatera Timur Pada Tahun 1946. 
[Pulau Pinang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1999]. For an alternative view of how 
traditional Indonesian royalty “transformed” its own shape and character, see Peter Carey, 
“Yogjakarta: From Sultanate to Revolutionary Capital o f Indonesia -  The Politics o f Cultural 
Survival”, Indonesia Chronicle. No.39, March 1986.
111 Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, Political Awakening. [Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publication, 1986] 
207-208. Tunku himself was closely related to the Sultan of Langkat.
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“sovereignty”, “prestige”, “happiness”, “prosperity” and “peace”112. Moreover, 
many among the Malay elite were also of the opinion that total independence, 
which Indonesians were spilling blood for, was antithetical to the security of 
Malaya in view of the problem of communalism and communism, which required 
British assistance to subdue. Finally, many mainstream nationalists shared at the 
time an opinion that the kind of unification their opponents in the radical MNP 
proposed with Indonesia would have relegated Malays to the peripheries of 
Indonesia Raya. In view of this, it was portentous that Sutan Sjahrir, Sumatran 
Prime Minister of Indonesia from November 1945 to February 1947 and one of 
the more moderate among Indonesian revolutionaries, had exhorted Onn bin 
Jaafar to “remain in friendship with the British and to build up his own show”113.
This final point however, revealed a fundamental cleavage in perceptions 
of kin-based pan-identity between its Malay and Indonesian proponents that not 
many have recognized. To Ibrahim Yaacob, Burhanuddin, and their compatriots, 
unification with Indonesia was based on a subscription to what they perceived in 
their minds to be the preponderance of Malay identity in the region114. Hence, 
unity within Indonesia Raya was assumed to be based on equal status for all 
Malay-dominant populations, which to them centred on Malaya, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines. Correspondingly, a brand of nationalism could be constructed 
across these territories along ethnic lines of Bangsa Melayu (The Malay 
nation)115. In effect, the Malay radical nationalists’ train of thought echoed 
Muhammad Yarnin’s vision of an “Austronesian Confederation” of Indonesia, 
Malaya and the Philippines116. For them, co-identification with Indonesia was to
112 These terms were used in various classified documents by the traditional Malay leadership to 
describe their colonial experience in comparison to Indonesia.
113 CO 537/2177, 23 January 1948, in Stockwell, Malava. 374.
114 The contradictions that confront the Malay socialists on this front are addressed in Muhammad 
Ikmal Said, “Ethnic Perspectives of the Left in Malaya” in Joel Kahn and Loh Kok Wah (eds), 
Fragmented Vision. 277-278.
115 See Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, As as Falsafah Kebamsaan Melavu. [Bukit Mertajam: Pustaka 
Semenanjung, 1954]; See also Ariffin Omar, Banes a Melavu. 191-199. Ariffin asserts that 
“although Burhanuddin claimed that his concepts o f Bangsa and Kebangsaan Melayu were not 
racial, they were nevertheless exclusive”.
116 Yamin had argued for the formation of such a confederation o f the “Three M ’s” -  Melaka, 
Mataram (an ancient Javanese kingdom), and Malolos (Philippines), nations which he viewed as 
originating from a common stock and possessing identical culture. See Arnold Brackman, 
Southeast Asia’s Second Front. [London: Pall Mall, 1966] 318.
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be premised on the dominance of Bangsa Melayu or a “Malay nation”, of which 
Indonesia was a part.
From the point of view of its subscribers in Indonesia however, the basis 
for Indonesia Raya was found neither in racial-ethnic affinity nor the 
preponderance of Malay identity, even though this did lie at the surface of their 
pan ideology. According to their interpretation of the ethno-historical record, the 
Malay Peninsula was part of the great Javanese Majapahit Empire, and political 
unification with Malaya in contemporary times was co-terminus with its re­
construction1 17. Illustrative of this was Yarnin’s contention that:
To separate Malaya from the rest of Indonesia amounts to deliberately 
weakening from the outset the position of the People’s State of 
Indonesia in her international relations. On the other hand, to unite 
Malaya to Indonesia will mean strengthening our position and 
completing our entity to accord with our national aspiration and 
consistent with the interest of geopolitics of air, land and sea118.
Knowingly or otherwise, on the part of these Indonesians, underwriting their 
conception of pan-identity was a notion of Javanese dominance119; and because 
Indonesia Raya was a geopolitical rather than racial or ethnic construction, this 
allowed them to discard the visions of pan-nationalism more easily when the 
complexities of the post-war political environment truncated any possible 
usurpation of British Malaya on this pretext120. In a telling indication of the 
different terms of reference the term Melayu Raya, popularised by Malay radicals, 
was hardly used among the Indonesian nationalists to describe what they saw 
more aptly as Indonesia Raya, a greater Indonesian nation whose boundaries 
spanned the extents of the ancient kingdom of Majapahit as they saw it.
117 This comes across clearly in the speeches of Sukarno cited earlier, as well as in the works of 
the Indonesian Nationalist ideologue Mohammad Yamin. See Yamin, Naskah Persiapan 
U ndam -U ndam D asar 1945. [Jakarta: Siguntang, 1959] 127-135.
118 Statement by Muhammad Yamin at the meeting o f the BPKI in BPKI, The Territory of the 
Indonesian State. 6.
1,9 This is interesting for the fact that Mohammad Yamin, the chief ideologue and progenitor o f 
Pan Indonesia based on a revival of Majapahit, was a Sumatran.
120 For the relatively less significance placed on pan idealism on the part o f Indonesian 
nationalists, see Abdul Rahman Ismail, “Takkan Melayu Hilang di Dunia: Suatu Sorotan Tentang 
Nasionalisme Melayu” in R. Suntharalingam and Abdul Rahman Ismail (eds), Nasionalisme: Satu 
Tinauan Seiarah. [Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1985].
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The kinship factor then, though significant in laying the basis for co­
identification in the anti-colonial struggle, was nevertheless a convoluted 
phenomenon in the emerging politics of the Malay World. It quite clearly 
generated both binding and divisive dynamics, and the manner in which it played 
out depended in particular on how the various streams of nationalist thought on 
the peninsula conceptualised their affiliation with Indonesia, which of these 
streams eventually inherited the post-colonial order, the shape of Indonesian and 
Malayan national identity as they evolved, and eventually how they came to 
understand the terms of reference of their relations as post-colonial kin states. 
These unresolved convolutions would subsequently cloud the functional aspects 
of relatedness, defined as the fulfilment of expectations and obligations of 
kinship, in the immediate post-colonial years.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
1949-1965: Enemies Beneath the Skin
Introduction
The previous chapter discussed in detail the relevance of the kinship factor 
to the nationalist projects in the Malay World. While its significance was no 
doubt magnified in the common struggle against colonialism, underneath this 
solidarity lay substantial differences in terms of. how the kinship factor was 
conceived to be a basis for affinity among various political quarters in Indonesia 
and Malaysia. Concomitantly, these contested conceptions of kinship resulting 
from alternative interpretations of history and historical experience played a 
significant role in influencing the shape and direction of post-colonial relations. 
As the domestic process of state consolidation and identity formulation was put 
into motion, so too did the different worldviews that emerged out of respective 
historical experiences work to further transform conceptions of kinship in the era 
of post-colonial boundaries. It was also in the post-colonial era that the functional 
aspect of relatedness took on greater prominence in political relations, when 
affinity had to translate into policy.
I. The shaping of foreign policy outlooks
An accomplished scholar of Indonesian foreign policy has described the 
post-colonial Javanese-dominated Indonesian worldview in the following manner: 
The struggle for independence exposed the weakness and vulnerability of 
the Indonesian state arising from its fragmented social and physical 
condition. In addition, an awareness of the attraction of Indonesia’s 
bountiful natural resources and the importance of its strategic location 
between the Indian and Pacific Oceans reinforced an apprehension of 
external powers. By contrast, that common international outlook 
encompassed also a proprietary attitude towards the regional environment1.
1 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. [London: Allen & Unwin, 1983] xiv.
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The “proprietary attitude” Michael Leifer wrote of stemmed from the fact that 
Indonesian independence was won through revolution and the central Indonesian 
state created through a conspicuous act of nationalist will. This informed the 
outlook of the political elite in Jakarta towards newly-formed states within its 
geographic locale. Malaya in particular was singled out as a state requiring 
“revolutionizing” as a result of their “counterfeit independence” .
The belief prevalent among the political and military elite in Jakarta at the 
time was that independence could never be “granted” by imperialists nor “won” 
in collaboration with them, but had to be fought for if it were to be considered 
genuine. By this token, it was not surprising that the Indonesian leadership was 
highly critical of the nationalist credentials of the Malay ruling elite on the 
peninsula. This was corroborated by Franklin Weinstein’s survey of the attitude 
of Indonesian leaders to Malaysia, where he found that “as for Malaysia, there 
was more to admire, but there were still grave doubts about the authenticity of its 
independence”3. Symptomatic of this was a quip directed at Malayan Prime 
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman by Sukarno. On the occasion of a visit by Tunku 
in 1955 (in his capacity as Chief Minister of British Malaya), Sukarno reportedly 
turned to him during a public rally and proclaimed, “Here is a man I am trying to 
persuade to fight”4. Indeed, the condescension in Indonesian attitudes to Malayan 
leaders set in train subsequent perceptions of expectations in relation to bilateral 
relations. Because of the nature of their respective independence struggles, many 
among the Indonesian leadership viewed Malaya’s standing as one of deference. 
Yet under Tunku however, as it was soon to become clear, Malaya was unwilling 
to assume this role.
It needs to be said that the revolutionary diatribe of the Jakarta leadership 
during this period was hardly an issue of mere political rhetoric. Indonesian 
foreign policy, described in official discourse as Bebas dan Aktif (independent
2 See Frederick Bunnell, “Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965”, Indonesia. Vol. 11 
(October 1966) 37-76; see also George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. [Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1952] 253-270.
3 See Franklin Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma o f Dependence. [Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1976] 166-171; See also Mohammad Hatta, “One Indonesian 
View of Malaysia”, Asian Survey. Vol.V (March 1965) 139.
4 Marvin Ott, “The Sources and Content o f Malaysian Foreign Policy towards Indonesia and the 
Philippines”, Ph.D dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University, 1971, 11.
143
and active), strove to provide substance to flamboyant policy statements. Very 
early on, this was manifested in the Hatta government’s rejection of a Philippine 
suggestion for the formation of an anti-communist Pacific Pact in May 1950. 
This trend was followed by subsequent governments from Mohammad Natsir, 
who succeeded Hatta in August 1950, through to 1959. Later, foreign policy 
making during the period of Guided Democracy (1959-1965) became auxiliary to 
the domestic purpose of sustaining the revolutionary culture of Indonesian 
politics. The nationalistic character of Indonesia’s foreign policy during this 
period was registered most conspicuously in Jakarta’s demand for West Irian, an 
unresolved issue carried over from the 1949 Round Table Conference at which 
the Dutch reluctantly recognised Indonesian independence, and one over which 
no Indonesian administration could afford to compromise as a symbol of national 
fulfilment. By the mid-1950s, the non-aligned impetus to foreign policy began 
taking more concrete form in Indonesia’s founding role at the 1955 Bandung 
Afro-Asian Conference. As further evidence of Indonesian attempts to project a 
non-aligned foreign policy, Jakarta also roundly condemned Washington’s 
sponsorship in September 1954 of a Collective Security Defence Treaty for 
Southeast Asia and took a decidedly anti-Western position in response to the 
British and French invasion of Egypt in 1956.
By mid-1957 however, it was becoming clear that the Sukarno 
administration’s “independent and active” policies were becoming more aligned 
with those of the Soviet Union and China. This was particularly noticeable after 
the President’s visits to the two communist giants the year before. The advent of 
the Guided Democracy era saw diplomatic belligerence raised to a level where 
much resource and attention was given to the prescription of an alternative 
regional and international order. Indonesia’s radical foreign policy was taken to 
the extreme as much out of a need to divert domestic attention from the 
increasingly precarious political and economic situation in Indonesia as to an 
intensified assertion of the revolutionary legacy of Indonesia’s international 
outlook. Indeed, many of Indonesia’s trademark policies during this period were 
targeted at challenging the prevailing regional and international order. It is from 
this perspective that the Jakarta’s relationship with Malaya should be viewed.
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One point of interest during this time was Jakarta’s inordinate interest in 
the evolution of independent Malaya, the international outlook of its political 
leadership, and its position on international affairs. Already, at the Malayan 
independence celebration, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio had expressed 
to the Australian High Commissioner that Malaya was “particularly important” to 
Indonesia5. This active interest in Malaya’s affairs would be further magnified by 
Indonesia’s proprietary attitude to regional entitlement on affairs concerning 
archipelagic Southeast Asia. It was from this vantage point that Jakarta 
questioned the “neutrality” of early post-colonial Malayan foreign policy. Robert 
Tilman, a close observer of Malayan foreign policy, has described Kuala 
Lumpur’s position on international affairs as that of a “committed neutral”6. This 
characterization of Malayan foreign policy, particularly in the early years of 
independence, has been erroneous. Many in the Kula Lumpur policy circles were 
avowed anti-communists. Most notable was Prime Minister Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, who himself claimed that:
It is sheer hypocrisy to suggest that when democracy is attacked we should 
remain silent and consider ourselves at peace with the world. Small as we 
are, we are not cowards and we are not hypocrites. In fact, today 
neutralism is no guarantee of one’s safety. India was neutral before she 
was attacked. Many other countries will soon find themselves in the same 
predicament7.
Because of Malaya’s underlying concern for communism, it was difficult for 
them to convince Indonesia (or indeed their own domestic opposition) of their 
neutrality.
The newly independent Malayan government’s strong foreign policy 
inclinations towards the West was epitomised by the priority placed on relations 
with Britain and the Commonwealth8. Furthermore it was the ANZAM
5 “Relations between Malaya and Indonesia”, A 1838 3006/4/7 Part 2, NAA.
6 Robert O. Tilman, “Malaysia Foreign Policy: The Dilemmas o f a Committed Neutral” in J.D. 
Montgomery and A.D. Hirschman (eds), Public Policy. [Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1969] 115-159.
7 Tunku’s address to Parliament, 5 December 1962, 39/87/2, DO 169/74, PRO.
8 This despite former Malaysian Foreign Minister Ghazalie Shafie’s insistence that in emphasizing 
relations with Britain and the commonwealth Malaya was not compromising on sovereignty nor 
subservient to British interests. See for example, Ghazalie Shafie, address delivered at Tunku 
Abdul Rahman Hall, Kuala Lumpur, 26 January 1960.
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agreement of 1949 and subsequently the AMDA (Anglo-Malayan Defence 
Agreement) signed with Britain in October 1957 that underwrote Malayan 
security9. While one could suggest that Malayan commitment to neutrality and 
non-alignment was exemplified by Kuala Lumpur’s absence from the SEATO 
(Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), the fact that the Malayan government 
remained firmly committed to the AMDA and was part of ASA (Association of 
Southeast Asia), an organization which included two countries (Thailand and the 
Philippines) which were signatories of security arrangements with the US, was in 
itself indicative of Malaya’s inclinations on questions of alignment10.
The issues and events surrounding the formation of SEATO are of 
particular relevance to any attempt at understanding the early currents of 
Indonesia-Malaysia relations. Here, it was the ambiguity surrounding Malaya’s 
position on the organisation that evoked the ire of an Indonesian government 
strongly convinced of its futility and suspicious of its intentions. Tunku had 
noted in private that while he and his cabinet “fully understood that the ultimate 
defence of Malaya lay in SEATO, politically the word ‘SEATO’ could not be 
safely used in connection with anything Malayan without provoking hysteria”11. 
It was likely that on his mind was the pressure being exerted by pro-Indonesian 
forces within the Malayan parliament for Kuala Lumpur to dissociate itself from 
Britain. While the Malayan leadership saw the need for rhetorical compromise, it 
was also keenly aware of London’s warnings “not to give handle to Indonesian 
propaganda . . .  to the effect that British forces are here primarily for (our) own 
purposes rather than to defend Malaysia and that defence agreement is a neo­
colonial imposition on Malaysia”12. In fact, Tunku had tacitly supported the 
security function of SEATO. This was evident in the Commonwealth Secretary’s 
report to Prime Minister Macmillan:
9 Australia and New Zealand subsequently signed on to participate in this security agreement in 
April 1959.
10 O f course, the Abdul Rahman government’s pro-West policy expressed through AMDA was 
not without its critics at home. In particular, UMNO backbenchers and the opposition parties 
were vocal in their criticisms that the security pact compromised Malayan sovereignty. See 
Malaya Legislative Council, 2nd Debates. Vol. 3, 1957-58. [Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 
1959] 67-69.
11 Draft report titled “Participation in SEATO Activities by Commonwealth Forces based in the 
Federation of Malaya”, JP(59) 66(A), 28 May 1959, DO 35/9957, PRO.
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If it were a question of active operations in support of SEATO, no 
difficulties would be placed in our (Britain’s) way. So long as his 
(Tunku’s) government was in power, we (Britain) could safely plan on the 
assumption that British forces could move by road or any other means 
direct from Malaya into Siam13.
On another occasion, Tunku had gone to the extent of claiming that “the 
Federation of Malaya, by signing a mutual defence treaty with Britain is 
indirectly in the SEATO”14. This association between Malaya’s commitment to 
AMDA and Britain’s obligation to SEATO was clear from Article VI of the so- 
called “Singapore Proviso” in the Malaysia Agreement of 1963. The provision, 
which was essentially an extension of the AMDA agreement of 1957 to cover the 
additional territories of Malaysia in 1963, gave Britain the right “to make such 
use of these (Malayan) facilities as the (British) Government may consider 
necessary for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and for 
Commonwealth defence and the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia”. It was 
clear from the final sentence of Article VI that these provisions were designed to 
secure maximum cooperation of Malaya in a SEATO contingency, when the 
“peace in Southeast Asia” was threatened. Interpreted in this manner, this 
agreement certainly lent credence to Indonesian suspicions that AMDA was a 
neo-colonial imposition with Malayan contrivance.
Given Malaya’s tacit backing of SEATO, it is also interesting to note that 
the Tunku’s administration still refrained from official commitment to the 
organisation. As often as he espoused the value of SEATO to Malaya, he was 
also fervent in publicly rejecting any prospect of Malayan participation in it, 
arguing that Malaya did not believe in alliances15. On the issue of SEATO 
membership, it has come to light that the Tunku’s administration refrained from 
participating in SEATO for purely domestic reasons, for fear that sentiments in
12 Telegram 1306 from British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations 
Office, London, 2 August 1965, DO 169/397, PRO.
13 Record of conversation between the Commonwealth Secretary and the Prime Minister of 
Malaya in London on 18 October 1960, DO 169/170, PRO.
14 Inward Telegram No.32 from British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth 
Relations Office, London, 21 February 1958, DO 35/9957, PRO.
15 See “Why Malaya does not intend to join SEATO”, Straits Budget. 14 January 1959.
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Malaya were strongly against Malayan involvement in any military alliance16. 
The vagaries behind the Malayan government’s policy proclivities toward 
SEATO surfaced in public debates over Malaya’s involvement in Laos in the late 
1950s, where Malaya only barely managed to convince Britain that evoking the 
AMDA agreement would put Kuala Lumpur in a tenuous position on the 
domestic political front17. Explaining this phenomenon, the British High 
Commissioner noted:
Even the Malays are divided on issues of the greatest importance to 
the Government. This division arises from the fact that a large 
proportion of them. . .  are of Indonesian origin and sympathizers, and 
that most of the Malay vernacular press is under Indonesian influence.
This group has shown signs of regarding the Tunku as too much 
committed to the West. . . .  As a whole they seem to incline towards 
socialism and neutralism on the Bandung model. These trends have 
been discernible in UMNO itself, particularly in its youth sections18.
As for Indonesia’s response to Malaya’s commitment to the West, any hopes that 
Jakarta harboured of weaning Malaya away from the West and SEATO influence 
were effectively laid to rest when during his visit to Jakarta in November 1958, 
Malayan Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak expressed the opinion that 
while Malaya was not part of SEATO, it did not and would not oppose it19.
Not only was Malayan foreign policy during this period effectively pro- 
West in substance if not in form, it was also marked by attempts to manage 
regional security issues. Malaya was the progenitor of the regional cooperation 
initiative SEAFET (Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty) in February 
1959, which would eventually evolve through an arduous process into ASA 
(Association of Southeast Asia) by July 1961. As it happened, Malayan interest 
in regional leadership was taking shape during the height of Indonesian 
internationalism and in Jakarta’s own regional locale, and the latter’s response to 
Malayan prescriptions for regional order clearly illustrated the extent of the clash
16 Australi High Commission Cable no.2274, 14 August 1964, A1838 2498/11 Part 2, NAA..
17 See JP(59) 66(A), 28 May 1959, DO 35/9957, PRO.
18 Report entitled “Federation o f  Malaya: Review o f  Events Since Independence”, CRO Reference 
MAL 30/11, DO 35/9957, PRO.
19 Foreign Office, London, Southeast Asia (General) File D 10362/11, December 1958, DO 
35/9951, PRO.
148
that seemed inevitable under these circumstances. Indonesia frowned upon 
Malaya’s SEAFET and ASA proposals, arguing that they ran counter to the 
Bandung spirit and weakened Affo-Asian solidarity20. Compounding matters was 
Tunku’s public disregard for the Non-Aligned Movement. In January 1958 
Tunku criticized non-aligned countries for not taking a definite stand against 
communism. Later, in a veiled challenge to Indonesia, he contested the viability 
and effectiveness of Bandung, the jewel in the crown of Indonesia’s international 
activism, by asking mockingly: “Where is this conference? Where is its 
permanent organisation which the Bandung conference proposed? To whom do 
we apply to become members?”21. In a further affront to the Sukarno regime, 
Tunku jested that guided democracy meant “you don’t know which way you’re
99going to be guided” .
Bilateral tensions as a result of divergent conceptions of regional order 
were aggravated, paradoxically enough, by the fact that Malaya’s opposition and 
challenge to Indonesian regional primacy did not actually preclude the possibility 
of Indonesian membership and participation in the regional organs envisaged by 
Kuala Lumpur. Nevertheless Indonesia’s participation in any of Malaya’s 
regional initiatives was clearly an issue involving prestige. Bearing this in mind, 
participating in and contributing to the realization of any regional initiative that 
originated from outside of Jakarta was viewed as a submission of its regional 
leadership role, a surrendering of its prestige in Southeast Asia and the Third 
World, and an undermining of its revolutionary legacy. Indeed, these differences 
in perceptions of each other’s regional role would serve to be a major stumbling 
block for attempts to premise their relations as sovereign nation-states on kinship.
II. Indonesia-Malaya Treaty of Friendship, 17 April 1959
Even before contending regional perspectives came to the fore, tension 
between Indonesia and Malaya had already been brewing with the latter’s
20 Correspondence between British Embassy, Jakarta and Southeast Asia Department, Foreign 
Office, London, 11611/59, 22 May 1959, DO 35/9913, PRO.
21 “Malaysia’s Search for Identity”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 13 February 1964, 355.
22 Ibid.
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independence. Indonesian suspicions of the benign circumstances surrounding 
Malayan independence in August 1957 was certainly portentous of the potential 
problems that would confront relations between these kin states. Likewise, the 
fact that the Malayan political elite viewed Indonesia as a possible security threat 
was evident early in their independence when Kuala Lumpur expressed 
reservations that Britain’s contemplated arms supply to Jakarta would add to 
Indonesia’s offensive potential23. That said, Malayan leaders were also acutely 
aware of the special consideration that relations with Indonesia demanded. In 
assessing the popular pressures he faced, Tunku’s belief was reported by High 
Commissioner Critchley to this effect:
There was now a very strong feeling amongst many Malays who 
looked to Indonesia as a “big brother” which his government could not 
ignore. He pointed out that two-thirds of the Malays in Johore, most 
of the Malays in Kuala Lumpur, and one cabinet minister (Sardon) 
were Indonesian. He also said that most of the Malay press was 
controlled by Indonesian-trained journalists24.
Domestic pressures dictated attempts to premise relations with their larger 
kin neighbours on the kinship factor of shared language, religion and cultural 
practice25. In an attempt to place relations on such a footing, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman had earlier paid a goodwill visit to Indonesia in his capacity as Chief 
Minister of Malaya in 1955. Subsequently in early 1957, Malaya opened a 
diplomatic mission in Jakarta. When the mission was converted to an embassy 
after Malayan independence, Tunku chose as his ambassador a trusted political 
ally, Senu bin Abdul Rahman. The following observations on Senu’s arrival in 
Jakarta were telling of the terms of Indonesian expectations at that juncture:
In accordance with a pleasant local custom, all other commonwealth 
Heads of Mission joined. . .  to offer an informal welcome to Malaya’s 
first Ambassador . . . .  These occasions are normally small and quite 
unofficial, with no Indonesians present other than a representative of 
the protocol division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yesterday’s
23 See Commonwealth Relations Office Telegram, FE 35/282/3,28 April 1959, DO 35/9951, PRO.
24 Critchley to Casey, 7 November 1957, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 1, NAA.
25 See Department o f Information, Malaysia, Malava-Indonesia Relations. 31 August 1957 to 15 
September 1963. [Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, 1963] 1.
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arrival. . .  attracted considerable attention. The airport was thronged 
with press reporters and photographers; the proceedings were 
broadcast by Radio Republik Indonesia; and the airport building was 
decorated with an enormous welcoming poster26.
During an official visit to Jakarta in November 1958 however, Deputy 
Prime Minister Razak, for reasons never made clear, was apparently confronted 
abruptly with a cultural agreement in a final form and his signature promptly 
solicited. Needless to say, Razak was taken aback by the forcefulness of this 
Indonesian gesture. He explained that the Federation government could not 
conclude treaties in this fashion, and that a draft would have to be examined in 
Kuala Lumpur and agreed by the cabinet before any commitment was made. It 
would have been clear to Malayan policy makers that these early events were 
premonitions that bilateral relations would entail subservience to an enthusiastic 
Indonesia seeking to exert influence upon Malayan policy. For Malaya, a thin, 
easily transgressed line lay between cordial bilateral relations on the one hand, 
and what could be conceived as Malayan acquiescence to Indonesian tutorship 
and directives on the other.
Notwithstanding the problems that simmered beneath the surface in those 
formative years, both states were receptive enough to the potential for 
collaboration as kin states to have entered into a friendship treaty. From a 
Malayan perspective, the signing of the treaty itself is significant in that it remains 
the only Treaty of Friendship ever signed by Kuala Lumpur27. Signed on 17 
April 1959 on the occasion of the Indonesian Prime Minister Djuanda’s goodwill 
visit to Malaya, the treaty was supposed to “restore blood and racial relations” 
and “re-discover common heritage”, building on precisely the historical ties of 
kinship that was interpreted to have existed and which functioned as a rallying 
point for anti-colonial struggle. The main clauses of the treaty, focusing as they 
did on language standardization and enhanced cultural and educational 
exchanges, attested to attempts at emphasizing avenues of kinship as a basis for 
bilateral relations.
26 McIntyre to Tange, 2 October 1957, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 1, NAA.
27 Interview with Zainal Sulong, Kuala Lumpur, 14 August 2001.
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Djuanda’s visit however, did not pass without controversy, even if 
tensions were masked by forced displays of camaraderie. It was notable for 
example, that the Indonesian delegation did not appreciate the inordinate amount 
of time spent on formal calls to feudal rulers28. Also, Indonesia’s cool reception 
to Tunku Abdul Rahman’s scheme for the establishment of the SEAFET did not 
go unnoticed. On his part, the Tunku was reluctant to express overt support for 
the five principles of Bandung, choosing instead to make reference to the UN 
Charter. It was clear from this that Malaya was still anxious not to be drawn too 
far into the Afro-Asian fold with which Indonesia was closely identified. 
Furthermore, Malaya’s emphasis on SEAFET over Bandung was viewed as an 
affront in Indonesian circles. Two years later, in a commentary comparing ASA, 
the successor to SEAFET, and Bandung, the Malayan media tellingly reported: 
“the one remains what it was at Bandung, the expression of nationalist fervour 
among ex-colonial territories; the other is an association looking to economic, 
social and cultural advance” . The Indonesian press retorted by arguing that the 
association was doomed to failure without Indonesian participation30. Central to 
Jakarta’s reaction to Kuala Lumpur’s foreign policy initiatives was their dislike of 
what they saw as a newcomer taking the initiative in an area where they 
considered themselves as rightful leaders. They resented how the Malayan 
leadership could declare themselves to be “neutral” while in effect showing 
benevolence to the West. In the words of an Australian observer, “the Tunku has 
been showing too much initiative and independence for the liking of a people who 
promoted and staged the Bandung Conference and who confidently expected to 
have the new independent Malaya in their pocket”31. This acrimony led to the 
cancellation of Prime Minister Djuanda’s reciprocal visit to Kuala Lumpur in 
196132.
Contending perspectives on regional security were not the only avenue for 
discord between the two kin states. Other indirect diplomatic fracas included
28 Critchley to Casey, 30 April 1959, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 2, NAA.
29 “Beginning at Bangkok”, Straits Times. 4 August 1961.
30 “Malaya: The Indonesia Issue”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 9 March 1961, 433.
31 McIntyre to Quinn, 8 March 1959, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 2, NAA.
32 Secretary o f State, Prime Minister’s Office, London, to Tunku Abdul Rahman, MAC 20/67, 23 
January 1961, DO 35/9951, PRO.
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Indonesia’s criticism of Malaya’s condemnation of China in the wake of the 
latter’s colonization of Tibet, which Indonesia saw as a matter of China’s 
“domestic affairs”, as well as Jakarta’s withdrawal of its UN contingent from the 
Belgian Congo, apparently from a change of policy position, but which occurred 
coincidentally right after Malaya sent theirs.
It was quite evident then, that Malaya’s foreign policy prerogatives were 
emerging fundamentally and diametrically opposed to that of Indonesia’s. On 
hindsight, it is not surprising that in spite of the promptings of the opposition Pan- 
Malayan Islamic Party, consisting of residual elements from the pro-Indonesia 
MNP, the Friendship Treaty was not followed up with further plans to strengthen 
cooperation . Similarly, while a measure of cultural cooperation persisted, 
particularly in the realms of language policy and religious exchange, politics 
remained at a level separate from everyday affairs. On the contrary, events 
surrounding this period of relations indicated that the leaderships of these two kin 
states were instead headed toward confrontation. It would be three issues 
pertaining directly to Indonesia’s sense of national and territorial vulnerability 
that would become the definitive markers of how leaders of both Indonesia and 
Malaya perceived and interpreted their relations as kin states in this period.
III. PRRI/Pemesta Rebellion
A major crisis that had long standing repercussions for relations pertained 
to Malaya’s policy towards a renegade regional movement that sought to 
challenge the Indonesian central government in Java.
By the late 1950s, regional dissent against the central Indonesian 
government was fast fermenting into a political movement to challenge the 
authority of Jakarta. In December 1956, the West Sumatra military command 
revolted and took over civil administration. In March 1957, a similar military- 
based regional political movement was formed in Sulawesi. Named Pemesta (an 
acronym for Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam or Universal Struggle Charter), 
this movement was formed in retaliation against the Jakarta government’s
33 “Malaysia’s Search for Identity”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 13 February 1964, 354.
153
clampdown on smuggling activity undertaken by the military commanders and 
units in Sulawesi to supplement the meagre funding given by the central 
government34. Later on 15 February 1958 a group of dissident politicians and 
military officers in Sumatra formed the PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik 
Indonesia or Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) in Padang 
and Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. What was noticeable about the PRRI/Permesta 
movement was that it consisted of essentially non-Javanese, Muslim and 
generally pro-Western elements in Indonesian politics. By virtue of this, the 
PRRI rebels had propensities similar to the newly independent administration in 
Malaya. Beyond their similar political outlook, kin affiliation felt by the Malays 
in Malaya toward Sumatra was much more resilient than their feelings toward the 
Javanese, and this would subsequently define both Malaya’s response to the 
rebellion and the Javanese-dominated Indonesian central government’s 
interpretation of Malayan intentions.
One of the immediate factors that precipitated the regional rebellion was 
the rapid decline of non-Javanese influence in the upper echelons of the central 
government. This was significant because until then Sumatra had enjoyed a 
strong presence in the highest levels of leadership in Indonesia through Masyumi 
and PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party), both regional parties with close links to 
Malayan political organisations (UMNO in the case of the former, and elements 
of MNP in the case of the latter). By the mid 1950s however, Javanese elements 
started to assert themselves in government, taking over key positions with the 
help of Sukarno. Symbolic of this was the resignation of the most prominent 
Sumatran nationalist, the respected Vice-President and Prime Minister 
Mohammad Hatta, in July 1956 out of a sense both of disillusionment at 
Indonesian developments and helplessness regarding the country’s slide into 
political and economic chaos.
Alongside the decline in regional (and especially Sumatran) influence in 
the central government was the heightened tendency of the Sukarno 
administration toward authoritarianism and communism. A shift in the Sukarno 
administration’s ideological propensities had begun to take shape by 1955-56.
34 Much of this smuggling, it must be noted, involved Malayans.
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Indicative of this was the decline in essentially pro-Western regional elements in 
the central government and the President’s increasingly active flirtation with the 
left. By that time, Sukarno, duly impressed during his visits to the Soviet Union 
and China, had begun seriously contemplating establishing a form of leftist and 
authoritarian rule in the wake of Indonesia’s apparently incurable political and 
economic problems.
When the Sumatran rebellion broke out, Malaya declared a policy of non­
interference. At an official level, Kuala Lumpur also denounced foreign aid to 
the rebels and condemned external interference in Indonesian affairs. While 
ostensibly a public commitment to abstain from supporting the rebellion, the 
Malayan government’s condemnation of foreign interference could also be read 
as a veiled attack on Soviet support for the central government in the latter’s 
clampdown on the rebels. On the other hand, the rebels were receiving support, 
both psychological as well as material, from Britain and the US35. To London 
and Washington, the emergence of this alternative power centre was a good check 
on the reactionary potential of the forces of Indonesian nationalism represented 
by Sukamo and his supporters36. Further to that, the rebel government in 
Indonesia was also looking for SEATO assistance to overthrow Sukamo37. These 
developments created a predicament for a Malayan government closely allied to 
these Western powers.
The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the rebels shared a deep 
affinity with Malaya. By virtue of the fact that most of the rebels were Sumatran, 
there was a strong kinship bond between them and the Malays of the peninsula, 
with whom they shared much by way of indigenous culture, and in some respects 
even ethnicity. Moreover the rebels were also staunch anti-communists, further 
availing an ideological avenue for affiliation. This made it difficult for the 
Malays to view with equanimity the suppression of their Sumatran cousins by an
35 See George Kahin and Audrey Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy. [Washington and London: 
University o f Washington Press, 1995]; Kenneth Conboy and Janies Morrison, Feet to the Fire: 
Covert Operations in Indonesia. 1957-1958. [Annapolis, M.D: Naval Institute Press, 1999]; 
Matthew Jones, “Maximum Disavowal of Aid”, English Historical Review. CXIV (November 
1999).
36 Memo 31/3 from the Colonial Office, 26 March 1959, DO 35/9951, PRO.
37 Inward Telegram No.215 from British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth 
Relations Office, London, DO 35/9957, PRO.
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overwhelmingly Javanese Indonesian military38. There is also evidence that at a
conference of dissident leaders in Sumatra in January 1958 the desirability of
federation between Malaya and Sumatra was discussed, and prominent rebels
• • 10such as Colonels Hussein and Barlian were in favour of the idea in principle . 
On another occasion, the rebel leaders in Sumatra were alleged to have assured 
the Dutch that if  Java fell into communist (PKI) hands, Sumatra would declare 
independence, ostensibly with the support of Malaya40.
Despite Malayan proclamations of non-involvement, Jakarta was well 
aware of the fact that the rebels had access to arms purchased via Singapore and 
the Thai-Malayan border. The rebels were also able to obtain foreign exchange 
by engaging in trading activity through Singapore and Penang41. More significant 
was the fact that PRRI rebels and sympathizers were permitted to visit the 
Federation regularly to publicize their cause42. In the face of accusations of 
complicity, Kuala Lumpur maintained that these rebels held valid visas which the 
government was “bound to honour”43. Bilateral tensions reached new heights in 
the aftermath of the collapse of the regional rebellion, when despite protestations 
by Jakarta, rebels continued receiving asylum in Malaya on “humanitarian 
grounds”44. Certain quarters have also suggested that some Malayans of 
Sumatran origin actively facilitated these rebels’ flight to Malaya45. Using 
legalistic arguments, the Malayan government had maintained that there was no 
extradition treaty in place with Indonesia, and hence no basis for repatriation. 
Nevertheless to placate the Indonesian government’s feelings, Kuala Lumpur 
enacted a law in which visas were issued to Indonesians only after they signed an
38 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur and Commonwealth 
Relations Office, 164/104/5, 28 November 1961, DO 169/74, PRO.
39 “Future Relations Between Indonesia and The Federation of Malaya”, Foreign Office Steering 
Committee Paper, Southeast Asia (General), 7 April 1959, DO 35/9951, PRO.
40 Matthew Jones, “Maximum Disavowal of Aid”, 1192.
41 Colonel Simbolon himself admitted to such activities in Payung Bangun, Kolonel Maludin 
Simbolon: Liku-liku Periuansannva dalam Pembanzunan Banssa. [Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1996] 
204.
42 See Lawrey to Tange, 21 February 1958 and Cablegram no.84, Australia High Commission, 
Kuala Lumpur, 26 March 1958, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 1, NAA.
43 Government o f Malaysia, Malava-Indonesia Relations. 5.
44 These rebels included a group of former Indonesian diplomats stationed in Europe who had 
defected to the PRRI during the rebellion and who requested asylum in Malaya. See Government 
o f Malaysia, Malava-Indonesia Relations. 5-6.
45 Marvin Ott, “The Sources and Content of Malaysian Foreign Policy”, 117.
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undertaking not to engage in politics whilst in the Federation. Kuala Lumpur also 
requested from Jakarta a list of names of offenders along with their invalidated 
travel documents so that the Malayan government could take legitimate measures 
to prevent their entry. By then however, a substantial number of these dissident 
rebels had already arrived in Malaya, knowing that they need not worry about 
repatriation.
In sum, Jakarta resented the Federation’s harbouring of Sumatran rebels, 
as well as what it perceived to be Malaya’s reluctance to curb their activities in 
Malaya. Indonesian expectations were for Malaya to take an active position to 
condemn the rebellion and provide support for the central government in Java. In 
the perception of the central government, diplomatic support from Malaya would 
have been significant given the knowledge in Jakarta that Britain, the US and 
Australia were actively supporting the rebels46. Moreover, any declared support 
on the part of Malaya for the central government would have assuaged Jakarta’s 
enduring suspicion that Malayan foreign policy was in fact voluntarily skewed 
towards the West. Needless to say, this support was not forthcoming from Kuala 
Lumpur, and the failure, or rather unwillingness, of Malaya to “fulfil” such 
expectations was viewed with disdain in Jakarta. Indonesian “disappointment” at 
Kuala Lumpur’s position on the rebellions would be publicly expressed several 
years later in a government report47. Evidently, President Sukamo was by that 
time already highly suspicious of Malaya’s sincerity and intentions, and he was 
quoted at a public meeting on 8 April 1958 to opine that an attempt was being 
made by Malaya to create a new Islamic bloc in Southeast Asia including an 
independent Sumatra48.
On Malaya’s part, its official position was that blood brotherhood, insofar 
as it existed with Indonesia, should not impede the application of international 
law, which Kuala Lumpur intended to abide by with regards to the repatriation of 
asylum seekers. Beneath this however, lay a concern for the manner in which
46 By July 1958, the Indonesian government could claim that it “has been able to learn in great 
detail the source and scope o f outside assistance to the rebels”. “Memorandum from Robertson to 
Dulles, 30 July 1958” in Foreign Relations of the United States. 1958-1960 Vol.XVII: Indonesia. 
[Washington: 1989].
47 The Problem of “Malaysia”. [London: Embassy o f the Republic of Indonesia, London, 1964] 1.
48 G.P.S. DINF4/58/100 (Exaffs), 15 April 1958.
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Jakarta’s demands of the Malayan government clearly betrayed the former’s 
expectations of deference on the part of the “younger brother” to its wishes. The 
Malayan government also found it difficult to condemn the Sumatran rebels for 
another reason: many among the Malay political elite considered Sumatra the 
cradle of the Malay race, whereas Java was seen as more distant (both 
geographically and culturally) and also the stronghold of communists49. Tunku 
himself was known to have felt strong sympathies towards the rebels50. The slant 
of the kinship factor in operation here is particularly interesting for, as suggested 
earlier, it was the close affinity between the Malays of the Peninsula and Sumatra 
that impeded close cooperation between Malaya and the Javanese dominated 
central government. Attesting to the potential political utility of this affinity, the 
opinions of Ghazalie Shafie expressed during a visit to Washington, quoted as 
follows, is worthy of note:
Regional feelings were strong in the country (Indonesia), and 
especially so in Sumatra and Sulawesi. He (Ghazalie) could cite no 
current dissidence in Sumatra but said he was in very close touch with 
the situation and with many responsible Sumatran leaders and was 
convinced that Sumatra is “on the move”. . . . Ghazalie said that 
Malaysia was quite capable of taking advantage of this situation, but 
insisted that his country is not taking action to do so just yet. He felt 
that when the time came the mistakes of 1958 should be avoided, that 
the United States and the West should stay out of the picture, and that 
Malaysia should be the power to stimulate action, using Indonesians 
with whom it is in contact51.
With fewer words but no less authority, Tunku Abdul Rahman is known to have 
expressed his opinion that if he so much as stretched out his hand at that time, 
Sumatra “would have been his”52. Indonesia’s concern for the lack of support on
49 Shanahan to Tange, 1 February 1958, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 1, NAA.
50 Critchley to Quinn, 2 April 1959, A 1838 3006/4/7 Part 2, NAA. In fact, Tunku was known to 
have expressed sometime later that “it was unfortunate that Colonel’s revolt against Sukamo 
failed” -  Cablegram no.465, Australia High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 23 December 1962,
A 1838 3006/4/7 Part 3, NAA.
51 US National Archives, RG 59, POL 7 Malaysia, memorandum of conversation, 23 July 1964, 
also quoted in Matthew Jones, “Maximum Disavowal o f Aid”, 1214.
52 Discussions with Michael Leifer, London, 28 September 2000.
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the part of Malaya for its territorial integrity was further aggravated by Kuala 
Lumpur’s position on the former’s claim over the Dutch territory of West Irian.
IV. West Irian
Indonesia’s claim to West Irian was carried over from the inconclusive 
terms of the 1949 Round Table Agreement, when sovereignty over the Dutch East 
Indies was transferred to Indonesia53. The Agreement provided that the political 
status of West Irian was to be determined by negotiations between the signatories 
within a year of its signing. Negotiations took place at various times from 1952 
to 1956, but proved inconclusive as the Dutch refused to rescind their claim. 
Indonesia, on the other hand, claimed that de jure sovereignty rested with them. 
Diplomatic support for Indonesia’s cause was provided by the Soviet Union and 
the Afro-Asian bloc. As sabre-rattling over West Irian intensified, the Dutch 
dispatched military reinforcements to West Irian in mid-196054. Indonesia 
retaliated by stigmatising this action as “provocative”, and launched an intense 
propaganda campaign within the Afro-Asian bloc against the Dutch. The fiery 
and abrasive rhetoric of Indonesian leaders fed the nationalistic fervour that the 
West Irian issue was inspiring in Indonesia55. Matters came to a head when 
Jakarta declared a policy of “Confrontation” against the Netherlands over West 
Irian on 21 July 1960; diplomatic ties were broken on 17 August 1960, 
Indonesia’s independence anniversary.
53 See Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy. 1945-1965. [The 
Hague: Mouton and Co, 1973] 79-177;x Colin Brown, “Indonesia’s West Irian Case in the UN 
General Assembly”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. Vol. VII, No.2 (June 1976).
54 The most memorable example of Dutch military pressure was the dispatch o f the aircraft carrier 
Karel Doorman in an exercise of gunboat diplomacy toward Indonesia.
55 In his Independence Day speech of 1950, Sukamo declared “The Irian question is a question of 
colonialism or non-colonialism, a question of colonialism or independence. Part of our country is 
still colonized by the Dutch. This is reality and we cannot accept this . . .  according to our 
Constitution, Irian is also Indonesian territory, territory o f the Republic o f Indonesia -  not 
tomorrow, not the day after tomorrow, but now, at this very moment. If  a settlement by 
negotiation cannot be arrived at within this year a major conflict will arise over the issue of who 
will be in power in that island from then onward. For once again I declare: we will not stop 
fighting, we will continue fighting, we will keep on fighting whatever may come, until Irian has 
been returned to our fold”. Sukarno’s nationalistic rhetoric was echoed by other leaders such as 
Subandrio, who declared that “Indonesia was determined to meet force with force over West 
Irian”, and Nasution, who proclaimed “the struggle for West Irian will be determined on the soil 
o f West Irian itse lf’.
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West Irian not only remained a thorn in relations between Indonesia and 
the Netherlands, but also emerged as an increasingly precarious security issue in 
Southeast Asia. Indeed, it was precisely the destabilizing potential of a military 
conflict over West Irian that drew Malaya into the fray as a possible mediator. 
More specifically, it was the expressed fear of the Malayan government at the 
time that an Indonesian confrontation with the Dutch over West Irian would play 
into the hands of the PKI and give the communists a foothold in the largest 
country in Southeast Asia, thereby threatening the security of Malaya itself. The 
fact that communist countries were Jakarta’s major source of political support and 
Moscow their main source of material assistance further aggravated Malayan 
concerns56. The situation was made even more precarious by the fact that in 
pursuit of the nationalistic, propagandistic objectives in his West Irian campaign, 
Sukamo had brought the Indonesian economy to the brink of collapse in order to 
make a political point57. It was these concerns that drove Tunku Abdul Rahman 
to offer himself as a mediator on the West Irian issue58.
The notion of Malaya playing the role of mediator in this dispute was 
from the very beginning questionable insofar as the Indonesian government was 
concerned. Given that Malaya had abstained from voting on the West Irian 
question at Twelfth UN General Assembly in September 1957, and in so doing 
drawn a negative response from Indonesia, it was hardly surprising that elements 
within the Indonesian government had misgivings toward Malayan intentions59. 
The perceptual and diplomatic repercussions of this lack of support from Kuala 
Lumpur were aggravated by the fact that after a trip to Kuala Lumpur, Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Subandrio had returned with what apparently was a promise of
56 For a discussion of communist support for Indonesia’s West Irian cause, see WAH-14-62, “The 
Irian Barat Settlement”, American Universities Field Staff Report. Southeast Asia Series, Vol.X, 
No. 18, 15 October 1962.
57 It was after the failure of Indonesian objectives at the 1957 UN General Assembly that a series 
of takeovers of Dutch enterprises began. Because of the still extensive Dutch economic presence 
in Indonesia at the time, the policy of nationalisation plunged the Indonesian economy into chaos. 
This point was stressed in Amry Vandenbosch, “Indonesia, the Netherlands and the New Guinea 
Issue”, Journal o f Southeast Asian Studies. Vol. VII, No. 1 (March 1976), 110.
58 Inward telegram, Commonwealth Relations Office, London, 20 September 1960, DO 169/70, 
PRO.
59 See Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy. [Sydney: Sydney 
University Press, 1968] 54.
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Malayan “support”60. Subsequently, Malaya’s reluctance to throw its lot behind 
Indonesia’s claims at the UN drew criticisms not only from Indonesia, but from 
pro-Indonesia Malay circles in Malaya as well. Indeed, the domestic 
repercussions caught the Malayan government by surprise, and prompted a 
change in policy towards the Indonesian claim when the matter arose again at the 
UN in November that same year.
After November 1957, Malaya began pressing for the peaceful departure 
of the Dutch from West Irian61. Malaya’s Ambassador to Jakarta, Senu Abdul 
Rahman, was dispatched with a personal letter to President Sukamo to ascertain 
Indonesia’s willingness regarding Malaya’s offer to mediate the conflict. In 
response, Prime Minister Djuanda accepted Malayan mediation on behalf of 
Jakarta62. The Indonesian government’s positive response was further reiterated 
by Armed Forces General Nasution during his visit to Malaya in 13 October 
1960 . Nevertheless, other parties expressed doubts as to the efficacy of 
Malayan mediation. To that effect, the British High Commissioner noted 
somewhat prophetically in October 1960: “It is questionable whether he (Tunku 
Abdul Rahman) has appreciated the delicacies and difficulties of the issue or 
realised that his activities in his self-appointed role as mediator may do little more 
than annoy both parties”64.
With Indonesia’s apparent blessings, expressed through Djuanda and 
Nasution, the Tunku presented his proposal that West Irian be placed under UN 
Trusteeship (monitored by Malaya, India and Ceylon), after which sovereignty 
was to be transferred to Indonesia. To gain support for his proposal, Tunku 
embarked on an international mission which took him to the capitals of the major
60 Document 1-1 1061/3, 28 November 1957, DO 35/9951, PRO.
61 Department of Information, Malaysia, Malava-Indonesia Relations. 8.
62 President Sukamo was away on vacation at the time, and Dr. Djuanda accepted the Tunku’s 
letter in his capacity as acting President.
63 It should be noted however, that General Nasution was initially less receptive to the Malayan 
government’s offer to mediate. It was only after he was shown Dr. Djuanda’s letter of 
appreciation that he spoke more supportively of the idea. Government o f Malaysia, Parliamentary 
Debates. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Rakyat, 1960-1967] 3419.
64 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur and Commonwealth 
Relations Office, London, KL-C-187, 21 October 1960, DO 169/170, PRO.
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Western powers65. Despite the expressed reservations of those consulted, by the 
close of his diplomatic tour the Tunku and Dutch Prime Minister Jan de Quay 
signed a Communique stating inter alia that “the Netherlands Government was 
willing to subject their policies in Netherlands New Guinea to the scrutiny and 
judgment of the United Nations”66. While seemingly clear, the Communique in 
fact suffered from fundamental misinterpretations on the Tunku’s part, which led 
to the unravelling of his diplomatic effort as well as the generation of negative 
sentiments in both the Indonesian government and public towards him. In the 
main, Tunku had misread Dutch intentions. The Dutch, as de Quay made clear to 
Tunku after the signing of the Communique and the press conference that 
followed, had agreed to the Tunku’s proposal to transfer West Irian 
administration to UN Trusteeship with the sole objective o f self-determination for  
the West Irian population.
Despite Tunku’s public claims that “it would not be in keeping with my 
own nationality to side with somebody who has got no blood connection with us 
whereas, on the other hand, the Malays and Indonesians are, what we might call, 
blood brothers”, the signing of the Communique amounted to a diplomatic faux
f \ 7pas, which cast doubts in Indonesian minds over Malayan intentions . The 
situation was further aggravated by the Tunku’s delay in presenting the terms of 
the Communique to Jakarta officials, who first came to know of it only via the 
media. Foreign Minister Subandrio subsequently criticized Tunku Abdul Rahman 
in public for acting without prior consultation with Jakarta, and declared that the 
only UN intervention acceptable to Jakarta was its supervision of the transfer of 
West Irian from the Netherlands direct to Indonesia68. A scathing Indonesian 
press campaign against the Tunku followed69. The Malayan government 
protested Subandrio’s criticisms and the press attacks by highlighting the Jakarta 
government’s previous support for the Tunku’s initiative. It is now known that 
the Tunku himself was close to divulging a letter from Djuanda, which they both
65 It should be noted that not all the countries supported the Tunku’s proposal. Australia and New 
Zealand in particular had reservations. Inward telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, 
London from Canberra, 7 November 1960, DO 169/170, PRO.
66 “Tunku neets Dutch leaders on W.Irian”, Straits Times. 26 November 1960.
67 Government of Malaysia, Parliamentary Debates. 3414.
68 Department o f Information, Malaysia, Malava-Indonesia Relations. 9.
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had earlier agreed to commit to secrecy, explicitly approving Malayan 
mediation70. Subandrio subsequently issued an apology through an official from 
the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, Suska, expressing gratitude for the Tunku’s 
efforts and goodwill. Nevertheless he also made clear to the Malayan
government that Indonesia no longer approved the temporary UN Trusteeship 
scheme.
Even though bilateral relations were prevented from deteriorating further 
with Subandrio’s apology, events surrounding the Tunku’s mediation attempt 
touched raw nerves and revealed Indonesian perceptions of and attitudes toward 
Malaya. First, it was clear that beneath Jakarta’s apparent approval of the 
mediation efforts suspicions of Malaya’s intentions persisted. This was evident in 
the fact that several members of the Indonesian government, such as Subandrio 
and Nasution (before he was made aware of Indonesia’s “official” position) were 
less than enthusiastic over Tunku’s proposal. Sukarno’s position on Malayan 
mediation was also questionable, though it should be noted that in the aftermath 
of the Tunku’s failed attempt at mediation, he did send a personal letter to the 
latter acknowledging his efforts. Nevertheless still implicit within his 
appreciative words was Sukarno’s dissatisfaction at the outcome of Tunku’s 
mediation:
Although the Indonesian Government did not expect that a Joint- 
Communique would be issued by your Excellency and the Dutch 
Government, yet we did not make any announcement at that time, 
despite the fact that the Joint-Communique had already created doubts 
among the Indonesian populace . . . .
I am sure Your Excellency would have understood that the Joint- 
Communique with all the accompanying explanation would set a 
strong reaction in Indonesia against the Government of the Indonesian 
Republic and Your Excellency, if there was no firm objections from 
yourself or your side. Due to this, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
69 Ibid, 9-10.
70 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur and Commonwealth 
Relations Office, London, C.207, 27 January 1961, D0169/171, PRO.
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Subandrio, considered it necessary to issue a statement opposing the 
statement made by Mr. Luns . . . .
As Your Excellency knows, whether it was in my explanation or from 
the letter of Dr. Djuanda from the President’s office, the people of 
Indonesia regard West Irian as an Indonesian territory . . . .  Based on 
this consideration, the Indonesian people regard the additional 
statements on the Joint-Communique as an attempt to force Indonesia 
to acknowledge Dutch sovereignty over West Irian71.
The veiled import of the letter is evident upon close reading. In it, Sukamo 
essentially agreed with Subandrio’s actions, indicated that the Tunku made a 
mistake in signing the Joint-Communique, and that Indonesia would not 
recognise the document.
Second, the fact that throughout the entire West Irian episode (including 
the period of Tunku’s mediation) the Malayan government never once declared 
official support for Indonesia’s position on West Irian was not lost on the Jakarta 
government. As a scholar of Indonesian affairs once noted succinctly:
It is an indication of the mental gulf that separated their (Malayan) 
thinking from that of the Indonesians that Tunku Abdul Rahman 
should have offered, on his own initiative, to mediate the Indonesian- 
Dutch dispute. The substance of his proposals was in itself highly 
offensive to the Indonesians, who considered that Irian should have 
been surrendered together with the rest of the Netherlands East Indies 
at the time of the transfer of sovereignty. The very proposition of 
such terms implied that the Malayans were more concerned with a 
bloodless compromise between the two parties than with any genuine 
conviction of the rightness of Indonesia’s case. That Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, as a fellow Malay and Asian, should have made such 
proposals at all, ‘arbitrating’ or mediating between the colonial power 
and its former victim added insult to injury72.
71 The unofficial translation of Sukarno’s letter was attached to the document entitled “A Report 
on the Reports of the Honourable Prime Minister in Seeking a Peaceful Solution to the Problem o f 
Irian Barat”, Ministry of External Affairs, Kuala Lumpur, 15 December 1960, DO 169/171, PRO.
72 Robert Curtis, “Malaysia and Indonesia”, New Left Review. No.28 (November-December 
1964) 22.
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If anything, this entire episode hardened Indonesian views of Malaya as a colonial 
stooge who still danced to the tune of imperialism.
Finally, it can be ascertained on hindsight that evidence existed to 
corroborate Indonesian suspicions of Tunku’s intentions. Records of the Tunku’s 
private conversations with British Prime Minister Macmillan revealed that he in 
fact sympathised with and supported the Netherland’s position that West Irian 
should only be relinquished via referendum73. When Macmillan expressed doubts 
over his proposal to hand West Irian over to Indonesia after a year of U.N. 
Trusteeship, the Tunku replied that:
The trustees need not hand over to anyone. The U.N. should decide ..
. . The Indonesians could not afford to spend any money on West 
New Guinea which would be an expensive trusteeship for anyone to 
take on. The Indonesians would no doubt hope that the inhabitants of 
West New Guinea would eventually opt for union with Indonesia, but 
as they were still cannibals it would take some time before they were 
able to decide anything at all for themselves74.
On another occasion, he had admitted to the Commonwealth Secretary that 
“Indonesia has no claim on legal or racial grounds to this territory (West Irian)”75. 
As late as 1963 Tunku and his foreign secretary Ghazalie Shafie were still 
meeting with leaders of the Freedom Movement of West Papua and expressing 
sympathy for their cause against the Indonesian government .
Jakarta’s apprehensions mirrored the fact that in Indonesian opinion, 
Malaya’s attempt to fashion a neutral mediatory role for itself implied Kuala 
Lumpur’s opinion that there were in fact “two-sides-of-the-story”. In this light, 
the gesture of mediation in effect flew in the face of Indonesia, which had 
expected from its Malayan kin unwavering support. Instead, mediation was 
interpreted as the audacious act of a government that never struggled for its
73 Tunku had given Macmillan an assurance that he would inform Jakarta that “trusteeship need 
not necessarily end in handover to Indonesia”. Abdul Rahman to Macmillan, 16 November 1960, 
PREM 11/4309, PRO. The author found no evidence that suggests Tunku did in fact relay this 
sentiment to Jakarta.
74 Correspondence between the British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur and Commonwealth 
Relations Office, London, KL 483/1, 7 October 1960, DO 169/170, PRO.
75 Record of conversation between Commonwealth Secretary and the Prime Minister o f Malaya, 
London, 18 October 1960, DO 169/170, PRO.
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national independence, but that presumptuously deemed itself “qualified” to 
mediate over an issue that was clearly a vestige of Indonesia’s anti-colonial 
struggle. Bearing this in mind, it was indeed ironical that the final solution that 
Jakarta accepted for the resolution of the West Irian crisis in 1962 was in fact 
strikingly similar to the initial Malayan proposal for UN Trusteeship of West 
Irian.
Bilateral tensions notwithstanding, the fact that there was marked support 
among Malays for Indonesia’s cause during this entire episode should not be lost. 
When Malaya voted positively in support of a UN resolution on Irian in 
November 1957, the Malay press lauded it as “the right move in support of 
Indonesia, which is closely linked with Malaya”77. UMNO Youth members 
further sought permission from the authorities to volunteer for Indonesia’s cause 
against the Dutch should conflict foment78. The pro-Indonesia daily, Utusan 
Melavu, also emphasised:
It is with such a feeling of brotherhood that the people of Malaya are 
careful about any deed or word which might hurt the feelings of the 
Indonesian people and government. In fact, a similarly close feeling 
could not be shown towards Malaya’s other neighbours although 
Malaya desires good relations based on mutual understanding and 
aid79.
Correspondingly, the Indonesian Ambassador noted that these responses “proved 
that Indonesia’s expectations about the Federation’s foreign policy, particularly 
on colonial issues, was well justified”80. Tunku himself was aware of the 
constraints of popular sentiments of affinity on his policy choices, as he had on 
occasion noted to his British counterpart (almost apologetically, it seemed) that in 
the event hostilities broke out between Indonesia and the Dutch over West Irian, 
“Malaya . . . because of her affinity with Indonesia, might have to declare openly
76 Telegram No.2328 from British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations 
Office, London, 19 October 1963, DO 169/159, PRO.
77 “Strengthening Mutual Understanding”, Utusan Melavu. 4 December 1957, in A 1838 3006/4/7 
Part 1, NAA.
78 Critchley to Tange, 24 December 1957 in ibid.
79 “Establishing Closer Relations with Indonesia”, Utusan Melavu. 26 September 1957, ibid.
80 Home to Tange, 13 December 1957, ibid.
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her support of Indonesia”81. British officials had also noted prophetically in 1957 
that “racial affinity with Indonesia and closeness of it (sic) make it politically 
difficult for Tunku to advocate policies unsympathetic to Indonesia and this will 
be one of his main political dilemmas”82. Following this, London expressed 
reservation for what it saw as Malaya’s deference to Indonesia represented in
O'!
their support for the tabling of Indonesia’s claims at the UN .
Notwithstanding popular support, the events that transpired immediately 
after Tunku’s failed attempt at mediation did have a considerable impact on 
Malayan perceptions of Indonesia. At an individual level, Indonesia’s rejection 
of his initiatives after first endorsing it was clearly a personal affront to Tunku 
Abdul Rahman84. Tunku observed that “the Malays had in the past tended to look 
up to Indonesia as a big brother but they were now angry over the attack that had 
been made on him”85. Tunku also opined to Dutch Ambassador van Gulik that he 
regarded the Indonesian mission to Moscow and Subandrio’s public rebuff as 
“having slammed the door in my face and in these circumstances, any further 
attempt to mediate would be regarded as a sign of weakness”86. Clearly from this 
statement, the Tunku was determined not to permit Indonesia to undermine his 
and Malaya’s international stature attained in the process of mediation.
The two events of the PRRI/Permesta Rebellion and West Irian crisis 
generated mutually reinforcing dynamics that influenced leaders of Indonesia and 
Malaya toward increasingly different and divergent perceptions and 
interpretations of their ties. Indonesian leaders were highly suspicious of
81 Abdul Rahman to Macmillan, 19 October 1960, PREM 11/4309, PRO.
82 Telegram no.334 from British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth Relations 
Office, London, 29 November 1957, FO 371/129520, PRO.
83 Telegram no.42 from British Embassy, Jakarta to Foreign Office, London, 30 October 1957, 
ibid.
84 The fact that Tunku took Subandrio’s rebuff personally was expressed to the Secretary of State 
for War Profumo on 12 January 1961. See correspondence between the British High 
Commission, Kuala Lumpur and Commonwealth Relations Office, London, C.207, 62/39/3, 27 
January 1961, DO 169/170, PRO.
85 Critchley to Menzies, 20 December 1960, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 2, NAA.
86 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur and Commonwealth 
Relations Office, London, 483/1, 21 January 1961, DO 169/171, PRO. While Tunku’s mediation 
was taking place, Sukamo had dispatched Nasution to the Soviet Union to obtain arms and 
equipment for the enforcement o f Indonesian claims to West Irian. In response, the Malayan 
Federation Cabinet decided on 20 December 1960 to mobilize the defence of the Federation in the 
event o f a breakout of hostilities. Report of the Secretary o f External Affairs, Wellington, 22 
December 1960, DO 169/171, PRO.
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Malayan complicity during the regional rebellion. Instead of backing a fellow kin 
state, Indonesian leaders perceived Malaya to have contributed to moves to 
undermine it. Subandrio reportedly opined for instance, that Tunku was “seeking 
to annex Sumatra because he needs Indonesia badly to face Chinese equality with 
the Malays inside Malaya”87. More importantly, while choosing a declaratory 
policy of distance, the Malayan government expressed sympathy for, not to 
mention provided indirect assistance to, the rebels in private.
Similarly over the West Irian issue, the Malayan Prime Minister’s attempt 
to fashion a mediatory role implied again that Kuala Lumpur adopted a position 
of neutrality on an issue that involved Indonesian unity. This was unacceptable to 
Jakarta, which once again expected Malayan support in the spirit of kinship. In 
signing the Communique with the Dutch, the Malayan government was seen to 
have taken a position without prior consultation with Jakarta, and one which was 
directly opposed to Jakarta’s interests. Not surprisingly, the Malayan government 
was subjected to severe criticism in the Indonesian press, which clearly reflected 
a sense of betrayal on the part of Indonesia. For instance, one reported that 
Indonesia “should have refrained from too much enthusiasm when Malaya
• • ooreceived her independence” . Another claimed in response to Malaya’s lack of 
support for Indonesia’s struggle to preserve national unity and territorial integrity 
that Indonesia “was surprised that her neighbour, a nation of the same blood and 
stock as Indonesians, did not follow the attitude of other newly-born nations such 
as Ghana, Tunisia and Morocco”89.
From the Malayan perspective, these two episodes also left bilateral ties 
with much to be desired. Malayan hands were tied over the issue of Sumatra, 
when the government clearly was unable to meet the expectations Jakarta. Not 
only was the cause of their Sumatran cousins uppermost in the minds of the 
Malayan political leaders, but also the fact that the rebellion in effect worked to 
Malaya’s own interest in seeing the tide of communism in the region stemmed. 
Matters were no less complicated on West Irian. For Malaya, West Irian 
presented an opportunity for active engagement in international diplomacy. This
87 Government of Malaysia, Malavsia-Indonesia Relations. 15.
88 “R.I. papers blast Malaya’s silence in UN vote”, Singapore Standard. 25 September 1957.
89 “The Irian issue: Why Malaya abstained”, Straits Times. 25 September 1957.
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was important not only for reasons of security, but also for the newly independent 
state to establish itself as an actor of some consequence in the international 
political arena. In that vein, it was important not only for Malaya to assert its 
sovereignty, but to do so independent of Indonesian influence.
This of course, did not go down well in Jakarta. Indonesia disliked the 
idea of a newcomer taking the initiative in an area where they considered 
themselves the rightful leaders by virtue of their size and legacy of national 
struggle. The Tunku’s apparently “easy” assumption of a leadership role in 
Southeast Asia was seen as upstaging Sukamo, and Indonesia was incensed with 
Tunku’s “insolence” in thinking that Malaya should become a model for all newly 
independent nations90. Even more difficult for Jakarta to swallow was the fact 
that several of Malaya’s activist foreign policies involved Indonesia’s own 
political predicaments, such as West Irian. Insofar as Malaya’s own security was 
concerned the Indonesian leadership’s persistence in making West Irian a highly 
charged nationalist affair and its constant reiteration of race and ethnic-based 
irredentism as the basis of its claims were unsettling for a Malayan political 
leadership still uncertain of Indonesian intentions toward Malaya. These 
concerns were further aggravated by the militaristic cloak with which Jakarta 
asserted its claims. Indeed the underlying concerns of Malayan leaders, that such 
tactics may well be applied at a later time against Malaya itself, was soon to 
become a reality.
V. Konfrontasi
On 27 May 1961, Tunku Abdul Rahman mooted the idea for the 
confederation of Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei with Malaya into 
a single political entity to be called the Federation of Malaysia91. To this proposal 
Indonesia initially raised no objections. In fact, in Sukarno’s own words, the 
Malaysia project was welcomed in Jakarta as long as it was advanced as a
90 “Interview with Subandrio”, Antara News Agency. 12 February 1963.
91 He had in fact briefly mentioned such a confederation in 1957. See “Next step: A greater 
federation of Malaya”, Singapore Standard. 25 September 1957.
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decolonisation project92. By January 1963, matters had turned around. Indonesia 
officially rejected the Malaysia plan and launched a policy of “KonfrontasF 
against the new federation. The impetus behind Jakarta’s aggression has been the 
subject of much scholarly debate. Mackie viewed it essentially as a result of 
Indonesia’s convoluted domestic politics playing out between the triumvirate of 
Sukamo, die PKI and the military93. Others have chosen to locate Konfrontasi 
against the broader picture of the Cold War, and they explore the event in that 
context94. Some have even suggested Western-inspired intelligence conspiracy as 
a possible cause95. Aside from Mackie’s work, most of these theories interpreted 
Konfrontasi as a diplomatic quandary inspired by external factors. While this 
view is not disputed, one should also consider the internal political dynamics 
within the Malay world and its shaping of this event. By this token Konfrontasi 
can also be viewed as the climax of antagonistic diplomacy between two kin 
states whose understanding of the basis of their relations as sovereign nation­
states were evolving along diametrically opposite planes. Prior to expanding on 
this argument however, it would be worthwhile to reiterate the key events of 
Konfrontasi in brief.
Not long after their initial reaction to Tunku’s proposal in 1961, Jakarta 
soon became convinced that the Malaysia project was not an act of decolonisation 
but rather a manifestation of neo-colonialism in their backyard96. This confirmed 
suspicions the Jakarta elite held toward Kuala Lumpur since 1957, that because of 
the close cooperation the latter maintained with Britain, they were susceptible to 
colonial influence. These suspicions should be viewed in the context of the 
international politics of the day, when anti-colonialism was at its peak and de­
colonization projects were often marked by bloody revolution. Malaysian
92 See Cindy Adams, Sukamo: An Autobiography. [New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co Inc, 1965] 300.
93 See J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute. 1963-1966. [Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1974].
94 See Brackman, Southeast Asia’s Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archinelaeo. 
[Singapore: Donald Moore Press, 1966]; John Subritsky, Confronting Sukamo; British. American. 
Australian, and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malavsian-Indonesian Confrontation. 1961-1965. 
[New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999]; Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast 
Asia. 1961-1965: Britain, the United States, and the Creation of Malaysia. [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001].
95 Greg Poulgrain, The Genesis o f Konfrontasi: Malaysia. Brunei. Indonesia 1945-1965. [Bathurst: 
Crawford House Publishing, 1998].
96 Indonesia’s case against Malaysia was laid out in The Problem of “Malaysia”.
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camaraderie with Britain was indeed a peculiar phenomenon in this light. Further 
fanning the flames of suspicion was Kuala Lumpur’s apparent support, 
manifested in their position on the PRRI/Pemesta rebellion, West Irian, and the 
AMDA treaty, for the seemingly provocative policies of certain Western states 
towards Indonesia. This view crystallized among the Jakarta elite in the wake of 
the Brunei revolt of 8 December 1962 in opposition to the Malaysia plan97. The 
Brunei revolt was led by A.M. Azahari, who was highly regarded in Indonesian 
nationalist circles for his anti-colonial activities in the Sultanate as opposed to the 
reticence of Malaya’s so-called independence heroes such as the Tunku98. The 
Indonesian leadership viewed the Brunei revolt as evidence that the Malaysia plan 
was being pushed forward against the will of the population in the Borneo 
territories, and this fanned their suspicions of the relationship between the 
Malaysian elite and the West. Other centres of power in Indonesia shared similar 
suspicions. The military viewed Malaysia as a potential Chinese fifth column at 
Indonesia’s doorstep that would threaten the security of the archipelago, while the 
PKI saw Malaysia as a legacy of imperialism in Southeast Asia99.
Insofar as the Indonesians were concerned, Konfrontasi, was a statement 
against the neo-imperialism that Malaysia was seen to represent. This was 
encapsulated in Sukarno’s radio address on the eve of the launch of Konfrontasi, 
where he declared:
We were bom in fire. We were not bom in the rays of the full moon 
like other nations. There are nations whose independence was 
presented to them. There are nations who, without any effort on their 
part, were given independence by the imperialists as a present. Not 
us, we fought for our independence at the cost of great sacrifice. We
97 For details surrounding the Brunei revolt, see Mackie, Konfrontasi. 112-122; Poulgrain, The 
Genesis. 206-230.
98 The militant nature of the rebellion however, was not brought about directly by Azahari but by 
H.M. Salleh, a former vice-president of the Party Rakyat Brunei. See Poulgrain, Genesis. 280.
99 See correspondence between Cambridge, British Embassy, Jakarta, and White, Southeast Asia 
Department, Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office, London, 1042/64, 30 September 1964, 
FCO 371/176460, PRO; See also J.D. Legge, Sukamo: A Political Biography. [London: Allen 
Lane The Penguin Press, 1972] 364-365.
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gained our independence through a tremendous struggle which has no 
comparison in this world100.
Indonesian suspicion and distrust of the motivations behind the Malaysia plan 
were later explicated by Michael Leifer as follows:
Certainly evident was a resentment of a revision of political 
boundaries in the vicinity of Indonesia which reconfirmed the legacy 
of colonialism in determining the territorial basis of state succession. 
Indonesia, in terms of population and scale as well as experience, had 
adopted a role of regional leadership which was not acknowledged in 
Kuala Lumpur. Its government, under Sukamo, held a strong 
presumption that it was entitled to be a party to territorial changes, 
especially where defence arrangements gave a former colonial power 
the right to use proximate bases as it deemed necessary for the 
preservation of peace in South-East Asia101.
The early stages of Konfrontasi were marked by regular diatribes 
emanating from all sections of the Jakarta government against Malaysia. 
Coercive diplomacy was synchronised with limited military action that began 
with the intrusion of Indonesian guerrillas into Sarawak in support of a “national 
liberation movement”, an act that subsequently led to clashes with British 
forces102. Warnings were also issued to the effect that Malayan fishing vessels 
caught “poaching” in Indonesian waters would be “burnt on sight”103. 
Confrontation was subsequently intensified with troop landings on the 
peninsula104. Policy makers in Kuala Lumpur interpreted these incursions as acts 
of reprisal for Malayan aid to the regional rebels from Sumatra and Sulawesi105.
100 These comments were expressed in a radio broadcast in December 1962, and were quoted from 
Colin Wild and Peter Carey (eds), Bom in Fire: The Indonesian Struggle for Independence. 
[Athens: Ohio University Press, 1986] xix.
101 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. 80.
102 Interestingly, there have been suspicions that it was the Philippine President Macapagal who 
first made the suggestion to Sukamo to introduce Indonesian guerrillas into Britain’s Borneo 
possessions. See correspondence between Peters, British Embassy, Manila, with Martin, British 
High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 9 December 1964, FO 371/176462, PRO. The role that the 
Philippines played in the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation offers up interesting yet unchartered 
areas of research.
103 Correspondence between British Embassy, Jakarta and Southeast Asia Department, Foreign 
Office, DH 1271/5, 5 March 1963, DO 169/74, PRO.
104 Indonesian “volunteer” troops landed at Pontian on 17 August, paratroop drops into Labis on 2
September, and another landing in Muar on 29 October 1964, all located the southern peninsula.
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Despite the sound and fury of Sukarno’s vitriolic rhetoric and periodic 
military incursions undertaken by Indonesian paramilitary forces, it is important 
to note that active diplomacy was being undertaken on a separate track as 
Indonesia sought to extricate itself from a crisis that was fast growing out of 
proportion for an Indonesian state increasingly destabilized by economic failure. 
From the outset of Konfrontasi, active diplomacy had been undertaken by the 
governments of Japan, the US, Thailand, the Philippines, and the UN. Feelers 
were also being sent by various factions within the Indonesian government in an 
attempt to pursue the path of diplomacy beneath the aggressive veneer of 
Indonesian rhetoric, while Sukamo and Tunku also met for a Summit in Tokyo in 
June 1963 in an ultimately failed attempt to iron out their differences.
Because Jakarta viewed Malaysia as an illegitimate neo-colonial creation 
supported by an anglophile leadership, initial opinions were that termination of 
their Konfrontasi policy could only be brought about by secret Anglo-Indonesian 
talks, without the involvement of Kuala Lumpur106. This position was maintained 
for a substantial period, and the Indonesian government only began to re-assess 
its position on this when its own internal structure of power shifted away from 
Sukamo and Subandrio, whom the British called “the real nigger in the 
woodpile”107. Even then, Sukamo was reluctant to meet Tunku in the latter’s 
capacity as “Prime Minister of Malaysia”108. On his part, Tunku was aware that if 
Anglo-Indonesian talks proceeded, it could be construed by Jakarta as evidence 
that the British were indeed the “puppet masters” behind the formation of 
Malaysia109. Attesting further to Malaysian suspicions over Indonesian gestures,
For details into Indonesian incursions, see Government o f Malaysia, Indonesian Aggression 
Against Malaysia. Vol.l. [Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1965].
10 Oliver, British Embassy, Jakarta, to Cable, Foreign Office, London, 1042/64, 9 October 1964, 
FO 371/176460, PRO.
106 See Chaerul Salleh, Jakarta Embassy telegram to Foreign Office, London, No. 1611, 9 October 
1964; Hatta to U.S. Embassy, Jakarta, telegram No. 1618, 12 October 1964; Bottomley, British 
High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, to Golds, Commonwealth Relations Office, Joint 
Malaysia/Indonesia Department, 1229/164/2, 13 October 1964, FO 371/176460, PRO.
107 Correspondence between British Embassy, Jakarta to Foreign Office, London, tel no. 1699, 30 
October 1964, FO 371/176461, PRO; British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, to 
Commonwealth Relations Office, London, tel no.2025, FO 371/176461, PRO.
108 National Archives and Records Administration, RG-59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 321, 
Indonesia-Malaysia, www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/ffus/johnsonlb/xxvi/index.cfm.
109 Foreign Office, London to British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, tel no.2646, 27 October 
1964, FO 371/176461, PRO.
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Tunku refused to entertain Sukarno’s suggestion made in September 1964 that a 
plebiscite be conducted to determine the will of the Borneo people towards 
absorption into Malaysia, or his promise to abide by its result110. To Tunku, such 
an act would both affirm Indonesia’s right to a voice in major political changes in 
Malaysian affairs111.
Following Kuala Lumpur’s refusal to submit to Anglo-Indonesian 
negotiations, moves were taken to bring both the Indonesian and Malaysian 
governments to the negotiation table. Of the many diplomatic overtures were 
undertaken during this period, it was an attempt to build a sub-regional 
organisation on the basis of race and ethnicity, termed Maphilindo, which was 
most intriguing.
VI. Maphilindo: Illusion or Reality?
Maphilindo was essentially a proposed confederation of the states of 
Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia, which found endorsement through the 
Manila agreement of July-August 1963. The brainchild of Philippine President 
Diosdado Macapagal and an acronym coined with the diplomatic contrivance of 
Subandrio, Maphilindo was envisaged to bring the three states into close 
association on the basis of Malay regional unity112. Maphilindo was to build on 
the Tokyo meeting between Sukarno and Abdul Rahman in early June 1963, 
where Sukamo apparently announced the termination of his policy of 
confrontation and both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the 1959
n° T o  Tunku, such a plebiscite was unnecessary as a UN team had already carried out a fact- 
finding poll of the leaders of the Borneo states in August 1963. Sukamo had rejected those 
findings on the basis that Indonesia was not given sufficient representation in the committee 
observing the fact-finding poll.
111 Department o f External Affairs, Canberra to Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 
0.25834, 9 October 1964, FO 371/176460, PRO.
112 It should be worth noting that the Philippines’ initial proposal for a “greater Malayan 
Conference” comprised of the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Bmnei and North Borneo 
(Sabah) and was put forth by then President Carlos Garcia in 1959. Indonesia was tellingly 
excluded from this original conception. See “A New Manila-Kuala Lumpur-Djakarta Axis?”, Far 
Eastern Economic Review. Vol.26, N o .3 ,15 January 1959. It has also been highlighted in the 
previous chapter that Malaysian leaders such as Onn bin Jaafar and Tunku Abdul Rahman himself 
had also entertained visions of pan-Malay union at various times prior to Maphilindo.
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Friendship Treaty113. It was at the Manila Summit that Sukamo, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, and Macapagal devised a mechanism for regular consultation in order to 
achieve consensus with regard to regional order114. With regards to Konfrontasi, 
Indonesia agreed to cease their confrontation of Malaysia, and the latter acceded 
to a UN survey to determine the wishes of the Borneo populations toward 
Malaysia. Beneath these concessions lay a further logic - Maphilindo also had as 
a sub-text a coordinated and implicit expression of concern at an increasing 
Chinese presence, both in the internal political environment in the three countries 
as well as the broader regional context115. This was reflected in Subandrio’s 
comment that “the Malayans, who could not handle the Chinese alone, might do 
so in a wider concept of Malay confederation”116.
The Manila Agreement was set up as a “face-saving” device for Indonesia 
to withdraw from Konfrontasi. But this was contravened when Malaysia 
announced the new date for its formation before the UN survey team could 
announce their findings, as should rightfully have been the procedure117. 
Predictably, this announcement elicited a negative response from Indonesia, with 
Sukamo claiming that it violated the Manila Agreement and as a result, Indonesia 
was not bound by the results of the U.N mission. Following this, Sukamo called 
for the reinstatement of the policy of aggression. Even though Maphilindo 
witnessed a revival with the Tokyo Summit of 20 June 1964, again involving 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, it suffered a similar fate as both
1 t o
Indonesia and Malaysia refused to concede on any terms .
It is clear from hindsight that the two Maphilindo summits were nothing 
more than an exercise in grandiose public relations. It suffered from a host of
113 Interestingly, the Communique that arose from the Tokyo meeting had as its first paragraph a 
Malayan “admission” that the Malaysia plan should have been discussed initially with Indonesia.
114 The consultation and consensus phenomenon has since entered the lexicon of the international 
relations of Southeast Asia as the operative principles musyawarah and muafakat. See 
“Philippines: Summit Results”, Far Eastern Economic Review. Vol.41, No.7, 15 August 1963, 
371.
115 See Alistair M. Taylor, “Malaysia, Indonesia -  and Maphilindo”, International Journal. 
Vol.XIX, No.2 (Spring 1964).
116 Record of conversation between Subandrio and Shann, 2 July 1963, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 9, 
NAA.
117 Telegram 727 from British Embassy, Manila to Foreign Office, London, 18 September 1963, 
DO 169/245, PRO.
1,8 See Mohd Abu Bakar, The Escalation of Konfrontasi fJune-September 1964). Kertas Seminar 
Jabatan No.2. [Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Malaya, Jabatan Sejarah, undated].
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shortcomings that all but destroyed the chances it had of re-organising bilateral 
relations. Not least among these was the lack of sincerity on the part of the two 
main players, Malaysia and Indonesia. Evidence available today indicates the 
highly questionable sincerity of Sukamo and Subandrio towards rapprochement 
on the principles of blood brotherhood encapsulated in the Maphilindo spirit. On 
their part, it has also become clear that in private, the likes of Tunku and Ghazali 
Shafie, the main policy makers at the Malaysian end, remained suspicious of 
Indonesian intentions. It was noted that at the Maphilindo summits the Malaysian 
delegation was subjected to much patronising cant by Indonesia for being “our 
Malay brothers”. The Malaysians were evidently unimpressed by this, and their 
tough negotiation at the second round of tripartite talks in February 1964 
exemplified their disdain:
Listening to them (the Malaysians) talk, one had the fear not that the 
Malaysians would not be tough in dealing with the Indonesians . . ., 
but that they might be so aggressive as not to see good opportunity for 
calming things down if one arose119.
Added to that was the fact that Maphilindo was subject itself to different 
interpretations among its proponents. Kuala Lumpur saw Maphilindo as 
Indonesian acceptance of “Malaysia”, while Jakarta viewed it as sounding the 
death-knell of “Malaysia”. This ambiguity was encapsulated in a singular clause 
of the Manila Agreement, that the formation of the Malaysian Federation would 
be approved “provided the support of the people of the Borneo territories is 
ascertained by an independent and impartial authority, the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations or his representatives”. In fact, this ambiguity led to a 
perception held in some quarters that Maphilindo was expressed as a Southeast 
Asian Munich, tantamount to Malaysian capitulation.
Quite clearly, suspicion and hostility dominated each party’s perception of 
the other during this period. While it is certainly true that Indonesia’s internal 
political dynamics played an important role in dictating the course of Jakarta’s 
policy toward Malaysia during this time, it would be a gross over-simplification 
to attribute Konfrontasi solely to this. It should be noted that even when the
119 Marshall, British Embassy, Bangkok to Cable, Southeast Asia Department, Foreign Office, 
London, 1057/64, 15 February 1964, FO 371/175076, PRO.
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initiative passed from Sukamo to the new administration of Suharto and Adam 
Malik, military incursions persisted, and the policy of confrontation remained 
intact for another year. Within the broader context of the evolution of relations, it 
was obvious that historical undercurrents and circumstances had an equally 
important role in shaping bilateral relations over the course of this period120.
Several factors account for Indonesian hostility toward the Malayan 
government in this regard. First, Malayan foreign policy during this period was 
construed by the predominantly Javanese elite in Jakarta as a move to challenge 
to Indonesia’s rightful leading role. Indonesia, it appeared, could not stomach the 
fact that “a country peopled by the same race of people, speaking a common 
language, and yet smaller and with fewer resources, was making a success of 
things whereas Indonesia was getting nowhere”121. Added to that was the belief 
that London and Kuala Lumpur had bulldozed the Borneo territories into 
Malaysia, clearly an act of imperialist intent in their own backyard in Indonesian 
eyes122. That neo-colonial collaboration between Britain and the UMNO-led 
government in Malaysia was a primary concern was corroborated by the 
following confession of a Sukamo confidante in the wake of clandestine 
negotiations for a solution to the conflict: “If the British Government were now to 
announce a date, however remote . . .  for the withdrawal of British bases in 
Malaysia, such action would make more credible Britain’s claims that Malaysia 
was not a threat to Indonesia”123. More important than Malaysia being a neo­
colonial creation was the fact that Indonesia was clearly irked that Malaysia was 
created without consultation with Jakarta. This was evident in the fact that 
although it accused Malaysia of being a neo-colonial creation (thus implying a re- 
imposition of British imperialism), Indonesian vitriol was always targeted at
120 See Alistair Taylor, “Malaysia, Indonesia”, 160-167. Indonesian suspicions of the neo-colonial 
intent behind Malaysia may not have been too far o f the mark either. See Tan Tai Yong, “The 
‘Grand Design’: British Policy, Local Politics and the Making o f Malaysia, 1955-1961”, paper 
presented at Conference on Decolonisation and the Transformation of Southeast Asia, Singapore, 
19-21 February 2001.
121 Jamieson to Secretary, Department o f External Affairs, 2 November 1961, A1838 3006/4/7 
Part 2, NAA.
122 This despite the fact that a member of the Indonesian Observer Team, Abdul Rachman, had 
publicly stated that he was “convinced of the impartiality of the UN Team’s work”, Antara News 
agency, 5 September 1963.
123 Record of conversations between General Parman and Colonel Berger, Paris, 9-13 October 
1964, ODR 707/6/2, FO 371/176462, PRO.
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Malaya, not Britain. Corroborating this were the various early Indonesian 
attempts to negotiate a settlement with Britain as well as Sukarno’s many urgings 
for London to force Tunku Abdul Rahman to return to the terms of the Manila 
Agreement124. The Malaysian affront was further repeated when, contrary to 
what was apparently agreed upon, Kuala Lumpur proceeded with the 
pronouncement of Malaysia Day in advance of the publication of the report of the 
UN commission to determine the wishes of the Borneo peoples. Second, the 
emergence of regional groupings such as the Malaya- inspired SEAFET and ASA 
threatened to weaken the Afro-Asian spirit that Indonesian foreign policy was so 
closely identified with125. Third, there was residual resentment over the Malayan 
government’s lack of support for Jakarta during the regional rebellions and over 
West Irian. While some might argue that these factors were merely rhetorical 
cover for Indonesia’s real purpose of Konfrontasi, namely to divert domestic 
attention from a failing regime, recently released documents on private 
negotiations between Indonesian and Malaysian leaders show that many of these 
were genuine concerns being felt by the Indonesian government at the time126.
Beyond this lay broader strategic concerns. Malaysia was also viewed as a 
potential challenge to Indonesia’s own territorial integrity127. Harking back to the 
regional crises in Sumatra and Sulawesi and the suspicions of Malayan 
involvement, there was a genuine fear in Jakarta that a successful Malaysia could 
inspire dissident groups in Sumatra to rise again and agitate to join in the 
federation128. Michael Leifer summarized Jakarta’s concerns as such: “Malaysia 
was perceived and depicted as an unrepresentative alien-inspired polity designed 
to perpetuate colonial economic and military interests in Southeast Asia which, by 
their nature, posed a threat to the viability and regional role of Indonesia”129. To 
that effect, concerns over the strategic implications of “Malaysia” were an 
extension of an already apprehensive attitude in Jakarta towards Kuala Lumpur’s
124 See Bottomley to Gilchrist, 24 November 1964, FO 371/176462, PRO.
125 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Commonwealth 
Relations Office, London, KL 601/1, 21 January 1959, DO 35/9913, PRO.
126 See Bangkok tel. No. 92: Foreign Ministers Meeting in Bangkok, 7 February 1964, FO 
371/175074, PRO.
127 See “Malaysian Attitudes”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 18 April 1963, 162-163.
128 C.L.M. Penders, The Life and Times of Sukamo. [London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1974] 176- 
177; J.M. Gullick, Malaysia and its Neighbours. [London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1967] 110.
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foreign relations tendencies manifested in ASA and SEAFET130. Jakarta’s 
distaste for Kuala Lumpur’s increasing assertiveness in the international arena, 
which they interpreted as being undertaken at their expense, was mirrored in the 
deterioration of the personal relationship between Sukamo and the Tunku. Their 
deep personal antagonisms have been summarized as follows:
In Indonesia he (Sukamo) created a socialist regime and was 
committed to proving it superior to the free-enterprise regime of 
Malaya. With his bitter resentment at Malaya for clinging to her ties 
with Britain, his fears of the expansion into South-East Asia of 
Chinese Communists, and above all his grandiose dream of ruling the 
entire Archipelago, the rift began to widen. The Tunku (Abdul 
Rahman), for all his aristocratic pride, must receive credit for his 
sustained efforts to bring Indonesia and Malaya closer together;
Sukamo was determined to kill the Malayan tiger and drive off the 
British lion. His aim was to destroy the Tunku’s idea of Malaysia in 
embryo, or, failing this, to attack it militarily, economically and 
politically while the infant nation was still learning to walk131.
For the conservative Malaysian government the implications of 
Konfrontasi were unequivocal. However Jakarta attempted to rationalize it, it 
was simply an encroachment upon Malaysian sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
In this sense, it was the climax of an increasing Indonesian reluctance to 
disengage its interest in Malaysia’s domestic affairs that had been brewing even 
before Malayan independence in 1957. Justifying this concern for example, was 
the fact that the Indonesian ambassador during the genesis of Konfrontasi, 
General Djatikusuma, was suspected of stirring up anti-Chinese feelings in 
Malaya132.
129 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. 75.
130 See Bernard Gordon, “Problems of Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia”, World Politics. 
Vol. 16, No.2 (January 1964).
131 James, Harold and Sheil-Small, Denis, The Undeclared War: The Story o f the Indonesian 
Confrontation. [Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1971] xviii.
132 See “Malaya Fortnightly Summary”, FE 58/11/1, DO 169/74, PRO.
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Concluding remarks
Indonesia’s confrontation policy toward Malaysia officially lasted until 12 
August 1966 when both parties reached an accord in Bangkok to cease hostilities 
and restore diplomatic relations. On their part, Indonesia was finally able to 
abandon its policy of confrontation after the purge of the PKI (after the latter’s 
abortive 30 September 1965 coup), and the transfer of power to Suharto’s New 
Order administration in July 1966. This begs the question as to what role the 
kinship factor had to play (if at all) in all this.
If indeed, the proposition expressed earlier that relations between kin states 
need not always be defined by amity is viable, then clearly it is possible to 
conceptualise Konfrontasi as a manifestation of problems between kin states, 
rather than a problem for the concept of kinship itself. In this event, it is 
important to register that even as Konfrontasi reached its height, Indonesian and 
Malaysian leaders repeatedly expressed their despondency at the deterioration of 
relations in the language of kinship. For instance, it was noted that one of the 
main reasons why Indonesia did not oppose Malaysia when the idea was mooted 
in the beginning was because “they feared this would alienate Sumatran Malays 
still further from Jakarta”133. A Malaysian government publication later testified: 
There has always been a strong desire on the part of the Malayan 
people for a very close and friendly relations with the people of 
Indonesia not only because of the sentimental and blood ties which 
bind a major part of the population of the Federation of Malaya with 
that of Indonesia but also because, apart from Thailand, Indonesia is 
the nearest neighbour of the Federation with which close cultural and 
economic relations existed134.
Likewise, Konfrontasi was viewed in some Malay circles as an Indonesian “sell­
out of peninsular Malays”135.
Of course, rhetoric could not conceal the fact that by 1963 the familiar 
pattern of relations between these two kin states, where the political function of 
kinship shifted from cooperation to rivalry among kin states, was repeating itself
133 Critchley to Baswick, 9 April, 1962, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 2, NAA.
134 Government of Malaysia, Malaya-Indonesia Relations. 1.
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again. Nevertheless, it was with the termination of Konfrontasi that the notion of 
blood brotherhood was revived in diplomacy within the Malay World. The first 
indication of this was evident with the warm greetings offered by Malay Ministers 
and officials to the Indonesian Military Mission from KOGAM (the Crush 
Malaya Command) upon the latter’s arrival in Kuala Lumpur on 27 May 1966 to 
prepare for the Bangkok meeting (1 June 1966). It was noted by Michael Leifer 
that upon the party’s arrival at the Tunku’s house for discussions, they were 
confronted by a banner in Malay above the door which proclaimed: “Welcome to 
our blood-brothers on this goodwill visit”136.
Aside from the rhetoric of kinship surrounding the termination of 
Konfrontasi, what was less well known was the extent of support and sympathy 
Jakarta found among the Malays in the peninsula for their cause against Malaysia. 
At the popular level sentiments were far less abrasive as people questioned the 
logic of “blood brothers” going to battle against each other. It was suggested by a 
prominent Malay journalist: “on the surface, it appeared that the Confrontation 
was directed at the new nation of Malaysia, but in fact, it was meant to confront 
Western powers that had masterminded the creation of Malaysia”137.
The termination of Konfrontasi was also an important event in relation to 
Indo-Malay concerns over the ascendancy of the Chinese communities among 
their midst:
At the root of much of the Malaysian jubilation over the ending of 
Confrontation is the feeling that the Chinese in the Borneo territories, 
and particularly in Malaya and Singapore, will be securely boxed in by 
more than 100 million people of the Malay race. It was precisely this 
feeling which led a Malaysian minister to say of Singapore that it was 
now a nut in a nutcracker138.
This commentary echoed Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s private 
concerns that rapprochement might be directed at Singapore139. Indeed the 
spectre of the Chinese “issue” had already been lurking in the shadows of
135 Smithies to Jockel, 12 September 1966, A1838 3006/4/9 Part 34, NAA.
136 Michael Leifer, Indonesia and Malaysia: The Changing Face of Confrontation. [Hull:
University of Hull, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1966] 395.
137 Said Zahari, Dark Clouds at Dawn: A Political Memoir. [Kuala Lumpur: Insan, 2001] 159.
138 “What comes after Confrontation?”, Canberra Times. 5 July 1966.
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Konfrontasi at its outbreak, when Ambassador Djatikusomo saw its utility as a 
propaganda tool and admitted that his work in Malaya “was to save Malays from 
being swallowed up by Chinese . . . .  Only Indonesians would bathe in blood to 
help Malaya”140.
It is worth noting also that despite the fact that their numbers were 
curtailed and ideology wounded by government repression, proponents of pan­
unity with Indonesia persisted in pressuring the UMNO-led government to adopt 
more conciliatory approaches towards Indonesia141. The likes of Ahmad 
Boestamam, former KMM and MNP member and at the time Chairman of the 
PRM (Partai Rakyat Malaysia) and Ishak Mohamed, Chairman of MPSF 
(Malayan People’s Socialist Front) worked together in the formation of Gerakan 
Pemuda Melayu Raya (Greater Malaysia Youth Movement) to further the cause 
of pan-unity. Their endeavour was supported by the Labour Party of Malaya, the 
PMIP under the leadership of Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, and former government 
minister Abdul Aziz Ishak, chairman of “the United Opposition Parties”142.
Indonesia even found quiet sympathy in the corridors of the Malayan 
parliament. While the Indonesian neo-colonial critique did not weaken Malaysian 
resolve to resist Indonesia, “it was nevertheless seen by many Malaysians, 
including moderates, as humiliatingly true”143. UMNO Youth persistently pushed 
for closer relations with Indonesia, and their leader Syed Jaafar Albar, Deputy 
Prime Minister Abdul Razak and parliamentarian Mahathir Mohammad were all 
known to have sympathised with the spirit behind the Indonesian campaign. 
Without Tunku’s knowledge Mahathir led a Malaysian delegation to the May 
1965 Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) meeting in Ghana. 
There, he supported a negotiated settlement between Indonesia and Malaysia with 
a view that that would facilitate British withdrawal from the country144.
139 Critchley to Plimsoll, 2 May 1966, A2908 M120 Part 6, NAA.
140 Critchley to Jockel, 29 May 1963, A1838 3006/4/7 Part 7, NAA.
141 See John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of UMNO and PAS. [Singapore: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1983] 54.
142 See Government of Malaysia, A Plot Exposed. [Kuala Lumpur: Government Publishers, 1965]. 
This published document includes the confessions of Ishak Mohamed and Raja Abu Hanifah of 
sedition.
143 “Quadripartite Talks: Agenda Item (B)”, Department o f External Affairs, Canberra, 22 June 
1966, A1838 3006/4/9 Part 35, NAA.
144 See Malay Mail. 12 May 1965.
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Evidently, opposed as they were to Indonesia’s military incursions, these 
Malaysian leaders nevertheless identified with the subtext of Indonesia’s policy 
insofar as continuing the fight against Western imperialism was concerned. In 
Indonesia too, certain quarters also questioned the logic of confrontation between , 
kindred populations145.
Noticeably, it was the kinship factor that was advocated as the basis for a 
new phase of Indonesia-Malaysia relations. The following exposition captures 
the essence of this transition:
A significant number of politically minded Malay, particularly of the 
younger and more educated generation, seem to be attracted by an 
anti-imperialist Indonesia free of international Communist 
associations. And these people offer a point of entry for the 
Indonesians to exploit such attitudes to their advantage. Indeed, many 
Malays would feel little alarm at Indonesian hegemony; such an 
arrangement would relegate the economically dominant and 
numerically important Chinese community to the similar minority 
position which they occupy in Indonesia.
The Malaysian Government has no desire to sacrifice its independent 
existence on the altar of Malay blood-brotherhood, yet the Bangkok 
Accord and the related agreement in Jakarta may have opened up a 
Pandora’s box of racial affinity which could be a more serious threat 
than military confrontation146.
Indeed, the above commentary on the implications and sub-text to the rhetoric of 
blood brotherhood was telling in light of the sympathy felt among many Malays 
toward the spirit of Indonesia’s Konfrontasi policy. Moreover, the comments also 
highlighted an increasingly pertinent dimension to the kinship factor that was 
taking shape in this relationship -  the need to reinforce Indo-Malay solidarity and 
identity in the face of the increasing political weight of their respective domestic 
Chinese constituencies.
145 See Agus Soetomo (ed), S. Takdir Alisiahbana. 1908-1994: Periuansan Kebudavaan 
Indonesia. [Jakarta: DianRakyat, 1999] 91-92.
146 Leifer, Indonesia and Malaysia. 404-405.
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CHAPTER FIVE
1967-1980: Re-building the “Special Relationship” 
Introduction
Konfrontasi, as it emerged, signalled the apex of bilateral tension that had 
been building up since Malayan independence, as well as the crystallisation of 
negative elite perceptions of each other. For Jakarta, the Malaysia plan was a 
manifestation of the neo-colonial influences against which their foreign policy was 
staunchly opposed. For Kuala Lumpur, Indonesia’s response to the formation of 
Malaysia should have been predictable in view of the Sukamo government’s 
bellicose and aggressive postures towards Malaya and Sumatra. While this Java- 
centric, “big-brother” attitude did gamer some measure of support from certain 
quarters in Malaysia, it was not appreciated in government circles. As Ghazali 
Shafie highlighted to British High Commissioner Gilchrist:
It remained extremely difficult (to get rid of Sukamo) if only because so 
many Javanese, probably not excluding Suharto himself, identified 
themselves with Sukamo. He was in some semi-mystic way an 
embodiment of the Javanese people and personality, and there was a 
deep grained feeling that by condemning him they would condemn 
themselves1.
Beyond this, Konfrontasi also had a fundamental impact on kinship 
discourse. Notwithstanding the measure of popular support from within Malaysia 
for the anti-colonial spirit of Konfrontasi, there was a sense among the Malay 
population in the Peninsula that Indonesia had stepped out of line by encroaching 
upon Malaysian soil. This fact severely dented the political objectives of the pan­
unionist Malays in the Peninsula. It is hence not surprising that PAS (Parti-Islam 
Se-Malaysia), successors to the MNP, turned away from the political objective of 
pan-unification in the aftermath of Konfrontasi.
Yet paradoxically, it was in the wake of Konfrontasi that the politics of 
kinship seemed to find new impetus in bilateral relations. Talk among Malaysian
1 Bentley, British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Reed, Commonwealth Office, London, HK 
3/3, 3 March 1967, FCO 24/243, PRO.
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and Indonesian leaders of blood brotherhood as a basis for post -Konfrontasi 
reconciliation gained prominence and publicity. Reconciliation based on blood 
brotherhood was portrayed as an attempt to repair a bilateral relationship scarred 
not so much by unwarranted Indonesian aggression, but by foreign policy lapses 
during the Sukamo-Tunku era. This sparked a re-assessment of Konfrontasi, with 
some reflecting that “referring to Indonesia the Tunku never wavered in his belief 
that there was a permanent bond of brotherly relationship between the people of 
Indonesia and those of the peninsula”2. Correspondingly, Indo-Malay 
rapprochement was portrayed as a return to the pre-Konfrontasi kinship 
relationship3; and immediately became a policy “popular with the Malays”4.
Such was the extent of Indonesia-Malaysia goodwill that rumours circulated 
of the Malaysian government’s preparation for a mass migration of Indonesians to 
offset the shift in their communal balance towards the Chinese5. Echoing the 
discourse surrounding Maphilindo, the end of Konfrontasi witnessed a resurgence 
of attention given to the idea of “Malay regionalism”. This time however, it 
appeared that Malaysia was more prepared to accept Indonesia’s “political 
paramountcy”6. Central to the resurgence of Malay regionalism during this period 
was the solidarity built upon the shared concern for the Chinese factor in domestic 
and regional politics. As an Australian intelligence report suggested: “There is 
undoubtedly an element of encircling Singapore in their (Malaysian) current 
thinking and . . .  the attractions of a deal with Indonesia that will keep the Chinese 
in their place and permanently ensure Malay hegemony in this area must loom 
larger than in the past”7. This view was reaffirmed when Toh Chin Choy, Deputy 
Prime Minister of the Chinese dominated city-state of Singapore, expressed that 
“Singapore had to watch that it was not squeezed between brother Malays”8. 
Given the acrimonious separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965, such 
sentiments were hardly surprising.
2 Ghazali Shafie, Malaysia. ASEAN and the World Order. [Bangi: Penerbit University Kebangsaan 
Malaysia, 2000] 388.
3 And quite conceivably, a return to pre-West Irian and PRRI/Pemesta rebellion episodes as well.
4 Eastman to Department o f External Affairs, Canberra, A1838 3006/4/9 Part 37, NAA.
5 Bentley to Reed, 2KL/16/89/9, 14 December 1966, DO 169/413, PRO.
6 “K.L., Jakarta talking of axis”, Melbourne Age. 15 October 1966.
7 Arawa to Hasluck, 23 May 1966, A 1838 3006/4/7 Part 39, NAA.
8 Correspondence between Australia High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Prime Minister’s Office, 
Canberra, 22 May 1966, A 1838/4/7 Part 39, NAA.
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To be certain, events immediately after Konfrontasi bore compelling 
evidence indicating the sincerity of these attempts at re-orienting bilateral relations 
on the basis of kinship. In a symbolic gesture of sincerity on the part of both 
parties to re-establish relations on firmer grounds, a commission to unify language 
and spelling was set up immediately9. More striking were joint efforts to root out 
remnant communist elements in Borneo. Insurgency remained a problem for post- 
Konfrontasi Indonesia and Malaysia as a result of lingering activities of the PKI 
along the border areas in Sabah and Sarawak. In response, the Indonesian and 
Malaysian governments cooperated to an extent and in a manner few would have 
thought possible only months earlier. Following a mutual security arrangement in 
March 1967, joint counter-insurgency operations, which included intelligence 
sharing and joint military patrols, were carried out on a regular basis10. Supplies 
for Indonesian regiments were also allowed to be channelled through Sarawak 
(Malaysian territory) instead of Kalimantan’s inadequate roads and difficult rivers, 
and a GBC (General Border Committee) was established to coordinate Indonesian 
and Malaysian military activities along this border. Such was the extent of military 
cooperation that one observer noted it assumed the quality of a de facto alliance11.
I. Transformation in foreign policy prerogatives
It has already been suggested in the previous chapter that Konfrontasi 
terminated with domestic political change in Indonesia. This is an important point 
to register, for the change did more than just end three years of hostility and open 
the door for rapprochement. From a broader perspective, it also facilitated the re­
establishment of bilateral relations on more stable foundations.
With the consolidation of Suharto’s New Order administration, Indonesian 
foreign policy made a firm shift away from revolutionary symbolism and 
expression. Foreign policy was re-directed to fervent anti-communism (marked by 
the suspension of diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China in October 
1967 and a significant improvement of relations with the United States) and an
9 This was MABBIM, discussed earlier.
10 This arrangement built on an earlier agreement on border security signed in September 1966. See 
Justus M. Van Der Kroef, “The Sarawak-Indonesian Border Insurgency”, Modem Asian Studies.
Vol.2, No.3 (July 1968).
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emphasis on trade and economics. The logic behind this shift was simple. The 
New Order government felt that Indonesia’s claim as a nation of consequence in 
the regional and international political arena had to be backed by political stability 
and economic vibrancy if it was to be recognised. Suharto’s pragmatic 
commitment was encapsulated in the pronouncement of Ketahanan Nasional 
(National Resilience) as the basis for Indonesia’s subsequent conduct of 
international affairs. An active foreign economic policy was subsequently 
emphasised by the foreign ministry as Jakarta quickly resumed trade relations with 
major Western powers and Japan. In order to attain its political goal of stability, 
the principles of Sukarno’s Pancasila were resurrected to form the cornerstone of 
Indonesian society after the domestic turmoil of the later Sukamo administration 
years12.
The advent of change however, was noticeably balanced by elements of
continuity as well, in particular the Java-centric view of the regional standing and
vulnerability of archipelagic Indonesia which was formed during the struggle for 
1 ^  *independence . Continuity also persisted because of the nationalistic character of 
Indonesia’s newfound anti-Communism14. Indeed, as Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik expressed, Indonesia’s declaratory foreign policy at this time was still 
targeted at “the elimination of colonialism and all its manifestations”15. This was 
illustrated in the new regime’s continued abidance by two tenets of earlier foreign 
policy practice -  a continued opposition to membership in military alliances and 
aspirations to pre-eminence in the management of regional order16. This view was 
corroborated by Suharto when he visited Washington in 1966:
Indonesians see themselves as potentially the dominant power of the 
Malay World -  and possibly of all Southeast Asia. They have learned, 
however, that the aggressive policies of Sukamo did more to damage 
than to promote the kind of leadership that Indonesia seeks. Thus, the
11 Michael Leifer, Conflict and Regional Order in South-East Asia. [London: International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper Series, 1980] 8.
12 The Pancasila referred to the officially sanctioned philosophical precepts upon which the 
Republican nationalists envisioned Indonesia to be built after independence. It enunciated five 
principles -  Nationalism, Internationalism, Belief in God, Popular Sovereignty and Social Justice.
13 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. [London: Allen & Unwin, 1983] 173.
14 U.S. Department of State, INR/EAP files: lot 90D 165, NIE 54/59-65, Washington, December 16, 
1965, www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/ff us/johnsonlb/xxvi/index.cfm.
15 SWB FE/5595/A3/3, 22 August 1977, “Malik on Indonesia’s relations with Asian countries”.
16 See Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policv.l l  1-112.
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Suharto government has chosen to follow the path of regional 
cooperation instead of conflict17.
It was also reflected in the recognition of the Indonesian military’s Commander-In- 
Chief General Panggabean that “Indonesia has a very great role to play in 
safeguarding Southeast Asia . . . .  This heavy task resting upon our shoulders, as a 
consequence, also brings very great responsibilities”18.
The confluence of continuity and change was profoundly evident in 
Indonesia’s post-Sukamo policy towards regional cooperation. As previously 
registered, one vehicle of contention for Indonesia-Malaysia relations during the 
Sukamo years centred on the matter of regional cooperation. Many of these 
differences surfaced again as the theme of regional cooperation emerged as a key 
agenda of the Adam Malik-Tun Razak talks in Bangkok in May-June 1966 aimed 
at terminating Konfrontasi. As mediators for the Bangkok Accords, Thailand was 
actively pushing for the inclusion of Indonesia within a regional framework. 
Jakarta itself seemed increasingly amiable toward this prospect. Malaysian 
response however, was markedly subdued. Still largely the prerogative of Tunku 
Abdul Rahman at the time, Malaysian policy towards Indonesia remained cautious. 
The Tunku was adamant that an Indonesia dominated by Javanese politicians and 
military commanders was not to be embraced with open arms so soon after they 
had challenged a nation that they declared was kin. In his view, “if (Indonesia) 
stuck to the present system of centralised rule by the Javanese, there could be no 
future peace or stability and this presented considerable dangers for Malaysia”19. 
Discussions in Bangkok revealed the Malaysian view that “the Bangkok Accord 
was reached in order to help Indonesia overcome its problems, and not as a 
settlement between two equal nations agreeing to end a dispute on parity” . By 
this token, Malaysia was in fact not interested in “grand schemes” of regionalism, 
especially those proposed by Indonesians. To Kuala Lumpur, Indonesian inclusion 
into ASA was sufficient insofar as their involvement in regional projects was 
concerned21.
17 Department of State, INR/ERP files, lot 90 D 165, NIE55-68, Washington, 31 December 1968.
18 “Indonesian Armed Services Responsibilities in Southeast Asia”, Berita Yudha. 23 July 1968.
19 H2/1-264, FCO 24/243, PRO.
20 Correspondence between Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur and Department of 
External Affairs, Canberra, 225/17. 7 March 1967, FCO 24/243, PRO.
21 See Cabinet Minutes, “Discussions with the Deputy Prime Minister o f Malaysia”, 13 April 1967, 
A5840 654/FAD, NAA.
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Clearly, threads of continuity amidst the change wrought by Konfrontasi 
also had a significant impact on how Malaysia viewed post-1965 Indonesia, 
tempering any immediate exuberance Kuala Lumpur might have felt in reaction to 
the change in government in Jakarta. The experience of Konfrontasi had resulted 
in a marked transformation in Malaysian foreign policy outlook. What had 
surprised Tunku and his conservative government most about that experience was 
not so much Indonesian audacity in landing troops in the Peninsula, or even their 
willingness to engage Kuala Lumpur’s British and Australian allies militarily in 
what was clearly a mismatch. Rather it was the amount of sympathy Indonesia 
managed to solicit from Third World states for the spirit of Jakarta’s confrontation 
of Malaysia22. Correspondingly, this alerted Kuala Lumpur to the need for a re­
think of the Malaysian approach to international affairs23. This was intimated by 
Foreign Minister Ghazali Shafie, who noted that “Confrontation by a big neighbour 
in 1963 provided a stimulus to foreign policy. For example, several new 
diplomatic missions in Africa and Asia have been established and foreign service 
recruitment accelerated”24. Another scholar noted more specifically that the event 
was “the turning point for Malaysian relations with the Muslim World”25. This 
change in international outlook set in motion a move to enhance Malaysia’s 
presence in international affairs.
Sensing a more reticent administration in Jakarta, Tunku moved cautiously 
to set a new tone for bilateral relations. During his visit to Indonesia in March 
1968, Tunku could not resist airing misgivings, and proceeded to lecture his 
Indonesian audience about the need for “wise leadership” in managing a multi-
Oftracial society, suggesting that Indonesia could learn from Malaysia’s experience .
97Needless to say, his Indonesian counterparts were unimpressed . Yet this 
triumphant outlook belied lingering concerns over Indonesia. Insofar as dealing 
with a post-Sukamo Indonesia was concerned, Tunku Abdul Rahman remained 
convinced that Indonesian arrogance and aggression had not subsided with the end
22 It was Indonesian lobbying that denied Malaysia participation at the Cairo NAM Conference and 
the May 1965 Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organisation Conference in Winneba, Ghana..
23 See WAH-4-64, “The Importance of Being Afro-Asian: Malaysia Feels Pressures Toward 
Ideology”, American Universities Field Staff Report. Southeast Asia Series, Vol.XII, No. 11, 
December 1964.
24 “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy”, Siaran Akhbar. 19 July 1966.
25 Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy. [London: Routledge, 1997] 57.
26 “Tunku Gives Lecture to Indonesians”, The Times. 9 March 1968.
27 Draft Report, A 1838 3006/4/9 Part 37, NAA.
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of Konfrontasi. His train of thought can be easily distilled from the fact that Tunku 
frequently made plain in private that he did not fully trust the Indonesian 
government, even as he made reconciliatory remarks in public28. This view was 
shared by his advisors, some of whom were still concerned that there were 
lingering anti-Malaysian elements among some of the leading generals in Jakarta as 
well as “relics of the Subandrio era” in the Indonesian foreign ministry29. To them 
this suspicion alone warranted caution in negotiating a resumption of bilateral 
relations. To that effect Indonesia’s less-than-cooperative response in the prelude 
to the resumption of diplomatic ties served only to heighten suspicions further. In 
their Note of Intent, Indonesia reiterated their position that diplomatic recognition 
was to be extended to the Malaysian government on the understanding that the 
people of Sabah and Sarawak be given an opportunity at an early date to re-affirm 
their wish to be part of Malaysia30. Indonesia’s special envoy to Malaysia Sunarso 
expressed to his Malaysian counterpart in private that while Suharto and Adam 
Malik were supportive of the restoration of ties even before elections, such a move 
would be unpopular with significant groups in the Indonesian Parliament31. The 
Tunku took exception to this and refused to agree to any linkage of recognition 
with elections. He felt that Malaysia had already provided sufficient guarantees 
and that Indonesia's decision to establish diplomatic relations should not be made 
conditional in such manner32. Malaysia’s position was summarized as such: 
Although the Malaysians remained relaxed at the prospect of not 
having diplomatic relations with the Indonesians for another year they 
are rather irritated at the way the Indonesians have chopped and 
changed in their recent public statements. Their feeling is that little 
attention has been paid to Malaysia’s position or prestige in these 
statements33.
28 Murray, Commonwealth Office, London to Philips, British Embassy, Jakarta, 1 May 1968, FCO 
24/243, PRO.
29 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, and Commonwealth Office, 
London, 2KL 16/89/9, 26 May 1967, FCO 24/243, PRO.
30 See “Full ties: A big ‘yes’”, Straits Times. 26 August 1967.
31 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, and Foreign Office, London, 
15 May 1967, FCO 24/243, PRO. It was further expressed at this meeting that while the Indonesian 
foreign ministry had looked to regard the outcome of the recently concluded Sabah elections as 
sufficient grounds for the restoration of ties, this was blocked by the politically-powerful military.
32 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, and Commonwealth Office, 
London, 2KL 16/89/9, 30 August 1967, FCO 24/243, PRO.
33 Bentley to Mason, 2KL/10/89/9, 26 May 1967, FCO 24/243, PRO.
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Indeed, such was Tunku’s ire toward Indonesia’s terms that he had contemplated at 
the time a postponement of the re-establishment of relations34. That the Indonesian 
government eventually relented was telling of Jakarta’s desire to prove their 
sincerity, if not contrition. Together with a concerted push for the establishment of 
ASEAN, Jakarta’s acceptance of the Malaysian interpretation of the Bangkok 
Accords inspired confidence in the latter that relations could finally be based on 
firmer ground.
II. ASEAN
The change in Jakarta’s attitude toward the terms for the normalisation of 
ties with Malaysia paved the way for the formation of ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations). By abandoning initial demands that normalization be 
contingent upon elections, the Suharto government evinced a measure of humility 
and compunction that was crucial in dispelling at least some of the lingering 
concerns that Kuala Lumpur had of their intentions. In return, the Malaysian 
government saw that there was an urgent need to keep the new Suharto 
administration afloat in what at the time were extremely rough Indonesian political 
waters. Certainly for Malaysia, for all their misgivings toward Indonesians in 
general and the Javanese in particular, and with the memories of Konfrontasi still 
fresh, it was clear to them that the evidently staunch anti-communist Suharto 
government was their best hope for closer ties with their larger kin . With this 
backdrop, the question of Indonesian participation in a regional organisation arose 
again. This time, Tunku left it to his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, to negotiate.
The formation of ASEAN in August 1967 is widely accepted among 
scholars as one of the clearest manifestations of Indonesia-Malaysia 
rapprochement36. Some policy-makers have been amenable to this suggestion as 
well, noting for example, that ASEAN was “conceived out of the pangs of 
Konfrontasi, an idea to obviate all future Konfrontasis in the region” . What is 
important to note about the formation of ASEAN for the purposes here is the
34 Ibid.
35 See correspondence between British Embassy, Jakarta and Southeast Asia Department, Foreign 
Office, London, DH 3/5, 30 January 1967, FCO 24/243, PRO.
36 See for example, Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy o f Accommodation. [London:
M.E. Sharpe, 1990].
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central role Indonesia and Malaysia played in the buildup to its formation. 
Attempts to locate rapprochement within the framework provided by a regional 
institutional structure had previously been thwarted by contending conceptions as 
to the terms of this new regionalism. As noted above, the Malaysian government 
was of the view that the existing structure provided by ASA was sufficient to 
provide the institutional setting required. On their part, Indonesia desired a “clean 
slate” in the form of a new organisation. This was of particular importance to 
Jakarta for two reasons. First, it allowed Indonesia to avoid giving the impression 
that it was capitulating. Second, it would have been a humiliation for the Suharto 
regime if Indonesia was forced into membership of regional organisations whose 
principle values were directly opposed to the fundamental and unchanging 
principles of Indonesian foreign policy. It was these prerogatives that prompted 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik to suggest in a secret letter to Razak the 
establishment of a bigger ASA grouping in June 196738. Malaysian accession to 
Indonesia’s initiative was premised on Jakarta’s recognition of Malaysian 
sovereignty over Sabah and Sarawak as determined in the 1966 Bangkok Accords. 
In turn, Malaysia reciprocated by supporting Indonesia’s proposal for the formation 
of this new organisation, which in effect satisfied Jakarta’s lingering desire to play 
a managerial role in regional affairs39. During initial negotiations on the preamble 
to the ASEAN Declaration, Indonesia and Malaysia reached a watershed, which 
foretold of the subsequent shape of relations over the next decade, when both 
shared the similar position that foreign bases should be removed from ASEAN 
member states40.
Symptomatic of the measure of Malaysian and regional deference to benign 
Indonesian primacy within ASEAN was the decision to hold the first ASEAN 
Ministerial meeting and house the ASEAN Standing Committee in Jakarta. What 
is important to note regarding events surrounding the formation of ASEAN is the 
fact that Kuala Lumpur made a deliberate decision to accept and defer to Jakarta’s
37 Ghazali Shafie, “Think ASEAN”, Foreign Affairs Malaysia. Vol. 16, No.2 (June 1983) 237.
38 See “Malik sends secret note to Razak”, Straits Times. 5 June 1967.
39 See Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. 142-143.
40 Interview with former senior Singaporean diplomat, Singapore, 2 February 2002. The terms of 
the preamble were only changed when Singapore objected to this clause.
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leadership of this new organisation, even if this managerial role was deliberately 
downplayed41.
III. Malaysia’s Indonesia Policy in Transition
For Malaysia, the formation of ASEAN marked a turning point in their 
relations with Indonesia. In essence, it locked Indonesia into a regional framework 
which functioned as a symbolic non-aggression pact. This transformation in 
Malaysian attitudes toward their larger kin state was manifested in the Tunku’s 
visit to Indonesia in March 1968, which opened with his portentous invocation of 
blood brotherhood:
Malaysians are blood brothers of the Indonesians. We are few in 
number. I sometimes wonder whether the Malays would have come 
into being if it had not been for the Indonesians. Thanks to Allah, 
Confrontation is over. It was not Indonesians confronting Malays, but 
communists opposing non-communists42.
While the 1968 visit did achieve much in terms of cultural and economic 
cooperation as well as a Malaysian declaration to extend their territorial waters in 
sync with Indonesia (a matter to be discussed at greater length later), it was “a 
significance which goes beyond the letter of the published Communique”43. The 
visit marked an important gesture on Malaysia’s part that Kuala Lumpur was ready 
to make efforts to reinstate bilateral ties on more substantial grounds. It was also 
of great consequence that during his visit the Tunku made a public call to all 
ASEAN members to render assistance to the Suharto government as it sought to 
bring growth and development to a ravaged economy44. Also notable were 
attempts during this visit to institutionalise a joint effort to unify the Malay and 
Indonesian languages, as well as suggestions to revive the 1959 Friendship Treaty. 
Yet notwithstanding the symbolic value of the Tunku-Suharto meeting, equally 
telling were matters of disagreement. Of particular interest was the Tunku’s
41 Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur, 7 November 2001; See also McLennan to 
Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 8 March 1968, A1838 3006/4/9 Part 37, NAA.
42 Correspondence between British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, and Commonwealth Office, 
London, 10/1, 16 March 1968, FCO 24/243, PRO.
43 Philips, British Embassy, Jakarta to Foreign Office, tel. No.l48A, 12 March 1968, FCO 24/243, 
PRO. For details of this bilateral agreement, see “Indonesia-Malaysia Joint Communique”, 7 March 
1968, FCO 24/243, PRO.
44 “Tengku’s plea to ASEAN nations to help Suharto”, Straits Times. 6 March 1968.
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attempt to engage Suharto in discussions over the possibility of framing the 
friendship treaty as the cornerstone of ASEAN as a defence agreement of sorts45. 
This had in fact been an option the Malaysian government had been contemplating 
in view of the British decision to withdraw its forces46. To this Suharto was not 
disposed, politely opining that “it was not desirable at this time”47. Interpreting the 
impetus behind Tunku’s proposal as a Malaysian desire to “neutralise” the 
Indonesian “threat”, Indonesia’s rejection was itself driven by their belief that 
Jakarta’s accession to the Malaysian suggestion would have been tantamount to an 
acceptance of Malaysia’s historical suspicions of Indonesia. Clearly, the 
Indonesian and Malaysian delegations both carried their own suspicions to the 
meeting, and while it was indeed a watershed event that did much to alleviate many 
of their private concerns, it did not entirely remove these suspicions48.
Nevertheless, residual mistrust did not dampen further attempts by either 
side to rebuild bilateral ties on firmer grounds. This was expressed when Tunku 
lent his voice to Suharto’s supplications for clemency from the Singapore 
government for two Indonesian marines sentenced to death for their role in 
sabotage activities49. Subsequently Tunku Abdul Rahman’s visit was reciprocated 
by an equally monumental visit in March 1970, when President Suharto became the 
first Indonesian head of state to set foot on Malaysian soil. Again, the language of 
brotherhood was employed to rationalise the visit: “There are many things in 
common between Indonesia and Malaysia and therefore we want to foster our 
brother relations with the Malaysians”50. The Malaysian press took great lengths to 
portray Suharto as the “antithesis in personality of Sukamo -  modest, gentle, hard­
working, reticent”51. These efforts to rebuild ties were reaffirmed with the signing 
of a Treaty of Friendship, reviving a similar agreement signed in 1959 but which 
was rendered void with Konfrontasi.
45 See “Rebuilding Stability in Southeast Asia”, Straits Times. 16 March 1968.
46 Falle, British High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Moreton, Commonwealth Office, 10/1, 2 
February 1968, FCO 24/243, PRO.
47 “Indonesia Reaffirms Her Defence Policy”, The Times. 17 March 1968.
48 Sutherland, British Embassy, Jakarta to Stewart, Foreign Office, London, 3/20,19 March 1968, 
FCO 24/243, PRO.
49 It is also interesting to note that Malays in Kuala Lumpur and Johore also demonstrated against 
the hanging of the marines. See Cable no.2691, Australia High Commission, Singapore, 23 October 
1968, A 1838 3006/4/9 Part 38, NAA.
50 “Suharto visit will set seal on growing friendship”, Straits Times. 10 March 1970.
51 “Across the Straits”, Straits Times. 10 March 1970.
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By the end of Tunku Abdul Rahman’s tenure as Prime Minister the tone of 
relations with Indonesia had begun to change. The aristocratic leader, whose term 
was marked by deep suspicions of the Javanese-centred mindsets of the Indonesian 
leadership, was himself beginning to re-orientate his attitudes toward Jakarta. His 
homage to former President Sukamo on the occasion of the latter’s death was 
especially poignant. The Tunku publicly acknowledged his former nemesis as a 
leader who “bravely fought the forces of colonialism and stirred up a strong wave 
of nationalism in Malaya”52. This eulogy was followed by tributes from Abdul 
Razak and Home Affairs Minister Ismail Abdul Rahman. Yet if the final years of 
Tunku’s administration set in train the transformation of Malaysia’s policy towards 
Indonesia, it was the transfer of leadership to Tun Abdul Razak that in effect 
codified this volte face in the tone of Indonesia-Malaysia relations that would have 
seemed impossible only a few years earlier.
Malaysia’s relations with Indonesia during this period of transition 
experienced a noticeable shift when significant events taking place in the 
Malaysian domestic political arena transformed the complexion of policy toward 
Jakarta53. Most notable of these events was the rupture to Malaysia’s domestic 
political tranquillity that was wrought by the race riots of 13 May 1969.
IV. 13 May and the resurgence of the Chinese “issue”
Since 1957, the multi-racial Alliance coalition had managed to hold 
together a potentially disparate polity in Malaysia through a mixture of sound 
economic policies and political accommodation. This political formula however, 
unravelled when Malays and Chinese clashed in the wake of Malay reaction to the 
Chinese opposition’s exuberance on their success at the 1969 national election54. 
In the aftermath of the racial riots, issues surrounding national identity leaped to 
the forefront of national discourse, and have remained there ever since.
Though primarily a domestic crisis, the 13 May 1969 racial riots had three 
international dimensions to it. First, because it involved the brittle relations
52 “’Soek-Man who fought bravely’ tribute by Tengku”, Straits Times. 23 June 1970.
53 This point has also been noted in Johan Saravanamuttu, The Dilemma of Independence: Two 
Decades of Malaysia’s Foreign Policy. 1957-1977. [Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia,
1983] 126-140.
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between the Malay and Chinese communities, it had a definite impact on the issue 
of relations with China and Chinese-dominated Singapore, and the potential 
influence that close ties with Indonesia might have in relation to these concerns. 
To that effect, a Malaysian political affairs report had hypothesised that:
Good relations with Indonesia have overriding significance because, to 
the Malays, Indonesia represents their ultimate source of strength in a 
region under the heavy shadow of communist China and with large 
overseas Chinese populations of unpredictable loyalty55.
Even prior to the riots, this racial dimension had already been an underlying 
influence on the triangular relations between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. 
Benny Moerdani had previously expressed that “it seemed inevitable . . . that one 
day Malaysia and Indonesia would come together” and “Singapore would need to 
adjust its relations with Malaysia and Indonesia in order to fit in with the 
circumstances of the region”56. Correspondingly, Singapore leaders were always 
uneasy about the pace of ipost-Konfrontasi rapprochement between Indonesia and 
Malaysia57.
Second, 13 May also encouraged Indonesian interest in the repercussions 
the riots had for their Malay cousins as well as their own indigenous population, 
who themselves were harbouring deep-seated distrust toward the ethnic Chinese 
community in Indonesia. This phenomenon was aggravated by the fact that the 
1965 anti-communist coup in Indonesia had provided greater stimulus for Malay 
communal feelings throughout the region. Commenting on this influence on 
Malaysia, an Australian intelligence source reported portentously:
The moderates (in Malaysia) see in a new relationship with Jakarta 
some element of insurance against the Chinese . . . .  More radical 
Malay feeling may move the government in Kuala Lumpur further in 
an anti-Chinese direction, and towards greater concerting of Malaysian 
and Indonesian policies58.
54 For a study of the 13 May 1969 incident, see Leon Comber, 13 May 1969. A Historical Survey of 
Sino-Malav Relations. [Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 1983].
55 “Extract from KL’s 1967/8 Annual Report”, A1838 3006/4/9 Part 38, NAA.
56 McLennan to Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 19 December 1968, A1838 
3006/4/9 Part 38, NAA.
57 Critchley to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 15 July 1968 A1838 3006/4/9 Part 38, 
NAA.
58 “Quadripartite Talks: Agenda Item (B)”, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 22 June 1966, 
A1838 3006/4/9 Part 35, NAA.
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In fact, many among the Malay community, particularly among the Malay radicals, 
believed that in the event of a clash with the Chinese, Indonesia would come to 
their assistance59. The negative implications of such a state of affairs for the fragile 
multi-racial Malaysian national identity was that “backed by Indonesia, and 
stimulated by Indonesia’s attitudes towards the Chinese . . .  the radical Malays 
could increasingly campaign to use Malay predominance in Government and 
administration for anti-Chinese measures”60.
Hence, it was in this context that the 13 May riots were followed closely in 
Indonesian circles. Although Jakarta was careful not to get involved, it was 
concerned enough that meetings were convened at the highest levels to determine 
the course of action to be undertaken should the Malaysian situation deteriorate. 
General Tjokropranolo, a close aide of Suharto, felt that “the Indonesian people as 
a whole felt they had an obligation to help the Malays in their ‘struggle’ with the 
Chinese”61. Evidently, Malaysian students even visited Indonesia to study tactics 
used during the Indonesian student riots of 1965-66, and the PMIP worked closely 
with Indonesian Muslim parties and organisations to instigate Malay sentiments 
against the Chinese62.
Finally, the riots all but brought an end to the administration of Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, and confirmed the transfer of power to Abdul Razak63. Changes at 
the helm of Malaysian politics were not merely cosmetic, for they signalled the 
emergence of a new national discourse that preached Malay supremacy in the 
construction of Malaysian national identity64. Closely associated with this 
discourse, but yet to receive scholarly attention, was the manner in which it related 
to and impacted upon the shape of Malaysian foreign policy. While perhaps not as 
fundamental a change compared to its impact on the domestic political sphere,
59 Cable no.2493, Australia High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 26 July 1969, A1838 3006/4/9 Part 
39, NAA.
60 Jockel to Hasluck, 12 May 1966, A 1838, 3006/4/7 Part 39, NAA.
61 Cable no. 1459, Australia High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 31 May 1969, A1838 3006/4/9 Part 
39, NAA.
62 McLennan to Secretary, Department o f External Affairs, Canberra, 26 September 1969, A1838 
3006/4/9 Part 39, NAA.
63 Cheah Boon Kheng suggests that Razal’s assumption o f power “had all the makings of a coup”. 
Ssee Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation. [Singapore: Institute o f Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2002] 130.
64 Ibid, 121-150.
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Malaysian foreign policy did experience a discernible shift under Razak, and it was 
in Indonesia policy that one witnessed the clearest signs of this65.
Razak was far more accommodating toward Indonesian desires to assume 
an active leadership role in regional affairs than his predecessor. For example, as 
Deputy Prime Minister, Razak eagerly kept Jakarta informed of developments in 
the Five-Power Talks - discussions which led to the formation of the FPDA (Five 
Power Defence Arrangement), and which was sparked by Britain’s withdrawal 
from the region66. While there were clearly strategic reasons for him to adopt a 
more obliging position toward Malaysia’s much larger neighbour, there was also a 
strong sense that the Buginese Razak was a keen believer in building a strong 
foundation for bilateral relations on the basis of the kinship factor. As a senior 
Malay diplomat intimated to the author, it was Razak who “did have visions of 
Rumpun”67.
Razak’s influence on Indonesia policy effectively took shape in the years 
during confrontation with Jakarta. Conspicuously less open with outright 
condemnations of Sukarno’s “Ganjang Malaysia” (“Crush Malaysia”) campaign 
than his predecessor, Razak’s role in fact focused on behind-the-scenes 
negotiations with elements of the Indonesian military and government less averse 
to Malaysia’s existence. Unlike his predecessor, Razak had also long supported 
Indonesia’s nationalist cause and ironically enough, maintained a close friendship 
with Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio (who along with Sukamo was 
considered an instigator of Konfrontasi)68. During Konfrontasi it was Razak who 
urged that “Malaysia wanted to live in peace with Indonesia” and that he hoped 
strained relations would be a “passing phase”. Later in a statement revealing the 
future basis of bilateral relations during his tenure, Razak commented during a 
motion in parliament to welcome agreement with Jakarta on the termination of 
Konfrontasi that: “We (Malaysia and Indonesia) must totally reject outside 
elements which aim at destroying peace, stability and progress of our region. It is
65 A scholarly exposition of the distinction between Malaysian foreign policy o f the Tunku Abdul 
Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak administrations remains to be undertaken. Owing to its time of 
publication, a tentative account can be found in Marvin Ott, “Foreign Policy Formulation in 
Malaysia”, Asian Survey. Vol.XII, No.2 (March 1972).
66 “Five-Power Talks”, 17 October 1967, A1838 3006/4/9 Part 37, NAA.
67 Interview with Zainal Sulong, Kuala Lumpur, 14 August 2001.
68 William Shaw, Tun Razak: His Life and Times. [London: Longman, 1976] 75-79. He was also a 
close friend of Des Alwi, the adopted son o f former Indonesian Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, and 
who was implicated in the PRRI Rebellion.
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in this context that Malaysia . . . regard the role of Indonesia . . .  as of utmost 
importance”69. More to the point, it was Razak, not Tunku Abdul Rahman, with 
whom Indonesia chose to negotiate the termination of Konfrontasi. It was also 
Razak who convinced Tunku of the need to create a new regional organisation 
(ASEAN) in order to capitalize on Jakarta’s new-found humility and willingness to
70work in unison with Malaysia to secure regional order .
Subsequently when he replaced Tunku Abdul Rahman as Malaysian Prime 
Minister in the aftermath of the May 1969 racial riots, Razak moved to cement 
relations with Indonesia at a level never before experienced between these two 
states, much to the chagrin of Malaysia’s feudal leaders71. The subtext to Razak’s 
policy towards Indonesia appeared to be deference for what his administration 
viewed as a larger kin state. In an attempt to consolidate national identity in the 
aftermath of May 1969, the Razak administration introduced the concept of Rukun 
Negara (Articles of Faith of the State) on 31 August 1970. As a blueprint for 
national solidarity and the re-establishment of national identity, the Rukun Negara 
echoed the Pancasila of Indonesia, itself a concept rejuvenated during Suharto’s 
New Order administration. Again, echoing Indonesia’s security policy 
imperatives, Malaysia’s priorities after the May 1969 racial riots were also oriented 
towards internal economic and social development72. The Razak administration 
also actively sought to re-frame Malaysia’s posture on international affairs away 
from its traditional identification with the West, and plot out a more independent 
outlook on foreign affairs which he termed “free and neutral”. It was this 
transformation in Malaysia’s international outlook that brought it closer in strategic 
vision to Indonesia.
Evidence emerged early in Razak’s tenure that under him, Malaysia would 
pay close attention to improving relations with Indonesia. When Indonesia 
experienced a severe rice shortage in the early 1970s, Suharto’s personal appeal to 
Malaysia for assistance was promptly met with a dispatch of a substantial amount 
of food aid73. Zainal Sulong, the Malaysian Ambassador to Jakarta during this 
period, recounted that upon relaying an emergency Indonesian request for 20 000
69 “Indonesia’s Major Role in Region” , Straits Times. 27 August 1966.
70 Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur, 7 November 2001; Interview with Ghazali 
Shafie, Kuala Lumpur, 8 November 2001.
71 Interview with Ariffin Omar, Penang, 16 September 2002.
72 SWB FE/4802/A3/9 13 January 1975, “Malaysia’s Defence Policy” .
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tons of rice to Razak, the latter’s immediate offer of 5 000 tons was quickly 
increased by 15 000 when Sulong convinced him that their “Indonesian brothers” 
needed help urgently, and that Malaysia “had to do more”74. This act led to an 
appreciative response on the part of President Suharto, who intimated that “this was 
how brothers should act”75. This episode in effect set the tone for an extended 
period of close rapport between Indonesia and Malaysia. Such was the rapport that 
on the occasion of his visit to Malaysia in July 1971, Indonesian Foreign Minister 
Adam Malik was personally invited by Razak to stay in the latter’s private house 
during the duration of his stay76. This close rapport subsequently led to 
convergence in strategic perceptions as well, of which one of the earliest 
manifestations was the joint Indonesia-Malaysia position on the Straits of Melaka 
and Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur’s attendant support of Indonesia’s archipelagic 
principle77.
V. Indonesia’s Archipelago Doctrine
On 13 December 1957, the Indonesian government made a unilateral 
declaration that:
All waters surrounding, between and connecting the islands 
constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension of 
breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and, 
therefore, parts of the internal or national waters which are under the 
exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian state.
Following this statement, the Jakarta government further declared an extension of 
the breadth of its territorial sea from the customary three miles to 12 nautical miles. 
The government also adopted the concept of straight baselines, in effect drawing a 
boundary connecting the outermost points of its outermost islands to demarcate 
what Indonesia argued was its internal seas, which consequently lay outside the 
purview of international maritime law. Foreign ships travelling through these 
waters were no longer considered to enjoy the “right” of innocent passage as they
73 Interview with Zainal Sulong, Kuala Lumpur, 14 August 2001.
74 ibid.
75 ibid.
76 Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur, 7 November 2001.
77 See “Malacca Straits: For Malaysia and Indonesia, A Family Affair”, Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 15 April 1972, 18.
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would in international waters. Instead, their innocent passage through sovereign 
Indonesian waters would be “granted” pending Indonesian approval. These 
statutes have come to be known as the Djuanda Declaration or “Archipelagic 
Principle”78. Insofar as the impetus behind the elucidation of the Archipelagic 
Principle was concerned, it was likely that it was formulated and passed as a direct 
result of Jakarta’s concern for the potential of its waterways being used by external 
powers to threaten Indonesian security, as was the case during the 1946-1948 
revolution79. The implications of this declaration were significant; notwithstanding 
practical capabilities for policing its waters, the Indonesian government could 
conceivably deny naval passage to any maritime power anywhere within its “legal 
regime” of internal waters. This same implication would later hold for the 
Indonesia-Malaysia agreement of November 1971 to deny the customary legal 
status of the Melaka and Singapore Straits.
Running corollary to the Archipelagic Principle was the Act of Innocent 
Passage of 1962 that regulated the “innocent passage” of foreign ships across 
Indonesia’s waterways, and the doctrine of Wawasan Nusantara. An initiative by 
the Indonesian military to revive and revise the archipelagic principle in the wake 
of the transfer of government from the Sukarno to Suharto administrations, 
Wawasan Nusantara not only reiterated the statutes of the Djuanda Doctrine, but 
“also had the effect of formalizing the notion that this area was a strategic area 
(where) . . .  the whole entity of land and water becomes a single strategic defence 
system”80. Explaining the relationship between the Archipelagic Principle and the 
doctrine of Wawasan Nusantara, former Foreign Minister and architect of the 
concept, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, clarified:
Whereas the archipelagic state principle is a concept of national 
territory, the Nusantara concept is a way of looking at the political 
unity of a nation and people that subsumes the national geographic 
reality of an archipelagic state. It can also be said that the concept of 
the unity of land and seas contained in the concept of the archipelagic
78 B. A. Hamzah suggests the possibility that the declaration might actually have been an extension 
o f the 1945 Indonesian Constitution. See B.A Hamzah (ed), Malaysia and Law of the Sea. [Kuala 
Lumpur: Heng Lee Stationary and Printing Co, 1983] 4. However, Michael Leifer contends 
otherwise. See Michael Leifer, Malacca. Singapore, and Indonesia. [Alphen ann den Rijn, 
Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978] 17-24.
79 See Dino Patti Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia’s Maritime Territorial Policy. [Jakarta: Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies, 1996] 34-42.
80 Ibid, 65.
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state constitutes the physical forum for the archipelago’s 
development81.
It is evident that the rationale behind Indonesia’s promulgation of the 
archipelago principle was two-fold. First, it reflected Jakarta’s acute sense of 
political and strategic vulnerability. To that effect, it has been opined by the 
Indonesian government that:
The Wiawasan Nusantara must become a reality. Our stand has been 
quite clear for a long time past. Just as in our national anthem we 
speak of land and water, there is no other country that makes similar 
mention. The Wawasan Nusantara concept is life or death for us82.
Indeed, Indonesian politics since 1945 has seen much undesired external 
intervention, and this gave credence to their perception that freedom of navigation 
in waters surrounding Indonesia actually constituted a threat to both the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Indonesian state83. To the power brokers 
in Jakarta, the waterways cordoning and intersecting the archipelago were clearly 
within Indonesia’s strategic milieu, and hence had to be secured.
A second justification for the Archipelago Principle lay in its nationalist 
imperative. Because the post-colonial political boundary of the Dutch East Indies 
had always been the point of reference for Indonesian nationalism, drawing borders 
around the archipelago by adjoining outermost points of furthermost islands was a 
logical foreclosure of Indonesia Raya {sans Malaya). This cartographic exercise, 
thence, demonstrated Indonesia’s assertion of total sovereignty over its motherland 
or “Tanah Air” (literally “land and waters”), and represented the apex of the 
political aspirations of Indonesian nationalists who envisaged the territory of 
Indonesia united as one nationality, one language and one homeland. Noticeably 
also, Indonesia’s position on its waterways had strong historical coincidence to the 
pre-modem Sumatran kingdom of Srivijaya and its control of its surrounding 
waters. This prompted one scholar to opine that what the post-colonial Jakarta
81 Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, “The Concept o f the Indonesian Archipelago”, Indonesian Quarterly. 
Vol. X, No.4, (1982) 23.
82 Sinar Harapan. 30 October 1974, 1.
83 The particular impetus provided by Indonesia’s fear o f foreign involvement and aggravation of 
regional dissent is emphasised in Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, “The Legal Regime o f Archipelagoes: 
Problems and Issues” in L.M. Alexander (ed), The Law of the Sea: Needs and Interests of 
Developing Countries. [Kingston: University of Rhode Island Press, 1973].
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government was articulating was in fact the “outlook of Palembang”84. It would 
hence be interesting to note in this context the omission of the Malay Peninsula, for 
as an earlier chapter had already discussed, the latter historically fell into the sphere 
of influence of Srivijaya.
Although a unilateral policy undertaking based on Indonesia’s domestic 
political and security concerns, the postulation of Jakarta’s archipelagic principle 
had implications beyond Indonesian borders. Most striking was its impact on 
relations with Malaysia, Jakarta’s closest neighbour vis-a-vis the shared waterways 
of the Straits of Melaka and Singapore85.
Indonesia’s claim to application of the straight baseline system as well as 
the extension of territorial sea from three to 12 miles challenged the international 
status of the Melaka Straits guaranteed in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, and 
posed legal and juridical problems for the international community. In the first 
instance, adoption of the straight baseline system was argued by Jakarta to be in 
accordance with precedence set by the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case decided at 
the International Court of Justice in 1951, even though “in the case of the 
Indonesian claim . . . there does not appear the special conditions and factors given 
by the Court to justify its exceptional approval of the application of the special 
method. The Indonesian case is totally different from the Norwegian case; there is 
no similarity at air  (emphasis added)86. Further to that, the extension of territorial 
sea jurisdiction from three to 12 miles was only valid if other states sharing similar 
waters (in this case Malaysia) adopted similar measuring standards. On their part, 
Malaysia was at that time signatory to the Geneva Conferences on the Law of the 
Sea of 1958 and 1960, which abided by the three-mile rule.
In order to bring the vision of Wawasan Nusantara to fruition, Indonesia 
embarked on a massive diplomatic initiative to rally support for its cause among 
Third World states. This diplomatic initiative began with a delegation to the 
UNCLOS (United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea) meeting in Geneva 
in February 1958, where the Indonesian government presented its case to the 
international community. Following that, Indonesia’s claim to the archipelago
84 See Leifer, Malacca. Singapore, and Indonesia. 27. Palembang was the capital of the Srivijayan 
kingdom.
85 Since the signing o f the Safety Navigation agreement in 1971 between Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore, both the Melaka and Singapore straits become regarded as a single strait.
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principle was raised to the Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee, Sea-Bed 
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and at all subsequent 
UNCLOS meetings. Beyond pursuing their case through multilateral institutional 
means, Indonesia also cultivated like-minded states at a bilateral level87. 
Nevertheless, the one state apart from Indonesia who had the greatest stake in the 
archipelago doctrine, and whose support was critical to the Indonesian cause, was 
Malaysia. Indonesia’s realization of Wawasan Nusantara hinged on Malaysia’s 
backing because part of what Jakarta claimed was Indonesia’s “territorial waters” 
actually lay between the peninsular and East Malaysia. Because of this 
geographical circumstance, the validity of Indonesia’s Archipelagic Principle 
primarily hinged on Malaysian recognition.
Differences had emerged in the initial years of Indonesia-Malaysia dialogue 
on the legal status of the Straits. These differences were traced back to the Anglo- 
Dutch Treaty of 1824, which guaranteed the international juridical status of the 
Melaka Straits and stipulated the responsibilities of Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta as 
inheritors of British and Dutch colonies to treaty obligations.
Upon being granted independence, the Malayan government was prepared 
to abide by all treaties signed by the British colonial government. Reflecting this 
commitment, it was noted in the Devolution Clause signed by these two 
governments that:
All obligations and responsibilities of the Government of the United 
Kingdom which arise from any valid international instrument are, from 
August 31, 1957, assumed by the Government of the Federation of 
Malaya, in so far as such instruments may be held to have application 
to or in respect of the Federation of Malaya. The rights and benefits 
heretofore enjoyed by the Government of the United Kingdom in virtue 
of the application of any such international instrument to or in respect 
of the Federation of Malay are from 31st August, 1957, enjoyed by the 
Government of the Federation of Malaya88.
86 K.E. Shaw (ed), The Straits o f Malacca: in Relation to the Problems o f the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans. [Singapore: University Education Press, 1979] 44.
87 See Leifer, “Malacca. Singapore, and Indonesia”, chap 1 for a background to Indonesia’s early 
diplomatic initiatives pertaining to their declaration of the archipelago principle.
88 Exchange of Letter concerning Succession to Rights and Obligations arising from International 
Instruments, September 12, 1957, in International Law Association, The Effect o f Independence on 
Treaties: A Handbook Prepared by the Committee on State Succession to Treaties and other
Governmental Obligations. [London: International Law Association, 1965] appendix to chap 9.
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In Indonesia’s case however, Dutch treaties signed with regard to their East Indies 
possessions enjoyed no such commitment. Instead, it was declared at the Round 
Table Conference at the Hague in 1949:
The Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of the United States 
of Indonesia understand that . . .  the rights and obligations of the 
Kingdom arising out of treaties and other international agreements 
concluded by the Kingdom shall be considered as the rights and 
obligations of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia only 
where and inasmuch as such treaties and agreements are applicable to 
the jurisdiction of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and 
with the exception of rights and duties arising out of treaties and 
agreements to which the Republic of the United States of Indonesia 
cannot become a party on the ground of the provisions of such treaties 
and agreements89.
It is clear from these two statements that both countries accorded a different 
measure of consideration towards the treaty obligations committed to by their 
colonial masters. Once again, the divergence in approach can no doubt be 
attributable to their different anti-colonial experiences.
Problems subsequently arose as a result of the different perspectives held in 
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur over the definition of territorial seas. Indonesia, 
because of its indented coastline, claimed the application of the straight base-line 
system to define its territorial seas. Malaysia, on the other hand, because of its 
straight coast, insisted on the application of the prevailing coast-line system. The 
problems with these contending definitions has been elaborated on by K.E. Shaw: 
An adoption of the system claimed by Indonesia is ipso facto a further 
extension of Indonesian territorial sea towards the coast of the Malay 
Peninsula, as the base-line for measuring the outer-limit of territorial 
sea would under this system start at the line linking all die islands 
within the archipelago and thus part of the free High Seas would 
become internal sea of Indonesia. This system together with the claim 
for extension of territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles would make up a 
double-extension putting a large part of the Strait-waters under
Also quoted in K.E. Shaw, “The Juridical Sttatus o f the Malacca Straits and its Relation to Indonesia 
and Malaysia” in Shaw (ed), The Straits of Malacca. 34. This clause was later incorporated into 
Article 169 o f the Constitution of Malaysia.
89 Daniel P. O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal and International Law -  Vol.II. [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967] 364-365.
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Indonesian jurisdiction. This certainly compromises Malaysia’s 
interests, and a struggle starts accordingly90.
This divergence in views was no doubt exacerbated by the Malayan government’s 
concern over the potential for Indonesian hegemony, which by the early 1960s had 
heightened as a result of Indonesia’s belligerent claim to West Irian and later, its 
policy of confrontation against Malaysia91.
Nevertheless in a reflection of a gradual change of Malaysian attitudes 
toward Indonesia, the Malaysian government eventually acceded to the 
abandonment of the three-mile limit for the extension of territorial sea to 12 miles 
in accordance to Indonesian measurements and codified in Jakarta’s declaration of 
the Archipelagic Principle. The Malaysian government also adopted the system of 
straight baselines which the Indonesians were using. The bill to extend Malaysia’s 
territorial waters was submitted to the Malaysian parliament in 1967. Notably, the 
two-year hiatus between the submission of the bill and its eventual passing (in 
1969) has been explained by some analysts as an abeyance in lieu of a perceived 
need in Kuala Lumpur to consult with Indonesia92. The agreement between 
Malaysia and Indonesia to delimit the continental shelves was eventually signed on 
18 March 1970 on the occasion of President Suharto’s watershed visit to 
Malaysia93.
Indo-Malaysian conformity in demarcating territorial waters however, 
shifted attention to the question of the status of the Melaka Straits, which fell into 
the sphere of both parties if the 12-mile delimitation mark was observed. This 
raised the further issue of the terms of navigation through the Straits. The 
foregoing discussion has already highlighted the international status of the Melaka 
Straits protected under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. By way of the Indo- 
Malaysian agreement of 1970, both Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur sought to exercise 
the right to regulate traffic along the Melaka Straits, in so doing denying the 
customary legal status of the Straits.
90 K.E. Shaw, “The Juridical Status” in K.E. Shaw (ed), The Straits o f Malacca. 2-3.
91 That said, it needs to be recognized that at no time during Konfrontasi did the Indonesian 
government make any territorial claim against Malaysia.
92 See Leifer, Malacca. Singapore, and Indonesia. 30. It should be noted here that the bill passed in 
2 August 1969 through an emergency ordinance. No vote was taken because of the suspension of 
parliament after the 13 May 1969 racial riots in Malaysia.
93 The full text of the document is titled “Indonesia-Malaysia: Agreement between the Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia relating to the Delimitation o f the
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Of greater concern in terms of bilateral relations however, was the issue of 
Indonesia’s archipelago principle and its implications for Malaysia’s management 
of the waterways linking East Malaysia to the peninsula. To that effect, Kuala 
Lumpur’s initial response is best described as “cautious support”. After expressing 
rhetorical support, a Memorandum of Understanding was finally signed in 1974 
between the two parties prior to the UNCLOS meeting at Caracas in July that year. 
In it, Malaysia expressed conditional support for Jakarta’s Archipelagic Principle 
and its propagation. In return, Indonesia was to take into account the legitimate 
interests of Malaysia, defined as the right for free and unimpeded communication 
flow between the Malay Peninsula and East Malaysia, as well as the establishment 
of a special corridor of passage. In spite of these commitments, the Malaysians 
continued to press their case further at Caracas and also the Geneva UNCLOS in 
May 1975. This persistence did not go down well in some Indonesian circles. 
Certain quarters in Jakarta were of the opinion that Malaysia was attempting to 
“negate and diminish” Indonesia’s archipelago principle94. On Malaysia’s part, 
there were some concerns within domestic circles that Kuala Lumpur might be 
bending too far backwards in synchronising their position with Jakarta’s. As Leifer 
articulated:
Within the Malaysian foreign ministry, a sense of reserve has existed 
about its maritime policy in as far as it has been believed that Malaysia 
moved somewhat precipitately in serving Indonesian interests more 
than its own, especially in as far as initiatives over the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore seemed to have strengthened Indonesia’s 
archipelago claim, which did not accord fully with Malaysian 
interests95.
The stalemate was broken when Suharto and Razak met in Prapat, North 
Sumatra, on November 1975. It was at this meeting that Malaysia made a 
commitment to “frilly support” Indonesia’s declaration of the Archipelagic 
Principle. This agreement took the form of another Memorandum signed in 
September 1976. The 1976 document set basic terms covering the recognition by
Continental Shelves between the two countries”, and can be found in B.A. Hamzah, Malaysia and 
Law of the Sea. 295-296.
94 See Hasjim Djalal, Periuansan Indonesia di Bidans Hukum Laut. [Bandung: Percetakan 
Ekonomi, 1979]. This point was also stressed in B.A. Hamzah, “Indonesia’s Archipelagic Regime: 
Implications for Malaysia”, Marine Policy. January 1984.
95 Leifer, Malacca. Singapore and Indonesia. 157.
207
Malaysia of archipelagic state principles and Indonesian sovereignty over its 
territorial sea and archipelagic waters, and the recognition by Indonesia to the 
rights of Malaysia to continue to enjoy existing rights and all other legitimate 
interests which it had traditionally exercised in the Indonesian territorial sea and 
archipelagic waters between West Malaysia and Sabah and Sarawak. It is 
important to note however, that despite Razak’s personal enthusiasm in pushing 
forward Malaysia’s recognition of Indonesia’s archipelago doctrine, the rank and 
file at the foreign ministry continued to harbour reservations regarding the 
Malaysian commitment96. Consequently to this day, Kuala Lumpur’s position vis- 
a-vis the archipelagic principle has yet to be ratified by the Malaysian parliament.
VI. Neutralization and ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality)
Attendant to bilateral accommodation around the issue of the Melaka Straits 
and Indonesia’s Archipelagic Principle was Indo-Malaysian cooperation over the 
neutralization of Southeast Asia as part of the management of regional order in 
Southeast Asia.
The idea of creating a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast 
Asia was the brainchild of former Malaysian Home Minister Tun Ismail, and was 
primarily a reaction to the changing regional security circumstances brought about 
by British military withdrawal. The ZOPFAN initiative can be traced back to the 
“Ismail Peace Plan” based on Ismail’s suggestion made in parliament in January 
1968 that “the time is . . .  ripe for the countries in the region to declare collectively 
the neutralisation of South-East Asia”97. Tun Ismail’s proposal for the 
neutralisation of Southeast Asia contained three core tenets - first, the 
neutralisation of the region had to be guaranteed by the great powers (the US, the 
Soviet Union, and China); second, it would be based on non-aggression pacts 
among regional states; and finally, it would also stand on a policy of peaceful co­
existence among the countries of the region98. Following Ismail’s presentation of 
his proposal, the push for the neutralisation of Southeast Asia gained greater
96 Interview with Idris Junid, Kuala Lumpur, 1 November 2001.
97 This quote was taken from Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysian Defence Policy: A Study in 
Parliamentary Attitudes. 1963-1973. [Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit University Malaya, 1980] 120.
98 See Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept. [Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1991] 13.
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urgency with the enunciation of the Guam doctrine, signalling the pulling out of 
American troops from Southeast Asia. Neutralisation was initially brushed aside 
by Tunku Abdul Rahman as unrealistic"; but was supported his deputy Abdul 
Razak100. Predictably, it was during the Razak administration that the 
neutralisation proposal was pushed to the fore of ASEAN’s regional security 
agenda, and became an international initiative that first surfaced at the Lusaka Non- 
Aligned Movement Conference in 1970, when Razak presented Malaysia’s plan to 
create a “zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality”101. Again, this prescription for 
regional order was to be premised on respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity among the ASEAN states, and the undertaking by the key external powers 
to exclude the region from power struggles as well as to play a supervisory role in 
guaranteeing the neutrality of the region102.
Indonesia’s initial response to Malaysia’s proposal was carefully calibrated. 
In reaction to Razak’s presentation of the scheme at Lusaka, Adam Malik opined 
that while it was something worth looking into, Jakarta’s bone of contention with 
the Malaysian proposal revolved around the understanding that in order to create a 
neutral Southeast Asia, “the understanding and the help of the big states was 
needed”103. To him, this was unacceptable to Indonesia. Jakarta’s initial response 
was followed by scepticism as to whether states like Malaysia, who maintained 
security arrangements with foreign powers, could realistically abide by such tenets 
of the neutralisation scheme. In a veiled criticism, an Indonesian editorial argued: 
The real neutralisation of Southeast Asia will have many consequences 
for several member countries that have so far fostered historical 
relations with powers outside Southeast Asia. Agreements on defence, 
special political relations, and the (sic) rest must be released104.
At the heart of Jakarta’s unwillingness to wholeheartedly endorse the 
Malaysian proposal for neutralisation was the issue of great power guarantees,
99 See Dick Wilson, The Neutralization o f Southeast Asia. [New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975] 8- 
9.
100 Cable No.253, Australia High Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 2 February 1968, A1838 3006/4/9 
Part 37, NAA.
101 The expansion of the Ismail Peace Plan into a detailed prescription for regional order was 
expounded in Ghazali Shafie, “The Neutralization o f Southeast Asia”, Pacific Community. Vol.3, 
No.l (October 1971).
102 See Ibid.
103 See “The Process o f Neutralisation of Southeast Asia Needs a Long Time”, Kompas. 22 
December 1970.
104 “Declaration on Neutralisation”, Indonesia Rava. 30 November 1971.
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which in effect granted external players virtual policing rights in the region. 
Indonesian concern was articulated by Adam Malik, who noted that “neutralisation 
that is the product of ‘one-way’ benevolence on the part of the big powers, at this 
stage, would perhaps prove as brittle and unstable as the interrelationship between 
the major powers themselves”105.
The notion that the neutrality of the region required the guarantee of external 
powers stood in direct contradiction to Jakarta’s own prescription for regional order 
-  that the latter had to be grounded on regional resilience106. The Indonesian 
military in particular, was wary of the fact that China was to be included in the 
regional formula as a guarantor107. The issue of the neutralization of Southeast 
Asia featured prominently in the Razak-Suharto talks of December 1970, and at 
Razak’s impromptu meeting with Adam Malik in July 1971108. What comes across 
clearly from this series of bilateral meetings was that Kuala Lumpur was moving 
proactively and unilaterally to consult with Jakarta prior on a matter relating to 
their regional initiatives. As a result of these consultations, by the time the 
neutralisation proposal was tabled and jointly agreed upon at the ASEAN foreign 
ministers meeting in November 1971, its complexion had fundamentally changed. 
Taking Indonesian reservations into consideration, ZOPFAN was expressed in 
what has become known as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration as “a desirable 
objective” in line with Indonesia’s position that the neutralisation of Southeast Asia 
was likely to be a long-term prospect109.
Razak himself was to offer a further concession to Indonesian sensitivities. 
In a marked shift away from the original Malaysian proposal which stipulated a 
requirement of external power guarantees, Razak instead announced at the Kuala 
Lumpur Ministerial Meeting that “the premise of the neutralisation proposal is 
regional and national resilience”110. Indeed, such was Malaysia’s willingness to 
take Indonesian concerns and sensitivities into account that despite its eventual 
imprecise form, “neutralisation of Southeast Asia as had been proposed by
105 “Towards an Asian Asia”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 25 September 1971, 31.
106 See Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. 148-149.
107 China was in fact the only external power that voiced support for the ZOPFAN proposal.
108 See “Razak-Suharto summit talks of vital significance: Indonesian Press”, Straits Times. 18 
December 1970; “ ’Family’ talks, then Malik flies home”, Straits Times. 18 July 1971.
109 See Heiner Hanggi, ASEAN. 19-20.
1,0 Malaysia, Jabatan Penerangan, Siaran Akhbar. 1975, quoted in Johan Saravanamuttu, 
“Malaysia’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1980” in Zakaria Haji Ahmad (ed), Government and Politics in 
Malaysia. [Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987] 142.
210
Malaysia is mentioned neither in the operative part of the Declaration nor in the 
Joint Communique which goes with it”111. By the time the “desirable objective” of 
ZOPFAN evolved into a more concrete formula for regional order in 1976, its 
determining character had transformed from the external power guarantee and non­
aggression pacts of the original Malaysian proposal to the notion of regional 
resilience, which was identified and accepted as Indonesia’s prescription for 
regional order. To that effect, an Indonesian analyst made the prescient 
observation that “Indonesian leaders, in fact, claimed that the ZOPFAN idea was 
basically theirs since Indonesia was the country that had consistently stressed the 
concept of an indigenous Southeast Asian regional order from the beginning of 
ASEAN”112. This was further manifested when Indonesia subsequently moved to 
tie its proposal for the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone (SEANWFZ) 
to the concept of ZOPFAN113. Likewise Malaysia’s willingness to allow for the 
dilution of its original proposal in order to accommodate Indonesian perspectives 
was telling of its willingness to defer to Indonesian proclivities.
Malaysia’s abidance by Indonesia’s Archipelagic Principle, as well as its 
attendant position on the Melaka Straits, and Indonesia’s accommodation of 
Malaysia’s neutralisation proposal, albeit with some adjustment to its terms, 
represented a quid pro quo that served once again to illuminate the extent to which 
international outlooks had converged over a short period of time, and further 
reinforced the perception that the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship formed the core 
of ASEAN114. While these events were definitive of the level of Indonesia- 
Malaysia fraternity during Razak’s administration, they were by no means the only 
examples of the extent to which bilateral ties had recovered from Konfrontasi. The 
Razak administration visibly threw its support behind Jakarta when the latter 
moved to annex Portuguese Timor in 1975115. In defence of Indonesian actions 
that were increasingly subjected to harsh international criticisms, Razak argued that 
“the obvious future for Portuguese Timor is for the territory to become part of
111 Hanggi. ASEAN. 18.
112 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism. [New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994] 177.
1,3 See Muthiah Alagappa, Towards a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Southeast Asia. [Kuala 
Lumpur: Institute o f Strategic and International Studies, 1987].
114 See WAH-7-73, “Nationalizing The Straits o f Malacca”, American Universities Field Staff 
Report. Southeast Asia Series, Vol.XXI, No.8, July 1973.
115 See “Malaysia accepts Indonesian action”, Straits Times. 14 December 1975.
211
Indonesia”116. Central to Malaysia’s concern, which it shared with Jakarta, was the 
spectre of the revival of communist insurgency in the event of Timorese 
independence. This concern was drawn from the fact that the Portuguese and 
Macau governments were at the time under communist control, and the latent fear 
in Malaysia and Indonesia was that Portugal and China would facilitate the 
dispatch of communist elements from Macau to support the Fretilin government in 
an independent Timor, a move which would have repercussions for Kuala Lumpur 
and Jakarta in their own fights against local communist insurgents117. 
Correspondingly, Ghazali Shafie was dispatched to Bali in 1976 to mediate 
between the Apogethi party and the Jakarta government in order for an agreement 
to be reached for the absorption of Portuguese Timor into the Indonesian Republic. 
One would certainly have noticed that Malaysia’s position on this matter stood in 
stark contrast to that taken during the 1950s on Sumatra and Sulawesi, where Kuala 
Lumpur instead sympathised with the anti-Jakarta cause. Further cooperation was 
evidenced in Malaysia and Indonesia jointly sponsoring UN resolutions on the 
decolonisation of Brunei118.
VII. Relations with China
Events surrounding Malaysia’s normalisation of ties with China in 1974, in 
particular, marked how the potential for diplomatic tension arising from 
contradictory policy positions was extinguished by kinship diplomacy between 
these two kin states.
The fact that both post-Sukarno Indonesia and Malaysia viewed China as a 
security threat stemmed from China’s reluctance to disavow support for the 
predominantly ethnic Chinese communist movements in both countries. Be that as 
it may, drastic changes in the strategic environment (most notably President 
Nixon’s visit to Peking) alerted Kuala Lumpur to the need for a re-assessment of 
their policy toward the People’s Republic of China119. This re-assessment began 
with Kuala Lumpur’s support for China’s membership at the UN and peaked with
116 SWB FE/5040/I, 23 October 1975, “Malaysian Prime Minister on future o f East Timor”.
117 Interview with Ghazali Shafie, Kuala Lumpur, 8 November 2001.
118 SWB FE/5061/A3/13, 19 November 1975, “The Razak-Suharto Talks”.
119 For a study of Malaysia-China relations during this period, see R.K. Jain, China and Malaysia. 
1949-1983. [New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1984].
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Razak’s landmark visit to Peking in May 1974 to establish diplomatic ties. These 
developments were of further significance for the fact that not only did Malaysia 
become the first ASEAN state to establish ties with China, but that its policy 
seemed to run against the grain of strategic thinking vis-a-vis China in the region at 
the time. In particular, it seemed to contradict Indonesia’s own policy toward 
China, which was still very much defined by suspicion toward the latter’s 
intentions.
While it does appear on the surface that a fundamental contradiction existed 
with regard to the Indonesian and Malaysian positions on China, several issues are 
worth noting. First, it must be acknowledged that Malaysia’s move to normalise 
ties with the People’s Republic of China was defined more by a reaction to 
changing geopolitical circumstances than by a removal of suspicion of Peking120. 
In this, Indo-Malaysian perspectives of China did not essentially differ. Second, 
and perhaps of greater significance, was the fact that since 1971, the Malaysian 
government had consistently consulted with Jakarta on their intention to review 
policy towards China. This was done in order to mollify anticipated concerns from 
Indonesia121. In fact, Razak had consulted personally with Suharto prior to 
Malaysia’s landmark vote at the 1971 UNGA to support the admission of the PRC 
into the UN122. As a result, while Jakarta may have initially felt slighted by 
Malaysian gestures toward China undertaken without prior consultation with them, 
after active consultation the Indonesian government declared publicly that 
Malaysia had the right to establish relations with China123. Consequently, the 
normalization of ties between Malaysia and China in May 1974 passed without 
much furore in Jakarta, owing to the fact that Indonesia was satisfied with the logic 
behind Malaysia’s decision, and more importantly, that Kuala Lumpur had kept 
Jakarta well informed at every stage of Malaysia-China negotiations124. In a move 
that once again reflected the convergence of strategic perspective between 
Indonesia and Malaysia as well as Malaysia’s own lingering concerns over Chinese
120 See Stephen Leong, “Malaysia and the People’s Republic of China in the 1980s: Political 
Vigilance and Economic Pragmatism”, Asian Survey. Vol.XXVII, No. 10 (October 1987).
121 Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, Singapore, 21 August 2000.
122 Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur, 8 November 2001.
123 Antara Daily News Bulletin. 7 December 1971 ; See also “Foreign Minister Adam Malik: 
Indonesia has no objections if ASEAN members open relations with China”, Suara Karva. 8 
December 1972.
213
objectives, the Kuala Lumpur government continued to publicly support Jakarta’s 
position of suspicion toward Peking’s intentions, despite having already normalised 
ties with China125.
VIII. From Razak to Hussein Onn
From the above discussion, it can be certainly said that the change in 
Malaysian attitudes toward Indonesia owed much to Tun Abduk Razak and his 
approach to relations with Jakarta. Less suspicious of Indonesian, and especially 
Javanese, intentions than the Tunku, this permitted Razak and key Indonesia 
policy-makers in his administration to embrace the New Order government in 
Indonesia. After Razak’s untimely death in January 1976, the baton was passed to 
Tun Hussein Onn, who immediately proclaimed that Malaysian foreign policy 
would continue along the lines plotted by his predecessor126. Malaysia’s Indonesia 
policy under the Hussein Onn government certainly held true to this proclamation. 
As a manifestation of the continued emphasis given to ties with Indonesia, Hussein 
Onn made Jakarta his first foreign port-of-call during his premiership on 28 
January 1976127. It was at this visit that Indo-Malaysian “brotherliness” was 
reaffirmed by Suharto and Hussein Onn128.
Subsequently, this tete-a-tete would become an annual event during the 
Hussein Onn administration, just as it was during Razak’s. It was also during 
Hussein Onn’s administration that Indonesia-Malaysia relations reached a new 
stage of amity with the expansion of military cooperation. Not only were the 
General Border Committee meetings and anti-communist offensives in Borneo 
continued, but military exercises between the Navies, Air Forces and Armies of 
Indonesia and Malaysia became regular events in the calendar of bilateral relations. 
Malindo Samatha (search and rescue exercises), Malindo Jaya and Malindo Mini
124 This point was reiterated by the two key architects o f Malaysia’s China policy of the time, 
Abdullah Ahmad and Ghazali Shafie, in the author’s interviews with them, and was confirmed on 
the Indonesian side during an interview with Des Alwi, Jakarta, 21 January 2002..
125 See SWB FE5969/A3/7, 15 November 1978, “Indonesia regrets Teng’s remarks on insurgents in 
Southeast Asia”; SWB FE/5969/A3/2, 15 November 1978, “Malaysia’s foreign policy and Teng 
Hsiao-ping’s visit”.
126 SWB FE/5118/A3/4, 27 January 1976, “Malaysia to continue Razak’s policies”.
127 It is true that in fact, Onn had visited Bangkok prior to making his trip to Jakarta. This however, 
was in fulfilment o f a promise made by Razak prior to his death that he would make an official visit 
to Thailand. Upon Razak’s death, Hussein Onn took the initiative to fulfil this promise.
128 SWB FE/5122/A3/2, 3 February 1976, “The Malaysian Prime Minister’s Visit to Indonesia”.
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(naval exercises), Elang Malindo (air force exercises) and Keris Kartika (army 
exercises) were either instituted or continued with admirable regularity. Keris 
Kartika in particular, was a milestone for it marked the first incidence where the 
Indonesian army engaged in joint military exercises. Additionally, the Malaysian 
military was granted permission to train in Indonesia129. When Malaysia declared 
its 200-mile economic zone in July 1977 after the G-77 and UNCLOS meetings, it 
enjoyed staunch Indonesian support130. Both Hussein Onn and Suharto also made 
combined efforts to mediate between the Moro Liberation Front Islamic separatists 
and the Philippine government131. The Indonesian and Malaysian governments 
also shared similar positions in condemning the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
and Israeli attacks against Iraq and Lebanon132. Collaboration also included the 
establishment of joint arms-production industry and satellite technology 
exchange133.
IX. Strategic Convergence -  The Kuantan Principle
Shared strategic perspectives bom of heightened sensitivities to kinship 
affiliation between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur also manifested themselves 
alongside events in Indochina. As early as 1970, Indonesia and Malaysia already 
evinced propensities toward shared perspectives over the Indochina crisis when 
Kuala Lumpur expressed enthusiasm over an initial Indonesian move to manage 
the regional crisis under the auspices of the Jakarta Conference on Cambodia134. 
Subsequently, the uncertain regional environment created after American 
withdrawal, the fall of Saigon, and the unification of Vietnam in 1976 in effect 
produced a security problem on the doorstep of ASEAN. The urgency which this 
event created among the ASEAN states resulted in the convening of the first 
ASEAN Summit in Bali in February 1976. It was at the Bali summit that the 
blueprint for the realization of ZOPFAN, which was in discussion since the Kuala
129 SWB FE/5816/A3/6, 18 May 1978, “Malaysian Armed Forces to train in Indonesia”.
130 SWB FE/5581/A3/9, 5 August 1977, “Indonesian support for Malaysia’s proposed 200-mile 
limit”.
131 SWB FE/5821/A3/2, 34 May 1978, “Malaysian radio on Hussein-Suharto talks”.
132 SWB FE/6803/A3/5 17 August 1981, “Malaysian Prime Minister concludes Indonesian visit”.
133 “Arms: K.L.-Jakarta decision is to avoid duplication”, Straits Times. 13 December 1976.
134 It is also interesting to note that of all the ASEAN states, it was only Malaysia that “appeared to 
respond with any real enthusiasm to Indonesia’s initiative”. See Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the 
Security of Southeast Asia. [London: Routledge, 1989] 54.
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Lumpur Declaration of 1971, was endorsed by the ASEAN heads of government in 
the form of the TAC (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation). ASEAN solidarity 
wrought of the TAC was to function as a basis through which dialogue with the 
Indochinese states, especially Vietnam, could be initiated. While attempts at 
engaging Vietnam intensified within ASEAN, so too did the difference strategic 
perspectives among its members towards developments in Indochina. Of especial 
significance was the direction Indonesia and Malaysia were moving on the issue.
Apprehension toward communism notwithstanding, Jakarta also took the 
view that Vietnam could be considered a potential regional partner and bulwark 
against increasing Chinese influence. This coincidence in strategic perspectives 
could be further built on the fact that both states also shared strongly nationalistic 
values that underpinned their respective foreign policies135. Largely as a result of 
this perception Jakarta’s response to Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia was 
visibly muted. In fact, Jakarta policy makers construed that Vietnam’s seemingly
1 TiT
aggressive policies were above all else “a reaction away from Peking” . This 
certainly was a reflection of Indonesian attitudes toward China, which was viewed 
in many circles in Jakarta as their main security threat. In a telling comparison of 
Vietnamese and Chinese attitudes, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja intimated that “Indonesia should be continuously vigilant with 
regard to People’s China because . . .  it would not make such a statement like 
Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, that his country would not support 
subversive movements in other countries”137. What was in fact of greater interest 
however, was the position that Malaysia was taking on this issue. Indochina 
topped the agenda at the Suharto-Hussein Onn summit meeting in March 1979,
n o
where Indonesia appeared to sway Malaysian opinion on the crisis . Given the 
lingering suspicions that both Indonesia and Malaysia had for Chinese expansion 
into the region (in the latter’s case, despite the normalisation of ties in 1974), the 
Indo-Malaysian position that took shape was centred on the logic that the 
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was in effect motivated by Hanoi’s antipathy 
toward China, an antipathy that was partially justified in light of China’s
135 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. 161.
136 SWB FE/4878/A3/10, 15 April 1975, “Impact o f Indochina events in Malaysia: Indonesian 
views”.
137 SWB FE/5945/A3/3, 18 October 1975, “Indonesian Foreign Minister on relations with China”.
138 See “Hussein to meet Suharto for talks on Indochina war”, Straits Times. 4 March 1979.
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subsequent military reprisal139. What was of further significance in the Indo- 
Malaysian position on Indo-China was that it contradicted the stance taken by their 
ASEAN neighbours, who sought to take a stronger position against Vietnam.
In a bilateral meeting at Kuantan in May 1980 between Suharto and 
Hussein Onn, the Indonesian and Malaysian governments issued a statement in the 
spirit of ZOPFAN, declaring that for Southeast Asia to be a region of peace, 
Vietnam must be freed from Soviet and Chinese influence. The Kuantan Principle, 
as the statement came to be known, was a result of Indo-Malaysian diplomacy 
extended to Hanoi earlier in the year, and was motivated by four factors140. First, 
Vietnam’s struggle against the US and subsequently China was perceived in 
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur as an essentially nationalist struggle. This coincided 
with Indonesia’s longstanding conviction that such struggles be supported. Indeed, 
this remained a key thread of continuity between the Sukarno and Suharto regimes. 
Even for Malaysia, shifts in the shade of foreign policy after 1970 meant that more 
sympathy was accorded to nationalist struggles of such nature as well. Second, 
both (but in particular Indonesia) saw the value of Vietnam as a potential regional 
partner, if not strategic ally. This was important in view of their shared concerns 
for the creeping influence of China. Third, it seemed that the leadership in 
Indonesia and Malaysia saw the Kuantan Principle as an opportunity to lay a solid 
foundation for what ASEAN had sought to achieve since 1976 -  the eventual 
acceptance of Vietnam and the Indochinese states into the organisation. Finally, 
the Kuantan Principle also provided an opportunity for both to re-assert the concept 
of ZOPFAN by making the call for the Soviet Union and China to exit 
Indochina141.
Concluding remarks
Although the Kuantan Principle ultimately failed to prove a viable solution 
to the regional crisis as a result of Vietnam’s ensuing aggression against Thailand 
(itself an ASEAN opponent of the Principle), it nevertheless was a significant
139 In fact, Malaysia had already been sharing the concerns of their Indonesian counterparts by 1978. 
See SWB FE/5969/A3/7, 15 November 1978, “Malaysia’s foreign policy and Teng Hsiao-ping’s 
visit”.
140 Malaysian foreign minister Tengku Ahmad Rithaudeen and Indonesian envoy General Benni 
Murdani were dispatched at different times earlier that year to open discussions with Hanoi.
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manifestation of converging perspectives driven by an awareness and politicisation 
of kinship ties that began with the advent of the Razak administration. This 
alignment of Malaysian policy with Jakarta’s that covered the range of issues 
discussed above began when Malaysia followed the Indonesian lead in walking out 
of the August 1971 NAM Conference in Guyana to protest that the principle of 
consensus had been violated when the conference admitted the Vietcong and 
Sihanouk delegations to full membership. This move was poignantly described by 
one observer as “self-induced subordination” of Malaysian interests to 
Indonesia142. Reflecting this observation, Zainal Sulong reportedly opined that it 
“would not be in Malaysia’s interest. . .  by not showing (sic) some deference to the 
prestige of their (Indonesian’s) government”143. In a resounding declaration 
pregnant with significance, Ghazali Shafie publicly declared at a GBC meeting in 
Jakarta:
It is a fact that whatever serves as a threat to any of the two countries 
(Indonesia and Malaysia) will also be regarded as so by the other. . . .
Let the understanding and cooperation now closely binding the two 
countries serve as a warning to any power that has ill intentions 
towards us. We will act together to oppose this threat completely and 
we shall never tolerate any nonsense from anywhere.. . .  Let this joint 
stand of ours be understood by all, particularly by those who have 
designs on us144.
It was also Ghazali Shafie who later related a specific instruction given by Suharto 
and Razak to Indonesian Security Minister Ali Moertopo and himself to take all the 
necessary steps to ensure that “pisang jangan berbuah dua kalV (never again 
should there be confrontation between the two people of the same stock)145.
141 “The Kuantan Principle”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 4-10 April 1980, 12.
142 Stephen Chee, “Malaysia and Singapore: Separate Identities, Different Priorities”, Asian Survey. 
Vol.XIII, No.2 (February 1973) 157.
143 Record of conversation between Eastman and Sulong, Kuala Lumpur, 23 September 1967,
A 1838 3006/4/9 Part 37, NAA.
144 Utusan Melavu. 18 September 1979. This comment was made on the occasion of the 10th 
Malaysia-Indonesia General Border Committee meeting in Jakarta.
145 See Ghazali Shafie, paper presented at the Second Malindo Dialogue, Bogor, Indonesia, January 
1990.
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CHAPTER SIX
1981-2000 : The Indonesia-Malaysia “Prestige Dilemma” 
Introduction
The Kuantan Principle of 1980 was formulated on the basis of shared 
strategic perception of regional developments and their impact on Indonesian and 
Malaysian security. While the case could no doubt be made that the Principle 
was issued in a reaction to strategic developments in Indochina, the fact that prior 
to Kuantan Indonesia and Malaysia had already shared a decade of harmony, and 
stability in bilateral relations certainly facilitated the building of consensus. In 
turn, the convergence of interest seems to have been underlined by the 
rejuvenation of relations on the basis of blood brotherhood that was liberally 
espoused by both the Indonesian and Malaysian leaderships since the termination 
of Konfrontasi.
As hinted in the previous chapter, relations during the 1970s were 
premised on Malaysia’s willing acknowledgement of Indonesian primacy in this 
relationship, resulting in a noticeable congruence between kinship rhetoric and 
Malaysian foreign policy. It can be discerned from the politics of policy-making 
over the past decade that both the Razak and Hussein Onn administrations were 
ready first, to ensure that Jakarta was consulted on matters of foreign policy, and 
second, to align Malaysian foreign policy as closely as possible to Jakarta’s 
position. The most glaring examples of this can be found in the two major policy 
initiatives in the 1970s -  the formulation of ZOPFAN and the normalisation of 
ties towards China. The latter case was particularly telling. While the May 1974 
normalization of ties with Peking could conceivably have been a source of tension 
for the two kin states given Indonesia’s acute suspicions of China, the Razak 
government ensured that Jakarta was regularly consulted and sufficiently satisfied 
with Malaysian reasons for a policy shift prior to Razak’s landmark visit to 
Peking to effect the change. In a move signifying Jakarta’s interest in cementing
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the upturn in relations of that decade, the Indonesian government made clear on 
the occasion of Tun Hussein Onn’s deliberations over his choice of deputies that 
they preferred Ghazali Shafie for the sake of policy continuity on the part of 
Malaysia1. Indonesian preference for Ghazali was premised on his role as the 
prime Malaysian interlocutor in relations with Indonesia for the decade since 
Konfrontasi, and hence would represent a welcomed continuity in bilateral 
relations. Furthermore, the fact that Ghazali was himself of Sumatran 
(Mandaeling) origin and related to former Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik probably endeared himself further to the Indonesians2. The eventual choice 
of the outspoken Malay nationalist Mahathir Mohamad however, elicited a 
different response from Jakarta. While the Indonesian leaders took easily to 
Razak and Ghazali, they greeted Mahathir’s ascension with caution and 
reservation3. Indeed, their initial consternation would prove portentous of the 
future of relations.
With the advent of the Mahathir administration in Malaysia in 1981, 
observers were quick to suggest that a “new dimension” to bilateral relations was 
required4. What was significant about this period of bilateral ties was how the 
transformation of foreign policy dispositions that resulted from internal 
reconstruction of their respective national identities impacted on perceptions and 
interpretations of the kinship factor in Indonesia-Malaysia relations on the part of 
the political elite in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. The Mahathir administration 
brought about a period in Malaysian history when Malaysian conceptions of 
national identity experienced a transformation that was manifested noticeably in 
foreign policy5. Likewise, the late 1980s witnessed a rejuvenation of Indonesian 
interest in international affairs as part of a political effort to regain a sense of 
national pride “lost” amidst the debacle of Konfrontasi and the failed communist 
coup of the mid-1960s. These developments had a direct impact on Indonesian
1 Interview with Abdullah Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur, 7 November 2001.
2 Interview with Wang Gungwu, Singapore, 2 February, 2001.
3 Interview withAbdullah Ahmad, Kuala Lumpur, 7 November 2001.
4 “Hubungan Malaysia-Indonesia Perlukan Dimensi Baru”, Utusan Malaysia. 5 September 1989.
5 For the impact o f Mahathir Mohamad on the Malaysian political culture, see Khoo Boo Teik, 
Paradoxes of Mahathirism: A Political Biography o f Mahathir Mohamad. [Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1993].
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and Malaysian perceptions of their role and status in international society, and 
how both saw their position in the Indo-Malay World. Insofar as bilateral 
relations were concerned, the question that arose was whether the momentum 
gathered during the Razak and Hussein Onn periods would be sustained during 
the Mahathir administration.
Bilateral relations in the 1980s appeared to be a continuation of earlier 
traditions, with kinship emphasised in the language of diplomacy. Commenting 
on Indonesian reports of a visit made my Mahathir to Indonesia in 1988, 
Malaysia’s Jakarta correspondent Yang Razali Kassim observed: “There is a 
particular line which the Indonesian media reserves for no visiting dignitary 
except a Malaysian -  cultural affinity. . . .  As the Indonesian press portrayed it, 
the encounter was like one between two members of the same family, embracing 
each other in mutual back-packing”6. The manner in which Suharto received 
Mahathir, Razali further noticed, was pregnant with significance. Suharto had 
insisted that the meeting be held in Jogjakarta, near to his birthplace and the site 
where he fought during the Indonesian revolution, and on his 67th birthday. 
Furthermore, he had arranged for Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, the most 
respected of the remaining sultans in Indonesia and governor of Jogjakarta, to 
receive Mahathir at the airport and join in their deliberations7. No doubt these 
observations were telling of the persistence of the kinship factor in Indonesia- 
Malaysia relations, but the question remained as to whether the firebrand and 
nationalistic Mahathir would overstep the line separating amity and rivalry in this 
relationship.
I. Foreign policy change and the advent of a “new stage” in relations
It is a fact that the study of international politics needs to account for 
change and transformation. Illustrative of this, as colonial states evolve into 
sovereign political entities, more often than not foreign policy perspectives shift 
as a consequence. That is the case with Indonesia and Malaysia, two states that
6 “Behind the Suharto, Mahathir Meeting”, Straits Times. 25 June 1988.
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by the advent of the 1980s had consolidated into politically stable and 
economically dynamic political entities. This in turn was reflected in foreign 
policy outlooks that saw Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur engage each other as 
diplomatic rivals in a contest for political primacy in the region.
The impact of Mahathir himself on Malaysian foreign policy has been a 
crucial factor behind the shift in Malaysian dispositions toward Indonesia from 
the calculated deference of the Razak and Hussein Onn years to a diplomatic 
nonchalance that characterised much of his administration’s policy toward 
Jakarta. Indeed, such is the pervasiveness of Mahathir Mohamad’s imprint in the 
conduct of Malaysian foreign policy that studies on the latter subject cannot but 
focus on the impact of his role8. One overriding characteristic that defines 
Malaysian foreign policy under Mahathir would be diplomatic adventurism 
underscored by an enviable record of political stability and economic growth. 
Clive Kessler has explained the association between Malaysian nationalism, state- 
building, and the Mahathir factor in this manner:
Having ensured, by assuring Malay ascendancy, that completing the 
unfinished agenda of preindependence Malay nationalism would 
remain the core objective of postindependence Malaysia as a Malay- 
based “but-more-than-just-Malay” multiethnic nation, Dr. Mahathir 
then allied his domination of the state to consolidate Malay corporate 
economic power, enabling i t . . .  to play a significant, even strategic, 
international role; to be players of consequence not only throughout 
Southeast Asia but also the Pacific, Southern and West Africa,
Central Asia, Latin America and even Europe. This, for him, was part 
of a larger world-historical agenda, one that was essential if the 
nationalist aspirations of countries such as Malaysia were to achieve 
adequate modem realization9.
7 See ibid.
8 See Murugesu Pathmanathan and David Lazarus (eds), Winds o f Change: The Mahathir Impact 
on Malaysia’s Foreign Policy. (Kuala Lumpur: Eastview Productions Sdn.Bhd, 1984); Johan 
Saravanamuttu, “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Period, 1981-1995: An Iconoclast 
Come to Rule”, Asian Journal o f Political Science. Vol.4, N o.l (June 1996); Khoo Boo Teik, 
Paradoxes of Mahathirism.
9 Clive Kessler, “Malaysia and Mahathir: Region Builder or Barrier Builder?”, The Asia-Australia 
Papers. N o.l (April 1999) 24.
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Diplomatic adventurism found expression in policies such as Buy British 
Last and Look East, which carried significant symbolic weight insofar as 
Malaysia’s emergence as a champion of Third World interests was concerned. 
Even if the policies failed to achieve any substantive results, their impact lay in 
the fact that Malaysia’s standing in international affairs soared. This recognition, 
along with the increasing primacy given to Malaysia’s role and example among 
states and governments in the developing world, initiated and contributed to a 
kind of ideological awakening within Malaysia. Mahathir’s adoption and 
propagation of the ideology of developing world unity against what he portrayed 
as the oppressive and predatory western developed world brought about a 
substantial normative change in the belief system of Malaysians and a 
reconstruction of Malaysian identity, resulting in widespread support for 
Mahathir’s nationalist slogan of “Malaysia Boleh” (“Malaysia is able”).
Mahathir Mohamad paid especial attention to the Islamic dimension of 
Malaysia’s foreign policy, a move that inadvertently slighted Indonesia, the 
world’s largest Muslim nation. Partly as a result of the legacy of the Tunku’s era 
(when Mahathir was a staunch and vocal critic of Tunku’s overtly pro-West 
foreign policy), and partly in response to the heightened Islamic consciousness in 
Malaysian society at the time, Mahathir made it a point to publicize Malaysia’s 
foreign policy towards its Muslim brethren10. Because of this, one could be 
forgiven for expecting relations with Indonesia, perceived as brethren in religion, 
to benefit from this Islamisation of foreign policy. Yet the substance of 
Mahathir’s activism did not go down well in Jakarta. Malaysian attempts to 
project themselves as a member of consequence in international society clashed 
with Indonesia’s own ambitions, and was viewed as a direct challenge to 
Indonesian primacy.
Indonesia, it might be recalled, had during the early years of the Suharto 
presidency shunned strident international political advocacy for the more 
pragmatic and realistic objective of national resilience, of which economic
10 For a detailed analysis o f how Malaysia’s foreign policy towards the Islamic world has been 
driven by domestic political exigencies, see Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy. 
[London: Routledge, 1995].
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development and internal political stability were primary pillars. Consequently, 
Jakarta deliberately adopted a much lower international profile. This move 
however, appeared to have been lamented in certain quarters within the 
Indonesian establishment. Indeed, many among the Indonesian political 
leadership felt the success of the national resilience program, which brought about 
vibrant economic development and stable internal politics, granted Indonesia “the 
right to assert a higher profile”11. To that effect, the observations of Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar, an advisor to former President B. J. Habibie, are worth quoting in 
full:
There was a discernible sense of national grandeur amongst some 
sections of the Indonesian political elite. Indonesian political elite 
members were very conscious of the fact that Indonesia is the largest 
country in Southeast Asia and the world’s fifth most populous state 
and that it has the potential to become a middle power. Many still 
cherished the memory of Indonesia’s heavy concentration on foreign 
policy under Sukarno, which had resulted in rapidly increasing 
international interest in the country. A significant element within the 
Indonesian political elite, therefore, believed that Indonesian foreign 
policy should have a higher profile, and be more active and more 
focused on the common interests of the Third World or the South, 
than it hitherto had under the New Order government12.
To what extent this view was representative of key policy-makers in 
Indonesia will no doubt be difficult to discern. Be that as it may, it is true that 
these activist ideals never strayed far from the surface of Indonesian perceptions 
of their own identity and position in international society, and “although tempered 
by current realities, they remain potent among Indonesia’s contemporary 
intellectual establishment”13. Echoing these impressions, another scholar has 
intimated: “A Java-centric view of the regional standing and vulnerability of 
archipelagic Indonesia which was formed during the struggle for independence
11 Michael Vatikiotis, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s”, Contemporary Southeast Asia.
Vol. 14, No.4 (March 1993) 357.
12 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism. [New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994] 284.
13 Michael Vatikiotis, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy”, 357.
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has been sustained since its attainment”14. Certainly, insofar as the “rightful” 
identity of Indonesia was concerned, domestic politicians were in consensus that 
Indonesia was a regional power.
This pressure for Indonesia to break out of its diplomatic dormancy 
subsequently led to a shift in international outlook among the political elite in 
Jakarta that was discernible in Indonesian foreign policy ventures during the mid 
to late 1980s. For example, some scholars view Jakarta’s decision to 
commemorate the 1955 Bandung Afro-Asian Conference in 1985 as a watershed 
in Indonesian foreign policy15. This led to various calls for Indonesia to take on a 
more proactive role in regional affairs16. Others have cited Indonesia’s Vietnam 
policy, which saw Jakarta take an active interest in resolving the Indochina crisis, 
as evidence of a shift in Jakarta’s once dormant foreign policy17. During Armed 
Forces Chief Benny Moerdani’s watershed visit to Vietnam in July 1984, Jusuf 
Wanandi observed: “We’re (Indonesia) emerging from a long period of dormancy 
in foreign affairs . . . .  The world is going to be hearing a lot more from Indonesia 
now
There have been suggestions that the rationale behind Indonesia’s 
diplomatic resurgence could be attributed to the emergence of a “Second 
Generation” in Indonesian nationalism19. While the nationalist spirit inherent in 
the Indonesian political psyche certainly accounted in some measure for this 
renewed impetus to activism, this rationale only reflected the fact that there 
probably has always been latent among the political elite in Indonesia a belief that 
Jakarta is an international player of consequence, and hence should re-assert its 
role to that effect. This drive for greater international prominence brought 
Indonesia into direct diplomatic conflict with Malaysia, which, as discussed
14 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. [London: Allen & Unwin, 1983] 173.
15 See for example, Heath MacMichael, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy: Towards a New Assertive 
Style. [Queensland: Griffiths University, Center for the Study o f Australia-Asia Relations, 1987].
16 “R.I. urged to take assertive lead in SEA”, Jakarta Post. 31 August 1992.
17 Interview with Ali Alatas, Jakarta, 24 January 2002.
18 “Indonesia’s New Approach to Vietnam Shows Higher Profile on Foreign Policy”, Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 3 July 1984.
19 See Gregory Hein, “Suharto’s Foreign Policy: Second Generation Nationalism in Indonesia”, 
Ph.D dissertation submitted to University of Califomia-Berkeley, California, 1986.
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above, itself was embarking on its own international activism driven by a 
rejuvenated Malaysian nationalism.
Malaysia’s move towards increasing its international profile saw Mahathir 
fashion for himself a role as the unofficial spokesperson of the Third World. 
Under his administration, Malaysia’s track record in international diplomacy has 
been impressive. Contradicting Indonesian preferences for enhanced North-South 
dialogue, Mahathir was instrumental in pushing South-South cooperation20. 
Malaysian leadership also extended to the political front, and has been manifested 
most strikingly in Mahathir’s active politicking at the UN. Greater international 
prominence has seen Malaysia voted in as member of the UN Security Council 
for two terms, in 1988-1990 and 1998-1999. Further to that, Malaysia has held 
the rotational position of President of the UN General Assembly (51st Session), 
along with the chairs of the G-77 and the Commission on Sustainable 
Development21. Malaysian leadership has also been exemplified in its 
participation in UN peacekeeping, which has been unrivaled by any other Third 
World state (or for that matter most developed states as well). Mahathir has 
continued Malaysia’s tradition of active support for and participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations, overseeing Malaysia’s involvement in Namibia, 
Cambodia, Somalia, Kuwait, the Iran-Iraq border, and more recently, Bosnia and 
East Timor, and has made Malaysia a centre for peacekeeping training.
Mahathir was also among the first Third World leaders to call for the Non- 
Aligned Movement to take on a new, more active role in the post-Cold War new 
world order. This activism was particularly pronounced at the 1992 NAM 
conference in Jakarta, where he purportedly “stole the thunder” and “virtually 
became, as a Far Eastern Economic Review cover story described it, the ‘new 
voice for the Third World’ or even a ‘little Sukarno’, as some of the Indonesian 
media opined”22. This reference to the Indonesian legacy was profoundly ironic, 
for it codified opinions already-formulating in Jakarta that the Mahathir
20 Joseph Liow, “Mahathir’s Foreign Policy” in Janies Chin and Ho Khai Leong (eds), The 
Mahathir Administration: Performance and Governance. [Singapore: Times Academic Press,
2001].
21 For a full listing of Malaysia’s accomplishments at the United Nations, refer to the homepage of 
the Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations, www.undp.org/missions/malaysia.
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administration was out to undermine Indonesia’s traditional role of regional 
primacy as the “first among equals”, as well as its international political 
ambitions23. The context of Mahathir’s implicit challenge to Indonesia’s 
diplomatic position in regional and international affairs during the 1992 NAM 
Summit in Jakarta takes on further significance for another reason; the 1992 
Summit marked the “return” to prominence of an Indonesian government which 
had for a long period shirked its natural propensity to leadership24. Not 
surprisingly, the Indonesian media was highly critical of what it perceived as 
Mahathir’s attempt to upstage Suharto at an event seen in Jakarta circles as a 
landmark occasion for Indonesian foreign policy. Rumours later emerged that the 
Indonesian press was instructed to edit and blot out key elements of Mahathir’s 
speeches to prevent him from outshining Suharto25. Tension was further 
exacerbated with the substantial and obvious distance between Indonesian and 
Malaysian positions on international affairs that came to the fore at the NAM 
Summit in Jakarta, where diplomatic maneuverings by both parties generated 
speculation that Indonesia-Malaysia relations were headed for another tailspin26. 
Whereas Suharto spoke as chairman of NAM of the need for non-aligned states to 
take on a more cooperative tone in relations with the developed world, Mahathir 
chose a confrontational approach, unleashing his characteristic diatribes against 
the West. This indeed, was frowned upon by Indonesia not only because it was 
clearly an implicit and disrespectful challenge to the chair, but also because 
Jakarta was aware that in actual practice, Malaysia was a close economic and 
military ally with the West27. Moreover, Indonesia, as the world’s largest Muslim 
population, did not take too kindly to Malaysia’s excessively strong pro-Islamic 
stance in support of Bosnia28. Predictably, the fact that it appeared as if it was 
Mahathir, not Suharto, who was completing in the late Twentieth Century “the
22 Saravanamuttu, “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy”, 6.
23 “Jakarta-K.L. Relations Lukewarm Under Mahathir”, Jakarta Post. 19 March 1991.
24 Interview with Ali Alatas, Jakarta, 24 January 2002.
25 See “Indonesia” in Asia 1993: Yearbook. [Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1993]
133.
26 See “The NAM Summit: Reason and Rhetoric”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 17 September 
1992.
27 Interview with Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Jakarta, 23 January 2002.
28 There was certainly a sense that Malaysia was out to make Indonesia “look bad”.
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victory of what President Sukarno used to refer as the ‘newly emerging forces’ 
over the ‘old established forces’” further fueled the flames of enmity between the 
two leaders and the two governments29. This in turn, was aggravated by the fact 
that many Indonesians privately welcomed Mahathir as the new champion of the 
Third World, a fact that Suharto himself was only too aware of30.
Differences in policy orientations between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur 
have further emerged at Track-Two conferences. In general, Malaysia has given 
little regard to Indonesian efforts at mediation over the contending claims for the 
South China Sea islands through the Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts 
in the South China Sea run by the latter31. One such example was Malaysia’s 
open rejection of Indonesia’s proposed solutions to contending South China Sea 
territorial claims involving Kuala Lumpur and several other regional states . In 
fact, Malaysia has challenged Indonesia’s neutrality in the South China Sea 
dispute in light of Jakarta’s own dispute with one of the South China Sea 
claimants, Vietnam, over the continental shelf of the Natuna Islands33.
The creeping resurgence of diplomatic tension notwithstanding, it was an 
awareness that historical and political circumstances were changing that brought 
leaders from both countries to launch a series of dialogues in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s in an attempt to relocate the kinship factor in a contemporary political 
context. These dialogues included the Dialog Pemuda Indonesia-Malaysia 
(Indonesia-Malaysia Youth Dialogue) and the Malaysia-Indonesia Conference 
series. The impetus for these exchanges was a concern that both kin states still 
held expectations of each other that neither appeared ready or willing to fulfil. 
This dichotomy was impressed upon in the following comments by then 
Malaysian Ambassador to Jakarta, Abdullah Zawawi:
29 See Clive Kessler, “Malaysia and Mahathir”, 24-25.
30 Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 18 January 2002.
31 See Dino Djalal, “Indonesia and Preventive Diplomacy: A Study of the Workshops on 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea”, Ph.D dissertation submitted to London 
School o f Economics, 2000, 190-196.
32 In his capacity as a participant in some of these Track-Two Conferences, the author has on 
several occasions personally witnessed the public disagreement between Malaysian and 
Indonesian representatives over this matter.
33 Dino Djalal, “Indonesia and Preventive Diplomacy”, 191.
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The question to ask ourselves is to what extent do we invoke the 
sentiments or (sic) our common heritage in the conduct of our 
bilateral relations. The dilemma is that so much is expected from it -  
each harbouring hopes that the other could be sympathetic because of 
the common heritage -  more than we expect from others, including 
our immediate neighbours and friends. Unfortunately, while we 
understand if a favourable consideration is not forthcoming from 
these others, we do not feel the same way in a similar situation 
between us34.
What emerged from these exchanges is worthy of note. First, it was 
curious that while the main emphasis of these dialogue sessions was declared to 
be Indonesia-Malaysia relations, the vast majority of the panels and papers 
presented focused not on the aspects of this relationship, but to issues roundly 
classifiable as “ASEAN in the post Cold War”, signifying perhaps an inability or 
reluctance to discuss the profoundly complex yet fundamental causes of 
Indonesia-Malaysia problems. Second, in the panels and papers that did dwell on 
the Indonesia-Malaysia relationship, different perspectives and interpretations 
clearly emerged. Firdhaus Abdullah observed for instance that at the Youth 
Dialogue meetings the Malaysian representatives “made no effort to hide their 
enthusiasm or attachment to the Serumpun concept” while the Indonesian 
delegation had conspicuously lacked any empathy toward the cause . Indeed, in 
a noticeable change from earlier attitudes, Indonesian representatives challenged 
the very notion that Malays and Indonesian emerged from a shared stock, arguing 
the point that “Malays” remained a small ethnic enclave in Eastern Sumatra and 
Riau. Similarly while Malaysian delegates took a forgiving outlook towards 
Konfrontasi, calling it an “aberration”, Indonesian attitudes were much more 
sober. This was reinforced by Benny Moerdani’s warning that “confrontation and
34 Abdullah Zawawi, speech entitled “Malaysia and Indonesia Bilateral Relations” delivered at 
Second Malaysia-Indonesia Conference, Penang, 11-14 December 1990.
35 Firdaus Haji Abdullah, “The Rumpun Concept in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations”, The 
Indonesian Quarterly. Vol.XXI, No.2 (1993) 147.
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hostility in those years is living proof that relations between the two countries 
cannot be taken for granted”36.
Lingering differences also impeded attempts at greater defence 
cooperation. While military exchanges sanctioned during the “golden age” of the 
Razak and Hussein Onn administrations continued, little further progress was 
made. In 1990 however, Indonesian Justice Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja 
proposed the formation of a defence pact between Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore37. This proposal was presented to Malaysia as a possible replacement 
for the FPDA, which Jakarta had always suspected to betray a lingering distrust of 
Indonesia. With Konfrontasi long since forgotten (or so it seemed), Jakarta 
perceived that the time was ripe for ties with Malaysia to move beyond the 
mistrust of earlier years. This sentiment however, was not shared in Kuala 
Lumpur circles, and the proposal was roundly dismissed for the following reason: 
“A trilateral security arrangement is counter-productive for ASEAN security in 
the long run. It could . . .  cause unnecessary alarm and it would therefore be wise 
for ASEAN to stay with the existing bilateral security arrangements”38.
Reflecting upon this proposal, one scholar has inferred that Mochtar’s 
suggestion for the formation of a trilateral defence pact was in fact just another 
manifestation of Indonesia’s latent desire to play a leadership role in regional 
affairs39. If this were so, the response from Kuala Lumpur was understandable. 
Yet the events surrounding the proposal were also telling of the lingering 
suspicions harboured in Kuala Lumpur over Jakarta’s intentions towards its 
immediate locale. Paradoxically, Malaysian authorities had earlier expressed 
reservations about Indonesia’s heightened military cooperation with Singapore, to 
which Malaysian media reports responded: “although Indonesia had the right to
36 Benny Moerdani, speech entitled “Kerjasama, Masalah, dan Tantangan” delivered at Dialog 
Pemuda Indonesia-Malaysia II, Bogor, 17-19 January 1990.
37 See Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, “Some Thoughts on ASEAN Security Cooperation: An 
Indonesian Perspective”, Contemporary Southeast Asia. Vol. 12, No.3 (1990).
38 “Bilateral defence pact better, says armed forces ch ief’, Straits Times. 8 March 1992.
39 See Bilver Singh, “Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia Triangular Defence Pact: Potentials and 
Perils”, Asian Defence Journal. December 1990.
230
establish relations with another country, it should take into account the special 
ties between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta which encompassed all aspects of life”40.
While there was undoubtedly continuity in traditional apprehension 
towards Indonesian intentions during this period, there was also a notable change 
in the terms of relations. The transformation of the respective Indonesian and 
Malaysian foreign policy outlooks in accordance with national priorities has 
already been noted. It was this transformation in foreign policy orientations and 
outlooks that locked Indonesia and Malaysia in a game of diplomatic 
brinkmanship which, though driven by different impulses, was profoundly ironic 
for its uncanny similarity to events leading up to Konfrontasi. What this 
amounted to was a perceptible shift in strategic outlook which in fact contravened 
an declaratory position that “we (Indonesia and Malaysia) may say that between 
our two countries there is a common perception on the way we put ourselves in 
the international plane whether regional or globally”41.
Predictably, divergent strategic outlooks eventually led Jakarta and Kuala 
Lumpur to cross diplomatic swords on several issues in the 1990s. Three, in 
particular, captured the mood of this period of bilateral ties and manifested 
lucidly this contest for political primacy within the Indo-Malay archipelago. The 
first of these issues revolved around Malaysian proposals for the establishment of 
a new regional trade and economic body, the EAEG. Second was the diplomatic 
dispute that arose from the revival of territorial claims that had been held in 
abeyance during the 1970s. The final, and perhaps most complicated issue of all, 
was the problem of illegal immigration. These differences, while more symbolic 
than substantial, nevertheless exposed the frailties that continued to plague the 
bilateral relationship between two kin states gradually drifting apart.
40 See Utusan Malaysia. 10 February 1990.
41 Soenarso Djajoesman, speech entitled “Malaysia and Indonesia Bilateral Relations” delivered at 
Second Malaysia-Indonesia Conference, Penang, 11-14 December 1990.
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II. EAEC
On the occasion of Chinese premier Li Peng’s visit in December 1990, 
Mahathir announced that “the countries of the region should strengthen further 
their economic and market ties so that eventually an economic bloc would be 
formed to countervail the other economic blocs”42. Subsequently, it was reported 
in the media that Malaysia would “take the lead” in establishing this “trade 
bloc”43. This grouping was envisioned to include the members of ASEAN along 
with the major East Asian economies of China, Japan, and South Korea, with the 
US and Australia conspicuously omitted44. As an institution, it was to be 
modelled along the lines of the EEC (European Economic Community), where 
the free flow of goods underpinned and augmented collective power and shared 
interest. From a Malaysian perspective, the EAEG (East Asian Economic 
Grouping) proposal was rationalised as necessary as a response to the failure of 
the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) talks in November and 
December 1990 (which entrenched Malaysian perceptions that global trade was 
being dictated by Western interests), as well as disappointment with ASEAN’s 
inability to register any substantial advancement in trade and economic 
cooperation.
Mahathir’s EAEG formula was a characteristically audacious diplomatic 
move in several ways. First, it was a direct challenge to American interests in the 
region, one of sufficient potential severity that US Secretary of State James Baker 
apparently responded through a specific memorandum to Japan that the latter not 
take part in the grouping45. More to the point, was the fact that the EAEG 
proposal was seen in Jakarta circles to be a deliberate affront to Indonesia. In the 
face of criticisms from numerous quarters (Japan, South Korea, and several 
ASEAN members were cautious in their response to the proposal), Malaysian 
authorities moved to avert a diplomatic imbroglio by elaborating that the original
42 Mahathir Mohamad, speech presented at state banquet for the visiting Chinese Prime Minister 
Li Peng, Kuala Lumpur, 10 December 1990.
43 “PM calls for Asia Pacific trade bloc”, New Straits Times. 11 December 1990.
44 See Linda Low, “The East Asian Economic Grouping”, Pacific Review. Vol.4, No.4 (1991).
45 This was mentioned in Johan Saravanamuttu, “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy”, 5.
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EAEG proposal was not meant to be a trade bloc, but merely a “consultative 
forum” to foster free trade46. Yet even when Kuala Lumpur moved to refine its 
proposition, Indonesian remained unwavering in opposition. Indonesia-Malaysia 
differences on this issue came to the fore at an ASEAN Senior Economic 
Officials Meeting in February 1991 when, despite earlier Malaysian assertions 
that ASEAN had endorsed its proposal, a Malaysian attempt to include the EAEG 
proposal on the agenda was blocked by the Indonesian delegation 47. While the 
Malaysian delegation hoped to institute EAEG as an independent body outside 
the framework of existing organisations and institutions, the Indonesians were of 
the opinion that any East Asian economic grouping had to be linked to APEC 
(Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), which Jakarta staunchly supported. As a 
result of concerns associated with the original proposal, the EAEG was 
subsequently renamed EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus) at the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in October 1991. The change in 
nomenclature that fronted the Malaysian proposal was noteworthy in one respect. 
As the definition of “caucus” would indicate, the EAEC would now have to be 
defined as a smaller grouping within a larger body or organisation. In that sense, 
the EAEC was now taking a form more akin to Jakarta’s counter-proposal of 
having the grouping operate within the larger APEC, rather than the original 
Malaysian vision. Beyond this significance however, this change in name did 
little to alter the shape of the Malaysian proposal nor its ultimate goal of creating 
a regional trade bloc. Indeed, Mahathir himself was of the opinion that the name- 
change would have little impact on his expectation of the region evolving into a 
trade bloc; nor did it transform Jakarta’s reading of and opposition to Malaysian 
intentions in any substantial way48.
Indonesian responses to the EAEG proposal reflected a fundamental 
opposition to it. In a veiled critique of the Malaysian proposal, former President 
Suharto opined that ASEAN needed to enhance intra-organisational cooperation
46 “PM: W e’ll understand if  EAEG’s not endorsed”, The Star. 8 October 1991.
47 SWB FE/0989/A3/4, 6 February 1991, “All ASEAN countries endorse new economic 
grouping”; “ASEAN to hold more talks on KL’s trade group plan”, Straits Times. 18 March 1991.
48 See Mahathir Mohamad, speech delivered at “ASEAN Countries and the World Economy: 
Challenge and Change” Conference, Bali, Indonesia, 5 March 1991.
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as well as cooperation with its dialogue partners, but this should not entail the 
formation of a trading bloc49. Ironically, the Indonesian position was reiterated by 
Suharto and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas at the same regional conference in which 
Mahathir expressed his opinion that the EAEG was something of a stepping-stone 
to a regional trade bloc50. Instead, as mentioned earlier, Indonesia sought to alter 
the complexion to suit what Jakarta considered the appropriate purpose for such 
an organisation. This the Indonesians did by insisting that if the grouping was to 
come into being, it could only function within the rubric of APEC51. The 
outcome of these contested versions of the purpose and character of the EAEC 
reached a climax at the ASEAN Summit meeting in Singapore in January 1992. 
The endorsement Kuala Lumpur sought at the summit was not forthcoming as 
Jakarta once again proved to be a stumbling block, urging caution in 
implementing the EAEC and calling for “further refinements” to the concept52. 
The extent to which Indonesian opinions prevailed was made plain when the 
EAEC was placed beneath the AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Agreement) and CEPT 
(Common Effective Preferential Tariffs) proposals on the summit agenda in terms 
of priority. The final straw came when the Summit Declaration gave only token 
mention to EAEC, specifying that it was an adjunct to APEC, and that it was only 
a forum that would meet “as and when the need arises”53. Indeed, Indonesia’s 
success in relegating the status of the EAEC to that of a caucus within APEC took 
on greater consequence in view of the fact that one of Malaysia’s rationales for 
proposing the grouping in the first place was to have it challenge APEC as the 
primary trade and economic organisation for the countries of East Asia54. In 
accomplishing what it did, Jakarta effectively pulled off a diplomatic counter­
coup that bore superficial resemblance to Indonesian instigation of Malaysia’s
49 “Indonesia warns against setting up Asian trade bloc”, Reuters News. 3 March 1991.
50 Both opinions were expressed at the “ASEAN Countries and the World Economy: Challenge 
and Change Conference” held at Bali, Indonesia, on 5 March 1991.
51 “Indonesia to present new ideas on EAEC, Alatas says”, Japan Economic Newswire. 22 January 
1992.
52 “Crux of the matter: Major leaders differ on style, agenda”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 16 
January 1992.
53 “ASEAN commitment on free trade area”, South China Morning Post. 29 January 1992.
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capitulation of their original proposal on neutralisation of Southeast Asia two 
decades before55.
No doubt several factors explain Indonesia’s rejection of the Malaysian 
plan. For one, the fact that the U.S. was Indonesia’s largest trading partner and 
the second largest market for Indonesian products meant that any move to 
marginalize American interests in the region would not have been beneficial to 
Jakarta56. Further, the logic behind the original Malaysian proposal (that since the 
rest of the world was forming trade blocs, East Asia should also do so) was 
viewed in some quarters in Indonesia as unnecessarily hostile towards to 
international trade57. Beneath this economic logic however, lay more deep-seated 
reasons. Like the Tunku before him, Mahathir’s proposal of the EAEG was made 
without prior consultation with Jakarta. Furthermore, Indonesians took issue with 
Mahathir’s aggressive style in pushing diplomatic initiatives, which was 
antithetical to how Indonesian leaders conducted their own foreign policy. 
Ultimately, the fact of the matter was that Jakarta held the opinion that insofar as 
the issue of hierarchy was concerned, it was they who should rightfully be at the 
forefront of international affairs and pushing international initiatives58. 
Correspondingly, in a response pregnant with implications, the Malaysian media 
questioned if Indonesia’s staunch opposition to the EAEC was not in fact a 
manifestation of a deeper desire to dominate ASEAN, or even Malaysia59.
54 It is well known that Malaysia had not been supportive of APEC at the time. Kuala Lumpur 
viewed the organization as a manifestation of Western interests, and suspected that the interests o f 
the smaller states of ASEAN would be compromised accordingly.
55 A fundamental difference between the two episodes though, was that in the case of the EAEC 
proposal Malaysia in effect relented to a change only. Unlike ZOPFAN, Kuala Lumpur continued 
to pursue their objectives for the grouping.
56 See Jakarta Post. 5 March 1991.
57 See Hadi Soesastro, The EAEG Proposal and East Asian Concepts o f the Pacific Basin.
[Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991].
58 See “Stormy Weather: Tension behind the smiles at Mahathir-Suharto talks”, Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 29 July 1993.
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III. Re-emergence of territorial disputes
Territorial disputes have never been a prominent feature of bilateral 
friction between Indonesia and Malaysia. Even at the height of Konfrontasi, it is 
important to recognize that Jakarta never made any claims to the territories 
associated with the expansion of Malaya into the Malaysian Federation. While 
the issues surrounding Konfrontasi involved conceptions of sovereignty, it did not 
amount to a challenge to the territorial limits of the newly envisioned state of 
Malaysia. It is in this respect that the territorial dispute between Jakarta and 
Kuala Lumpur over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan takes on prominence not 
only because this was the first bilateral impasse centred on territorial counter­
claims, but also for the timing behind both parties’ enunciation of their respective 
claims. Indeed, the fact that it was only in the early 1990s that both parties made 
claims to the islands further emphasises the changes in the complexion of the 
relationship during this most recent phase in bilateral relations. The potential 
severity of this dispute was insinuated by then Indonesian Ambassador to 
Malaysia Soenarso Djajusman, who warned that “border problems have always 
been the most sensitive issue in a relationship between two neighbouring 
countries”60.
Sipadan and Ligitan are located off the Northeastern coast of the island of 
Borneo, in the Celebes Sea. Historical ownership of these two islands is not 
clearly documented. Indeed, it is this cartographical vagueness that has permitted 
both Indonesia and Malaysia to press their claims. During the colonial period of 
the region’s history, the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan were administered as part 
of the Tirun district of islands and riverine states, and were the subject of 
competing claims by the Spanish and Dutch by the advent of the 19th Century61. 
Sovereignty over the two islands was later claimed by the British when the North 
Borneo Trading Company took over jurisdiction of the territory of North Borneo
59 “Indonesia’s role as big brother”, The Star. 25 January 1992; “Indonesia rocks the ASEAN 
boat”, Business Times Malaysia. 28 January 1992.
60 “Islands dispute an urgent matter for K.L., Jakarta”, Straits Times. 2 March 1992.
61 See Graham Irwin, Nineteenth Century Borneo: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry. [Singapore: 
Donald Moore, 1955] 153-154.
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in 1877. Subsequently, as a result of Dutch interests and pressure, Britain and 
Holland signed a convention in 1891 which delimited the seas off the coast of 
North Borneo into separate British and Dutch spheres. This effectively placed 
Sipadan under Dutch jurisdiction and Ligitan within both Dutch and British 
spheres of influence .
Following Indonesian independence in 1945, which saw Indonesia inherit 
the entire territorial expanse of the Dutch East Indies (sans West Irian), Jakarta 
claimed sovereignty over both Sipadan and Ligitan islands63. Indonesia’s claims 
were later underscored by the December 1957 Djuanda Declaration of Indonesia’s 
archipelago doctrine. To Kuala Lumpur however, the two islands were critical to 
the extension of their own continental shelf claims64. By this measure, the 
drawing of territorial basepoints on the basis of Malaysian sovereignty over 
Sipadan and Ligitan allows the Malaysian government to, among other things, lay 
claim to petroleum resources that might fall within this ambit65, not to mention 
offer up further maritime buffer space vis-a-vis Indonesia and the Philippines66. 
The extent to which legalistic maritime problems have arisen from Malaysian 
claims to these islands was summarized by Mark Valencia as follows:
Malaysia’s inferred baseline, which links Malaysian territory on 
Sebatik Island with Pulau Sipadan does not connect islands fringing 
her coast nor does it enclose a coast which is deeply indented, and it 
deviates appreciably from the general direction of the coast. With 
respect to Indonesia, Malaysia has unilaterally drawn the common 
territorial sea boundary as a line which bisects the angle formed by 
Indonesia’s archipelagic baseline and Malaysia’s inferred baseline.. . .
62 See “Malaysia-Indonesia Bentuk Komite Gabungan” Suara Karva. 19 July 1991.
63 “Havens in doubt”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 20 June 1990.
64 B.A. Hamzah, Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone: A Study in Legal Aspects. [Petaling Jaya: 
Pelanduk Publications, 1988].
65 See Mark Valencia, Malaysia and the Law of the Sea. [Kuala Lumpur: Institute o f Strategic and 
International Studies, 1991] 81.
66 Sipadan and Ligitan were in fact used as a strategic front line by the Malaysian defence forces 
during Konfrontasi, when Malaysian troops were placed there in anticipation o f Indonesian 
saboteurs and military expeditions passing by the islands into Sabah.
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Even assuming that Malaysia owns Sipadan and Ligitan, Malaysia has 
claimed territorial seas and a section of the continental shelf which 
extends beyond a line of equidistance with these two neighbours67.
Given the potential for legal wrangling and diplomatic conflict as a result of these 
respective assertions of ownership over the two islands, it is interesting to note 
that prior to 1991, little was made of these contending claims. Sovereignty over 
the islands was omitted from the agenda of maritime matters discussed in a host 
of bilateral meetings that began in 196968. Furthermore, then Malaysian Deputy 
Prime Minister Tun Razak had allegedly expressed to Indonesian President 
Suharto during a tete-a-tete that Malaysia would not assert any claim to the 
islands of Sipadan and Ligitan69. Whether or not such an undertaking was in fact 
given by Razak, it is clear that maintaining the status quo for the most part 
defined the attitude of both parties to the contested claims70. Problems surfaced 
soon after.the transfer of power in Malaysia from Hussein Onn to Mahathir. 
Tensions mounted in 1982 when rumours circulated in Indonesian circles that 
Malaysia had stationed troops on Sipadan, resulting in the mobilisation of the 
Indonesian military71. These rumours later proved unfounded72. Consequently, 
Indonesian Law Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja declared that the islands 
“belonged to both states” . The issue was then transferred to the jurisdiction of 
the GBC, which had already been put in place to delineate the land borders in 
Borneo, and an accord signed to preserve the status quo.
The issue of the contested claims over the two islands re-emerged in June 
1991 when Indonesia issued a “reminder” in response to heightened Malaysian
67 Valencia, Malaysia and the Law of the SEA. 83.
68 According to some media reports later, this omission was made so as not to jeopardize the 
improving relations between the two states. See “Ghafar holds bilateral talks with Suharto”, New 
Straits Times. 27 July 1991.
69 This point was highlighted to me by the late Michael Leifer. This Malaysian “promise” was 
also hinted at in “Isle of Contention: Tiny Sipadan becomes an object o f rival claims”, Far Eastern 
Economic Review. 17 March 1994.
70 While there is no documented evidence of Razak’s “promise” as far as this author is aware of, 
its existence is not inconsistent with Razak’s proclivities towards Indonesia.
71 “Sipedan: Mengapa Pihak Indonesia Dan Malaysia Tak Belajar Dari Mercu Suar”, Sinar 
Harapan. 4 October 1982.
72 “Jakarta: Troops on isle report not true”, Straits Times. 8 July 1992.
73 “Status P. Sipedan Dedang Dirundingkan R.I. -Malaysia”, Sinar Harapan. 26 October 1982.
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tourism development activities on the islands74. While it was declared by both 
parties that the problem could be solved on the basis of “the spirit of ASEAN and 
brotherliness of the two countries”, this “reminder” also marked the beginning of 
deteriorating relations75. It was Indonesia’s case that by proceeding with 
development projects on the islands, Malaysia was deliberately violating the 1982 
accord that maintained the status quo over ownership of the islands76. In response 
to these accusations, Kuala Lumpur despatched a government team to visit the 
islands, and officials retorted that the islands “are ours”, and that “for all intents 
and purposes, they are Malaysian islands”77. Tensions subsequently mounted 
with the appearance of Indonesian military forces around the islands, 
demonstrating not only the Indonesian claim, but also conveying the message that 
the use of force was being considered as an option in Jakarta .
In a provocative act that further amplified an already precarious situation, 
the Indonesian navy detained a Sabah fishing boat for violating the Indonesian 
EEZ79. Although the Sabah fishing vessel was fined and released two days later, 
a private meeting initiated by then Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba 
with President Suharto to discuss the issue further aggravated the situation, when 
the Indonesian President emerged from that meeting apparently irritated and 
annoyed by Ghafar’s presumptuous attitude80. The swift deterioration of the 
situation drove home the point that existing levels of interaction and exchange 
were insufficient for the respective claimants to “agree to disagree”. Malaysia, in 
particular, was deeply concerned that Indonesian military activities around the 
island were resurrecting the ghost of Konfrontasi. This was evidenced in the 
repeated admonition, especially on the part of the Malaysian leadership, not to 
permit relations to revert back to the days of Konfrontasi. Correspondingly, Kuala
74 “Hentikan Pembangunan di Sipadan dan Ligitan”, Kompas. 6 June 1991; SWB FE/1101/A3/3,
18 June 1991, “Malaysia seeks resolution of dispute with Indonesia”.
75 This language was reportedly used by Indonesian officials. See “Jakarta asks K.L. to stop 
developing disputed island”, Straits Times. 6 June 1991.
76 “K.L.-Jakarta talks on disputed islands soon”, The Star. 6 June 1991.
77 See “Islands are ours, says Abdullah”, The Star. 8 June 1991; “Panel will discuss Jakarta’s 
claim to disputed islands, says K.L. Minister”, Straits Times. 9 June 1991.
78 “Pan gab: Masalah Sipadan Jangan Merusak Hubungan”, Suar a Pembaruan. 7 June 1991.
79 “Sabah seeks help from Jakarta, K.L. for release of fishing boat”, Straits Times. 13 June 1991.
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Lumpur mooted the creation of a joint commission to facilitate both ministerial
talks and more specifically, to look into resolving the Sipadan and Ligitan
dispute. In a telling re-appraisal of the vaunted “ASEAN way” of dealing with
conflicts, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi openly expressed that
• 81“traditional methods of solving problems were no longer sufficient” . 
Consequently, the first Malaysia-Indonesia Joint Commission met in Kuala 
Lumpur for their inaugural meeting from 7 to 11 October 1991, with both parties 
declaring their commitment to “intensify discussions” to resolve the dispute . 
Although driven by the need to avert further deterioration in relations as a result 
of counter-claims, the Joint Commission was to present a forum for the 
comprehensive management of bilateral disputes, and its inauguration was 
publicised as the dawning of a new era in Indonesia-Malaysia cooperation .
Public proclamations notwithstanding, problems did not abate. For 
example, the Indonesian military made it a point to engage in a subtle measure of 
gunboat diplomacy during periods when official negotiations were taking place. 
Illustrating the Indonesian military’s initiation of this game of brinkmanship, it 
was quoted in a report that “Indonesian air force planes usually make low passes 
over the island whenever senior Malaysian officials visit the islands”84. Similarly 
Indonesian and Malaysian naval vessels routinely circled the islands on the 
occasion of JCMs (Joint Committee Meeting) while Malaysia carried out its own 
military maneuvres in the vicinity85. Suggestions that both states could engage in 
joint development projects on the islands were also roundly rejected by the 
Indonesian military.
While tensions were permitted to gradually blow over, the inability of six 
subsequent JCMs to find some sort of resolution to their differences demonstrated
80 Interview with Ali Alatas, Jakarta, 24 January 2002. Apparently, the Indonesians were taken by 
surprise by this unscheduled meeting.
81 “Let’s clear the air”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 1 August 1991.
82 SWB FE/1137/A3/5, 30 July 1991, “Malaysia sets up group to resolve territorial dispute with 
Indonesia”; “Indonesia, Malaysia to discuss islands claims”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 24 
October 1991.
83 “Four joint panels with Indonesians set up”, Straits Times. 8 October 1991.
84 “Isle o f Contention: Tiny Sipadan becomes an object o f rival claims”, Far Eastern Economic 
Review. 17 March 1994.
85 “Bid to avert clashes over disputed isles off Sabah”, Straits Times. 29 January 1992.
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not only the severity of the problem, but also the extent to which both states had 
drifted apart86. In February 1993, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 
intimated that both states could eventually submit their respective claims to the 
International Court of Justice, “but this would be the last resort if bilateral ties 
between Indonesia and Malaysia broke down”87. His assessment was indeed 
prescient, for after much resistance to third party mediation, ironically enough 
particularly on the part of Jakarta, both parties finally agreed via Memorandum of
O O
Understanding to take the dispute to the ICJ in October 1996 .
While the contest for jurisdiction over Sipadan and Ligitan was 
undoubtedly the most prominent of territorial disputes between the two avowed 
kin states, it was by no means the only source of contested boundaries. Potential 
border problems such as claims over Sebatik Island and the Semantipal and 
Sinapad rivers that flow through Borneo, continue to persist89. Problems over the 
delineation of the Indonesia-Malaysia border, particularly in Borneo, came to 
light recently when members of the Indonesian armed forces seized five 
Malaysian employees of a logging company for crossing over into Indonesian 
territory, and allegedly demanded a ransom for their release90. Malaysia 
responded by accusing Indonesian security forces of having moved a Malaysian 
boundary marker. Third-party diplomatic sources confirmed that at the time, both 
militaries were put on alert along the Borneo border91. Border problems between 
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur also created another quandary for bilateral ties -  that 
of illegal Indonesian migration into Malaysia.
86 Indeed, such was the severity that negotiations were upgraded to the level o f “personal envoys” 
of the leaders of the two claimants.
87 “Jakarta to defend claim to Sipadan and Ligitan Isles”, Straits Times. 8 February 1993.
88 It was understood that Mahathir had made the suggestion to Suharto during a meeting in 1994, 
and it appeared that the latter had politely rejected it. See “Mahathir has four-eyes meeting with 
Suharto”, Straits Times. 17 September 1994.
89 See “Indonesian MPs fear more border rows with KL”, Straits Times. 21 November 1996.
90 “Border dispute heats up after four ‘abductions’”, South China Morning Post. 3 July 2000.
91 Interview with a senior Singapore diplomat, Kuala Lumpur, 14 November 2001.
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IV. Immigration issues
It has already been established earlier that migration within the Indo- 
Malay Archipelago has long been a feature of the interaction and exchange that 
defined the identity of the region, especially in the pre-colonial era. In the more 
recent colonial past, British and Malay authorities in the peninsula also 
encouraged the migration of workers from Indonesia. Because of shared racial 
and to some extent cultural traits, Indonesian immigrants were viewed by the 
Malay aristocracy and royalty in the nineteenth century as demographic buffers 
against the British-sanctioned influx of Chinese and Indian labour. Right up to 
the 1950s and early 1960s, Indonesian migration into Malaya was encouraged by 
Kuala Lumpur for political reasons, as it allowed “Malays” to maintain a 
numerical superiority over the Chinese and Indians.
That said, while Indonesians have historically migrated into the peninsula 
and played a critical role in shaping the culture that has evolved there, in more 
recent times Indonesian migration has been viewed in a markedly negative light, 
and have been blamed for a host of social problems that have plagued Malaysia. 
While the issue has yet to boil over into open diplomatic and military conflict, 
this relatively new character of Indonesian migration has been a thorn in the side 
of bilateral relations. The inability to find a satisfactory solution has also been 
something of an embarrassment to both governments, culminating in the mass 
expulsion of Indonesian illegal immigrants in July 2002.
The contemporary phenomenon of Indonesian economic migration into 
the peninsula is not new92. It began in the early 1970s, when the expansion of the 
Malaysian economy as a result of an industrialisation program undertaken on the 
back of the New Economic Policy demanded more labour than the local market 
could supply. In particular, the urban migration of Malay youths opened the door 
for Indonesian labour in the agricultural sector. Push factors included 
unemployment problems and over-population in Java, while the relatively higher 
wages found in the peninsula was a major pull factor. Added to that was the fact
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that the easy assimilation of Indonesian migrants into Malay society sometimes 
also allowed the “guests” to benefit from the affirmative action programs of the 
NEP as well93. Even without such inducement, the fact that Malaysia was not 
only a location of close proximity but also a nation whose majority population 
shared much with the Indonesians in terms of language, culture and even ethnicity 
meant that the peninsula would be the obvious choice for Indonesian labour 
looking to relocate to greener pastures.
By the late 1980s, Indonesian labour had moved from agriculture to the 
construction and service sectors in tandem with the urbanisation of Malaysia. 
Numbers also rose substantially to meet increased demand. The increase in their 
numbers has raised alarm over their potential rupturing effect on the fabric of 
Malaysian society. This was because the influx of foreign, largely Indonesian, 
labour in Malaysia has evidently coincided with an increase in crime rates. 
Indeed, Indonesian labourers have been implicated and indicted in crimes ranging 
from petty theft to high profile robberies and murders94. Matters were further 
aggravated by the fact that a large proportion of Indonesian workers in Malaysia 
had entered the country illegally. In 1981 for example, it was estimated that there 
were 100 000 illegal Indonesian immigrants in Malaysia95. By 1987, this figure 
was estimated by the Malaysian Trade Union Congress to have surpassed one 
million. It was further estimated in 1987 that 36% of prison inmates throughout 
Malaysia were illegal Indonesian immigrants96. Clearly, the phenomenon of 
Indonesian illegal immigrants was fast becoming a security problem for Malaysia. 
It was not surprising that this was accompanied by a perceptible shift in 
Malaysian attitudes towards Indonesian immigrants, which also provided a telling 
insight into the changing nature of relations. An observer of this phenomenon
92 See Asisah Kassim, “The Unwelcome Guests: Indonesia Immigrants and Malaysian Public 
Responses”, Tonan Aiia Kenkvu (Southeast Asian Studies"). Vol.25, No.2 (September 1987).
93 “Migrant workers spark resentment in Malaysia”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 11 January
1990.
94 For a detailed discussion of some of these examples, see Firdaus Abdullah, “The Phenomenon 
of Illegal Immigrants”, The Indonesian Quarterly. Vol.XXI, No.2 (1993).
95 See “Illegal migrant report for Jakarta”, Straits Times. 15 February 1981.
96 “Malaysia acts to stem tide of illegal immigrants”, Straits Times. 29 January 1987.
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had written that in the early years these immigrants were “silently welcomed” by 
the Malays, for:
The immigrants were then perceived as bangsa serumpun who would 
eventually assimilate with the local bumiputra. Thus, in the long run 
the Indonesian immigrants were regarded to have strengthened the 
Malays’ electoral power vis-a-vis the non-Malays because it was 
assumed that they will be assimilated with the local Malays97.
However, the increase in the number of these bangsa serumpun was leading to 
more intense competition for jobs, and especially those traditionally the preserve 
of Malay commerce. Furthermore, in more recent times it became apparent to 
Malaysian authorities that many of the Indonesian immigrants (illegal or 
otherwise) were in fact Christians who had begun using shared language and 
ethnicity as an avenue to proselytise among the Malay community98. Such was 
the severity of this problem that a Malaysian cabinet minister had considered the 
spreading of Christianity among the Malay population by their Indonesian cousins 
to be the “biggest threat facing Muslims in Malaysia today”99.
Several measures were undertaken at a bilateral level to stem the swelling 
tide of illegal immigration. For instance, an agreement was signed in 1984 in 
Medan, Sumatra, which stipulated that Indonesia would supply six specific 
categories of workers for two-year contracts whenever requested by Malaysia100. 
In 1988, Jakarta announced that Indonesians working illegally in Malaysia would 
be issued passports to provide them “protection and help them earn better pay”101. 
Correspondingly, Malaysia announced new laws in 1991 that stipulated stricter 
penalties for employers of illegal immigrant workers as well as a minimum wage 
and other terms to improve working conditions. Under this scheme, Indonesian 
illegals, when caught, would still be permitted to work provided they registered 
with the Malaysian immigration department and obtained valid travel documents
97 Firdaus Abdullah, “Issues in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations”, paper presented at the ASEAN 
Fellowship Seminar, Tokyo, Japan, 20 August 1992, 45-46.
98 Non-Muslim proselytising among the Muslim community is prohibited by Malaysian federal 
law.
99 “Illegals must go”, The Star. 9 August, 1987.
100 “KL-Jakarta Labour Pact”, Straits Times. 20 June 1984.
101 “Passports for illegal Indonesians in Malaysia”, Straits Times. 6 July 1988.
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from the Indonesian embassy. While these efforts could be applauded, they have 
done little to stem the flow of illegals from Indonesia; nor has this cooperation 
been without its own obstacles and problems. The bureaucratic nature of the 
solutions meant a long and arduous, sometimes even expensive, process which 
was a burden for immigration departments and too complex for the potential 
Indonesian illegal migrant to comprehend. More importantly, there has been, in 
the minds of each party, the perception that the other has not been doing its part in 
the joint attempt to eradicate this problem of illegal immigrants. Malaysian 
authorities, for example, have continually highlighted Jakarta’s apparent 
unwillingness to render maximum cooperation in repatriating Indonesian illegals 
who were caught or imprisoned for crimes. This lack of cooperation has led to 
overcrowding and deteriorating prison conditions, in turn resulting in problems 
such as the hostage siege in Kuantan Prison on 9 January 1987. On their part, 
certain quarters in Indonesia have criticised Malaysia for dramatizing the issue 
and portraying Indonesians in a “degrading and disparaging” manner102.
By early 2002, Malaysia’s policy on Indonesian labour seemed primed for 
a shift when, in response to another all-too-familiar incident of rioting by 
Indonesian immigrant workers in Negri Sembilan, Law Minister Rais Yatim 
noted:
Besides defying authority, they (Indonesian immigrant workers) had 
the cheek to wave the Indonesian flag. They are not in Jakarta. They 
are in Malaysia.. . .  Indonesia’s Ambassador here need not say sorry 
anymore. We are going to take stem action. Malaysians in general 
cannot tolerate the violent behaviour of the Indonesians who are being 
too extreme and ungrateful103.
Following this, Prime Minister Mahathir expressed the opinion that it was time 
for Indonesian workers in Malaysia to be “replaced” by workers of other 
nationalities104. Not long after, in a reaction to spats of criminal incidents 
involving Indonesian workers, the Malaysian government embarked on a total 
shift from the traditional policy of welcoming the ‘cousins’ from the archipelago
102 “Jakarta paper raps Malaysian press over illegal immigrants”, Straits Times. 10 March 1987.
103 “Sorry is not enough”, Straits Times. 22 January 2002.
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to a large-scale repatriation of Indonesian illegals, the stipulation of severe 
penalties for those who continued to stay, and the closing of its doors to 
Indonesian labour via the implementation of a “Hire Indonesians Last” policy105. 
The Indonesian illegal immigrant problem was heavily “securitised” by a 
Malaysian press that repeatedly blamed them for a host of security problems 
involving riots and robberies106. These moves illicited a heated response from the 
Indonesian media. In an article bearing the provocative title “Remember 
Konfrontasi”, the Jakarta Post launched a stinging attack against Malaysia’s 
actions, arguing that the new policies were far too extreme, and that “there was a 
time, not so long ago, when Indonesia would not take such a belligerent act from 
a neighbouring country lying down”107.
A sidebar to the illegal immigration problem has been the issue of 
Acehnese immigrants and political refugees, which inadvertently involved a 
reluctant Malaysian government in the internal affairs of a Jakarta administration 
struggling to contain a politically-motivated separatist revolt in the northern tip of 
the island of Sumatra. Latent problems were compounded by the fact that the 
Aceh separatists enjoyed historically strong kin relations with peninsular Malays.
V. The Problem of Aceh
Despite widespread speculation, the extent of Malaysian involvement in 
the Aceh problem remains unclear. Prime Minister Mahathir has often reiterated 
the Malaysian government’s non-involvement in what he claims is an Indonesian 
domestic affair. Likewise, Indonesian President Suharto has never publicly 
questioned Malaysian declarations of non-involvement, though on several 
occasions he did suggest “external sources” of interference. In point of fact, there 
remains little by way of concrete evidence to implicate government-sanctioned 
involvement on the part of Malaysia apart from knowledge that Acehnese rebels
104 “Too many, too much trouble”, Straits Times. 23 January 2002.
105 It should be noted that the policy was quickly rescinded as a result o f intense lobbying by the 
Malaysian construction industry, which relied heavily on Indonesian labour.
106 See Joseph Liow, “Desecuritising the ‘Illegal Indonesian Migrant Worker’ Problem in 
Malaysia’s Relations with Indonesia”, IDSS Commentaries. No. 18 (September 2002).
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are making their way to the peninsula either as asylum seekers or as illegal 
immigrants108. To such effect, the Aceh situation is an extension of the broader 
problem of illegal Indonesian immigration into Malaysia. This has created some 
problems for Malaysian authorities, who have had to chose between repatriation 
(which would probably lead to further prosecution) or asylum, which could 
potentially dampen ties with Indonesia. Such a dilemma was demonstrated in 
1991, when 112 Acehnese asylum seekers who landed in Penang and Kedah were 
initially labelled illegal immigrants, and hence to be repatriated, but were 
eventually given the choice by the Malaysian government to stay on in 
Malaysia109. Further complicating matters was the fact that some of these 
Acehnese refugees in fact possessed dual nationalities.
Despite constant pledges by Malaysian government authorities that 
Malaysia did not support the cause of the GAM, the fact that among certain 
pockets of the Malay population in the peninsula there was more-than-passing 
interest in the Aceh situation has meant that relations between Indonesia and 
Malaysia have remained testy over Aceh. As hinted in an earlier chapter, in a 
number of ways Aceh is closer geographically and spiritually to Malaysia than it 
is to Jakarta. The economic and political interaction between Aceh and the Malay 
sultanates through the centuries has resulted in many Acehnese settling down in 
the peninsula, particularly in Kedah and Penang. Several top Malaysian 
government officials are known to have Acehnese roots as well110. 
Correspondingly on a diplomatic level, Malaysian consular officials in the 
Northern Sumatran capital of Medan have been kept at a distance by their 
Indonesian counterparts suspicious of their ties with Acehnese separatists111.
107 “Remember 'Konfrontasi'”, Jakarta Post. 1 February 2002.
108 For example, Acehnese refugees fleeing the fighting between the secessionist Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement) and government forces regularly land on the peninsula seeking 
asylum. SWB FE/1106/A3/4,24 June 1991, “Indonesian Foreign Minister seeks ‘amicable’ 
solutions with Malaysia”.
109 See “ 112 Acehnese who fled to Malaysia can stay if  they want to, says envoy”, Straits Times. 1 
June 1991.
110 Former Agriculture Minister and Kedah Chief Minister Sanusi Junid, for example, was related 
to the late Acehnese nationalist, Daud Beureueh.
111 See “Aceh unrest leads to mounting death toll”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 24 January
1991.
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While the Indonesian government has refrained from direct criticism of 
Kuala Lumpur, some in the military have been of the opinion that the Acehnese 
were permitted to “live freely in Malaysia despite being guilty of violent actions 
against the Indonesian military”. These comments were made by General 
Pramono, commander of the North Sumatra garrison, who further intimated 
(without providing details) that “certain quarters in Indonesia had accused
119specific groups and individuals in Malaysia of aiding the rebels directly” . 
Suggestions have also been made by Jakarta authorities that armed Acehnese 
civilians were plying between Aceh and Malaysia without any problem113. 
Evidence in the form of pro-GAM material that quotes Acehnese sources in 
Malaysia and refers to rebels who have fled to Kuala Lumpur has apparently 
surfaced to justify the Jakarta government’s suspicions114. It has also come to 
light that the GAM leadership has on occasion operated out of Malaysia115. 
Concomitantly, GAM military commanders have publicly revealed that their 
militia have on occasion received training in Malaysia116.
The Aceh conundrum in Indonesia-Malaysia relations has brought to light 
once again the Islamic dimension to the kinship factor in the politics of the Malay 
World. Hundreds of Malaysian students venture to religious schools in Aceh for 
their education. This owes much to the perception mentioned earlier that Aceh 
has long been viewed as the “veranda of Mecca”. Religious co-identification was 
further strengthened during the Suharto years when Acehnese rejected the former 
president’s Pancasila democracy (which they viewed as un-Islamic) and 
sympathised with the staunch adherence to Islamic principles found in the state 
administrations of Kelantan and Kedah in Malaysia. Indeed, religious 
undercurrents to the Aceh issue in Indonesia-Malaysia problems provide an 
arresting sign of how politicised religion and kinship politics intertwine at a 
popular level. It is to this Islamic dimension, mentioned at the beginning as
112 “Aceh rebels ‘may use Malaysia as main hideout”, Straits Times. 24 July 1992.
113 FBIS-EAS-1999-1222, 23 December 1999, “Minister Says GAM Members Plying Between 
Aceh, Malaysia”.
114 “Aceh unrest leads to mounting death toll”, Far Eastern Economic Review. 24 January 1991.
115 Ibid.
116 FBIS-EAS-1999-114,14 December 1999, “GAM Leader Confirms Military Trainings in 
Libya, Malaysia” .
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among the earliest manifestations of politicised kinship, that the present work 
now returns.
VI. Political Islam
Despite the status of Indonesia and Malaysia as co-religionists, in their 
post-independence histories Islam has never been utilised as a channel for 
bilateral cooperation or policy coherence in Indonesia-Malaysia relations, at least 
insofar as governmental interactions are concerned. Yet while Islam has all along 
been downplayed by the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia during the post-
117 tcolonial era, it has never drifted far from the surface of popular politics . This 
has become even more so in recent times, where the resurgence of political Islam
1 1 Q
can be witnessed in the domestic political arenas of both countries .
It shall be recalled that the Islamic links between the peninsula and 
archipelago in the context of Islamic resurgence and anti-colonial struggle were 
particularly strong, built on the back of shared experience during their education 
in the Middle East and South Asia. Co-religious identification with Indonesia 
among Malay anti-colonialists however, stemmed not only from their Arab links. 
Here, it is important to note that the politicisation of Islam that was taking place 
in Indonesia played a crucial role in grafting Islam onto the political scene in 
colonial Malaya. The first Islamic political organisations and structures to be 
found in the Dunia Melayu were located in Indonesia, and they had a profound 
influence on the subsequent emergence of similar organisations in Malaya119. A 
brief survey of the birth of political Islam in Malaysia illustrates this point.
It was through the political struggle of the Islamic Masjumi Party {Majlis 
Masyuarat Muslim Indonesia) in Indonesia after the Pacific War that an overtly 
Islamic political spirit was injected into Malay politics in the Peninsula. Masjumi 
leaders were present as special guests at a Malay nationalist and religious leaders’
1,7 A scholar has suggested that Islam played a crucial role in the termination o f Konfrontasi. See 
Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order” Modernization in 
Indonesia. [Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982] 120-121.
118 “The Rise o f the Muslim Militant”, Straits Times. 16 December 2001.
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conference (Persidangan Ekonomi-Agama Sa-Malaysia) held on March 1947 at 
Gunung Semanggol in Perak to discuss the role of Islam in Malayan politics. It 
was during this conference that the Masjumi representatives shared their 
conception of the Islamic struggle for sovereign nationhood with their 
counterparts in Malaya. Further to that, the Indonesian representatives, in their 
public address, suggestively articulated that “the greater Indonesian Empire will 
consist of equal autonomous states which will be free members of the Indonesian 
Commonwealth”120. The Gunung Semanggol event was to have a significant
p i
influence on the worldview of future Malay Islamic political leaders of PAS . It 
was also via the experiences garnered from these meetings that Malay nationalists 
envisaged the formation of the Lembaga Islam Se Malaya (All-Malaya Islamic 
Council), later renamed MATA or Majlis Agama Tertinggi Malaya (Malayan 
Supreme Religious Council)122. This religious organisation was modelled after 
Majlis Islam Al Indonesia (Council of Muslim Parties of Indonesia) in Indonesia,
p i
the predecessor of Masjumi . MATA itself was to undergo metamorphosis into 
an overt political organisation. To that effect, some have suggested that MATA 
itself was sufficiently politicised to be considered “the first institutionalisation of 
the Islamic reformist stream in Malay nationalism”124.
In their own response to Britain’s Malayan Union plan of 1946, MATA 
moved to call for a Malay Congress in March 1948 to discuss issues such as the 
formation of an Islamic political party, the establishment of an economic bureau 
to oversee Malay affairs, and the setting up of an Islamic University125. Aside 
from representatives from all quarters of Malay society (including UMNO and 
Malay elements of the communist party), the Congress also had in attendance
119 See William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism. [New York: Oxford University Press, 
1967],
120 MSS/PIJ (Malay Security Service/Political Intelligence Journal), Serial No.5, 1947, Arkib 
Negara.
121 John Funston, Malay Politics in Malaysia: A Study o f UMNO and PAS. [Kuala Lumpur: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1980] 124.
122 See Nabir bin Haji Abdullah, Maahad Il-Ihva Assvariff Gununs Semanssol. 1934-1935. [Kuala 
Lumpur: Jabatan Sejarah, Universiti Malaya, 1976] 149.
123 See Alias Mohamed, “PAS Platform: Development and Change, 1951-1986”, dissertation 
submitted to Universiti Malaya, Department of History, 1989, 6.
124 John Funston, Malay Politics. 88.
125 MSS/PIJ, Serial No.5, 1947.
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three prominent Sumatran Ulama -  Kiai Masyhur from West Sumatra, Tengku
Osman from Medan, and Haji Shamsuddin Mustaffa from Siak. Notably, the
1
Congress opened with the singing of the Masjumi song “Selamat Masjumi' . It 
was at the Congress that the Hizbul Muslimin (“Muslim Party”) was initiated. 
Needless to say, the party was inspired by Masjumi, and its leaders such as Abu 
Bakar al Bakri and Mohammad Asri soon developed close relations with 
Indonesian Ulama and nationalists.
Because of the close association between its members and those of the 
nationalist party MNP, certain quarters have contended that Hizbul Muslimin can 
be considered the “Islamic wing” of Malay nationalism127. Not only did the 
Hizbul Muslimin take on the organisational structure of Masjumi, it also 
subscribed to a similar political and religious philosophy. In the spirit of die 
Indonesian revolution, and more specifically the Islamic revolts in Java and 
Sumatra that was ongoing at the time, party leaders unanimously called for active 
revolt against the forces of colonialism. This was reflected in the following 
excerpt from a speech of one of the party’s leaders: “Indonesia had achieved her 
independence by the sacrifice of many lives . . . Malays would not obtain their 
independence by just asking for it. Independence . . . could only be obtained by 
bloodshed”128. Indeed, it was the significance of this Islamic movement in the 
overall history of Malay politics that sparked UMNO founder Onn bin Jaafar to 
make his famous remark that “we saw the danger coming from the jungle in 1945 
and today we see a similar danger descending from the mountain under the cloak 
of religion”129. The basis established during this period for religious and political 
collaboration between Islamic radicalism in Indonesia and Malaya was amplified 
by the formation of religious schools known as Sekolah Rakyat (People’s School) 
throughout the peninsula. Again, these schools, established after a decision taken
126 Alias Mohamed, “PAS Platform”, 18.
127 See John Funston, Malay Politics. 87-88.
128 MSS/PIJ, Serial No.5, 1947. Though this view was expressed before the formation o f Hizbul 
Muslimin, it was nonetheless well-known that MATA members were automatic members o f the 
party upon its formation. Hence it can be suggested that this view represented the view o f the 
Hizbul Muslimin as well.
129 Onn’s reference to the jungle relate to the communist movement in 1945. Similarly, his 
reference to the mountain implicated the radical Islamic movement that was bom at Gunung 
Semanggol (Gunung is the Malay word for mountain).
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at a MATA meeting in September 1947 which witnessed the formation of LEPIR 
or Lembaga Pendidikan Rakyat (People’s Education Board), were to be modelled 
after the Muhammadiyah schools in Indonesia130. This was a significant 
development because at that time, Muhammadiyah was actively engaged in 
preaching and practising radical nationalism in Sumatra. For the first time also, 
religious students from the peninsula were sent not only to Aligarh, Medina or Al- 
Azhar, but also to Indonesia to further their education131.
What is significant in the discussion above is that the coalescing of 
political ideologies of Hizbul Muslimin, Muhammadiyah, and Masyumi would 
prove to have an incisive influence on the ideologies of later representations of
1 ^7Islamic reformism and nationalism in the MNP, and later PAS . These early 
linkages also formed a firm basis for Islamic groups from Indonesia and Malaysia 
to maintain close relations despite the decline of Islam as a political factor in the 
post-colonial domestic politics of both countries. These links have also endured 
through the various stages and changing shape of relations at the government 
level, particularly during periods of tension. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
the Dakwah or Islamic revival that took place in Malaysia in the 1970s had 
benefited from precisely these longstanding relations with Indonesian religious 
organisations, for the Indonesians were the movement’s “first influential 
international contact” and thus “provided an important stimulus to Islamic 
revivalism in Malaysia”133.
In recent years, both countries have witnessed a revival of Islamic 
discourse in their respective political arenas and in contrast to earlier trends, it has
130 See Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia. 1900-1942. [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978] 311.
131 There were also a substantial amount of African and Arab-trained Islamic scholars of 
Indonesian origin who either resided in or made frequent sojourns to the peninsula to teach. Some 
of these included Sjech Thaher Djalaluddin, founder o f the Al-Imam journal, Haji Abdul Karim 
Amrullah and Sjech Muhammad Chajjath.
132 John Funston, Malay Politics. 140. That said, it should also be recognised that PAS has since 
developed their own strain of Islamic ideology in the deobandi tradition, and on the back o f the 
thinking of Abd al-Wahhab and Maulanah Mawdudi. This is contrasted markedly by the case of 
Indonesia today, where Islamic ideology is largely “home-bred” through thinkers such as 
Sirajuddin Abbas, Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Masjid and Abdurrahman Wahid.
133 A.B. Shamsul, “Identity Construction, Nation Formation, and Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia” 
in Robert Hefner and Patricia Horvatich (eds), Islam in an Era o f Nation-State: Politics and 
Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia. [Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1997] 214.
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been Indonesian Islam which has been looking to learn from the Malaysian model 
of Islamic resurgence134. During the latter years of the Suharto administration, 
Islamic forces were once again gradually introduced back into Indonesia’s 
mainstream political discourse as the president sought to balance the increasing 
influence of the military. Likewise in Malaysia, the resurgence of PAS has led to 
increasing Islamic consciousness within the dominant UMNO party as well, 
exemplified by the attempts of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to 
shore up the Islamic identity of the party. Ties between Islamic groups were 
given greater impetus via the exchanges between the IKD (Institut Kajian Dasar), 
a think-tank established by Anwar Ibrahim, and ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan 
Muslim Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals’ Association), established 
by B.J. Habibie135. At its prime, the IKD and ICMI network was instrumental in 
fostering bilateral harmony through their regular organisation of joint seminars 
and conferences on Serumpun, exploring ways and means to encourage closer 
relations and greater exchange on this basis136. It is also well-known that Anwar 
was especially popular among Indonesian Muslim circles, and had close links 
with several other Indonesian Muslim groups.
Of late, evidence has emerged that the Islamic linkages between the 
Indonesian and Malaysian Ummah have extended to radical and militant Islam as 
well137. Members of the Malaysia-based Islamic militant group KMM 
(Kumpulan Militan Malaysia138) have been travelling frequently to Indonesia, 
working closely with Indonesian counterparts in the Laskar Jihad and Majlis 
Mujahidin Indonesia. Malaysian and Singapore intelligence sources have 
indicated that KMM operations were in fact part of a larger movement involving 
the JI (Jemaah Islamiyah), a radical regional terrorist organisation “directed” by
134 William Liddle, Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics. [Sydney: Allen & Unwin,
1996] 273-274.
135 The Anwar-Habibie link subsequently accounted for a minor bilateral dispute when Habibie, as 
Indonesian President, openly expressed support for Anwar after the latter was removed from 
power and incarcerated for alleged corruption and sexual impropriety.
136 Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 18 January 2002.
137 See Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with CNN, 9 February 2002, 
www.gov.sg/singov/interviews/090202sm.htm.
138 Not to be confused with the Malayan pre-war nationalist organization, Kesatuan Melayu Muda, 
with which it shares the same abbreviations.
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Indonesian leadership, most notably Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali. While these 
militant elements thus far remain peripheral players in Indonesian and Malaysian 
politics, their stated objectives of forming a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic state) 
comprising Indonesia and Malaysia, along with southern Philippines and southern 
Thailand, raises the spectre of previous attempts, such as Indonesia Raya-Melayu 
Raya and Maphilindo, to unify the Indo-Malay World on the basis of common 
identity. The plan for establishment of a Daulah Islamiyah itself was an 
intriguing and elaborate long-term strategy that involved the socialisation of 
young Muslims through religious training in Indonesia, who would later be 
integrated into state administrations and mainstream politics in order to transform 
Indonesia and Malaysia into part of a broader Islamic state via legitimate electoral 
processes139. In a recent intelligence report, it appears that another umbrella 
organisation, Rabitatul Mujahideen, has emerged to encompass Islamic radical 
groups (including the KMM and JI) and facilitate the realisation of this Indo- 
Malay Islamic state140.
Concluding remarks
Given its relatively recent content, this chapter has had to rely on 
secondary resource material to sketch recent permutations of the Indonesia- 
Malaysia relationship given the unavailability of primary sources. Be that as it 
may, a comprehensive picture has still emerged of how the kinship factor has 
undergone further change as relations have evolved. Under the Mahathir 
administration, Malaysia has attempted to restructure the terms of relations with 
Indonesia that were established during the tenures of Tun Razak and Tun Hussein 
Onn. Mahathir seems to have departed from his predecessors’ policy of “self­
induced subordination” to Jakarta. The proactive and nationalistic foreign policy 
that the Mahathir administration has embarked upon, particularly since the late 
1980s, has coincided with resurgence in Jakarta’s own interest in resuming its
139 See “Malaysia knew terrorists had slipped through security dragnet”, Straits Times. 17 October 
2002 .
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position as a key mover of Third World politics. This has resulted in a clash of 
policy perspectives that threatens to unravel the efforts of an earlier generation of 
leaders who had sought to establish relations on a firmer footing provided by the 
conscious fulfilment of expectations and obligations as kin states.
In some ways, competition between Indonesia and Malaysia is 
understandable. Both had made quick strides in economic development by the 
1990s. Furthermore, national identity building in both states has also advanced 
substantially. This has not only had an impact on the personal and cultural 
identities of the populations, but on their loyalties as well, as far as kinship 
sentiments were concerned. In this regard, attention is drawn to the fact that for 
both Indonesia and Malaysia, foreign policy has enjoyed a distinct role in the 
national identity-building project. During the 1980s and 1990s, not only were 
Indonesian and Malaysian foreign policies focused on regional and international 
activism, they were also distinctly nationalistic. The fallout of this phenomenon 
for bilateral relations however, stems from the fact that both competed for the 
same audience, on the same issues, with the same objectives in mind, but have 
nevertheless approached these issues from different and antagonistic angles. 
Consequently, the construction of national identities undertaken in these two kin 
states wrought foreign policies that in the end provoked each other.
Given the significance of the “Chinese factor” in framing kin relations 
during the Razak-Hussein Onn era of Malaysian relations with Indonesia, it is 
also notable that the weakening premises of kinship during the 1990s has further 
coincided with a marked reduction in Indo-Malay concerns for relations with 
Beijing, as well as with their own domestic ethnic Chinese communities. 
Indonesia normalised ties with China in 1990, and domestic factors were 
identified as drivers behind this policy shift141. In Malaysia’s case, relations with 
China have in fact improved substantially in the 1990s, as have inter-communal
140 See “Bashir had clear role in plotting terror attacks”, Straits Times. 18 October 2002. This was 
also confirmed in a discussion with Rohan Gunaratna, Singapore, 16 October 2002.
141 See Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics o f a Troubled Relationship. [London: 
Routledge, 1999].
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relations within the country142. Consequently, while lingering concerns for the 
“Chinese factor” may have strengthened Indo-Malay co-identification in the 
1970s, the diminution of these concerns as a result of transformations of Indo- 
Malay national identities to accommodate ethnic Chinese within a national multi­
national framework at the domestic level, and improved relations with China at 
the international level, has led to the demise of this “anti-Chinese” impetus to 
kinship affiliations.
Whether the sense was that Malaysia suffered from a “small brother” 
syndrome in relation to Indonesia which compelled the Mahathir administration 
to overcompensate, as some Indonesian political circles are prone to believe143; or 
that Indonesia was peeved because the Mahathir government simply did not abide 
by the unwritten rule of deference set in place by Tun Razak for the conduct of 
Malaysia’s relations with Indonesia, as some Malaysians maintain144, the fact of 
the matter is that during the 1980s and especially 1990s, kinship amity which was 
established during the Razak-Ghazali Shafie and Suharto-Adam Malik era as a 
foundation for bilateral relations was put aside as both states engaged in a contest 
for primacy originating from divergent assumptions as to the fundamental basis of 
their relations. Moreover, there remained a latent sense that on the part of 
Indonesia in particular, the construction of kinship identity along ethnic (i.e 
Malay) lines, already a clearly tenuous exercise from an anthropological point of 
view, without adhering to the functional aspects to such relatedness, was 
becoming increasingly irrelevant. This opinion was expressed by Jusuf Wanandi, 
who noted:
Generally both Malaysia and Indonesia may be Malay nations . . .  but 
they should not expect too much from Indonesia based on the ‘Malay 
stock’ factor . . . .  The vast majority of Indonesians are Javanese, 
who do not regard themselves as Malay145.
142 For changes in Malaysia’s China policy, see Joseph Liow, “Malaysia-China Relations in the 
1990s: The Maturing o f a Partnership”, Asian Survey. Vol.XL, No.4 (July/August 2000).
143 Ali Alatas expressed to the author that “while this is an unexpressed feeling (on the 
Malaysian’s part), it was an undercurrent that manifested in attitude”. Interview with Ali Alatas, 
Jakarta, 24 January 2002.
144 Interview with Ghazali Shafie, Kuala Lumpur, 8 November 2001.
145 “Towards stronger neighbourly links”, Business Times. 2 March 1988.
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Given this opinion, and Indonesia’s frustration at Kuala Lumpur’s disregard for 
the tradition set by previous administrations of regular consultation with and 
deference to Jakarta on foreign and security policy matters during much of this 
period, it was clear that in Indonesian eyes, rumpun identity was being defined by 
Jakarta’s expectations as to the functional aspects of kinship, namely to be 
consulted and deferred to on matters pertaining to Malaysian policy. Likewise, 
Malaysia’s perceived lack of regard for these functional terms of kinship has led 
Indonesia to question Malaysian sincerity and its validity as a basis for political 
relations.
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CONCLUSION
This study began with three objectives, namely to understand the basis of 
kinship discourse in Indonesia-Malaysia relations, how kinship was politicised in 
terms of its conceptualisation and application, and why its dominant motif has 
been rivalry more than harmony despite its regular evocation. As a political 
phenomenon it has been determined that kinship operates at three inter-related 
levels: (1) at an anthropological level, where conceptions of race, culture, and 
ethnicity are seen to provide the premises for the construction of affinity; (2) at a 
sociological and functional level, where the construction of affinity is 
“politicised” by the perception and interpretation of expectations and obligations 
to frame political relations; and (3), at an abstract level, where kinship takes the 
form of an identity premised on exclusivity in relation to conceptions of “self’ 
and “other”. It has been at all three levels of the kinship factor that Indonesia- 
Malaysia relations has been explored.
The study has uncovered a fundamental tension that underscores 
Indonesia-Malaysia relations. On the one hand, the dominant diplomatic 
discourse over the past 50 years has been that of kinship based on constructions of 
racial, ethnic, and cultural affinity, with little thought given (at least on the part of 
its advocates) for the conceptual and intellectual tensions that invariably follow 
such broad categorisations and constructions. This has been particularly so at the 
popular level, even though at various times it has also influenced policy decision­
making among political leaders. Indeed, when expectations and obligations are 
fulfilled and co-identification strengthened in defence of Pribumi identity against 
common threats, as was the case in the 1970s, the kinship factor can generate 
harmony in bilateral relations.
On the other hand, despite the fact that there is a basis upon which to 
define Indonesia and Malaysia as kin states based on these broad conceptions of 
affinity and the persistence of kinship discourse, their “special relationship” has 
consistently been plagued with problems. This state of affairs has been a 
consequence both of contested interpretations of history and the terms of kin 
affinity that gave rise to these broad conceptions of kinship, most notably over the
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ethno-cultural continuity of the region, and the perceived failure of Indonesia and 
Malaysia as kin states to fulfil the expectations and obligations of kinship. Both 
problems have been borne of fundamental differences in their respective historical 
experiences and the forging of their national identities. The manner in which 
conceptions of affinity have shaped and been shaped in the course of Indo-Malay 
political history testify to continuity and change behind the understanding of the 
kinship factor in Indonesia-Malaysia relations. In the study of Indonesia- 
Malaysia relations thence, it appears that tensions have as much to do with 
conflicts of identity as they do with conflicts of interests.
I. Race, ethnicity, and territory
As suggested earlier, one reason why the kinship factor has been unable to 
provide a basis for harmony lies not so much in its absence, but more so in its 
contested meanings in terms of its historical premises and ethnic yardsticks. It is 
true that the cultural continuity of the Indo-Malay World, particularly in terms of 
shared language and religion, exists to foster common personal and cultural 
identity. The problem, as this study has highlighted, is how to translate 
romanticism into a political identity, particularly as a basis for post-colonial 
relations.
The politics of blood brotherhood can be traced to the anti-colonial 
struggle when kinship provided an avenue whereby pribumi identity was 
constructed against the common adversary Western imperialism1. Despite the 
apparent congruence in objectives however, there was a fundamental difference 
between respective conceptions of pan-identity held by the various political actors 
that diluted the psychological and nationalistic appeal of the singular Indo-Malay 
nation-state. Indonesian impressions of Indonesia Raya involved the adoption of 
pre-revolution conceptions based on historical mythology. Pan-nationalists such 
as Muhammad Yamin and Sukarno, motivated by the legacy of the Javanese 
kingdom of Majapahit, claimed to be heirs of this ancient polity whose extent was 
interpreted, by their reading of history, to have included the Malay Peninsula.
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Such a conceptualisation ultimately founded on a historiographical error, dictated 
the Indonesian anti-colonial vision of the territorial boundaries to the post­
colonial state.
Melayu Raya was also conceptualised along the lines of the re-awakening 
of a historical identity based on another ancient kingdom, Srivijaya. In the same 
way Muhammad Yamin, the key ideologue behind Indonesia Raya, interpreted 
Indonesian history, Burhanuddin al-Helmy’s exposition of Melayu Raya read 
from Malay history the extension of the great kingdom of Srivijaya into 
contemporary geopolitics. Unlike Yamin however, who conceptualised his pan 
identity based in the main on historical territorial claims, the authenticity of 
Melayu Raya derived primarily from racial, ethnic and cultural bases. These 
different frames of reference made it clear very early on in the history of the 
politics of kinship in the Indo-Malay World that there would be fundamental 
problems to the construction of pan-identity. Most Indonesians are not ethnic 
Malay, and attempts by pan-Malay nationalists at recasting history in this mould 
proved to be cavalier at best, counter-productive at worst. Hence in order to 
understand the construction of relatedness in this region it is critical, among other 
things, that one appreciates the distinction between Indonesian and Malay 
understandings of ethnicity and “Malayness”, for this distinction lies at the heart 
of the identity of the Indo-Malay World. Nor did the champions of pan-unity on 
either side of the Melaka Straits give heed to the empirical record of tension 
between Malay and Javanese kingdoms that defined much of pre-colonial 
geopolitics in the Indo-Malay World. This fact lends further credence to the 
belief that kinship was constructed without due regard to historiographical 
complexities.
Complications arising from these contending interpretations of the 
historical and anthropological basis for pan-identity deepened as the anti-colonial 
struggle intensified. Tthe Indonesian quest for modem statehood was advanced 
along civic and egalitarian, not ethnic or racial, lines. The 1928 Youth Pledge 
taken at Bandung, when leaders of the anti-Dutch movement from throughout the 
archipelago gathered and proclaimed their loyalty to one national identity,
1 The role o f kinship myth-making in nationalism is discussed in David Brown, Contemporary
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language and flag epitomised this. The making of Indonesia then, was a Batavia- 
centric, and not Java-centric, phenomenon2. Likewise despite Yamin’s 
romanticism, it would eventually be Dutch colonial boundaries that served as the 
point of reference for Indonesian nationalism.
In contrast to Indonesia’s violent egalitarian revolution, the transition from 
communal to national identity in Malaya was characterised not by issues of 
territorial boundaries and vulnerability, but by the peaceful imposition of a system 
of governance that preserved the rights of a dominant community, the Malays. 
Led eventually by the conservative elite bent on retaining their status, anti­
colonialism in Malaya stood antithetic to the civic and egalitarian nationalism that 
defined Indonesia’s process of self-determination, where the aristocracy and 
traditional elite were viewed as obstacles to, as opposed to facilitators of, de­
colonization. Within this ethnic framework it was Malay nationalism (as opposed 
to Malayan nationalism) that dominated, which had as its epicentre the 
competition between the traditional aristocratic ruling elite and the Indonesian- 
influenced radical Malay nationalists. Attempts to conceptualise relations with 
Indonesian kin in the post-war era was integral to the tension between these two 
groups. Some in Malaya, and in particular the conservative elite, harboured 
discomfort at the nature of Indonesian nationalism even as they applauded the 
spirit of Indonesian anti-colonialism. What compounded matters was the fact that 
during the course of the Indonesian revolution the traditional Malay elite, highly 
protective and conscious of their identities and social status as the privileged 
indigenous people, witnessed a wholesale restructuring of society in Indonesia via 
a bloodbath against traditional forces in Sumatra. This experience had a profound 
impact on the conservative Malay leadership of the peninsula which eventually 
inherited the colonial state.
Negative perceptions and complications stemming from events of the 
revolution were compounded by the close relationship between British Malaya 
and Sumatra. Sumatra was the bastion of traditional feudalistic society in
Nationalism: Civic. Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics. [London: Routledge, 2000] 40-42.
2 It can be considered “Batavia-centric” in the sense that it was targeted at inheriting in its entirety 
the Dutch territories known as the Dutch East Indies, which had its capital at Batavia. This brand 
o f nationalism did not privilege the Javanese, though they constituted up to 60% of the population 
o f the archipelago.
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Indonesia and shared much closer affinity with the state and societal structures in 
peninsular Malaya than Java or any other East Indies territories. Consequently, as 
it was the Sumatran feudal structure that was demolished by what appeared to be 
a Java-centred republican revolution, Malay suspicion of republican Indonesia 
was predictable. In the same vein, suspicions of Malay-Sumatran complicity in 
retaliation were never far from the minds of Indonesia’s Javanese leaders.
These observations highlight the pertinence of Sumatra-peninsula ties in 
the context of Indonesia-Malaysia relations. Kinship links between the peninsula 
and Sumatra has previously been established. Likewise, much of the
complications surrounding kinship politics in early Indonesia-Malaysia relations 
were related to questions of Sumatran loyalty to the Indonesian nation-state as 
opposed to narrow ethno-cultural identity, and Malaya’s role in instigating or 
encouraging separatist tendencies. In turn, it is evident that these problems are 
associated with the fact that Malays from the peninsula share personal and 
cultural identity with Sumatrans to a much greater degree than they do with other 
Indonesian communities. On this basis, the subsequent formation of Malaysia 
was viewed as potentially divisive from an Indonesian perspective in that it might 
tempt Sumatran separatism3. The fact that the Malay political elite had close 
relations with the then-influential Sumatra-based Masyumi Party further 
heightened Javanese concerns. It was also telling how during the early years of 
relations Jakarta politicians were wary of Malay diplomats who cultivated 
Sumatran contacts4.
In many ways, much of this Sumatran-Malay dimension to Indonesia- 
Malaysia kinship remains in tact, and continues to be fostered via Malaysian 
students studying in religious and secular institutions in Sumatra. To the extent 
that personal and cultural affinity may or may not translate into political identity, 
it would be interesting to observe Malaysian responses should Sumatran 
discontent towards the central Javanese-dominated government structure in 
Indonesia re-emerge. The case of Aceh is telling, in this regard, of Malaysia’s 
inability to distance itself completely from Java-Sumatra politics, even in this 
contemporary era when national identities are presumably less contested.
3 J.M. Gullick, Malaysia and its Neighbours. [London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1967] 110.
262
It appears then, that framing kinship in ethnic terms (as Malays are wont 
to do) would undoubtedly privilege Malay-Sumatran relations to an extent greater 
than what a Javanese-led government would be comfortable with. Consequently, 
Indonesians have at times registered their disapproval to the conceptualisation of 
kinship explicitly on ethnic grounds. Indeed, it was in response to such attempts 
that Benny Moerdani warned:
Communities in both countries have strong reasons to believe that 
they have similarities in various aspects of life. However, we must 
also be wise enough to say that there are a number of differences in 
both communities’ socio-cultural and economic life. . . . These 
differences should not be overlooked as they can be the source of a 
split in perception5.
Some have made the observation that some Indonesians see “rumpun” as holding 
much more appeal to the Malays precisely because of the continued emphasis on 
racial and ethnic identity in contemporary Malaysian politics6.
It is hence clear from the permutations Indo-Malay nationalisms were 
undergoing that while both adhered to broad historical premises in their initial 
attempts to construct post-colonial identities, thus identifying them as kin states, 
these identities in fact were shaping up to be fundamentally different. One 
shunned ethnic logic to statehood while the other embraced it; one destroyed the 
feudal elements in society while the other elevated their status. These 
fundamental differences set up a clash of identities that would compound the 
problems surrounding the expectations and obligations both sides read into their 
post-colonial relationship.
4 Interview with Zainal Sulong, Kuala Lumpur, 14 August 2001.
5 Benny Moerdani, speech entitled “Kerjasama, Masalah, dan Tantangan” delivered at Dialog 
Pemuda Indonesia-Malaysia II, Bogor, 17-19 January 1990.
6 Firdhaus Abdullah, “The Rumpun Concept in Malaysia-Indonesia Relations”, The Indonesian 
Quarterly. Vol.XXI, No.2 (1993) 146.
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II. Historical process, identity construction, and the basis of expectations
and obligations
While the identification of Indo-Malay affinity with ethno-cultural frames 
of reference constitute one side of the kinship puzzle, the functional aspects of 
relatedness, defined as the fulfilment of expectations and obligations read into a 
kinship relationship, also warrants consideration. In particular, this aspect of 
kinship takes on prominence in Indonesia-Malaysia relations in the post-colonial 
era, when political leaders were pressured by each other as well as their respective 
domestic audiences to translate historical “facts” and political rhetoric into 
coherent policies. It is when kinship is conceived of as a functional principle with 
attendant expectations and obligations that the correlation between the kinship 
factor and the process of national identity building comes into even greater relief.
Long-time observers of Indonesian foreign policy such as Michael Leifer 
and Franklin Weinstein have contended that an “aspiration to greatness” and 
“regional sense of entitlement”, borne of its revolutionary experiences during its 
anti-colonial struggle, lies at the heart of the Indonesian political psyche. This 
was certainly characteristic of the Indonesian worldview during the excesses of 
Sukamoism, but also held true during the Suharto administration. No doubt, 
under Suharto, Indonesian foreign policy turned away from the grandiloquence of 
his predecessor. Yet this shift of focus from politics to economics was underlined 
by Suharto’s belief that powerful states had powerful economies, while 
Indonesia’s push for international recognition of its archipelagic regime during 
Suharto’s presidency was fashioned to give substance to aspirations to greatness. 
Moreover, ASEAN’s principle of regional resilience was grafted from Indonesian 
domestic political lexicon to provide the subtext to regional security, in so doing 
further institutionalising Jakarta’s sense of entitlement. Within ASEAN, 
Indonesia was widely recognised as primus inter pares and the prime manager of 
regional order7. As for relations with Malaysia, the kinship factor could not be
7 In considering the “absence” of any evidence of subtle Indonesian “benign hegemony” one 
should distinguish between self-restraint on the part o f Jakarta, and Indonesia’s reluctance to 
assume a leadership role. Indeed, as this dissertation has shown, the fact that Indonesia was not 
consulted on matters pertaining to the security o f Southeast Asia was more often than not 
interpreted as presumptuous by the Indonesians. This has been in evidence in Malaysian
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divorced from Indonesian primacy. This is evident from the following comment 
in an Indonesian Armed Forces daily noted in the aftermath of Konfrontasi:
There is much we can note to prove that Malaysia and Indonesia are in 
fact brothers -  eggs of the same nest. . . .  It is not only in the cultural 
field that Malaysia feels itself our younger brother, but in other fields 
as well. We should respond to this, not arrogantly but as an elder 
brother8.
From Jakarta’s perspective, the fact that Malayan de-colonization 
transpired not by revolution, but in cooperation with the colonial power 
contravened the ideologies of Indonesian leaders who had come to develop a 
worldview and culture of politics that based legitimacy of states primarily on the 
nature of their independence struggle. By this token the very fact that Malayan 
independence was bom out of a collaborative effort between the Western- 
educated aristocratic and feudal elite and the British colonialists made it a travesty 
in Indonesian eyes. To them, a kindred relationship expressed in separate 
statehood and adhered to without revolution was something they found difficult to 
accept.
This travesty however, could perhaps be overlooked if post-independence 
Malaya had acknowledged Indonesian primacy and assumed a subsidiary, if not 
deferential, role towards its more established kin. Instead, independent Malaya 
was seen to have given little consideration for Jakarta in the formulation of their 
own foreign policy. This was apparent from the very outset when, to Jakarta, the 
kinship rhetoric preached by Malayan leaders did not synchronise with the 
policies they practiced. Tunku’s pro-West inclinations were viewed suspiciously 
within Jakarta circles, as were his attempts to manage regional affairs through his 
SEAFET and ASA initiatives. Not only did Malaya not acknowledge Indonesia’s 
leadership, its sympathies for rebels who perpetuated the rebellion of 1957-58 and 
ambivalance on Indonesia’s West Irian claims further sharpened Indonesian 
impressions that far from fulfilling the functional aspects of kinship and providing 
unequivocal support for a kin state, Malaya had undermined the very sovereignty
diplomatic initiatives as well as Thailand’s apparent unilateral move in shifting its stand on 
Indochina in the late 1980s.
8 “Wrong Key”, A1838 3006/4/9 Pt 37, NAA.
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and integrity of Indonesia, not to mention challenged Indonesia’s conceptions of 
regional order and its “right” to dictate the pattern of regional security 
developments.
There is also a distinct cultural dimension in terms of kinship hierarchy in 
the Javanese mindset that, though difficult to grasp, should not be overlooked. 
M.C. Ricklefs has written that Javanese political culture emphasises a strict 
observance of hierarchy9. Considering that since the mid 1950s, and particularly 
during Suharto’s New Order regime, a disproportionate number of Javanese have 
occupied the seats of Indonesian power, it is clear that in some respects the 
Javanese outlook and worldview has influenced how the Indonesian government 
perceives and interprets its relations with Malaysia10. Jakarta certainly viewed 
early Malayan policy during Tunku’s administration as lacking the deference to 
Jakarta that should have underscored kin relations. Instead, the tone of Malayan 
policy in the early post-colonial period engendered a belief in Indonesia that far 
from acting as kin, Malaya was “an unrepresentative alien-inspired polity 
designed to perpetuate colonial economic and military interests in Southeast Asia 
which, by their nature, posed a threat to the viability and regional role of 
Indonesia”11. In Indonesian eyes, Malaya, while declaring its desire to associate 
with Indonesia on the basis of kinship, had in fact undermined Indonesia’s 
national unity, territorial integrity, and claim to political primacy in the region. 
Subsequently, whatever its eventual domestic political rationale, the outbreak of 
Konfrontasi reinforces the perception that Indonesian aggression was rooted in 
their misgivings toward a perceived lack of respect on the part of Malaya.
Relations during the Razak administration, however, contrasted starkly to 
the enmity that marked Tunku’s milieu. It was during this time that one finds the 
“golden age” of bilateral ties - when perspectives, outlooks, and policies 
converged to an extent never before (and never since) experienced as the key 
protagonists of the Razak administration (Razak himself, along with his
9 See M.C. Ricklefs, “Unity and Disunity in Javanese Political and Religious Thought o f the 
Eighteenth Century”, Modem Asian Studies. Vol.26, No.4 (1992).
10 The Javanese basis to the Indonesian state during the Suharto administration is argued in 
Virginia Matheson Hooker (ed), Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia. [Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1993] and Michael Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto.
[London: Routledge, 1993].
1 Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy. [London: Allen & Unwin, 1983] 75.
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lieutenants Ghazali Shafie and Zainal Sulong) pursued an active policy of “self- 
induced subordination” toward Indonesia. A popular explanation for Malaysia’s 
volte face has been the observed need to facilitate the re-integration of post- 
Konfrontasi Indonesia into regional affairs, and to foster a new Indonesian 
government that was aware of the responsibilities that came with regional 
preponderance. Yet it was also clear from the complexion of Malaysia’s 
positions on issues such as the neutralisation of Southeast Asia, the Melaka 
Straits, Indonesia’s Archipelago Doctrine, and even China policy that Malaysia 
pro-actively sought to re-orientate relations with Indonesia on the basis of 
deference. Malaysia in effect surrendered the neutralisation initiative to 
Indonesia, when consideration for Indonesian sensitivities toward its original 
proposal led to the final adoption of the Indonesian, as opposed to Malaysian, 
draft. While the ZOPFAN initiative was Malaysian in name, it was Indonesian in 
principle. Likewise, Razak’s willingness to recognise Indonesia’s Archipelagic 
Doctrine without initial confirmation of Malaysian rights to free communication 
between East and West Malaysia further evinced this attitude of deference, and 
was in fact a matter of frustration for his own foreign policy officials.
Several years into the following administration of Mahathir Mohamad 
however, Indonesia-Malaysia relations seemed to return to earlier patterns of 
rivalry. In a profoundly ironic twist, Mahathir’s Malaysia posed a challenge to 
Indonesian regional leadership on the back of the same anti-Western crusade long 
identified with and espoused by Indonesia. To be sure, Mahathir came into office 
with an explicit pro-Malay and nationalist agenda. Nevertheless, his version of 
Malay nationalism paid little regard to affinity with Indonesia, certainly not with 
the Javanese who dominated the upper echelons of the Jakarta government. 
Furthermore, his explicit focus on foreign policy as an avenue through which to 
assert resurgent Malay nationalism brought Malaysia into direct conflict with 
Indonesia, for whom foreign policy was a matter of prestige.
Through the construction of a vocal and activist foreign policy, Mahathir 
sought to project Malaysia to the forefront of Third World international affairs. 
This locked Malaysia and Indonesia in a prestige dilemma defined by a contest 
for international prominence and regional primacy, while blood brotherhood was
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increasingly breached as the policy of consultation and alignment with Jakarta 
that characterised the Razak and Hussein Onn administrations was jettisoned. As 
the Malaysian state matured in developmental terms, strengthening Malaysian 
national identity as a result, Kuala Lumpur more deliberately avoided toeing the 
Jakarta line. Just as it was during the administration of Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
Malaysia’s interests during this more recent period, insofar as Indonesia policy 
was concerned, was to break out of Jakarta’s shadow.
This tension was acute in the 1990s, when Malaysian assertiveness in 
international affairs clashed with Indonesia’s renewed interest in foreign policy 
matters. The incident at the 1992 NAM Summit, when Mahathir was referred to
1*7as a “Little Sukarno”, particularly incensed Suharto . Throughout the 1990s, 
several events further illustrated Malaysia’s challenge to Indonesian conceptions 
of regional order and Jakarta’s ambitions to dictate the pattern of regional 
developments. This included the controversy surrounding Mahathir’s EAEG 
proposal, Malaysia’s rejection of Indonesian attempts to play a mediatory role to 
facilitate the management of the South China Sea territorial claims, and the 
divergent positions taken by Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta as to the recognition of 
the coup by Hun Sen against Prince Ranariddh in Cambodia in 1997 in the build­
up to ASEAN expansion.
Aside from the “prestige dilemma”, the kinship factor has also generated a 
wave of problems during this era. While the Malaysian government has publicly 
disavowed any support for GAM, many segments of the Malay population in the 
peninsula have long been sympathetic to the cause of Aceh Merdeka (Acehnese 
independence). In addition, there seems to be evidence that some measure of 
material support and even military training had been given to the Aceh 
independence movement from sources in peninsular Malaysia. Paradoxically, the 
fact that Kuala Lumpur has seen the need to express regularly in public their non­
support and non-recognition of the Aceh Merdeka cause is indicative of how 
complex and potentially divisive the problem of Aceh remains for Indonesia- 
Malaysia relations.
12 This was confirmed by most, if not all, Indonesian interviewees.
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Malaysia’s securitisation of the illegal immigration problem has been 
another example of the complications arising from the residual influence of the 
kinship factor. Malaysia’s lack of understanding and indulgence on this issue, 
manifested in its demand for the immediate repatriation of Indonesian illegal 
workers and the provision of less-than-respectable holding accommodation for 
Indonesians awaiting repatriation, has not been taken well by Jakarta. In 
Indonesian eyes, Malaysia’s “legalistic” pursuit of such policies was being 
undertaken with no consideration for the “special relationship” that Kuala 
Lumpur claims to exist between the two kin states. This in turn evoked 
Indonesian perceptions that Malaysia was not adhering to the functional 
requirements of the kinship factor. In other words, to Indonesian minds 
Malaysia’s deeds certainly were not matching its words, and the perceived acts of 
arrogation of leadership on the part of the latter were difficult to endure for an 
Indonesian government that clearly viewed itself as primus inter pares in 
relations with Kuala Lumpur.
Indo-Malay disunity has also been exaggerated by Mahathir’s own 
attitudes towards Indonesian leaders. Mahathir made little pretence of his disdain 
for previous practices of consultation and deference to Indonesia. In relation to 
Indonesia policy, Mahathir’s brand of Malay nationalism was not only a 
deliberate attempt not to tow the Indonesian line, but in many ways to “out-do” 
Indonesia in regional and international affairs. This state of affairs elicited the 
following response from a former senior Indonesian foreign ministry official: 
“Malaysia suffers from a “little brother” complex and compensates by diplomatic 
activities to break out of Indonesian shadow. This has been an undercurrent to 
relations in the 80s and 90s”13.
It is quite evident then, that though Indonesia and Malaysia are kin states, 
the kinship factor has not been able to generate harmony in bilateral relations, 
except for the 1970s, when Malaysian administrations were clearly pro-active in 
consultation and deference to Jakarta on foreign policy and security matters. This 
is attributable to the contested perceptions and interpretations each has had 
towards the terms of kinship, the divergent and ultimately antagonistic paths that
13 Interview with former senior foreign ministry official, Jakarta, 24 January 2002.
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national identities evolved along, and the consequent failure of one or the other to 
meet the “functional aspects of relatedness” that extended from their contested 
understandings (of kinship). Certainly, these problems are further suggestive of 
the unresolved tensions within the building of post-colonial identities, in 
particular the issue of how to re-conceptualise loyalties and re-frame post-colonial 
relations in the context of historical legacies.
III. Constructing Pribumi (indigenous) identity
While there is anthropological, historiographical, and empirical evidence 
to suggest that the kinship factor has been a problematic basis upon which to 
organise Indonesia-Malaysia relations, there has nevertheless been avenues that 
illuminate the prescience of the phenomenon of kinship as a distinct cohesive 
force in Indonesia-Malaysia relations. This pertains to the apparent effectiveness 
of the kinship factor in fostering fraternity when defined and constructed in terms 
of the exclusivity of kin identity, in opposition to what both parties perceive as a 
shared threat.
As the study has indicated, kinship exclusivity first gained prominence as 
political logic in response to colonialism. Be that as it may, kinship has also been 
a persuasive and politically expedient factor in the context of Indo-Malay reaction 
to the perceived challenge posed by their respective Chinese communities, and to 
a lesser but no less significant extent the influence of China and Chinese- 
dominated Singapore on these communities, on their national identities premised 
on Pribumi primacy. This was a particularly pertinent feature of bilateral 
relations during the 1970s, when Malay interpretations of Malaysian national 
identity was perceived to be coming under threat from Chinese encroachment 
onto Malay political “space”. Domestically, the 13 May 1969 riots and ethnic 
Chinese challenge to Malay primacy re-ignited ethno-nationalist fervour among 
the Malay population and re-kindled suspicion of the Chinese community. On the 
international front, despite lingering concerns for the potential threat from Peking, 
Kuala Lumpur was forced to re-assess its China policy in the wake of Sino-U.S. 
detente. Malaysian concerns on these fronts were shared by Jakarta, which under
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Suharto was harbouring suspicions of Peking and its own ethnic Chinese 
communities in the wake of the 1965 communist coup attempt. It was in this 
manner that the Chinese have been a “problem” for Indonesian and Malaysian 
national identity construction and nation formation, not to mention security. 
Hence, it was not surprising that developments in Malaysia after 13 May were 
followed with great interest in Jakarta, while many in the Malaysian government 
were looking to Indonesia for assurance and justification. The loyalties of the 
Chinese communities have been regularly questioned in both states, and their 
control of economic resources have caused anti-Chinese sentiments to fester. By 
the late 1960s, both Indonesia and Malaysia also shared the same concerns for the 
threat from Peking-inspired communist activities along the shared border in 
Borneo. In this regard, it is suggested that dealing with the “Chinese problem” 
overshadowed all else as a policy prerogative for both states during this period. 
Consequently, the need for policy convergence in relation to this problem was 
manifested in the creation of the General Border Committee, close consultation 
on the matter of normalisation of ties with Peking, and finally in the 1980 
Kuantan statement.
Hence, while there was certainly a measure of belief among policy-makers 
in both governments during the late 1960s and the 1970s that Indo-Malay kinship 
could provide an avenue for strengthening ties, kinship was framed in terms of 
shared concerns towards communist China and the challenge to Pribumi primacy 
from domestic ethnic Chinese communities. More importantly for Malaysia, the 
improvement of relations with Indonesia in the 1970s can be viewed in tandem 
with the re-assertion of Malay dominance. To the Malay leadership, this could be 
conveniently accomplished by reinvigorating affinity with Indonesia along racial 
and ethnic lines. Put differently, Indonesia became an ally to Malaysia as it 
sought after May 1969 to accentuate Malay primacy over the Chinese in the re­
construction of Malaysian national identity. This has been verified by the fact 
that many Malays, including those in seats of power, looked to Indonesia at this 
time as a bastion of “Malay” identity, and in so doing re-affirmed the affinity that 
was built during the anti-colonial struggles. Such was the extent of these attempts 
at reviving affiliation that Malaysian Chinese, as well as the leadership of
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Chinese-dominated Singapore, located in the heart of the Indo-Malay archipelago, 
were keenly aware of the threatening possibility of an Indo-Malay confederation 
taking shape with an anti-Chinese subtext. In other words, while the 
inclusiveness of kinship, in terms of the translation of cultural and ethnic 
affinities into political reality, or even the interpretation and fulfilment of 
expectations and obligations, has been a matter of contestation between Indonesia 
and Malaysia, kinship exclusivity has proven a more effective and persuasive 
logic behind Indo-Malay fraternity. This permutation of kinship also explains 
why political leaders and audiences continue to look to it for greater meaning and 
intelligibility to bilateral relations, despite all the hiccups that have accompanied 
it.
IV. Kinship paradoxes: The continued search for meaning and
intelligibility
In a keynote address at the Second Malaysia-Indonesia Conference, then 
Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi made the following assertion:
The five principles of peaceful co-existence which order relations 
between the family of nations alone should not be what relations 
between two countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia are founded 
upon. If relations between Malaysia and Indonesia are pegged at 
mere peaceful co-existence, then we pitch our relationship on the 
lowest possible note in the relations between two nations. Our ties 
would be no better, no worse than our ties with our most distant 
friends. What we strive for and what we already have to a 
considerable degree, is relations at the fullest, relations suffused 
with maximum understanding, mutual empathy and reciprocal 
concern14. (Emphasis added)
Implicit in Badawi’s statement is his invocation of what John Baylis classifies as 
the “Evangelical” approach to international relations, where the Indonesia- 
Malaysia relationship is again portrayed as a fraternal association of peoples 
whose common culture, language, and religion “set them apart from ‘normal’
14 See Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, keynote address delivered at Second Malaysia-Indonesia 
Conference, Penang, 11-14 December 1990.
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relations between states in the international system”15. Consequently, this implies 
the hope that kinship affinity can still take on greater prominence in relations 
even after decades (or even centuries, if one considers pre-colonial relations) of 
bilateral rivalry. In a somewhat optimistic, if not altogether ironic, editorial, a 
prominent Malaysian commentator has also suggested that: “The Malaysian 
respect for Indonesia as the Big Brother, whatever the Big Brother’s shortcomings 
may be, continues unabated. On the other hand, Indonesia’s concern for 
Malaysia’s well being continues to underpin ties with Kuala Lumpur”16. These 
intimations fall in line with an ongoing tradition that has seen bilateral ties 
portrayed as a “special relationship” rendered in kinship terms.
Indeed, despite the recurrence of bilateral tension, the fact remains that the 
pull of kinship, particularly through public opinion and civil society interaction, 
has always been strong, and continues to be a source of intelligibility for 
Indonesia-Malaysia relations. Given the emergence of terminology such as 
“Berkumpung” (to come together as in a village or tribe), “Diplomasi Serumpun” 
(racial diplomacy), and “Musyawarah dan Muafakat” (consultation and 
consensus) over the years, a “language of kinship” seems to have emerged in the 
lexicon of bilateral relations, and that hark back to pre-colonial notions of 
community and identity. The resilience of such ideas, along with the continued 
existence of avenues through which closer relations can be plotted, indicates that 
the phenomenon of kinship remains of some import in the affairs and identity of 
the Indo-Malay World. The impact of inter-marriage and migration that has 
given rise to a shared linguistic and cultural legacy, already emphasised earlier, 
continues to define much of the cross-border interchange in the Indo-Malay 
World today. Artistic and literary traditions of the peninsula continue to be traced 
back to Indonesia. In the early years of Malayan independence, the Malay 
education system was built around Indonesian teachers, and these educational 
exchanges remain a feature of relations today. The Indonesian revolution was
15 John Baylis, Anglo-American Relations Since 1939. [Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1997] 8-9.
16 “Behind the Suharto, Mahathir Meeting”, Straits Times. 25 June 1988.
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celebrated in many Malayan circles, and Indonesian anti-colonialists continue to 
be lauded as Malay heroes17.
It must be said however, that while the historical legacy of social-cultural 
exchange has continued into contemporary times, there is a sense within certain 
quarters that the relationship has not been conducted on an equal basis. This is so 
at least in Malaysian eyes, where cultural exchange continues to be viewed as a 
one-sided phenomenon:
In cultural exchanges . . .  more Indonesian songs are aired in Malaysia, 
more films shown, more books and magazines available, to the 
Malaysian public than are Malaysian items available to the 
Indonesians. Similarly close to a thousand Malaysians are studying in 
Indonesia and very few Indonesia students are in Indonesia, whereas 
many Indonesian students do study abroad, including Singapore. Is the 
teaching in Bahasa Malaysia a problem? Are there no suitable 
institutions? Will Indonesian students not feel comfortable in 
Malaysia18?
In light of this, the issue was raised when Malaysian Ambassador Abdullah 
Zawawi shared his candid impression that “in the equation of our two countries’ 
present relations, Malaysia and Indonesia have not been equally committed in our 
efforts to give meaning to the ‘rumpuri' factor”19. Yet given the propensity 
among Malay popular opinion to view Indonesians as ethnic kin and Indonesia’s 
reluctance to be associated as such, this imbalance is hardly surprising. Not too 
long ago Indonesians too, sought to construct kinship along ethno-cultural lines, 
suggesting that:
Except for some minor differences wrought by history . . .  the two 
nations could well be one. In the first place, Malaysia in the minds of 
Indonesians, is Malay -  Brothers of the Malay race. This impression is 
hard to change, although Indonesians know that according to the 
statistics Malays actually make up only slightly more than half of the 
population of Malaysia. On their television sets, Indonesians watch
17 The recently released Malay television drama “Embun” portrays Ibrahim Yaacob, the pro- 
Indonesian architect o f Melayu Raya, as a Malay hero and patriot.
18 Abdullah Zawawi, speech entitled “Malaysia and Indonesia Bilateral Relations” delivered at 
Second Malaysia-Indonesia Conference, Penang, 11-14 December 1990.
19 See ibid.
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Malaysian artistes perform dances or play music that can hardly be 
distinguished from those of Indonesia’s own regions. Indonesians can 
communicate with Malaysians as easily as Englishmen with 
Americans20.
In more recent Indonesian thinking however, concerns over the functional aspects 
of relatedness (i.e. the fulfilment of expectations and obligations) have superseded 
the ethno-cultural kinship discourse that was prevalent in the earlier years, and 
that is still regurgitated by many Malaysians today.
To be certain, while popular conceptions of kinship might have operated 
at a different level to that of high politics, it has nevertheless often exerted some 
influence on the latter, and hence one should exercise caution in describing the 
evocation of kinship solely as rhetorical commonplace. Research undertaken here 
has shown how this has been manifested in the fact that the rhetorical 
proclamations made by political leaders in fact often synchronize with their 
opinions expressed behind closed doors. For example, Tunku Abdul Rahman 
himself regularly expressed in private how, in making Malayan policy towards 
Indonesia, he felt compelled to take into account pro-Indonesia sentiments of 
many among the Malay community who still harboured sentimental loyalties 
toward Indonesia even after independence. As but one example, the discrepancy 
between Tunku’s private and public positions on Indonesia’s West Irian claims 
illustrate how his personal opposition to Indonesia’s cause was checked by the 
fact that his Malay electorate supported it. Indeed, this pressure to emphasise 
kinship was all the more intriguing during Tunku’s administration for the fact that 
of all Malaysia’s leaders, he was the staunchest in his disdain for the Javanese- 
dominated Indonesian leadership. Indonesian leaders too, have admitted privately 
to popular pressure driving their interest in Malaysian affairs, particularly in the 
aftermath of the May 1969 race riots. These circumstances certainly conditioned 
relations during the Razak era, when relations were reinforced on the back of 
“people-to-people” ties.
Yet while popular opinion may have contributed to the politicisation of 
kinship in Indonesia-Malaysia relations, one should be mindful that its influence
20 Hari Hartojo, “Confrontation”, A 1838 3006/4/9 Part 39, NAA.
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is also subject to transformation and change. More to the point, given the 
relationship between kinship and identity, one can see that in the context of the 
present study, as national identities take shape, so too the factor of kinship can be 
transformed as loyalties of populations and focus of the state (insofar as Indo- 
Malay kinship is concerned) begins to shift with the codification of nation- 
building projects and increase in popular confidence in the nation-state, in so 
doing losing the romanticism and sentimentality of kinship in the complex maze 
of nationhood. Rather than viewing each other as fellow kinsmen on the basis of 
shared language, religion, or even ethnicity, they now begin to view each other as 
nationals of a different state. Both begin also to define themselves more 
explicitly as separate and distinct from each other, and the level of polemics 
between the two may well increase as a result.
Interestingly, the close relation between kinship and national identity has 
also been manifested in the nature of bilateral disputes that have plagued 
relations. In a marked change from questions of identity and sovereignty that 
defined earlier periods of post-colonial relations, recent Indonesia-Malaysia 
contestations have centred on territorial disputes and a contest for primacy in the 
Indo-Malay World. The transition from kinship to national loyalties indicate that 
as national identities are forged, the extent to which the kinship factor can give 
intelligibility to international relations cannot be divorced from the state and 
nation-building context21.
V. Kinship perceptions and interpretations
Dovetailing into the consideration of popular opinion and the paradoxes it 
generates are the perceptions of policy makers themselves. It is the case here that 
along with the evolution of the identities of the Indonesian and Malaysian states, 
leadership personalities and propensities have also contributed to perceptions and 
misinterpretations of the terms and basis of the kinship factor. While the extent 
of influence from such sources cannot realistically be determined quantitatively, it 
is nevertheless suggested that in many instances the twists and turns of the
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politics of kinship in Indonesia-Malaysia relations have been driven as much by 
the perceptions and outlooks of individual leaders as by the prerogatives of 
national identity construction. Of the four Prime Ministers in Malaysian history 
for instance, only the Buginese Razak could claim pure Indonesian descent22. 
This could perhaps partially account for the “archipelagic orientation” of his 
worldview. In like manner, Presidents Sukamo and Suharto came from a 
Javanese tradition that has often perceived itself as culturally superior in the Indo- 
Malay World. One notes further how Indonesia-Malaya relations in the 
immediate post-colonial period were defined as much by the lack of rapport 
between Sukamo and Tunku Abdul Rahman as by other issues. J.M. Gullick 
summarises the tenuous relationship as follows:
President Sukamo and Tunku Abdul Rahman cordially dislike each 
other. The Indonesian President had climbed to power from humble 
origins by way of Dutch prisons and armed revolution. He despises 
the Malay prince as being . . .  in the camp of the colonial power. The 
Tunku, disconcerted and displeased by the flamboyant demagoguery 
of Sukamo, distrusts his domestic alliance with Indonesian 
communism and despises his regime for the economic chaos which it 
has allowed to enplf a once prosperous country23.
Subsequently, as chief advisors to Suharto and Razak respectively, the blood ties 
between Adam Malik and Ghazali Shafie (both were distant cousins who grew up 
together) led to the perception among Indonesian and Malay leaders of that era 
that the kinship factor could and should in fact provide a viable basis for 
organising relations.
Likewise, Suharto’s relationship with Mahathir has been subjected to 
much scrutiny, and anecdotal evidence abound that attest to the distance between 
them. It is a known fact that Suharto’s relationship with Mahathir lacked the 
cordiality and affinity that characterised his rapport with Razak. In fact, 
Mahathir’s outlook towards Indonesia was antithetic to Razak’s willingness to 
align Malaysian policy positions with Jakarta on the basis of the kinship factor
21 See Michael Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies”, 
International Security. Vol.23, No.l (Summer 1998).
22 Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Hussein Onn had Thai and English blood respectively while 
Mahathir’s father was of North Indian origin.
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through active consultation on policy matters (prior to policy formulation, it must 
be added), and sometimes deference on matters of specific interest to the 
Indonesian cousins. Indeed, the prevailing opinion in Javanese-dominated 
Indonesian political circles was that Mahathir lacked respect for Suharto24. In 
private, Mahathir had on several occasions expressed sentiments that were critical 
of Suharto, while the latter, when considering Malaysia’s “lack of regard” for 
Indonesian sensitivities, has always been mindful of Mahathir’s Indian roots25.
As this study has hinted, bilateral tensions, be they military or diplomatic, 
do not necessarily arise solely out of clashes of calculated material interests. 
Differences in ideas, perceptions, or even personalities, also foment discord and 
rivalry. One such avenue with regards to Indonesia-Malaysia relations, this study 
has shown, is associated with the kinship factor, where perceptions and 
interpretations of its meaning and terms of references can influence the pattern of 
relations between kin states such as Indonesia and Malaysia. In this case, while 
both agree to varying degrees with the historical precedents behind their ties, both 
differ in their understanding of kin identity. Moreover, the expectations and 
obligations of kinship, and the extent to which perceptions and interpretations of 
these terms of fraternity have been fulfilled or not, have also been important in 
explaining harmony and discord. In this regard, it is important to note that while 
its prominence may have been diluted over time, the historical legacy of kinship 
has always featured in various aspects of Indonesia-Malaysia relations, and to 
dismiss it would be to misread the history, culture and politics of the Indo-Malay 
World. Nor should one consider kinship as nothing more than a rhetorical tool, 
for as this study has shown, the influence of the kinship factor in Indo-Malay 
politics is in fact much more complicated; defined by concerted attempts on the 
part of political leaders to foster coherence on kinship principles, the prevalence
23 J.M. Gullick, Malaysia and its Neighbours. [London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1967] 108.
24 Interview with Mochtar Kusumamaatdja, Jakarta, 23 January 2002.
25 For example in a conversation with a guest at Mahathir’s daughter’s wedding in 1998, the 
Malaysian Prime Minister had expressed the opinion that he was “smarter than Suharto” in 
handling economic and political crises. On other occasions, Mahathir had apparently compared 
his sons, Malaysian businessmen Mirzan and Mokhzani Mahathir, favourably against Tommy 
Suharto. As for Suharto, he had always considered Mahathir’s abrasive attitude as “un-Malay”. 
Interview with an Indonesian source, Jakarta, 21 January 2002.
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of popular opinions that pressure them to do so, and the consequential success or 
failure of such policies.
VI. The future of the kinship factor
It is clear from the above observations that while it is evident that 
Indonesia-Malaysia relations have been characterised more by diplomatic discord 
than harmony as a result of clashes of national histories and identities, it remains 
a fact that the kinship factor continues to be looked to for meaning and 
intelligibility to bilateral relations, not only at a popular level, but occasionally 
among political leaders as well. This raises the issue of how dominant a role it 
might play in future. In assessing whether the kinship factor might continue to 
have relevance to the understanding of the politics of the Indo-Malay World, it is 
the exclusivity of kinship that again warrants especial attention.
Returning first to a hypothesis presented earlier, namely that the kinship 
factor performs exclusive as well as inclusive functions, one considers the 
possibility of shared perceptions of threats that might provide rallying points to 
invigorate affiliation. Indeed, as this study has shown, the suggestion that 
perceptions of kinship can be strengthened for a common cause is not foreign to 
Indonesia-Malaysia ties. It certainly inspired congruence in anti-colonial 
perspectives prior to the Pacific War, giving rise to a pan-Malay movement. It 
was also observed that lying behind the rhetoric of ethnic Malay blood 
brotherhood employed to justify reconciliation after Konfrontasi was an anti- 
Chinese agenda, which subsequently underpinned relations during the decade 
following the termination of Indonesian aggression. More recently, this seemed 
to be the case in relation to Singapore, the Chinese-dominated city-state 
sandwiched geographically between Indonesia and Malaysia. There was mention, 
for example, that in the buildup to the formation of ASEAN, ethno-religious 
kinship groupings sought initially to exclude Singapore from membership26. 
Similarly, when Suharto appealed for clemency for two Indonesian marines 
scheduled to be hanged in Singapore, his appeal was supported by Tunku Abdul
26 Interview with a senior Singapore diplomat, Singapore, 2 February 2002.
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Rahman27. Malaysia’s alignment with Indonesia on the issue of the status of the 
Melaka Straits, which resulted in attempts to block the internationalisation of the 
Straits, can also be construed as a move to strategically comer Singapore . 
Indonesia shared Malaysian annoyance over a remark made in 1987 by Singapore 
minister Lee Hsien Loong questioning the loyalty of Singapore’s minority Malay 
population in a time of crisis with its neighbours, as well as over the visit of 
Israeli President Chaim Herzog to the city-state .
The argument that the Chinese issue is integral to conceptions of kin 
identity in the Indo-Malay World arises from the fact that the traditional political 
and economic influence of the ethnic Chinese communities in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, not to mention the presence of a Chinese-dominated Singapore at the 
heart of the archipelago, has historically been and continues to be an anomaly in 
the cultural and strategic milieu of the Indo-Malay World, if not altogether a 
political thom in its side. The “Chinese” and “Singapore” issues have featured 
not only as a viable domestic political bogey for both Indonesia and Malaysia, but 
in some respects also as a motivation for policy congruence between the kin 
states.
The kinship factor could also potentially take on greater political 
consequence in the event of a resurgence of political Islam in both countries. 
This study has indicated that while Islam stood at the sidelines of political 
discourse in both Indonesia and Malaysia for long periods, one notices a recent 
resurgence in Islamic politics in the domestic sphere in both countries (more so in 
Malaysia, it must be added). Of course, the extent to which the abstract notion of 
Islamic brotherhood can provide a basis upon which state-to-state relations can be 
built, will depend on how deep the roots of political Islam lie in both societies. It 
does appear that its current prospects are dim owing to the largely secular nature 
of the Malaysian and Indonesian governments. Nevertheless, the emergence and 
increasing popularity of radical Islamic movements that are creeping into 
mainstream political discourse, not to mention the sudden re-emergence of Islam
27 Ibid.
28 This certainly was the prevailing opinion of the Singapore leadership at the time.
29 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism. [New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994] 173. See also Tim Huxley, “Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious 
Balance?", The Pacific Review. Vol.4, No.3 (1991).
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as a key factor in international politics, highlights the possibility that Islam might 
have the potential to succeed in giving deeper meaning to kinship discourse in the 
Indo-Malay World, and making the kinship factor an organising principle upon 
which Indonesia and Malaysia can build bilateral harmony and policy coherence.
In sum, this study has aimed at contributing to the study of Indonesia- 
Malaysia relations by introducing the kinship factor as a frame of reference to 
understand the Indonesia-Malaysia “special relationship”, and placing it in a 
historical framework that distinguishes different phases of development. This 
approach has illuminated the variance in perceptions and interpretations of 
kinship, the interaction of the kinship factor with prerogatives of identity, nation, 
and state construction, and the manner in which leaders have or have not 
employed the kinship factor in their understanding of how relations should be 
framed.
Without doubt, the shape of the kinship factor has been transformed over 
time as Indonesia-Malaysia relations have evolved. Kinship evidently featured 
more prominently in the early history of relations with the introduction of pan- 
Malayism, which itself is a concept that remains contested in academic circles30. 
Subsequently, attempts at organising relations on the factor of kinship have met 
with varied success. Four observations can be gleaned from this study that 
explain this. First, the genealogical and anthropological logic and evidence of 
kinship ties remains a matter of contested interpretation that has impeded open 
embrace of kinship. Second, notwithstanding the above observation, the 
successful mobilisation of the kinship factor has hinged on the fulfilment of 
perceived obligations and expectations, and Malaysian deference to Indonesia 
appears to be integral to this dynamic. Yet as this study has shown, Malaysia in 
particular has not taken the path of deference, save for the administrations of 
Razak and Hussein Onn. Rather, Kuala Lumpur has challenged Indonesian 
primacy in this relationship. This has in turn given rise to bilateral acrimony and 
what can be characterised as kin rivalry. Third, the kinship factor as a matter of 
identity construction has also seen its influence gradually curtailed as it confronts
30 See Angus MacIntyre, “The ‘Greater Indonesia’ Idea o f Nationalism in Malaya and Indonesia”, 
Modem Asian Studies. Vol.7, No.l (1973), and Rustam Sani, “Melayu Raya as a Malay ‘Nation
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the reality of national identity building in Indonesia and Malaysia, where over 
time loyalties have shifted away from kinship to nationhood. Finally however, it 
is also notable that the logic of exclusivity inherent in the meaning of kinship still 
makes it an easy rallying point for kin sentiments and the fostering of common 
identity when plotted against foreign influences and threats.
Despite the lack of a concrete anthropological basis or any semblance of 
empirical consistency insofar as the association between kinship and harmony is 
concerned, political leaders have always persisted in engaging in the discourse of 
kinship to give meaning and intelligibility to their relations, and this trend is 
likely to continue. Yet as national identities continue to take shape, Indonesia and 
Malaysia will also find additional terms of reference, beyond the kinship factor, 
through which to articulate bilateral ties. It seems then, that the essence of this 
relationship is best captured in the Malay/Indonesian metaphor that warns of the 
potential, if not inevitable, friction between two entities as close as “gigi dan 
lidah” (teeth and tongue) - they will remain close, and it is precisely for that 
reason that there will invariably be problems between Indonesia and Malaysia, 
their kinship notwithstanding.
The phenomenon of “special relationships” in international relations, as 
suggested, remains an understudied dimension in the field of international studies. 
Given the sense that such “special relationships” are premised on factors other 
than calculations of material interests, the study has attempted to unravel the 
terms of reference to such relationships. One permutation of “special 
relationships”, as has been argued, is kinship and relations between kin states, and 
the study has looked to chart alternative conceptual territory by suggesting that in 
“special relationships”, issues of harmony and discord can be dictated by 
expectations and obligations rooted in the sense of either shared histories, 
cultures, or ethnicities among states.
While no attempt has been made at grand theorising, some preliminary 
observations have been made, which might form the basis for future studies in 
foreign policy analysis and international relations theory in relation to “special 
relationships”. In particular, it has highlighted how a normative idea, that of
o f Intent’” in Dahlan, H.M. (ed), The Nascent Malaysian Society. [Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan
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kinship, can and has influenced decision-making processes. It has also suggested 
that the English School, with its emphasis on the idiographic and normative 
dimensions of international politics, is the best-equipped mode of inquiry to 
explore the kinship factor in international relations. While the English School 
does not explicitly evoke the kinship factor, the study has shown that its core 
epistemological and methodological assumptions, such as the normative character 
of statecraft and decision-making that open the way for detailed study on the 
manner in which political elites perceive and interpret ideas and institutions of 
international relations, dovetail with the kinship factor as an idea encompassing 
expectations and obligations that influence how kin states conceptualise the terms 
of their relationship. Likewise, the historical and contextual focus of the English 
School can also illuminate the shifting influence of the kinship factor in kin state 
relations, given that kinship as a phenomenon in international relations is, as this 
study has suggested, intimately linked to national identity formation, which itself 
is a historical and evolutionary process.
Yet the use of the kinship factor has also illuminated shortcomings of the 
English School that need to be taken into consideration. For example, while the 
English School remains state-centric in its assumptions, this study has suggested 
that in order to understand the nature of relations between states that share 
historical, cultural, and ethnic commonalities, one has inevitably to take into 
account how these states came into being, and what influence kinship had in this 
process. This is particularly so in the case of Third World states, another category 
in international relations that the English School tradition in its current Western- 
centric form is not equipped to explore, where post-colonial states have had to 
come to terms with the demands of nationhood and national identity formation 
whilst still having strong historical ties of race, culture, and ethnicity with other 
states31. Indeed, how people and political elite have conceptualised the terms of
Antropologi dan Sosiologi, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1976].
31 There has, however, been increasing interest in the English School tradition in studies on the 
international politics o f East Asia. See for example, Christopher Hughes, Taiwan and Chinese 
Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society. [London: Routledge, 1997]; 
Liselotte Odgaard, Maritime Security Between China and Southeast Asia: Conflict and 
Cooperation in the Making of Regional Order. [Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002]. There has also been 
an increasing presence of the English School within the Chinese Intematioanl Relations 
community. See, for example, papers by Chen Zhimin, Ni Shixiong, Su Changhe and Wang
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relations with fellow kin states given this dichotomy is critical to the 
understanding of the nature and shape of kin state relations. Ultimately, this 
study is interested in how borders came about and what impact this process has 
had on relations between states, particularly those states that share common 
histories, and where kinship and co-identification stands as a central component 
of this process. In this regard, it suggests that in order to understand the 
motivations behind foreign policies of kin states in relation to each other, rather 
than take sovereign territorial state as the point of entry, the very manner in which 
these kin states came into existence as independent entities, and concomitantly 
how identity formation has influenced kin states’ perceptions of each other and 
the terms of their relationship over time, is of equal, if not more, import insofar as 
one strives to have a better understanding of how and why the leaders and 
population of kin states look to the kinship factor for intelligibility and meaning 
to their bilateral relations.
Yiwei at the Conference entitled “International Relations Theory: A Sino-British Dialogue”, 
Fudan University, Shanghai, 25-26 April 2000.
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